AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT: A STUDY OF SPEECH ACTS IN DISCOURSE AND ESL/EFL MATERIALS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose was to formulate a description of the speech act agreement/disagreement and the rules of use under which it occurs in native speaker conversation. This was done by surreptitiously recording natural conversation, transcribing it and examining it for agreement/disagreement. It was found that it occurred only as a response related to a prior initiation move and it occurred on a scale of politeness from the most polite forms of agreement to the least polite forms of disagreement. The description was compared to two ESL/EFL textbooks to determine the degree to which the presentation matched that of native speaker use. The result was that the textbooks presented formulaic expressions which occurred infrequently in conversations among native speakers.
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PREFACE

I have taught in countries where teaching students how to agree and disagree with foreigners for the purpose of business negotiations is of prime importance. I was aware of the importance of this speech act chairman suggested describing a speech act as part of my thesis, and agreement/disagreement seemed the natural choice.

Anything of value to the ESL field which might be found in this thesis is the result of the training I have received from all of the professors in the Department of English as a Second Language at the University of Hawaii. I especially owe a debt of gratitude to my chairman, Dr. J. Richards, for his endless patience, encouragement and guidance, and for the many fruitful ideas he suggested throughout the study. He is responsible for suggesting that 'Opines' rather than 'Reportatives' may be the prior initiation move to which agreement/disagreement can occur as responses. To Dr. M. Long I owe my love for research, and my faith in rigid empirical research as the only sound method of supplying answers to the many questions about how language is used. To Dr. R. Schmidt I owe my love of naturally occurring language which always exists within sociolinguistic contexts.

In addition I owe a debt of gratitude to my family, Mrs. R. H. Pearson and to the many friends all over the world who gave me such tremendous support and encouragement. To all of them I dedicate this thesis.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

For the last several years the field of English as a Second/Foreign Language has seen a considerable expansion in the number of functionally based pedagogical materials. The communicative properties of language in use have assumed prime importance with 'communicative competence' as the teaching slogan of the day.

The research described in this thesis is an empirically based investigation of the speech act agreement/disagreement. The goal of the study was to formulate a description of what constitutes agreement/disagreement and to discover the rules of speaking within which it operates in native speaker conversation. The findings are then applied to two conversation oriented notional functional ESL/EFL textbooks to determine the degree to which the presentation of this speech act correlates with its appearance in native speaker conversation. Chapter I provides some of the historical context from which notional functional materials arose. Chapter II outlines the literature and research relevant to this study. Chapter III describes the methods and procedures followed in carrying out the research. Chapter IV presents the results, discusses the findings and the relevance of those findings to the ESL/EFL classroom/learner. Chapter V makes a comparison of the findings of this study with two conversational notional functional ESL/EFL textbooks.

Recent changes in the focus of linguistics have resulted in causing a virtual revolution in the approach to language taken by linguists and language educators alike. Structural linguists in the 1930's-50's
defined language as "systematized combinations of sounds meaningful in a given cultural community and grammar as the set of formal patterns in which words of a language are arranged in order to convey larger meanings" (Harsh 1982:3). Analysis of these patterns proceeded from form (phonemes to sentences) to meaning allowing the unique patterns of individual languages to be described and contrasted. At the same time behaviorist psychology was in vogue with its theory that language learning, like any other form of learning, was a set of habits which could be established through a mechanical habit forming process.

Language teachers turned to the structural linguists for a theory of language and to the behaviorist psychologists for a theory of learning. Out of this union came the audio–lingual method with its stress on teaching language as it is spoken by native speakers (and hence the emphasis on the oral/aural aspects of language in teaching), and its view that language could be identified as a system of basic structures which could be broken down into a sequence, presented to the student and drilled mechanically.

Reibel commented that what this meant was that we were taking the language behavior and the language knowledge that we aimed to produce in our learners, analyzing the linguistic components of the desired performance and isolating its units. Then we were teaching the units piece by piece so as to get back to the exact position from which we started (Reibel 1969). Wilkins adds that "the assumption seems to be that form and meaning are in a one-to-one relation, so that the meaning to be learned in association with a particular grammatical form would be self–evident" (Wilkins 1976:9). In another article he notes that there is no assurance that the student can work out how the grammatical
system he has mechanically learned works in actual communication. Additionally, the language taught the student and the language he needs are often different. Another problem, he points out, is that sentences of similar structure are brought together in one unit rather than sentences that co-occur in real life so that structurally based courses are artificial intrinsically even though they purport to teach the language as it is spoken by native speakers (Wilkins 1975:174-75).

With the 1960's came Chomsky's Transformational Grammar and criticism of structuralism and its psychological basis as not merely inadequate but as misconceived. Concerning audio-lingualism he said, "Linguists have had their share in perpetuating the myth that linguistic behavior is 'habitual' and that a fixed stock of 'patterns' is acquired through practice and used as the basis for 'analogy.' These views could be maintained only as long as grammatical description was sufficiently vague and imprecise. As soon as an attempt is made to give a careful and precise account of the rules of sentence formation, the rules of phonetic organization, or the rules of sound-meaning correspondence in a language, the inadequacy of such an approach becomes apparent. What is more, the fundamental concepts of linguistic description have been subjected to serious critique" (Chomsky 1966:43-49).

Although Chomsky viewed the learner as a creative individual who learns in an abstract way, and his transformational grammar opened new avenues for inquiry, his view of language was very narrow. "Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions of memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest,
and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance. This seems to me to have been the position of the founders of modern general linguistics, and no cogent reason for modifying it has been offered" (Chomsky 1965:3).

This view of language as a well-defined system arrested in time dates back to de Saussure and has been attacked by Jakobson and Halle, Hockett, Firth and others. Both Firth and Hockett contend that such a narrow definition of language does not allow language to be used as an instrument for human interaction, and Labov says:

> It is difficult to avoid the common-sense conclusion that the object of linguistics must ultimately be the instrument of communication used by the speech community; and if we are not talking about that language, there is something trivial in our proceedings (Labov 1970:33).

In addition to his narrow definition of language, Chomsky's failure to provide an explicit place for socio-cultural features in his definition of linguistic competence has been attacked most notably by Hymes in 1971. Chomsky postulated that linguistic theory is comprised of two parts: linguistic competence, and linguistic performance. 'Linguistic competence' is the unconscious knowledge of the language structure which allows the ideal speaker-listener to produce and understand an infinite set of sentences creatively. 'Linguistic performance' is concerned with the processes of encoding and decoding. Hymes contends that a view of competence must cover the overall underlying knowledge and ability for language use which the speaker-listener possesses, and he proposes four sectors of communicative competence.

1) Whether something is formally possible (grammaticality).
2) Whether something is feasible in virtue of the means of implementation available.

3) Whether something is appropriate in relation to a context in which it is used and evaluated.

4) Whether something is in fact done, actually performed, and what its doing entails. (Hymes 1971)

The concept of language had been expanded to include not only 'usage' but 'use,' and the concept of communicative competence became the rallying point and goal of language teaching.

'The 1970's brought a new interest in how language functions in interpersonal communication. Wilkins' book, Notional Syllabuses, appeared in 1976. In it "he attempted to outline a theory of the communicative content of language which could be used as a basis for elaborating a language teaching syllabus (Richards 1982). He conceived of a 'notional' syllabus as consisting of three elements of meaning conveyed by an utterance: (1) the semantical/grammatical in which the propositional meaning is expressed through "grammatical systems in different languages" (Wilkins 1976:21), (2) modality in which attitudes and degrees of certainty are expressed through the use of modal verbs, intonation, etc., (3) categories of communicative function in which the function of the utterance as a whole in the larger context in which it appears is expressed, i.e., the social purpose of the utterance. For Wilkins all three elements were interwoven and there could be no separation of grammar, meaning, and function. He states that a 'notional' syllabus begins with what it is that the speaker communicates through language (Wilkins 1976:18).
Van Ek and the Council of Europe defined the organization of a syllabus in terms of situations in which a learner will use the language, i.e., the roles he will play, the settings in which he will play them, and the topics he will have to deal with. Designation of the learner and the specific aims he has for learning the language are therefore deemed prerequisite for the design of a syllabus. After designating the situations and the language activities which the learner will be involved in, the 'functions' and 'notions' he will have to be skilled in using can be identified. After the notions and functions a learner will probably use are identified, the actual language forms can be specified. Finally, the degree of skill the learner will need in order to perform must be stipulated in order to complete the learner's objectives. Within each category, the Council of Europe document provides a list of possible components from which the objectives of the learner can be designated.

There have been many criticisms of the notional functional approach, (cf. Brumfit 1981 and 1980, Paulston 1981, Widdowson 1973, 1979 and 1981, Stratton 1977), most notably for its lack of an empirical data base and its reliance on native-speaker intuition in the implementation of all phases of the theory. Wilkins himself admitted in 1973 that "the framework adopted is largely ad hoc... and in the places where I have attempted to suggest some possible linguistic realizations of the communicative functions, the suggestions are made on the basis of introspection and not as the result of objective, observational research" (Wilkins 1973:42).

There are other problems as well. For example, no universally accepted finite list of functions or speech acts exists, neither speech
acts nor functions are adequately defined and, as yet, there exists no complete description of the rules of speaking which a 'notional' syllabus claims to teach.

Therefore, if a syllabus based on speech acts or functions is being used, the teacher or materials writer must rely on his or her own intuition in making decisions about what constitutes a particular function and what other functions it can and does co-occur with in actual language use.

Wilkins advocates the use of "authentic language materials" in courses based on a 'notional' syllabus to aid the learner in bridging "the gap between classroom knowledge and an effective capacity to participate in real language events" (Wilkins 1973:79). He goes on to say that "the function of an individual utterance is often not deducible from its form but can only be discovered when the context in which it occurs is fully taken into account and . . . that there are recurrent, though not fixed, patterns of interaction through language so that different language functions may chain together in not unpredictable ways. These facts suggest that in contrast to sentence-level learning of a synthetic approach, learning based on a notional syllabus demands a linguistic context for utterances that is larger than the utterance and might well be founded on the typical sequences of language functions that recur in natural language use.

"It would seem to follow that the use of dialogues in teaching is far more crucial than is the case in synthetic approaches, that such dialogues should be based much more closely on the kinds of linguistic interaction that take place in real language use and should not be
treated simply as ways of *contextualizing* particular grammatical structures" (Wilkins 1976:80-81).

Chapter II outlines the literature and past research on "the kinds of linguistic interaction that take place in real language use" (Wilkins 1976:80-81).
NOTES

1 Conversation is defined as "any stretch of talk which involves two or more speakers and in which what is said is more or less unprepared, and not overtly predetermined in terms of topic or procedure" (Edmondson 1981:6).

2 Rules of usage provide for the way language is manifested, rules of use provide for the way language is realized as a means of communication (Widdowson 1979:116).

3 The term 'notion' has to do with the relationship between the utterance and the world independent of the people who use it, e.g., time, existence, etc. 'Function' refers to what people use language for in reference to other people, e.g., an offer, refusal, etc. (Schachter 1981).
CHAPTER II
THE ANALYSIS OF SPOKEN DISCOURSE

Spoken discourse has been examined and analyzed from many different perspectives depending on the purpose of the analysis and the background of the analyst. Sociologists, anthropologists, *ethnomethodologists*, *pragmaticians*, philosophers, sociolinguists, psycholinguists and discourse analysts all "share a common interest in how language actually functions, and a common belief that just as there are rules within the areas of language traditionally studied by linguists, so too there are rules in operation and grammars to be written to describe how language is used in face-to-face communication among human beings" (Richards 1980:414).

This chapter will concentrate on reviewing the various methods of analysis that have been applied to language, especially spoken language, in order to form a background for the research carried out in this thesis. It begins with an examination of Austin and Searle's account of Speech Act theory and then considers other theories and *taxonomies* of illocutionary acts. Following this, some issues in pragmatics relevant to the analysis of discourse will be discussed and, finally, some of the methods which have been used in the analysis of larger units of discourse will be examined.

A Speech Act Theory

1. Austin

   It would appear that virtually all methods of analysis of verbal language must acknowledge at least some debt to speech act theory since "linguistics restricted itself for a generation to a concentration
on form," leaving "the study of meaning to linguistic philosophers" (Coulthard 1977:11). In 1955, in a series of lectures delivered at Harvard University, J. L. Austin observed that "It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact,' which it must do either truly or falsely" (Austin 1962:1). He then went on to describe a kind of utterance he named a 'performative' as when uttering "the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it" (Austin 1962:6). The utterance 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth'—as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stern constitutes the performance of an action, and although it has the grammatical make-up of a statement, it is not an utterance which could be 'true' or 'false' (Austin 1962:5). Austin thus makes a distinction between a 'performative' which can be either 'happy' or 'unhappy' and a 'constative' (statement) which can 'be true or false.

In succeeding lectures he advanced the position that in saying anything one is performing some kind of act. He accomplished this by demonstrating that in fact all utterances are performative simply by analyzing them into a form 'I state that I + present simple active verb' (Austin 1962:62). He was then in a position to conclude that in uttering something a speaker can be performing three simultaneous acts at once, a 'locutionary act' which is the "performance of an act of saying something" (Austin 1962:100), an 'illocutionary act' which is the "performance of an act in saying something" (Austin 1962:99), and a 'perlocutionary act' which is the performance of an act such as when
"saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons; and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them" (Austin 1962:101).

According to Austin, there are three ways in which illocutionary acts are bound up with effects, all of which are different from the production of effects characteristic of the perlocutionary act.

1) "Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed." He calls this "the securing of uptake" (Austin 1962:116-17).

2) "The illocutionary act 'takes effect' in certain ways, as distinguished from producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the normal way, i.e., changes in the natural course of events."

3) "... many illocutionary acts invite by convention a response or sequel" (Austin 1962:117).

A perlocutionary act may be either an achievement of a 'perlocutionary object' (e.g., alerting) or may bring about a 'perlocutionary sequel' (e.g., alarming, in the case of the illocutionary act of warning).

Edmondson has noted that within Austin's theory "the notion of the perlocutionary act is an implicit recognition that a speech act has an interactional component" (Edmondson 1981:20). But he criticizes Austin for confusing perlocutionary effect and perlocutionary intent so that the perlocutionary act cannot be said to be part of a speech act in the way that the locutionary and illocutionary acts are. Perlocutionary
intent is indistinguishable from illocutionary intent while the perlocutionary effect of an utterance cannot be considered part of the utterance (Edmondson 1981:20).

Not working with real conversation, but with isolated invented sentences, Austin ties the speaker's intentions to illocutionary force. According to Coulthard (1977:19), some discourse analysts, e.g., Sacks, et al., would probably say that the illocutionary force of an utterance should be from the viewpoint of the hearer rather than from that of the speaker since the speaker's intention is not available for examination, while the hearer's interpretation is evident from his response, and it is this response which directs the progress of the interaction.

Strawson observes that a speaker has much more control over the illocutionary force than the perlocutionary. He agrees with Austin that illocutionary force is that intended by the speaker, but he stresses that "the speaker must find a means of making the intention clear" (Strawson 1964:451). The use of an explicit perfunnative is the clearest way to convey a speaker's intention, but it is also direct and may not always be appropriate.

Although Austin's work has aroused a great deal of criticism and controversy, his distinction between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts remains useful in any discussion of speech acts.

a) Austin's Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts

Austin distinguishes five "very general classes" as a basis for discussion of speech acts (Austin 1962:151) (cf. Appendix I, Table 1).
1) **Verdictives** "consist of the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact, so far as these are distinguishable" (Austin 1962:153). Some of his examples include: grade, assess, value, describe, analyze and estimate.

2) **Exercitives** are "the giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It is a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement that it is so: it is advocacy that it should be so, as opposed to an estimate that it is so" (Austin 1962:155). Examples include: name, choose, advise, beg, direct, and enact.

3) **Commissives** have as their whole point committing the speaker to a certain course of action. He lists promise, contract, undertake, intend and shall as some examples.

4) **Behablatives** "include the notion of reaction to other people's behavior and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct" (Austin 1962:160). This class includes apologize, thank, deplore, commiserate, welcome and curse among others.

5) **Expositives** "are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and of references." Austin himself expresses some uneasiness about this class saying that "we may dispute as to whether these are not verdictive, exercitive, behabitative, or commissive acts as well . . .; or whether they are not straight descriptions of our feelings, practice, etc."
(Austin 1962:161). He lists analyze, argue, agree, and demur as examples.

2. Searle

Building on the concepts Austin formulated, Searle has attempted to detail some of the rules governing the effective use of certain speech acts. In Speech Acts (1969), he hypothesized that "speaking a language is performing speech acts such as making statements, giving commands, . . . ; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and predicating; and, secondly, that these acts in general are made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements" (Searle 1969:16). He went on to define a 'speech act' as "the production or issuance of a sentence taken under certain conditions, and speech acts are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication" (Searle 1969:17). He believes that 'any purely formal theory of language is necessarily incomplete without studying speech acts,' and that an analytic truth about language is that "whatever can be meant can be said" (Searle 1969:17). He claims then that there are a series of "analytic connections between the notion of speech acts, what the speaker means, what the sentence uttered means, what the speaker intends, what the hearer understands, and what the rules governing the linguistic elements are" (Searle 1969:21).

Following Austin he maintains that a speaker performs three kinds of acts in uttering a sentence. 'Utterance acts' are simply uttering strings of words. Instead of Austin's locutionary act, he proposes the 'propositional act' which contains the content of an utterance and includes the two subsidiary acts of 1) 'referring' to someone or something, i.e., identifying it for the hearer, and 2) 'predicating'
something about that which has been referred. Propositions are always "expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act" (Searle 1969:29), and from this he can distinguish two syntactic elements in a sentence, a 'propositional indicator' and an 'illocutionary force indicator' which indicates "what illocutionary act, or function, the speaker is performing in the utterance" (Searle 1969:30). He also accepts Austin's 'perlocutionary act' as "the consequences or effects such acts have on the actions, thoughts or beliefs, etc. of hearers" (Searle 1969:25).

For Searle, "saying something and meaning it are closely connected with intending to produce certain effects on the hearer" (Searle 1969:48). When a speaker utters a sentence and means it, he will be intending (1) to make the hearer aware of certain states of affairs, (2) to make the hearer aware of these states of affairs by getting him to recognize this intention, and (3) to make the hearer recognize this intention through his knowledge of the rules for the sentence uttered. If the hearer understands the sentence, these three intentions will have been realized.

Before outlining necessary and sufficient conditions for performing a happy act of 'promising' he makes a distinction between two types of facts. Knowledge is the knowledge of 'brute facts,' and "the concepts which make up the knowledge are essentially physical, or, in its dualistic version, either physical or mental. ... and the basis for all knowledge of this kind is generally supposed to be simple empirical observations recording sense experiences" (Searle 1969:50). The other type of fact he enumerates are 'institutional facts,' about which he says "there is no simple set of statements about physical or psychological properties of states of affairs to which the statements of facts such as
these are reducible. ... They are indeed facts; but their existence, unlike the existence of brute facts, presupposes the existence of certain human institutions" (Searle 1969:51).

The necessary and sufficient conditions he identifies for promising have been outlined by Schmidt and Richards as follows:

- **Normal** input and output conditions obtain, i.e., the speaker and hearer are not insane or play-acting, etc.
- A speaker expresses a sentence, the propositional content of which predicates a future act of the speaker.
- The hearer would prefer the speaker's doing the act to his not doing the act, and the speaker believes this. Searle calls this a preparatory condition.
- It is not obvious to both speaker and hearer that the speaker will do the act in the normal course of events. (The second preparation condition.)
- The speaker intends to do the act. This is the illocutionary point of promising, which Searle calls the sincerity condition.
- The speaker intends that the utterance of the sentence will place him under an obligation to do the act. This is called the essential condition" (Schmidt and Richards 1980:134).

By extension, the psychological state expressed in the performance of the illocutionary act is the 'sincerity condition.' For 'assert,' 'state' or 'affirm' this means that the speaker believes his proposition to be an expression of an actual state of affairs.

The preparatory condition tells us what the speaker implies by the act. There are two parts to the preparatory condition: a) the differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer in
relation to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and b) the differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and the hearer. So the illocutionary act of 'assert,' 'state' or 'affirm' has the preparatory condition a) the speaker has evidence for the truth of his proposition, and b) it is not obvious to both the speaker and hearer that the hearer knows or doesn't need to be reminded of the proposition.

The 'point' or purpose of the type of act is the 'essential' condition of performing an act. For 'assert,' 'state' or 'affirm' this means that the proposition really does represent an actual state of affairs backed by what is perceived to be evidence to that effect. He is careful to point out that by 'illocutionary point' or 'purpose' he is not talking about 'perlocutionary intent.' "For many, perhaps most, of the important illocutionary acts, there is no essential perlocutionary intent associated by definition with the corresponding verb, e.g., statements are not by definition attempts to produce perlocutionary effects in hearers" (Searle 1976:3).

In developing a taxonomy of illocutionary acts he states that "essential conditions form the best basis for a taxonomy" (Searle 1976:3), but he claims that in addition to illocutionary point or essential conditions and the sincerity condition, the 'direction of fit' is also one of the three most important criteria around which he builds his taxonomy. By direction of fit he indicates that the illocutionary force determines how the content of a proposition relates to the world. When the words fit the world as in statements, descriptions, assertions, etc., he calls it "word-to-world direction of fit," but when the words
determine the world, as in promises, requests, etc., he calls it "world-to-word direction of fit" (Searle 1976:4).

In addition to these three criteria outlined above he lists several other dimensions as criteria for classification. i) Differences in the force, strength, or commitment with which the illocutionary point is presented. ii) Differences according to how the utterance relates to the rest of the discourse. iii) Differences in how the illocutionary force-indicating devices determine propositional content. iv) Differences between acts which must be speech acts (verbally performed) and those which can be, but do not need to be. v) Differences between acts which require the speaker and hearer to be members of an extra-linguistic institution for their performance and those which don't. vi) Differences in acts which are due to the illocutionary verb having a performative use and those where it does not. vii) Differences in the style of performance of the illocutionary act (Searle 1976:5-7).

He outlines six problems with Austin's taxonomy of illocutionary acts. 1) A confusion between verbs and acts, 2) not all the verbs are illocutionary verbs, 3) too much overlap of the categories, 4) too much heterogeneity within the categories, 5) many of the verbs within the categories don't satisfy the definition for that category, and 6) most importantly, no consistent principle of classification exists.

Searle, along with Austin, is responsible for providing a framework for a theory of speech acts. Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts is the most important of any of the taxonomies. It is outlined as follows.
a) Searle's Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts

Searle lists five basic categories and one subcategory (cf. Appendix I, Table 1).

**Representatives** "commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition" (Searle 1976:10). The direction of fit is 'words to the world,' and the sincerity condition is 'belief.' The degree of belief and commitment varies along a **continuum,** in Searle's words "they are determinable rather than determinates" (Searle 1976:10). True and false are on opposite ends of the same dimension of assessment. A representative can be tested by whether or not it can be characterized as true or false. Syntactically, the deep structure of a paradigm representative sentence is:

\[ \text{I verb (that) } + S \]

I predict he **will** come

Examples include: state, assert, claim, say, deny.

**Directives** "are attempts (of varying degrees, and hence, more precisely, they are determinates of the determinable which includes attempting) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something" (Searle 1976:11). The direction of fit is world→words, and the sincerity condition is 'desire.' The propositional content is always that the hearer does some future action. Syntactically, the deep **structure** of a paradigm directive sentence is:

\[ \text{I verb you } + \text{ you Fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv)} \]

I order you to leave

Examples include: ask, order, request, invite, advise.
Commissives "commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to some future course of action" (Searle 1976:11). The direction of fit is world-to-words, and the sincerity condition is 'intention.' The propositional content is always that the speaker does some future action. Syntactically the deep structure of a paradigm commissive sentence is:

I verb (you) + I Fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv)

I promise to pay you the money.

Examples include: pledge, promise.

Expressives "express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content" (Searle 1976:12). There is no direction of fit but the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed. Syntactically, the deep structure of a paradigm expressive sentence is:

I verb you + I/you VP = Gerundive Nm

I apologize for stepping on your toe.

Examples include: thank, congratulate, apologize.

Declarations, successfully performed, "bring about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality" (Searle 1976:13). Declarations cause an alternation in the status or condition of the referred-to object only because the declarative has been performed. This class is closest to Austin's 'performatives' and Searle acknowledges this saying that Austin realized that making a statement was "as much performing an illocutionary act as making a promise. Any utterance will consist in performing one or more illocutionary acts" (Searle 1976:13). Syntactically the deep structures of the three most important classes of paradigm declarative sentences are:
Examples include: pronounce, appoint, declare, resign, excommunicate, define, name, dub. As a subclass of Declarations he formulates Representative Declarations which differ from the other declarations in that they share with representatives a sincerity condition. In some institutional situations facts are not only ascertained, but an authority is needed to decide (and declare that decision) as to what those facts are after they have been ascertained. A person who nominates another cannot lie in performing the illocutionary act. The direction of fit is both ways (one for declarations and the other for representatives) and the sincerity condition is 'belief.' Syntactically, the deep structure for this subclass is:

I verb NP₁ + NP₁ be pred.
I call him a liar.

Examples include: describe, diagnose, call. Usually verbs in this subclass are in the indicative forms characteristic of representatives.

He is a liar.
So Searle concludes that there are two syntactical forms for representatives: one which focuses on the propositional content, the other on the object referred to.

There have been many criticisms of Searle's theories and subsequent taxonomy of illocutionary acts. Only a few which are relevant
Levinson (1980) maintains that "Searle's systemization is responsible for the loss of some of the social and interactional insights to be found in Austin's work" (Levinson 1980:7). The fact that Searle considered only the paradigm cases while "in the empirical investigation of conversational behavior we seldom come across the paradigm cases (if indeed we ever do)" is a criticism raised by Edmondson (1981:21). He goes on by saying that Searle's evidence for his characterization of 'promising' is native-speaker intuition.

Concerning the propositional content rule, he asks "how and in what sense a proposition P is expressed in an utterance T" (Edmondson 1981:21). The preparatory rule cannot be anything but weak because the hearer's preference and the speaker's beliefs cannot be inspected except for what we can deduce from the discourse itself. He notes that following Gricean co-operative principles (cf. p. 33) we assume sincerity so the sincerity condition has no identity. The essential condition, he insists, is simply a dictionary definition of the notion, such as 'promising' (Edmondson 1981:21).

He attacks Searle's assumption that his classification of illocutionary acts is a classification of the basic things we do with language by using Goffman's (1971:177) example of the "minimization" which usually follows an expression of thanks and includes such utterances as 'not at all,' 'don't mention it,' 'you're welcome.' Where could Searle's classification place this type of act? Edmondson continues by saying that Searle's five categories are "so broad that their relevance for the analysis of spoken discourse is limited"
The reason for this, he states, is that "what Searle characterizes and classifies are not units of conversational behavior, but concepts evoked by a set of lexical items in English-illocutionary verbs" (Edmondson 1981:22).

3. Other Taxonomies

In addition to Austin's and Searle's major taxonomies, several others have been proposed. (Appendix I contains a table of the seven different taxonomies discussed in this study. Searle's is listed first as a basis for comparison.)

Ohmann's (1972) system provides many subcategories which 'mediate' between the few basic categories. He also provides for conditionals claiming that they are "amalgamated speech acts, joining an influencer and a commissive" (Ohmann 1972:125). A description of this type allows a different illocutionary act to be assigned to each component sentence of the compound sentence (cf. Appendix I, Table 1).

Hancher (1979) drew on both Ohmann and Searle in formulating his classification of illocutionary acts. He suggests that in addition to Searle's classes, there should be a 'commissive directives' class which he says "have both commissive and directive force, e.g., inviting, offering, challenging. These all look forward to some act by the hearer which will respond to the original speech act." These he calls precooperative illocutionary acts and they give "rise to a cooperative illocutionary act involving more than one agent, such as a gift (whether goods or hospitality), a sale, a contract" (Hancher 1979:8). He claims that contracts, marriages, and bets are cooperative commissives, while cooperative declarations are such things as gifts.
In 1974, Fraser proposed a taxonomy of 'vernacular perfonnative verbs. The criteria he lists for differentiating the classes are the same as Searle's (cf. pp. 20-22). Also, similarly to Searle, he claims that "the purpose of the speaker in performing the act" is the most important criterium (Fraser 1974:142). He specifies this by saying that "the speaker in performing an illocutionary act has the intention of creating in the hearer an understanding of the speaker's position towards the proposition expressed in the sentence" (Fraser 1974:143).

Fraser distinguishes eight classes and breaks the classification into two parts, the first three classes consist of verbs which describe the world: asserting, evaluating and verbs that reflect the speaker's attitude. The second five classes are of verbs which change the world in some way: stipulating, requesting, suggesting, legitimatizing, and committing (cf. Appendix I, Table 1).

Recently Fraser (forthcoming) has proposed a revised system for the classification of speech acts which he states were "named by Austin (1962) as illocutionary acts" (Fraser, forthcoming, 51). In this system, he divides the verbs into classes according to which of the four major attitudes the speaker is expressing toward the proposition. He claims that "what distinguishes each of these four attitudes is that once one is recognized as being the attitude intended by the speaker, the speaker has successfully communicated to the hearer" (Fraser, forthcoming, 53-54). To each attitude he assigns a corresponding term of classification. Each class is further subclassified according to different conditions placed on that attitude by the speaker. The four attitudes and classifications are as follows:
**Representatives/Belief.** The speaker expresses his belief that the propositional content is true. Examples include assert, predict, agree, describe. Sub-species involve conditions about the reasons and basis for the belief by the speaker.

**Directives/Attitude.** The speaker expresses his attitude towards a future action of the hearer. Examples include plead, forbid, suggest, order. There are sub-species in this genus also.

**Commissives/Commitment.** The speaker expresses his intentions about a future action. Examples include guarantee, promise, offer, volunteer.

**Evaluatives/Evaluation.** The speaker expresses regret, sympathy, gladness, pleasure and gratitude. Examples include greet, thank, apologize, compliment.

This revised taxonomy is more finely grained in that it demonstrates the broader more generalized categories of illocutionary force and how these broader categories of what people do with language are subdivided into increasingly finer shadings. Also, by characterizing an illocutionary act by defining it in terms of the attitude which the speaker intends to express toward the propositional content, he can show that "each attitude places some restrictions on the proposition about which the attitude is held" (Fraser, forthcoming, 59).

Bach and Harnish (1979) presented more detailed definitions of the speaker's attitudes which place the most finely grained restrictions on a classification of illocutionary acts. In 1957, Grice defined a 'reflexive intention' as "an intention that is intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized" (Grice 1957:382). Following Fraser (1974), Bach and Harnish restrict illocutionary intentions to those which are
fulfilled when the hearer does nothing more than recognize those intentions, and "the sort of reflexive intention that has this feature is that of expressing an attitude, e.g., a belief or desire" (Bach and Harnish 1979:xv). They present a 'Schema for Speech Acts' which gives an account of how the hearer can identify what is said, and from that "with mutual contextual beliefs, he can proceed to the identification of the speaker's illocutionary act, that is, of what attitude the speaker is intending" (Bach and Harnish 1979:xv). Their taxonomy is based on "the distinguishing features" of those attitudes, i.e., the exact thing that the hearer must identify (Bach and Harnish 1979:40).

At the highest level they identify five classes, Constatives, Directives, Commissives, and Acknowledgements. These are defined as follows:

**Constatives.** The speaker expresses the speaker's belief and his intention or desire that the hearer have a similar belief. Examples include assert, predict, report, classify, predicate, advise, conclude, agree, deny, accept, disagree, object, reply, guess, assume.

**Directives.** The speaker expresses his attitude toward some future action by the hearer and his intention that his utterance be accepted by the hearer, as a reason for the hearer's doing it. Examples include request, inquire, demand, forbid, allow, advise.

**Commissives.** The speaker expresses his intention and belief that his utterance obligates him to some action. Examples include promise, offer.

**Acknowledgements.** The speaker expresses his feelings about the hearer or intends his utterance to satisfy a social expectation and he
believes that it does. Examples include apologize, condole, congratulate, greet, thank, bid, accept, reject.

Each of these five categories is further subdivided according to more refined conditions within the larger category. For instance, under the larger class of constantives, the concessives, assentives, and dissentives "all involve a presumption about the contextual relevance of the expressed belief. A 'concessive' (e.g., 'agree') expresses a belief contrary to what (the speaker) would like to believe or contrary to what he previously believed. . . . Assentives (e.g., 'agree') and dissentives (e.g., 'disagree') presume that a certain claim has been made by (the hearer) or that someone's claim, not necessarily (the speaker's or the hearer's) is under discussion" (Bach and Harnish 1979:45).

Ballmer and Brennenstuhl (1981) claim that their work presents an "alternative to all previously published classifications of speech acts" (Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981:v). The aim "is to classify speech acts by means of a classification of speech act verbs," which are defined as verbs "used to describe the content or means of expression of linguistic activities like 'to lie,' and 'to discuss'" (Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981:15). They separate 'speech act verbs' from general verbs by using the following frame: 'Someone VP-past . . . ' e.g., Alphonse declared 'I am hungry.' 'Declare' is a speech act verb according to their definition because the sentence makes sense. Using a heuristic method employing native-speaker intuition, they divided all the speech act verbs into semantic 'categories' with some categories further divided into 'phases.' These categories are combined into models which
"from a heuristic point of view the order of the categories displays the order of the main phases of a model 'x' with verbal means" (Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981:23). For example, the 'Struggle Model' begins with a 'starting situation,' which is followed by an initiation of the struggle by 'making claims' and then 'dissent.' The real beginning of the struggle is the 'attack' which is followed by various 'tactical phases.' Towards the end of the struggle 'making coalitions' or 'retreating' occurs and the struggle results in a 'victory' for one opponent and in 'defeat' for the other, or in mutual 'willingness to cooperate.' A model is therefore defined as "a semantical area structured by a set of categories connected by appropriate orderings" (Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981:26).

Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981:32 claim that their classification "because it is based on the classification of an exhaustive list of speech act designating verbs, ... accounts fully for all the possibilities of linguistic behavior and does not neglect for instance interactions and a large part of discourse behavior" (Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981:32).

4. Some Criticisms of Speech Act Theory

Levinson (1980) has made some serious criticisms of Speech Act Theory. In fact he goes so far as to say that "there are in fact some compelling reasons to think that speech act theory may disappear in favor of much more complex multi-faceted pragmatic approaches to the functions that utterances perform" (Levinson 1980:19). He claims this for several reasons, one being that it isn't possible to assign a speech act function to an utterance because neither the utterance units nor the speech act units are clearly defined, "and the one is characterized
partly in terms of the other" (Levinson 1980:20). He continues by saying that even if we could assign speech acts to utterances in any way other than arbitrarily, it still would not tell us anything about how conversations proceed since we now know that 'conversational sequencing' cannot be stated according to speech act categories. His conclusion is that the concept of the 'speech act' will turn out to be a transitional concept which will give way to "more sophisticated and empirically based theories of the ways in which we actually communicate" (Levinson 1980:21).

As Edmondson has pointed out (cf. p. ) Speech Act theory completely overlooks the interactional relationships built into some of the illocutionary acts described in the theory, e.g., Austin lists 'agree' as an Expositive but doesn't acknowledge the fact that it can only occur in relation with some other previous utterance. In addition, might not agree/disagree equally qualify as a Behablative as a "notion of reaction to other people's behavior . . . and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct . . . ." (Austin 1962:160), e.g.,

C31:23, 25

D: Oh now that's stingy.
A: Yeah that's definitely stingy.

Doesn't 'A' react to another person's behavior and express an attitude towards it? Moreover, how would Austin classify D's utterance: as a Verdictive, a 'describe,' or as an Exercitive, a 'name'?

Searle also overlooks relationships between utterances when he discusses the three necessary conditions for a speech act, although he
does realize the **importance** of truth for the speaker of a proposition. As with Austin, where does A's utterance fit in *Searle's* system? Searle would probably place it as a Representative (cf. p. 20) because the speaker appears to believe the content of his utterance, but can an **evaluation** like 'stingy' be tested as being true or false? According to what/who's scale of assessment, and according to what criteria is the judgement made? Doesn't A's utterance also express a psychological state as in an **Expressive**? Searle makes a separate class of Representative Declarations, a class which is a subclass of Declarations in that it shares some conditions with Representatives (cf. p. 22). But no mention is made of a subclass of Representatives, which include some characteristics of Expressives.

*Ohmann* recognizes 'amalgamated speech acts.' *Hancher* recognizes that some types of speech acts are related to what occurs subsequent to the initial utterance in his "precooperative illocutionary acts" (cf. p. 24), although such acts refer to acts as sales and contracts.

*Fraser*’s 1974 taxonomy fails to account for verbs which occur only as responses to other speech acts so 'agree' and 'state' are both listed as 'Verbs of Asserting.' And again, where would Fraser place the utterances in the previous example? Would they both be asserting, or evaluating? Couldn't they also be attitude in that both speakers are showing their **attitudes** toward a state of affairs? His forthcoming **taxonomy** does indicate finer shadings of speaker attitude toward his proposition, but the same criticisms above still hold true.

*Bach* and *Harnish* recognize the two part relationship required by some speech acts, *e.g.*, 'assentives' and 'dissentives' (cf. p. 28).
Again where would they classify the utterances in the previous example, as constatives (cf. p. 27)? If so, do either utterance express the speaker's "intention or desire that the hearer have a similar belief"? (cf. p. 27).

The models of interactional sequences presented by Ballmer and Brennenstuhl clearly display the interactional qualities among speech acts, and the overlapping and combining aspects of speech functions (cf. pp. 28–29). But again what of the two utterances in the example, what category contains them and accounts for their relationship. None of the theories of speech acts outlined above can adequately describe or define those utterances given in the example.

B. Issues in Pragmatics Relevant to Discourse

Most conversation is not made up of a single speech act, but is made up of utterances performing several speech acts simultaneously. Labov and Fanshall (1977:29) note "the parties to a conversation appear to be understanding and reacting to these speech acts at many levels of abstraction . . . conversation is not a chain of utterances, but rather a matrix of utterances and actions bound together by a web of understandings and reactions." Goffman (1971) sees conversation as a form of interaction. It's a means that people use to deal with each other, and "a major function of conversation then is the performance of speech acts . . . and a crucial goal for conversationists is to interpret the intended speech act appropriately" (Richards 1980:418).

Hymes (1972, 1974) has defined 'speech events' as activities which are governed directly by 'norms' for the use of speech. An example he gives is a conversation at a party where the party is the non-verbal context or 'speech situation' in which the 'speech event,'
Several speech events, conversations, can occur successively or simultaneously at the party and within each event there are one or more 'speech acts.' Speech events then are the largest units for which there are linguistic structures and are made up of speech acts. The setting (time and place), the participants, the purpose (even if only phatic), the hey (tone, manner of spirit in which an event is performed), the channel (written, oral, etc.), and the message content (topic) are all important components of speech events which determine the performance and outcome of the events.

Ervin-Tripp (1976) has presented a proposal for the way a speaker chooses which type of directive he/she will utter. She claims that social factors determine the actual choice of directive type. Social variables such as age, rank, familiarity, presence of outsiders, territorial location, and many other all affect directive choice. Moreover, she claims that hearers do not necessarily need to infer the illocutionary force of a directive from a literal interpretation. When speakers and hearers share a knowledge of obligations and prohibitions, an utterance can be promptly understood through simple interpretation rules.

People come to the interactional exchange that is conversation with shared assumptions and expectations about how it will develop and what they are expected to contribute to it. They also share common principles that allow them to interpret each other's utterances as contributions to that conversation. Grice (1967) formulated a general principle he called the "cooperative principle" which participants in conversation are expected to observe. Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 1967:45). Under this general principle he distinguished four categories, **Quantity**, Quality, Relation and Manner, under which are listed more specific maxims and sub-maxims.

**Quantity** relates to the quantity of information to be provided.

1) Make your contribution as **informative** as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

**Quality**. Try to make your contribution one that is true.

1) Do not say what you believe to be false.

2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

**Relation**. Be relevant.

**Manner** relates not (like the previous categories) to what is said, but, rather, to **HOW** what is said is to be said. Be perspicuous.

1) Avoid obscurity of expression.

2) Avoid ambiguity.

3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

4) Be orderly. (Grice 1967:45-46)

These categories and **maxims** have received much criticism for their lack of definiteness but perhaps it is just that breadth of interpretation that gives them such strength and allows for their **generalizability**. Certainly, they have provided much in the way of explaining how conversation is interpreted.

**Lakoff** (1973:296) puts forth the argument that "conditions for the applicability of a **syntactic** rule include pragmatic factors like the effect the speaker wishes his utterance to have on the addressee." She suggests that there are three areas of pragmatic behavior which act as
conditions. 1) "The speaker's assumptions about his/her relations with his addressee, 2) his real-world situation as he speaks, and 3) the extent to which he wishes to change either or both or to reinforce them" (Lakoff 1973:296). These conditions affect the way a speaker makes use of two sets of rules in speaking. The first set are Rules of Pragmatic Competence: 1) Be clear, 2) Be polite. The second set of rules are Grice's Rules of Conversation (cf. pp. 33-34). She notes that most often when the rule for clarity conflicts with that of politeness, politeness supersedes. This she claims is only natural since in "informal conversation, actual communication of important ideas is secondary . . . (to a speaker's desire to) impart a favorable feeling about the factual information, best achieved by making one's addressee think well of one, notably through the use of the Rules of Politeness" (Lakoff 1973:298; parentheses are mine). She introduces three Rules of Politeness (Lakoff 1973:298).

1) "Don't impose." This can be interpreted as 'remain aloof,' don't intrude into other people's business. Stay away from 'free goods' or at least ask permission before indulging in them.

2) "Give options." This says 'Let the other person make his own decisions, leave his options open for him.' Devices for the realization of this rule include hedges which may suggest the speaker's weak emotional commitment to his proposition. Another such device is the use of uncertainty markers such as 'I guess . . .,' 'Maybe' and tag questions. She suggests that the speaker may be genuinely uncertain or he may be acting politely because "such sentences leave the final decision as to the truth of the sentence up to the addressee" (Lakoff 1973:300).
3) **Make** A feel good—be friendly. This rule produces a sense of comradarrie between speaker and hearer. The use of nicknames, in-group language **and** particles like 'like,' 'you know,' 'I mean' which are not meaningless according to Lakoff, "they mean R2 is in effect" (Lakoff **1973**:302). She also observes that such principles, since their use indicates to the hearer that what the speaker is saying is only his own feelings, then "the use of such expressions may also be construed as giving options" (Lakoff **1973**:302).

Leech (**1977**), in a discussion of how logical sense and pragmatic force are related, proposes the Tact **Maxim**. In so doing he introduces several other useful insights into the motivating factors behind what people do with words in interrelating. He maintains (**1977**:4-5) that there are three scales which are important in defining pragmatic force.

1) **Cost/benefit** scale. This scale specifies how much the act referred to in the speech act is judged to cost or benefit the speaker or the hearer.

2) **Optionality** scale. **This** scale specifies how far the performance of the act referred to in the speech act is at the choice of the speaker or hearer.

3) Politeness scale. This scale is partially a **function** of scales 1) and 2). If the **cost/benefit** factor is held constant and the **optionality** scale is increased, the degree of politeness is increased. Conversely, if the optionality factor is held constant, and the **cost/benefit** scale is increased, the degree of politeness is increased.

Concerning Grice's Maxim of Quantity (cf. p. 34), he mentions that a negative sentence, being less informative violates the **maxim** "unless there is some reason to believe that the equivalent positive statement X
is true" (Leech 1977:12), i.e. a negative question implies disbelief in the possibility of a negative answer. "The force of a negative question (is) a tactful way of expressing disagreement, disbelief, impatience" (Leech 1977:12; parentheses are mine).

As an introduction to the Tact Maxim he refers to 'negative politeness' as "the avoidance of conflict, or of situations which might lead to conflict" (Leech 1977:18). According to him three factors enter into the need for politeness. The 'power factor' is "the mutual recognition by $k$ and $l$ that $k$ is in a position of superiority over $l$" (Leech 1977:18), so $k$ is the 'authoritor,' and $l$ is the 'authoritee.' The 'solidarity factor' is "the strength of the mutual bond of intimacy between $k$ and $l$" (Leech 1977:18). The 'degree of conflict factor' exists as a scale of severity from 'physical conflict' to 'will–incompatibility.' "Unless the power factor or the solidarity factor is sufficiently strong, it is necessary to employ tact in order to reduce or eliminate the conflict factor" (Leech 1977:19). He states that 'tact' is "strategic conflict avoidance, and can be measured in terms of the degree of effort put into the avoidance of a conflict situation" (Leech 1977:19). Therefore, usually the more tactful an utterance is, the more indirect it is. "Tact is closely correlated with indirectness, where indirectness is to be defined . . . in terms of the complexity of the inductive strategy required in order to work out the force, given the sense" (Leech 1977:20). Indirectness here is scalar. There isn't any opposition between direct and indirect speech acts, there are only different degrees of indirectness.

Finally, he states the Tact Maxim as "Assume that you are the authoritee and that your interlocutor is the authoritor" (Leech 1977:20),
and gives the following as a meta-maxim, "Don't put your interlocutor in a position where either you or he have/has to break the Tact Maxim" (Leech 1977:21).

Another aspect to the interactional quality of conversation has been put forth by Brown and Levinson (1978). Speech acts can present varying degrees of threat to either the speaker or the hearer by imposing on one of the participant's freedom of action, e.g., requests threaten the freedom of action of the hearer, and/or by damaging the self-image of one of the participants, e.g., criticisms threaten the hearer's face whereas apologies threaten the speaker's face. As a result, a speaker assesses the amount of threat according to participants' power and rank relationships, social distance, and the weight of particular impositions in that culture in selecting an appropriate form or strategy for performing the act. Acts with the least amount of threat can be performed more directly and explicitly than those which involve greater threat. The most threatening acts may not be done at all, while somewhat less threatening ones may be carried out 'off the record' with hints or association clues providing both the speaker and the hearer with an out by providing different possible interpretations of the speech act.

There are two types of strategies open to a speaker, 'negative politeness' "performs the function of minimizing the particular imposition that the speech act unavoidably effects" (Brown and Levinson 1978:134), by apologizing or being indirect and formal. 'Positive politeness' strategies are those which emphasize speaker-hearer solidarity, rapport and equality by the use of in-group identity
markers, exaggerated interest or sympathy with the hearer, or by attending to the hearer's wants.

Brown and Levinson suggest that 'face' is "something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction. In general, people cooperate (and assume each other's cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerability of face. That is normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten other's faces, it is generally in every participant's best interest to maintain each others' face" (Brown and Levinson 1978:66).

This brief description cannot do justice to the power or the depth of Brown and Levinson's insights, nor can it do justice to a model which has had pervasive effects on all aspects of the analysis of interactional discourse.

C. Conversational Analysis

Hatch and Long (1980) describe 'conversational analysis' as answering the question, 'What is the interactional structure of natural talk?' (Hatch and Long 1980:28). Instead of looking at an utterance in terms of linguistic functions (speech acts) such as directives and representatives, conversational analysts like Schegloff, Sacks and Jefferson look at utterances in terms of conversational functions, e.g., openings and closings. Edmondson (1981:38) notes that "elements of interactional structure (conversational functions) may be realized by verbal or non-verbal acts which may be related in complex ways" (parentheses are mine).
Turn-taking is an aspect of interaction occurring in natural conversation which has been described by Sacks in the form of rules derived from the investigation of natural conversation: 1) only one party talks at a time, 2) speaker change occurs by a current speaker controlling the next turn through a) naming or alluding to the next speaker, or b) constraining the next utterance, but not selecting the next speaker, or c) selecting neither and leaving it open to one of the other participants to continue the conversation by self-selection. 'Potential next speakers' are then concerned with points of possible completion which Sacks claims come at the ends of sentences12 so as next speaker could begin speaking as soon as a current speaker has reached a possible completion (Sacks, ms. in Coulthard 1977:53-55).

Even though such 'communicative rules' have been laid out for turn-taking, and that the possible next speaker can 'know' that a turn is available, "whether or not he takes the available turn however is a matter of subjective choice" (Edmondson 1981:41).

Regarding interruptions and speaker overlap, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:706-07) suggest that normally adult speakers do not interrupt one another. When overlap occurs it isn't random as it tends to occur just before a construction is about to be completed. Ochs (1979:71) indicates that the hearer projects a possible ending point of an utterance and attempts to 'get the floor' as that point approaches. Gilson (1982:10) concluded from a study of an explicit adversary situation that there were two types of interruptions "'disruptive interruptions' increase conflict, and 'bonding interruptions' bring participants together. Such interruptions with their distinctive results can be predicted from the relationships between participants."13 Bennett
suggests that interpretation of whether an interruption is belligerent or is trivial or even cooperative in any given situation may depend on how much "one or more of the participants feels he/she has or has not been able (or allowed) to share in the creation of that conversation as much as or in the ways they would have liked."

Sequencing in conversation is another area of concern for conversational analysis. Labov (1970, 1972) explains how an utterance can be heard as an answer to a preceding utterance by formulating 'interpretive rules.' Speaker-hearer shared knowledge is crucially important for correct interpretation because, as Labov says, speaker A must try to find a link between what he initially said and speaker B's response. Failure to find any relation may be due to incompetence. He also suggests that it is through an interpretative rule that a hearer is able to recognize a 'request for confirmation' when that request is formed as an assertion (Labov 1972:252-57).

One problem that has concerned all discourse analysts is the size of the basic unit. Labov (1972), Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1972) use the 'utterance' or 'turn.' Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) felt they needed a smaller unit which they've called the 'move.' A move can be the same as one utterance, but some utterances contain more than one move, e.g., 'To keep you strong, yes, /but why do you want to be strong?'

A conversation consists of at least two turns according to Coulthard (1977:70). Within conversation, there may be paired sequences which are 'conditionally relevant.' The 'adjacency-pair' such as 'greet-greet,' 'invite-accept/decline,' 'offer-accept/refuse,' 'question-answer' has been defined by Schegloff (1977) as having the following features:
1) Two utterances length
2) Adjacent **positioning** of component utterances
3) Different speaker producing each utterance
4) Relative ordering of parts (i.e., first pair parts precede second pair parts), and
5) **Discrimination** relations (i.e., the pair type of which a first pair part is a member is relevant to the selection among second pair parts).  (In Edmondson 1981:46)

Coulthard (1977:70) claims that "adjacency pairs are the basic structural **units** in conversation (and they) are very important during conversations both for operating the turn-taking system by enabling a speaker to select next action and next speaker, and also for enabling the next speaker to avoid both gap and overlap."  (Parentheses are mine.)

Sacks notes that in the case of an adjacency pair, the first pair part **provides** specifically for the second and if the second pair part doesn't follow, the absence is both noticeable and noticed.

He further suggests a person who asks a question has the right to talk again after the answer is given and that he can ask another question so that a 'chaining rule' allows for an indefinitely long sequence of Q. A. Q. A. Q. A.  (Sacks 1972a:54).

Edmondson (1981:49-50) points out that it is sometimes hard to how **how** to interpret what a particular utterance does in a conversation. He gives two possible rules for interpretation, the "effect **rule**" (whereby utterance **Two** determines the nature of utterance **One**), and the "sequence rule" (whereby utterance **One** determines the nature of utterance **Two**). Since both together are not possible, he proposes a "hearer-haws-best" principle, such that **H's** interpretation of **S's**
behavior may be said to determine what S's behavior counts as at that point of time in the ongoing conversation: this allows for the possibility of course that S may self-correct—i.e., the hearer-knows-best principle may be applied sequentially (cf. p. 13 where it is noted that Austin ties the speaker's intentions to 'illocutionary force').

Other types of pairs functioning as sequences are also common in conversation. Sacks has named another pair a 'pre-sequence' which occurs when a speaker wishes to avoid potentially embarrassing or annoying situations, e.g., a speaker is opening himself to a possible refusal by making an invitation so he precedes his invitation by producing a pre-sequence to determine if his invitation is likely to be accepted.

Pre-sequence—A: What are you doing tonight?

B: Nothing. Why?

Invitation —A: I was wondering if you'd like to go to a movie.

(Coulthard 1977:71)

Schegloff (1972:76-79) has identified embedded pairs calling them 'insertion sequences.' Sometimes a next speaker doesn't want to or can't respond immediately to the first speaker's pair part so he responds by initiating another first pair part. During the inserted sequence, the original first pair part remains relevant and therefore must be responded to when the inserted sequence is finished.

Another type of embedded sequence, the 'side sequence' has been proposed by Jefferson (1972:294–330). This differs from the 'insertion sequence' in two ways. 1) The first item is not a first pair part, the other items are not 'inserted' and there is no expectation of who should
speak at the end of a sequence or of what type of utterance should follow. 2) The sequence which is a 'misapprehension' followed by a 'clarification' looks like a pair, actually, there is a third element, an indication by the 'misapprehender' that he now understands and that the sequence is terminated.

Concerning relationships between the pairs, Sacks in a series of lectures in 1967, put forth "a much more pervasive form of structuring which he calls 'tying'" (in Coulthard 1977:74). Cohesive devices discussed by Halliday and Hasan (1976) are one type of tying, but as Sacks argues "a speaker can't tie and that this is very important because in tying a speaker is forced to show whether he did or did not understand what went before. Thus tying simultaneously fulfills two functions, it is cohesive and it displays the speaker's understanding of previous utterances" (Coulthard 1977:75).

Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks (1977:378) noted that most 'other-corrections' are modulated by being downgraded on a 'confidence uncertainty' scale, e.g., 'I think,' 'maybe,' or by the use of certain question forms, e.g., 'You mean 'X'?' 'Other-corrections' and 'understanding checks' are not asserted, but offered for acceptance or rejection as a guess or suggestion. They also suggest that if a hearer understands a speaker well enough to produce a correction, his/her understanding is "adequate to allow production of a sequentially appropriate next turn" (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977:380), and this is usually what happens. So hearers who could do an other-correction, usually don't; they do a sequentially appropriate next turn instead. "Therein lies the basis for the modulation, in particular, the uncertainty marking of other-correction: if it were confidently
held, it ought not to be done; only if *unsurely* held ought it to displace the sequentially implicated next turn. Therein is a basis for much of the other—correction which does occur being treated by its recipient on its occurrence, as involving *more* than correction, *i.e.*, disagreement" (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977:380). They also suggest that "other forms of 'other-initiated repair' are systematically related to disagreement regularly being used and understood as pre-disagreements" (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977:f.n. 28, 380), but there was no further discussion on this point. In a subsequent article, Schegloff (1981:88) suggests in passing that the reason 'uh huh's' and the like can be taken as indications of agreement with a speaker is because "if disagreement were brewing, then opportunities to initiate repair *would* supply a ready vehicle for the display and potential deflection of that disagreement." When such opportunities for raising problems of understanding are passed over, the indication is that such problems do not exist. Schegloff (1981:88) claims that it might also be taken as indicating "the absence of that which such problems might have portended—disagreement—and thus be taken as indications of agreement."

Coulthard (1977:91-92) lists some major difficulties connected with the work on 'conversational mechanisms' presented by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson. 1) Their descriptive categories are not well defined so it is difficult for another researcher to assign such categories as 'challenge' or 'terminator' to his own data. Coulthard suggests this is due to the lack of relation of linguistic form to conversational meaning. 2) Their analysis is based on some 'stretches of text' extracted from various examples of conversations, and an appeal to intuition. They don't offer any analysis which can deal with the
whole of any discourse. 3) Their analysis does not offer any exceptions or variants of the structures they describe, and 4) furthermore the question of what constitutes a structure is not satisfactorially answered. 5) The terms 'utterance' and 'turn' are used interchangeably whereas many utterances consist of a single sentence but some do not.

Coulthard gives them credit for presenting "a great many insights into the workings of conversation and some useful analytic tools," but he contends that their work generally "suffers from a lack of explicitness and formalism, which hinders others anxious to make use of it" (Coulthard 1977:92).

Empirical research into compliment responses in everyday conversation by Pomerantz has revealed that "most compliments responses lie between (not at the polar extremes of) acceptances and agreement on the one hand, and rejections and disagreements on the other" (Pomerantz 1978:81). She found that there are two systems of constraints. "Responses to compliments often find expression as 1) second assessments which are formed as agreements or disagreements with the prior compliments ... agreements are generally performed as preferred seconds and disagreements as dispreferred seconds" (Pomerantz 1978:81), and as 2) accepting or rejecting prior compliments with acceptance being the preferred second. The findings also revealed that the two systems are interrelated, agreements are associated with acceptances and disagreements with rejections. However, the fact is that disagreements and rejections occur more often in response to compliments than agreements/acceptances. She accounts for this phenomena as being due to a system involving "speakers' minimization of self-praise" (Pomerantz 1978:81). Responses to compliments, then, can be seen as a solution or resolution of the
problem of conflicting systems: 1) preferences to agree with and/or accept compliments, and 2) the desire to avoid self-praise.

She outlines two types of 'action chain. The first one has accept/reject as the second part and the complement part is seen as a 'supportive' action. In the second type, the complement is seen as an assessment with which the receiver can agree/disagree.

In discussing 'tokens' of appreciation, she mentions that the token "recognizes the status of the prior compliment without being semantically fitted to the specifics of that complement. That is, it does not, itself, contain a focus upon the referent of the complement" (Pomerantz 1978:83), and it should be performed in a next turn after a complement.

Agreements were found most commonly to be such that "the referent assessed in a prior assessment is again assessed in a current turn such that current speakers assessment (the second) stands in agreement with prior speaker's. Referent preservation across the pair of assessments is a feature of such agreements" (Pomerantz 1978:84). She also suggests that often acceptances, especially tokens, are followed by agreements as responses to compliments.

Disagreements appear as two types, as a second evaluation, i.e., that of the second speaker, "which stands in some disagreement with the prior" (Pomerantz 1978:87). This often occurs as a "contrastively classed (negative) evaluation term, ... from the positive one contained in the prior" (Pomerantz 1978:37). The second type is when the second speaker presents an argument as a response, i.e., as an 'exception' to what was assessed previously.

"When a recipient agrees with a prior compliment, he affiliates his position with the prior asserted position; when he disagrees, he
disaffiliates his position from that of the prior" (Pomerantz 1978:88).

Following complements, agreements and disagreements which retain prior referents are agreements or disagreements with praise of self. Therefore, self-praise avoidance strategies are put into play by either the speaker himself when he uses a disclaimer, or by another speaker when he/she makes a critical assessment of the self-praising person. Another aspect of self-praise avoidance is that it can be interactional through strategies that give credit to other persons, e.g., one speaker may 'announce' the accomplishments of another.

Solutions to these problems of multiple preferences can take various forms. 'Praise downgrades' can be employed and with this type of solution agreements show some features of disagreement and visa versa. 'Upgrading' is a type of agreement which uses stronger second evaluation terms than in the original complement. 'Contrastive opposites' are a type of disagreement where negative, critical evaluations are followed by positive complimentary ones.

Another type of agreement is a 'scaled-down agreement' where the praise terms in the response are more moderate than the original. This type often has "initially positioned agreement tokens or appreciations" (Pomerantz 1978:95). In addition a sequence may be set up whereby the participants make alternating reassertions of their evaluation terms. These scaled-down agreements seem to be subject to some restrictions. They don't follow "complements which directly praise coparticipant" (Pomerantz 1978:97). They contain referents that are "objects, persons, activities, and so on, other than coparticipant directly ("you"), namely, referents through which coparticipants are accorded credit" (Pomerantz 1978:97).
Disagreement also can occur in various forms. In proposing that credit given in the complement was exaggerated, the responder will counterpropose lesser \textit{amounts} of credit, but he/she does not altogether negate or deny the prior assertions. Disagreement markers such as 'though,' 'yet' and 'but' are used with qualifications of a prior complement. Following these diminishments and qualifications the original praise giver may challenge or disagree with the responder's evaluation and reassert praise.

Praise downgraders in both agreements and disagreements are a \textit{common} solution to the "incompatible preferences operating on compliment responses," \textit{i.e.}, compromise following negotiation (Pomerantz 1978:101). 'With downgraders, the referent of the prior \textit{is preserved}, but the praise is neither totally agreed with (\textit{i.e.,} it is responsive to self-praise avoidance) nor totally disagreed with (\textit{i.e.,} it is also responsive to \textit{acceptance/agreement} preferences)" (Pomerantz 1978:101).

D. Systems for the Analysis of Discourse

Several systems have been developed which approach the analysis of spoken discourse from the level of the conversation as the overall unit of analysis. In so doing, the \textit{discourse} analyst can determine the function of a speech act in relation to the whole organizational pattern of the \textit{conversation}. Discourse function not only covers "the meaning of an utterance in context" but also the function of an utterance "in relation to other utterances in the discourse ... the interactional location of utterances within discourse" (McTear 1979:395). Utterances are not connected to each \textit{other}, but it is the actions they \textit{perform} which bring about those connections. Edmonson suggests that a conversational unit is seen "as both \textit{illocution} and interaction ... a
speaker is both communicating his own wishes, feelings, beliefs, and desires and interacting with a fellow member, eliciting and giving responses in a dynamic process of negotiation" (Edmondson 1981:54).

1. Rehbein and Ehlich

Rehbein and Ehlich (1976) noted that Searle's conditions (cf. p. 17) are not enough for the analysis of a speech act. They suggest that at least the antecedents or pre-history and the "systematic effects and consequences" or post-history of the act must also be taken into consideration, i.e., "the processes leading to the constitution of a speech act, ... play a central part within the sequel of action to which the speech act belongs. The same is true of the immediate effects which the utterance has on the hearer" (Rehbein and Ehlich 1976:314-15). They relate the perlocutionary effect to the speech act they are examining in their paper, "effective reasoning" which is only successful if it produces a certain change on the part of the hearer; "otherwise it only counts as 'reasoning'" (Rehbein and Ehlich 1976:314-15). In order to bring about this change in the hearer, they maintain that the speaker and hearer must share certain knowledge and the speaker must realize what that shared knowledge consists of. The purpose of their analytic system is to produce a model of the complex structure of the "psychic process" of "representing reality in speech" (Rehbein and Ehlich 1976:316).

Their model introduces three types of effective reasoning. 1) The speaker attempts to cause the hearer to understand a past action on the part of the speaker. 2) The speaker gives reasons for one of his future actions. 3) The speaker attempts to cause the hearer to understand
some assertion he has uttered leading to "cognitive conformity" between the speaker and hearer which would then be part of the shared knowledge upon which they can base further interaction (Rehbein and Ehlich 1976:328).

Simplified reconstruction of their model extracts much of its power as a model of a complex psychological process, but even simplified it retains the interactional aspects which are the main points of interest here.

I) The speaker has done some action C,

II) and consequently realized that the hearer does or does not understand that action.

III) A) If the hearer has not understood the action:

i) the speaker knows that

a) the hearer will have either a negative or positive attitude toward the speaker's action, and that

b) a negative attitude would bring about a deterioration of the relationship, (perhaps to the point of breaking it off) while

c) a positive attitude would include the continuation of the relationship.

d) Therefore, if he/she desires to continue the relationship, he must cause the hearer to understand his action.

ii) The hearer must choose between:

a) indicating that he has not understood (and bringing d above into play)
or, b) not understanding the action and causing the consequences of non-comprehension to come into effect.

iii) If the hearer indicates he has not understood the action, the first speaker has two options: 1) some form of response from the first speaker is needed as a clue for understanding what he/she did, or 2) not attempting to give any clues to help the hearer in which case the hearer will have a negative attitude.

B) If the hearer understood the action initially, he has a positive attitude and the relationship/conversation can continue using that action on the part of the speaker as a new addition to their store of shared knowledge.

One of the interesting aspects of their model is that it cannot be viewed as a simple succession of actions. Decisions are made by both the speaker and the hearer at points where conditions necessitate, and sequences can repeat themselves within the frame of a larger sequence. For example, if the hearer has indicated non-comprehension at point III.A., and the speaker has responded with a clue which the hearer still could not understand, the situation returns to point III.A. again. So, either 1) closure of a sequence can occur, or 2) repetition of a sequence can occur after the expression of a 'right pair part.'

2. Labov and Fanshall

In very general terms it could be said that Labov and Fanshall's (1977) analysis of Therapeutic Discourse offers certain parallels to that
of Rehbein and Ehlich in that they both look at analysis in terms of speech act sequences. Labov and Fanshall have taken taped sessions between a therapist and an analyst and applied a 'cross-sectional analysis' to them. For their analysis they identify two kinds of relations among utterances, propositions, and actions. 'Vertical relations' are "between surface utterances and deeper actions, which are united by rules of interpretation and production, while the 'horizontal relations' (are) of sequencing between actions and utterances which are united by sequencing rules" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:37; parenthesis are mine). They have dealt with the analysis of the discourse by dividing their data into five episodes. Each episode is broken into units which serve as the basis for the cross-sectional analysis. The units are further subdivided into sub-units (cf. Appendix I, Table 3).

"Their analysis is made at different levels of abstraction" (McTear 1979:398). They bring together in an 'expansion' of each unit of text "all the information that we have that will help in understanding the production, interpretation and sequencing of the utterance in question" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:48). They do this by expanding the paralinguistic cues, giving referents, relating past and future factual information to the utterance, and identifying shared knowledge, all to ground the utterances in social interaction.

Labov and Fanshall (1977:55-56) isolate several types of propositions which are related to "the normal course of social life" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:55). 'Challenges to competence' as 'status predicates' usually do not deny that a person holds a certain status, but the question is whether that person is qualified or not to hold that
status. 'Performance predicates' criticize or support a person's activity in the roles that he plays and usually appear as qualitative judgements that a person is above or below expected standards in his role performance. 'Constitutional predicates' are not concerned with a person's status but instead assign certain particular characteristics to a person, e.g., lazy, thoughtless, energetic.

What is done by an utterance is the interactional component of a discourse according to Labov and Fanshall (1977:67). They define interaction "as action which affects (alters or maintains) the relations of the self and others in face-to-face communication" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:59) which move along the dimensions of power and solidarity.

'Verbal interactions' are grouped into four sets of 'speech acts' (Labov and Fanshall 1977:61). The first set, 'Meta-actions,' have to do with the regulation of speech itself and describe what the speaker is doing besides taking his turn. These include initiate, interrupt, redirect; continue, respond, repeat and reinforce; end, signal completion and withdraw.

The second set, 'Representations,' are a large class of speech acts which represent some state of affairs. A-events are known to the speaker but not necessarily to the hearer. The speaker may give information and/or "express various states of mind about them" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:62), because he is in a position to deal with them as an expert without fear of contradiction. The feelings about such A-events identified by Labov and Fanshall in their data include 'belief,' 'uncertainty,' 'exasperation,' and 'deference.'
'D–events' are disputable events. "In dealing with these events, both speaker and listener realize that the truth of the proposition cannot be assumed: the speaker acts in a way that shows he is aware that someone might disagree with him" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:62). Usually this is accomplished through an assertion which usually leads to a response. Assertions are of two kinds according to Labov and Fanshall. An 'evaluation' occurs after a speaker's presentation of a series of events that actually happened and expresses the significance of those events. An 'interpretation' occurs if the event related can be taken as symbolic of some other meaning. Both are initial actions by some speaker and can be responded to by another speaker 'agreeing with,' 'denying,' or 'supporting' that assertion. The responder may also reinterpret the original interpretation. The initial speaker may support his own statement with further evidence, or contradict his own position. "'Agree,' 'deny,' and 'contradict' are discrete, cognitively oriented actions; to 'give support' or 'question' are actions of variable strength that are intrinsically affective" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:63).

The third set of speech actions outlined by Labov and Fanshall are 'requests' which include 'mitigated requests,' e.g., petitions, pleas, suggestions, and 'aggravated requests,' e.g., orders, commands and demands. Responses may appear as one of three types: 1) the hearer may fulfill the request by giving the information or carrying out the action requested, 2) the hearer may put off the request with an accounting (in which case it may be reinstated, redirected or withdrawn), or 3) the hearer may refuse it with or without an accounting. If he refuses it without an accounting, a break in relations might result.
The fourth set of speech actions are types of interpretations hearers can have of requests. 'Challenges' are "any reference to a situation, which if true, would lower the status of the other person" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:64), and include 'criticisms,' 'attacks,' and 'insults.' 'Supports' are "that form of behavior which would reinforce or raise the status of the other person" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:64), and include 'praise,' 'flattery,' and 'reinforcement.' 'Questions' represent an intermediate step in making a challenge by throwing "doubt upon a proposition which another speaker endorses" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:64). Responses can be in the form of a 'defense' which may include a challenge or criticism of the initial speaker, or they can be an 'admission,' or a 'huff' which breaks relations. The initial speaker may 'retreat from,' 'mitigate,' or 'aggravate' his initial challenge (cf. Appendix I, Table 3).

These four sets of speech actions can be seen as hierarchical ordering of levels of interactional significance. The highest level represents the most impersonal level of discourse regulation while the fourth level represents the deepest and most personal level of speech act interpretations which can be made by the hearer. So it can be said that "obligatory sequencing is not found between utterances but between the actions which are being performed" (Labov and Fanshall 1977:70).

3. Sinclair & Coulthard and Sinclair & Brazil

While Labov and Fanshall propose a model based on a hierarchy of levels of interactional significance, Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) and Sinclair and Brazil (1982) approach analysis through a Hallidayan model where units of the lowest rank, Acts, are defined functionally, and higher rank units are defined in terms of possible combinations of
lower units producing a structural analysis. The smallest unit is the 'act' which describes the functional properties the speaker is using the item for. Three major acts are described: 1) 'elicitations' which function as requests for linguistic responses, 2) 'directives' which function as requests for non-linguistic responses, and 3) informatives which serve the function of passing on information, opinions, and facts. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975:28) suggest that the function 'elicitation,' is most often realized grammatically as a question; 'directives' as imperatives; and 'informatives' as declaratives, but this is not always a clear one-to-one relationship. Choices about form are determined from 'situation' and 'tactics.' 'Situation' "includes all relevant factors in the environment, social conventions, and the shared experiences of the participants" (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975:28). 'Tactics' are "the way in which items precede, follow and are related to each other. It is the place in structure of the discourse which finally determines which act a particular grammatical item is realizing, though classification can only be made of items already tagged with features from grammar and situation" (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975:29).

When there is a succession of statements, questions, and commands the hearer knows that he only has to respond to the final one, only that one has an initiating function. Initiation moves have one elicitation, directive, or informative. "A 'move' constitutes a coherent contribution to the interaction" according to Sinclair and Coulthard (1975:36) while Sinclair and Brazil (1982:53) define a 'move' as "a minimum contribution by one speaker and comprising one or more acts." When a move is comprised of more than one act, the other acts are subsidiary to the head and optional. Initiation is usually followed by a response move
and typical response types can be identified as following each of the three major acts, i.e., directives are followed by 'reacts,' the performance of the action required by the directive; infomatives are followed by 'acknowledges,' a verbal or non-verbal signal confirming that the hearer is listening and understanding; elicitations are followed by 'replies,' often a one word moodless noise although they can be statements or questions. 'Comments' can optionally follow replies and serve to justify, expand, provide additional information about the head. They are almost always realized by statements or tag-questions (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975:36).

'Exchanges' are "the minimum unit of interaction" and are comprised of one or more moves (Sinclair and Brazil 1982:53). The four main functions of exchanges are informing, directing, eliciting, and checking.

Sinclair and Brazil (1982:52) identify another level in the hierarchy which they call a 'sequence.' This appears when "a predictable routine is begun—perhaps a number of similar questions, or repetitive commands, or anything that participants recognize as forming a distinctive set of exchanges, with a beginning, middle, and end."

'Transactions' are marked by boundaries and comprise one or more sequences or exchanges but beyond that little is known about them (according to both Sinclair and Coulthard (1975:56) and Sinclair and Brazil (1982:53)) because the level of the sequence is the highest level where a formal linguistic pattern can be found.

'Lessons' are "the highest unit of classroom discourse, made up of a series of transactions" (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975:59) (cf. Appendix I, Table 2).
Sinclair and Brazil (1982:60) suggest that there are three main kinds of elicitation identifiable because they bring about different consequences in the discourse. The first type is the 'polar interrogative' or Yes/No Question which has an ideal response to either 'Yes' or 'No' with nothing else required. If the hearer is hesitant about his response he can use a tentative marker, e.g., maybe, sometimes, probably, I suppose so, etc. However, it is noted that this type of eliciting device is fairly rare because a speaker is concerned with the maintenance of control in conversation so he prefers to pre-empt decisions. Also, usually the hearer is happier when he has some idea as to the position of the speaker and why he is asking the question. Therefore, the second type of elicit, 'eliciting agreement' is more common where the responder has to deal with the knowledge he has of the speaker's attitudes.

Normally, a fitting response to an elicitation contains two acts: an act announcing the decision and an act indicating the speaker's position. When the response is negative, there might be a third act that indicates the difference between the assumptions of the first speaker and the decision of the responder.

Syntactically, tag-questions and negative questions are agreement eliciting devices. A tag question suggests that a "lack of immediate agreement by the addressee has cast doubt on the truth of the assertion" and so he is requested to support the proposition (Sinclair and Brazil 1982:65). Negative questions, on the other hand, appear to be the third stage of a process. First a positive assertion is made, its truth is questioned, and then a negative question is appropriate as a check
on the truth value of the original assertion. Negative questions put pressure on the hearer to clarify. Sinclair and Brazil (1982:66) claim that "declaratives will nearly always be understood as if there was a tag on the end; and positive polar interrogatives will imply that a speaker tends to believe the declarative form of his questions." The use of the forms, 'declaratives' and 'polar interrogatives,' allows a speaker to be less explicit in seeking agreement and allows for the possibility of negotiation in discourse.

The third type of elicitation is 'eliciting content' which is usually realized by an information question beginning with a wh-word. The response can take any form as long as it supplies the content requested by the speaker.

4. Edmondson, and Edmondson & House

The word done by both Sinclair and Coulthard, and Sinclair and Brazil represent very similar models for the analysis of a specific type of discourse as found in a classroom between a teacher and pupils. Edmondson (1981) and Edmondson and House (1982) on the other hand, present a model for the analysis of conversation which is defined as "any stretch of talk which involves two or more speakers and in which what is said is more or less un-prepared, and not overtly pre-determined in terms of topic or procedure" (Edmondson and House 1982:35). In addition they claim "that in contributing to a conversational event, a speaker produces an utterance, i.e., a significant instance of language use, which has a dual conversational function: in the first place it reveals the speaker's beliefs, attitudes, desires and so on about some state of affairs, and secondly it plays a part in building up the ongoing
conversation, being significant both with respect to what may follow it in the conversation" (Edmondson and House 1982:36). These two aspects are: 1) the *illocutionary* value which relates to the speaker and is indicated by terms such as 'suggest,' 'request,' and 'offer,' and 2) the 'interactional value' which relates the illocutionary value to a possible outcome of the conversation and is indicated by such terms as 'agree,' 'contradict,' and 'refuse.' Conversation is structured in terms of interactional structure as an answer reflects the "interactional relation holding between the utterance so named and the preceding question" (Edmondson and House 1982:36).

'Interactional structure' is described as being made up of four hierarchical elements. 'Illocutionary acts' are at the lowest level and these identify the *communicative intent* of the speaker. 'Acts' make up the 'moves' made by one speaker in one *turn-at-talk.* 'Exchanges' are 'moves' made by different speakers which are combined in structured sequences. Exchanges are then linked together into 'Phases' and an ordered sequence of Phases makes up the full *conversation.*

At a minimum, an exchange is made up of two moves produced by different speakers. It's a "conversational unit in which both partners together reach a conversational outcome, i.e., they reach a point of agreement, and the conversation may then proceed to further business or indeed to a closing ritual" (Edmondson and House 1982:38). They describe the basic obligatory units of exchange as 'initiate' and 'satisfy.' Using an offer as an example of initiate, accepting would satisfy the initiate. A rejection of an offer must in *turn* be accepted by the first speaker to make a satisfy. This rejection of the offer is called a 'contra' because it does not satisfy the initiate. In an 'initiate,'
'contra,' 'satisfy' exchange the original offer is withdrawn by the satisfy move. If the refusal is not accepted by the offering speaker and he repeats his offer, the exchange can include a series of contras before a satisfy is reached. Besides satisfy and contra, a responder has a third option, he may employ a 'counter' which is similar to a contra but the potential consequences are different. (1) If a counter is satisfied the speaker who made the satisfy may still hold his initial position which was countered. (2) If a counter is withdrawn, i.e., it is contraed and the counterer then satisfies that contra, the withdrawal of the counter does not entail accepting, i.e., satisfying the move that was originally countered.

A: I think we should invite the whole family.
B: Oh God the kids are such terrors.
A: Oh come on they're not that bad.
B: Yeah perhaps you're right, but even so I don't want to have to cook for the whole family. I'll be exhausted.
A: Oh well if you feel like that about it let's forget the whole business.

This can be diagrammed as follows:

```
Initiate Counter Contra Satisfy Contra Satisfy
A  B  A  B  B  A
```

One speaker can make two consecutive moves inside one exchange. When this happens, the first move is always a satisfy which does not close the
exchange but which does terminate a "sub-issue inside the ongoing process of negotiation" (Edmondson and House 1982:42).

Exchanges can be linked by 'pre-exchanges,' 'pre-responding-exchanges,' and 'post-exchanges.' These linked exchanges then form three 'Phases,' i.e., the 'opening,' 'core,' and 'closing' phases (cf. Appendix I, Table 2).

Having given a formal description of conversational structure Edmondson and House give a psychological interpretation. "The way in which speakers make use of interactional structures in order to gain their conversational goals" they call 'conversational strategy' (Edmondson and House 1982:45). They note that using a strategy may not be deliberate because conventionalism is so strong in conversational behavior. The central notion in 'strategy,' for them, is the notion of anticipation. 'Supportive moves' are derived from this notion of anticipation even though they do not form a part of the interactional structures. 'Grounders' give support to a move by providing the grounds for it; 'sweeteners' sweeten a move by removing a possible objection the hearer may have; 'expanders' give more details about a person or state of affairs; 'disarmers' are self-defensive in that they anticipate a possible offense to the hearer.

Social skills, not linguistic ones, are at issue when referring to notions of politeness or tact, which are "centrally concerned with the degree to which a speaker takes his hearer into account, and suits what he says and how he says it to what he believes his hearers reaction might be" (Edmondson and House 1982:47).

Edmondson and House list seven "social rules of conduct" which they claim "may be empirically derived from observing people talk"
(Edmondson and House 1982:47). They call them 'conversational
maxims,' and offer the following as examples.

1) Support your hearer's costs and benefits and suppress your own.
2) Anticipate any case in which you might give offense.
3) When wanting something from your hearer, be prepared to ground your request and to make compensatory offers.
4) Be generous in giving information about yourself if your hearer requests such—i.e., when a free social good is requested, give more than is asked for.
5) When you can, support your hearer during his turn, i.e., engage in 'active listening.'
6) Plug any conversational gaps.
7) When in doubt, reciprocate, especially in 'hearer-friendly' social rituals which facilitate contacts—i.e., when you receive a social benefit, give one back.

(Edmondson and House 1982:47)

All seven maxims can be summed up in the first maxim which is termed the '8-support maxim.' It is meant to apply to both participants by implying that "one should avoid putting the hearer in a position such that he cannot in his behavior act in an H-supportive manner"

(Edmondson and House 1982:48).

Illocutionary acts have to do with "how an utterance having an interactional function is to be characterized with regard to the speaker's meaning" (Edmondson and House 1982:49). Edmondson and House propose four classes with categories under each, two of these relate to issues in this study.
1) "Attitudinal Illocutions" have to do with a positive or negative attitude being held towards a class of events (or states of affairs). "Non-future events" include 'minimizers," 'excuses,' 'thanks," 'congratulates," 'complains," 'forgives," and 'sympathizes." 'Future events' consist of 'resolves," 'invites," 'willings," 'requests," 'suggests not to do P," and 'permits."

2) "Informatory Illocutions" are concerned with the passing on of information and subtypes are categorized in terms of the nature, importance, and relevance of that information. 'Tells' communicate "to a hearer a piece of information which the speaker believes to be true, and which he believes is of substantial relevance and importance for the hearer. The information so communicated is further a matter of knowledge (a 'fact') as opposed to belief, or opinion. This implies that in performing a 'Tell," a speaker will normally expect that his hearer will accept the informatory content to be true." (Edmondson and House 1982:57).

'Remarks' are made when a speaker wants to establish or increase familiarity with a hearer and are thus phatic in nature. They concern topics which both the speaker and the hearer are equally familiar with and are usually so banal they can only be agreed with.

'Opines' are defined as what a speaker does when he/she communicates to the hearer "an opinion, judgement or evaluation concerning some fact or state of affairs which he believes to be true" (Edmondson and House 1982:58), and which he believes is important and relevant to himself.
and the hearer. 'Opines' and 'Tells' then can be seen to be complementary, i.e., when a 'fact' is communicated, it's a Tell, when an 'opinion' is communicated, it's an Opine. Opines are believed by a speaker to be true out of experience and judgement rather than scientific 'knowledge.' However Edmondson and House (1982:58) comment that it is "well known that speakers, as human beings, do not generally pay a great deal of attention to the fact/opinion distinction: maybe we may say here that where you draw the line between the two is a matter of opinion." "Discloses" involve autobiographical or private information about the speaker which he/she thinks the hearer may find interesting or amusing. The hearer is not expected to hold any opinions or to start arguing about such content because it is of an autobiographical nature.

Edmondson and House have set forth a comprehensive analysis which takes into account what people do in conversation 1) through a formal description of the interactional structure, 2) through a description of conversational strategies reflecting the social skills of the participants, 3) through a description of conversational maxims which help guide a speaker's choice of which strategies to employ and the verbal means by which those strategies are manifested, and 4) through a description of illocutionary categories outlining the speaker's intent in producing an utterance. In taking all these areas into account, they have produced a descriptive system which provides much insight into what people do when they converse.

In examining the speech act agreement/disagreement as it naturally occurs in conversation, speech-act theory is a necessary base from which
to begin. However, agreement/disagreement exists as a response to some previous utterance and as such the relationship between the two utterances and the quality of that relationship must be examined and identified. In addition, no uttered speech act can occur isolated from any environmental or contextual factors. These factors of context and environment place the uttered act in a relationship with the whole of the conversation. For this reason the analysis of a speech act within an interactional framework is necessary for showing how that act functions within the discourse. A speech act naturally uttered during conversation must be examined from many different angles in order to achieve a composite picture of that speech act.
NOTES

1 These can be distinguished as follows: the locutionary act, "he said that . . .," the illocutionary act, "he argued/adviced/etc. that . . .," the perlocutionary act, "he insulted/convinced, etc. me that . . ." (Austin 1962:102).

2 Also see Grice's category of Manner, Maxim 2 Avoid Ambiguity on page 34.

3 He likens the study of any purely formal theory of language to studying baseball "only as a formal system of rules and not as a game" (Searle 1969:17).

4 Illocutionary effects, not perlocutionary effects.

5 Searle accepts Austin's definition but not all of his members.

6 He distinguishes between 'ceremonial acts' which require some institutionalized situation for their successful performance, and 'vernacular acts' which have no such conditions. His classification deals only with performative verbs of the latter type.

7 His terminology follows Searle's with Representatives, Directives, and Commissives but the class Searle has termed 'Expressives,' Fraser calls 'Evaluatives.' Also, Fraser leaves out Searle's class of 'declarations' or performatives.

8 'Mutual contextual belief' is "salient contextual information" (Bach and Harnish 1979:5) that need not necessarily be true but that both the speaker and hearer share and believe the other believes. In addition to these contextual beliefs there are two more mutual beliefs that the speaker and hearer share with other members of the linguistic community. 'Linguistic presumption' is the belief that all members share a common language and background information. 'Communicative presumption' is the belief that whenever a member says something, he does so with some recognizable illocutionary intent. According to Bach and Harnish, all three of these mutual beliefs are necessary for the hearer to be able to identify the speakers intent.

9 Bach and Harnish continue by stating that "To assent that P is to express agreement with this claim, to dissent from it is to express disagreement, and to dispute it is to express the belief that there is reason not to believe that P" (Bach and Harnish 1979:45).

Fraser's (forthcoming) revised taxonomy would appear to be a revision of his 1974 taxonomy in the light of Bach and Harnish's analysis of the speaker's attitudes toward his propositional content, although he doesn't say so.
10 'Speech act verbs' are distinguished from 'performatives' which are used to perform linguistic acts (actions, activities), e.g., 'to order,' 'to ask.'

11 Austin briefly acknowledges responses or sequel acts (cf. p

12 Sack, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974:721) state that 'possible completion points' "turn out to be possible completion points of sentences, clauses, phrases, and one-word constructions, and multiples thereof." i.e., as "syntax conceived in terms of its relevance to turn-taking." Ochs (1979:70) expands on this by saying, "That is, speaker change occurs at the end of an idea expressed by one participant.''

13 Unfortunately Gilson does not give any further definition of "disruptive interruptions" or "bonding interruptions."

14 Pomerantz defines an action chain as "a type of organization in which two ordered actions \( \text{Action}_1 \) and \( \text{Action}_2 \), are linked such that the performing of \( \text{Action}_1 \) provides the possibility of performance of \( \text{Action}_2 \) as an appropriate next action" (Pomerantz 1978:82). Schegloff's 'adjacency pairs' are different in that after a first pair-part is produced, its second pair-part is "conditionally relevant" (Pomerantz 1978:110). Second parts of an action chain are a 'may,' not a 'should.'

15 The work presented in Sinclair and Brazil (1982) and Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) appears to be essentially similar in basic approach to analysis therefore the two are presented together here (cf. Appendix I, Table 2 for comparison of structures).

16 Halliday (1970) is interested in the existence of and the surface ordering of elements within a sentence. He believes that there is no reason to make any classification of language use without an examination of grammar. He identifies three functions within the structure of a clause: 1) the 'ideational' which expresses the content, 2) the 'interpersonal' which maintains social relations, and 3) the 'textual' which enables link to be made with the situation.

17 The model of analysis presented by Edmondson and House in 1981 is essentially the same as that formulated by Edmondson in 1981 although the Edmondson and House presentation is somewhat simplified in the explanation. The description which follows is that presented in both books.

18 Not to be confused with Grice (cf. p. 34).
CHAPTER III
METHODS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methods and procedures carried out in order to formulate a description of what constitutes agreement/disagreement and to discover the rules of speaking within which it operates in native speaker conversation. The empirical data base for the analysis comes out of surreptitiously collected conversational data so that the speech act agreement/disagreement will be described as it appears in instances of natural usage. The type of data collected and the methods for collection are discussed followed by a description of the data, the transcription process and the procedures for analysis. As a method for analysis of the data two subclasses of Searle's 'Representatives,' Reportatives, and Opines, are proposed.

This description of the speech act agreement/disagree can then be applied to "the presentation of agreement/disagreement in several notional/functional based materials to see if there is any correlation between how these functions appear in the materials and how they appear in real language use." The data collected should therefore reflect "the kinds of linguistic interaction that take place in real language use" since courses based on notional syllabuses attempt to equip the learner with "an effective capacity to participate in real language events" (Wilkins 1973:79).

A. Data Type and Methods of Collection

Labov has equated 'natural speech' with 'casual speech' by which "in a narrow sense, we mean the everyday speech used in informal
situations when no attention is directed to language" (1973:86). But Wolfson (1976) argues that a person will pay more attention to his speech any time he is talking with others outside his intimate circle and that paying attention to his speech may result in an attempt to be less formal rather than more formal. She goes on to claim that "there is no such entity as casual or natural speech and that we (should substitute instead the term appropriate speech" (Wolfson 1976:204). By 'appropriate' she says "appropriate to the speech event in which (he)/she is participating" (Wolfson 1976:202; parentheses are mine). She suggests that data should be collected "by observing and recording a large variety of speech situations" and especially from "those (people) whom we know well enough to see frequently in a large number of different situations (so) that we can get a view in depth of how a variable is used" (Wolfson 1976:205; parentheses are mine).2 Wolfson concurs with Labov's statement in 1964 to the effect that "one of the most important principles governing variation is that of differential frequency in the use of the variable by different groups of speakers" (Wolfson 1976:207). Merritt (1979:120) concurs with Wolfson when she says that some linguists should investigate "the social use of language ... (by looking) at naturally occurring instances of language use in situations of face-to-face interaction." One of the reasons for the importance of this avenue of research is given when she says, "it has always been my feeling that we do not have much access to speaker's intent except when we, ourselves, are the speakers: while, on the other hand, we do have access to hearer's understanding since as analytical 'overhearsers' we have essentially the same 'information' or 'data' available to us as does the hearer or addressee" (Merritt 1979:122).
She suggests that the linguistic investigations of occasions when a stranger speaks with a stranger might give useful insights into how language serves as a communication system because in such situations the participants have no mutually shared background knowledge about each other.

Therefore, in accordance with the aims and purposes for this research and with the suggestions laid out above it was decided that

1) the data for this study should ideally come from as broad a spectrum of speech situations and speakers as possible, but due to limitations on time, money and researchers (one person), it was decided to limit the collection of data to informal social and business interactions, i.e., to the type of language a non-ESP conversation oriented Notional/Functional ESL/EFL textbook might teach.

2) the data should all be collected surreptitiously in so far as this would be possible.

3) the actual collection would be carried out (a) by recording conversation everywhere and anywhere it occurred using a small tape-recorder equipment with a microphone, (b) by writing down examples when they were observed, (c) by taping talk-shows and discussion/interviews on TV and the radio, (d) by tapping the telephones of several friends.

4) whenever conversational data were collected, relevant situational data were also noted: location; interlocutors' ages, sexes, relationship, status, social distance; variety of English, i.e., British/American standard/non-standard dialect.
of American English. When this type of information was not readily available to the researcher, approximations from observations were noted. For individual examples, relevant contextual information was also noted.

5) the researcher would not be included in the data collected as much as possible, and that no attempts would be made by the researcher to elicit examples of agreement/disagreement.

6) only native-speakers of English could be included in the data.

7) only the conversation of adults would be employed.

Data were collected from (1) face-to-face interactions, service encounters, informal meetings and discussions, a TV discussion/interview, a party, conversations among friends, overheard conversations in public places, and intra-family interactions; (2) non-face-to-face interactions: radio talk-shows, telephone conversations between friends, between acquaintances and between adversaries. Interactions occurring between strangers, acquaintances, friends, family members, lovers (or potentially so), and role/relationship adversaries (interlocutors who are adversaries due to their inherent role/relationship, e.g., talk-show guests and hosts) (cf. Appendix I, Chart I for a breakdown and comparison of data sources).

At first, the aim was to collect conversational data from as wide a variety of sources as possible by taping on a recorder. Time consuming complete transcriptions revealed very few examples of agreement/disagreement so situations where agreement/disagreement were likely to occur were concentrated on for recording and transcribing, e.g., radio and TV talk-show data and discussions among friends. In the latter case
no attempt was made to elicit agreement or disagreement or to channel discussion toward controversial topics, and the researcher, when present, remained out of any discussion as much as possible so that frequency ratios of the occurrence of agreement and disagreement within categories of speech events would reflect a normal value, other situational factors taken into account.

B. Description of the Data

The conversational data used in this study were all surreptitiously recorded as it occurred in everyday conversational exchanges. Comparisons of sociolinguistic information such as relationship among interlocutors, and speech events revealed that the conversations could be grouped together into eight groups.

Appendix I, Chart 1 contains charts with information about the Situation, Event, Location, Number of Interlocutors, Sex, Roles, Ages, Relationship, Status, Method of Recording, Number of Minutes, Number of Opines, Agreements, and Disagreements for each conversation. The conversations are grouped into the eight groupings mentioned above and the total number of minutes, total number of Opines, Agreements and Disagreements are given for each group along with frequency ratios of agreement to Opine, and Disagreement to Opine. Included in the Appendix is an explanation of the abbreviations used in the charts and definitions of various terms.

Group 1 contains seven telephone conversations between the same two interlocutors who are very good friends. The female is in the process of breaking up with her boyfriend who is also known to the male interlocutor. Conversation B, the longest of all the conversations in
data being over 2½ hours long, is almost exclusively devoted to that topic and contains emotionally charged exchanges.

Group 2 contains 12 conversations, or segments of longer conversations, all among the same four interlocutors who are roommates. The conversations all take place in the kitchen of their house around the table and include some fairly unusual topics, e.g., the best age for a child to begin formal education, but none could be considered disputable events, i.e., 'D-events' (cf. Labov and Fanshall, Chapter II, p. 55).

Group 3 contains 11 discussions, reports and conversations in an office among different interlocutors about different aspects of the business. These were recorded surreptitiously by a businessman friend of the researcher in his office. The recordings sometimes contain gaps when something of a secret nature was mentioned and the recorder turned off. C16 was a report given of a past situation and therefore contained no Opines.

Group 4 contains four telephone conversations all between different interlocutors. In each situation the interlocutors are acquaintances rather than friends and topics contained no personal information or expression of emotion.

Group 5 contains four service encounters between strangers. Three take place in stores and involve the purchase or order of some goods. The fourth one takes place at a Post Office window, i.e., C7, and contains no Opines.

Group 6 is a recorded discussion—interview involving four guests and two hosts. All the interlocutors were acquainted and there were no
real overtones of animosity expressed even though views were quite different.

Group 7 contains five short conversations recorded from a radio talk show. The host was the same in all five cases but the guests who called in were all different. With the exception of C13 animosity was apparent. The host seemed to heckle his guests.

Group 8 contains one discussion occurring between three professors and one student in one of the professor's offices. At points in the discussion slight emotional overtones appeared as individuals showed personal commitment to their propositions.

Group 9 contains 22 snippits, individual examples of agreement and disagreement which were recorded in writing when the researcher overheard them in a variety of locations.

C. The Transcription Process

"A pervasive sentiment among those who draw from performance data is that the data they utilize are more accurate than intuition data: their data constitute the real world—what is as opposed to what ought to be" (Ochs 1979:43). But, in fact, the actual performance is not the researcher's data. The performance is recorded, and the recording of the verbal and non-verbal interactional behavior is transcribed onto paper for the researcher and for those who follow his research efforts. "What is on a transcript will influence and constrain what generalizations emerge" (Ochs 1979:43), but some degree of 'selective observation' is unavoidable. Ochs advises that transcription should not be "random and implicit" but rather it should "be a selective process reflecting theoretical goals and definitions" (Ochs 1979:44). This selection should be encouraged since an overly detailed transcription is hard to follow and assess.
In transcribing the first several conversations, it is difficult to be selective because it is impossible to know what is and what isn't important until some analysis is made on the data. The transcription methodology described here is the end result of a process which evolved as analysis proceeded and revealed what was possibly important to include and what was not.

The first consideration was the layout of the transcription. The researcher/data collector/transcriber has always found it extremely difficult to read and understand a layout where speaker A is on the left going down in a column and speaker B is on the right. Such a system also complicates the exact notation of speaker overlap, a fact pointed out by Schmidt (1982) in a discussion. It was thereby decided to use a layout system with all of the speakers starting their turns from the left hand margin.

The next concern was with the non-verbal behavior inherent in natural interaction. To transcribe, or not to transcribe, or something in between, was the question. Since this was a study into the linguistic behavior of the speech act agree/disagree it was decided not to transcribe unless it was determined by the transcriber to be necessary for the correct interpretation of the utterance, or to establish the relationship between an utterance and a special referent within the context. When this occurs, the non-verbal behavior is bracketed and interjected into the utterance.

Another area of concern was orthography. Should the transcription be represented phonetically; partially phonetically, e.g., reflecting dialectal differences; with modified orthography indicating the way an
item is pronounced rather than the way it is written, e.g., 'gonna,' 'lemme see it,' 'yah see?' (cf. Sacks, et al. 1974). In another discussion, it was pointed out that such types of pronunciation are often made naturally when reading the transcript aloud at a natural pace when representation were in standard orthography. Therefore, it was decided to use standard orthography throughout unless intelligibility was problematic without phonetic representation—happily this never occurred, and dialectal differences were not an issue in this study.

Other considerations were pauses and pause length, and speaker overlap/interruptions. Many types of sequences in conversation are based on turn units, e.g., 'adjacency pairs' (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973, also cf. pp. 41–42, Chapter II of this manuscript). Agreement/disagreement is a response to a previous utterance made by another speaker in another turn so markers of turn units would be important to note in transcription. "Turns are considered to be verbal units bounded either by the talk of another speaker or by a significant pause" (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974:703). It was decided to determine pause length by counting one–thousand one, one–thousand two, . . ., and that pauses extending over one–thousand one were marked with the number, e.g., (-5) is a pause the length of which extends to one–thousand five.

As was noted before (cf. Chapter II, pp. 40–41) the occurrence of speaker overlap is not random. It occurs just before a construction is completed when the hearer wants the floor and makes a bid for a turn. However, it was not known if there was any direct relation between overlap and agreement/disagreement. Therefore it was decided to carefully and clearly note it.
Appendix I, Table 6 gives the transcription *symbols* and their meanings, which have been used in the transcription of the data for this study.

**D. Procedures for the Analysis of the Data**

Having collected and transcribed the data the next step was to locate examples of agreement and disagreement within the data but since the speech act *agree/disagree* is a type of response to another speech act, it was also necessary to locate the preceding utterance to which the example of *agree/disagree* was a response. This was achieved in the following way:

1) While reading the relevant literature, note was taken of examples that various authors marked as agreement or disagreement, e.g., Pomerantz (1978:82) gives the following "action chain" formula as one possible "appropriate next action" in response to a compliment:

"A₁: A compliments B

A₂: B agrees/disagrees with the complimentary assertion."  
(Pomerantz 1978:82)

2) The data was examined to locate examples that seemed obvious examples of agreement or disagreement, e.g., the use of the performative verbs, "agree," "disagree"; repetition of the previous speaker's utterance with some indication that the second speaker was in accord or disaccord with it, or elliptical versions thereof, e.g.,
Agreement:

S16

A: She was a nice lady :: I really liked her.

B: I liked her too.

Disagreement:

S8

A: Chinese food is so good!

B: I don't think so.

Also included were the types of instances that had been noted during the reading, such as the complement response noted above, e.g.,

Disagreement:

S1

A: Great speech Brown.

B: Really wasn't very good, too brief. I wanted to say a lot more.

Both the obvious examples of agreement and disagreement and the preceding utterances to which they were a response were located.

3) A list was then made up containing two types of examples (a) those which the researcher was unsure about as being agreement/disagreement, and (b) those which the researcher was sure about as being agreement/disagreement. All the examples included the previous speaker's utterance to which the agreement/disagreement was a response. The researcher then presented this list to three linguists in her department and
asked them to note the examples of agreement and disagreement which they found. A meeting was then held for a discussion of their findings along with their reasons for deciding that a particular example was a member of the speech act, 'agree/disagree' or not. A preliminary, rough and broadly defined set of hypotheses was drawn up which might possibly govern the occurrence of agree/disagree.4

4) This rough and broadly defined set of hypotheses was then applied to the rest of the examples about which the researcher was certain constituted 'agreement/disagreement' (as outlined in 2 above) to determine which of the hypotheses could be generalized to a broader data base, and to more clearly define those that did apply.

5) The more clearly defined hypotheses were then applied to the corpus of data as a whole, revealing more examples and more clearly defining their occurrence. As the data were examined, notes were kept on the syntactic, semantic, and functional types of utterances which could be responded to with agreement/disagreement.

6) At this point it was realized that there was a need to describe what agreement/disagreement was following as a preceding utterance. Some differentiations among prior utterances were classified. Out of this classification two distinct subclasses within Searle's class of Representatives are proposed as a method for analysis of the data in this study. One of these subclasses could be responded to with agreement/disagreement,
and this was labeled 'Opine.' The other subclass could not be responded to with agreement/disagreement and was labeled 'Reportative.' The subclass 'Opine' was further broken down into subclasses and these were also described (cf. p. for detailed discussion).

7) The new classifications were applied to the data for verification and were verified.

8) What followed was a sifting process of going back and forth between the data and reclassification, breaking down and regrouping, always trying to find some pattern, some relationship and some description that would fit all the data in the study and might possibly be generalizable beyond the data. As the process continued, the results described in the next chapter became discernible, and when the data was analyzed the last time to see if those categories worked, it was discovered that they did.

The location of agreement and disagreement in the conversational data was complicated by the occurrence of 'Yeah,' 'Hmm,' 'Oh,' and other one word moodless noises produced following another speaker's Opine or co-occurring with an Opine as an overlap or interruption. The question was whether these noises indicated acknowledgement of the Opine or were tokens of agreement.

Sinclair and Coulthard (cf. Chapter II, p. 58) define an 'acknowledge' as a verbal or non-verbal signal confirming that the hearer is listening and understanding occurring as a 'response' move to an 'informative.' As such, it does not mark agreement. Pomerantz (cf.
Chapter II, p. 47) suggests that 'tokens' recognize the status of the prior speaker's assessment without a specific focus on the referent, and she gives 'Yeah' as an example. In addition, her findings show that tokens are followed by agreements as responses to compliments.

Examination of the conversational data revealed that when 'Yeah' appeared at the beginning of a speaker's turn and was followed in the same turn by a second move, that second move was either some form of expression of agreement, or it began with 'but' followed by a second assessment of the prior speaker's referent. When 'Yeah' appeared alone in a one utterance turn, the next speaker appeared to have understood it as agreement. Similarly the two instances of 'Huh uh' were understood as disagreement by the next speaker. Therefore 'Yeah' at the beginning of a turn or occurring alone as a one utterance turn was considered to be a token of agreement while 'huh uh' was considered to be a token of disagreement. Additional evidence is supplied by Schegloff (cf. Chapter 11, p. 45) when he allows that 'uh huh's' and the like can be taken as indications of agreement because they indicate that opportunities for disagreement have been passed over.

E. A Proposal for Two Sub-Classes of 'Representatives'

The speech act agree/disagree is an act performed in conjunction with a prior utterance by the previous participant. Some prior utterance to agreement/disagreement must be produced so that a relationship can be established, a first utterance 'in conjunction with' a second utterance. Agreement/disagreement cannot stand alone, it must occur as a 'second' in a relationship with a 'first.' The nature of the first utterance must be described in order to be able to describe
the nature of the second utterance and to describe the relationship between them.

Examination of the data collected for this study revealed that obvious examples of the speech act agreement/disagreement appeared to follow a prior utterance in which a speaker expressed an assessment of a referent in terms of a degree of certainty/uncertainty or in terms of an assignment of a characteristic/quality with or without a positive/negative value judgement. In the example,

C31:23, 25
D: Oh, now that's stingy.
A: Yeah that's definitely stingy.

the repetition of the original utterance with the addition of the agreement token, 'yeah,' and an intensifier 'definitely' clearly marks agreement. 'Stingy' is a quality with a negative value assessed by the speaker towards the referent 'that.'

C36:18, 19
C: I don't think they're (children) ready for socializing outside of the family, you know, before the age of about five or six.
D: Yeah, I agree with you.

This example employs the performative verb 'agree' to indicate the speaker's agreement. The first speaker uses the verb 'think' with the first person present tense, to indicate the degree of certainty with which he views the truth value of his propositional content at the moment of speaking.

Searle's system, on the whole, is tighter and more economical than the others. It is the one most generally thought of as representative
of Speech Act theory as well as the one most generally used by others to build upon, or from which to develop new taxonomies. Searle's inclusion of the category Representative Declarations as a sub-category of Declarations which includes aspects of Representatives allows for the possibility of other such combinations as Hancher has shown (cf. pp. 24–25). In this study utterances which express a speaker's assessment of a referent in terms of a degree of certainty/uncertainty or in terms of an assignment of a characteristic/quality with or without a positive/negative value judgement are to be specially provided for in Searle's taxonomy. They will be called 'Opines' and are postulated to be a sub-category of Representatives.

What of utterances which do not express such assessments, i.e., utterances which only convey or report factual information to the hearer without any assessment of that information on the part of the speaker? If Opines appear as a sub-category of Representatives, it is also necessary to postulate a sub-category of 'Reportatives' which are often distinct from Opines functionally and interactionally, and may be thought of as appearing on opposite ends of a continuum.

1. Reportatives

When Searle designated 'brute facts' as being facts making up knowledge of physical or mental concepts that are based on empirical observation (cf. p. 16), he was referring to the type of fact or factual knowledge which provides the evidence for the truth of a speaker's proposition required by the preparatory condition for the illocutionary acts 'assert,' 'state,' or 'affirm.' As such, 'assert,' 'state,' 'affirm,' along with 'report,' 'describe,' and 'say,' are members of the proposed sub-category, 'Reportatives' in that the proposition can be
subjected to tests of validation or falsification in the objective real world. They function as conveyors of information/knowledge consisting of 'brute facts' about some event or state-of-affairs known to the speaker but which may not be known to the hearer. They may add to speaker-hearer shared knowledge, modify shared knowledge, or be entirely new information/knowledge. They assign no characteristics or qualities, contain no assessment of value judgement on the part of the speaker toward that information/knowledge, and they express no degree of modality by the speaker. They express states of affairs that are absolute, not relative to anything at the time of speaking. In the data they:

may refer to the speaker:

 Cl:43

  D: *The example I gave her was 60 minutes.

may refer to another person or to an object, event or state of affairs:

 Cl:38

  D: They are still edited, they've got to get it down to exactly the right number of minutes.

may report what others have said about themselves, others, states, events, and objects:

 Cl:30a

  D: . . . and her comment was that (a) every TV program is edited.
In the data a hearer may respond to a *Reportative* by:

1) acknowledgement

   **Cl:64, 65, 66**

   D: It's illegal.
   
   B: Well, everything is.
   
   C: # Hum.

2) confirmation of the truth value of the proposition

   **CA:112, 113**

   A: They call you *Mark* the Clown.
   
   B: That's what they do.

3) denial or correction of the truth value of the proposition

   **ClI:18, 19**

   B: # Right, but you do - I guess you didn't hear it on ABC the other night, that we're going to pick up the *lossess* that the *banks* ( . . . )
   
   A: No, we're not picking up the *lossess*.

2. Opines

   In this study an utterance was classified as an Opine if in that utterance the *speaker* assesses a referent by assigning it

   1) some degree of *certainty/uncertainty* as in

      a) its likelihood of occurrence or of being a state of affairs
      
      b) its frequency of occurrence,
      
      c) its approximate size or amount.

   2) some characteristic or quality with or without a *positive/negative* value judgement (compare with Edmondson's 'Opine¹ and 'Tell,' cf. pp. 65–66).
'Judgements,' 'beliefs,' 'opinions,' 'evaluations,' 'approximations,' 'estimations,' 'assessments,' and other such related speech acts make up the sub-category 'Opine.' All these acts above are related in that they share some of the attributes of Reportatives. Both Reportatives and Opines are sub-categories of Representatives, e.g., the 'direction of fit' for both is words-to-the-world. They also share some of the attributes of Expressives which express the speaker's feelings and attitudes about the state of affairs referred to in the expressed proposition (cf. p. 21). However, in Expressives the truth of the proposition is presupposed, while in Opines the speaker and hearer do not necessarily hold the same assessment of the state of affairs being referred to. In an Opine, the truth status of the proposition is negotiable in that the state of affairs referred to is not subject to immediate empirical verification as being either 'True' or 'False.' Opines reflect a subjective reality as opposed to Reportatives which reflect an objective reality and are subject to tests of validation or falsification. Opines express states of affairs that are relative, not absolute at the time of speaking.  

a) Characteristics of Opines

A speaker assesses a referent by assigning it some degree of certainty/uncertainty as in

a) its likelihood of occurrence or of being a state of affairs.

This characteristic contains two classes: what can be termed 'Tentatives' and 'Suppositions.'

Tentatives are represented by epistemic modality: possibility-probability, necessity, the tentative forms 'might,' 'would,' 'should,'
and Tag Questions and Xegative Questions. Represented in the data were the verbs: 'would' as the most frequent, e.g., 'That would be a method.' 'may,' 'might,' 'can,' 'could,' 'must,' and 'have to' meaning no other possibility, 'not necessarily, don't have to.' Adverbs included 'maybe' as the most frequent, e.g., 'Maybe I agree,' 'probably,' 'certainly,' 'of course (not).' A Noun phrase which occurred was 'Adj./N or something,' e.g., 'It's the flu or something.'

The expression of necessity with 'must' and 'have to' can be used to issue a command or order, e.g., 'You must go to the dentist at 2:30,' when the speaker is in a position of authority over the hearer. The speaker may feel that going to the dentist is in the best interests of the hearer, and thereby be implying an evaluation, but the force of command comes from his authority and the hearer is not in a position to agree or disagree with an implied Opine issued from an authority. Commands and orders were not counted as Opines in this study. 10

On the other hand, the expression of necessity with 'must' and 'have to' can be used to mean 'no other possibility,' e.g.,

A: It's a new book so it must be England.

The sales girl assesses the location of a book's publisher as England because it is not in the American book list and therefore there is no other possibility except England in her judgement. 'Must' and 'have to' with the meaning 'no other possibility' are considered Opines. 11

'Should' is a member of the tentative forms along with 'may' and 'might' when it expresses "extreme likelihood or a reasonable assumption or conclusion...it implicitly allows for the speaker to be mistaken" (Palmer 1979:49), e.g.,
S1

A: He should have arrived by now. The plane was to land at 8:50 and it's now 9:30.

Futurity expressed with the modal 'will' was not counted as an 'Opine' even though future occurrences or states of affairs cannot be empirically verified as true or false at the moment of speaking. The quality of volition on the part of the speaker excludes future 'will' from inclusion in the class of Opines.

CB: 260

A: I'll just go take a sleeping pill and go to sleep.

Tag questions and negative questions also express tentativeness (cf. pp. 36, 59, 11-Lit. review). Negative questions imply "disbelief in the possibility of a negative answer" (Leech 1977). Tag questions ask the hearer to support the proposition which the speaker believes to be true.

'Suppositions' can be recognized as such if an utterance can be preceded by 'As far as I can ascertain from what information you have given me or that I already have, I can suppose . . .' The point is that the speaker is knowingly making a supposition based on information which he considers to be incomplete or not empirically verifiable at the moment of speaking. Examples from the data fell into two groupings.

1) Suppositions based on mental perceptions included the verbs 'I think' as the most frequent, 'I guess,' 'I believe,' and 'I feel.'

2) Suppositions based on physical perceptions included the verbs 'it sounds (like)' and 'it looks (like).'
In this data, the expression 'supposed to' is considered to be a Reportative and is not counted as an Opine, e.g.,

C8:6

A: You're supposed to be here from 12:00 right?

This is an obligation, and like a command leaves no options for agreement or disagreement open for the hearer.

The expressions 'it depends on,' e.g.,

C9:31a

A: Nice yeah. It all depends on the style of the shoe.

B: umhum yeah some people really ( . . ) them and some people don't.

and 'it's up to you,' e.g.,

C9:83

A: You want the boxes, it's up to you.

can be considered Reportatives as In, 'I report the fact that it's up to you,' or Opines as In, 'I suppose it all depends on the style . . . .'

A constraint which appeared on suppositions is that they be in the present tense, and first person singular except for the two expressions above. It must be a supposition made at the time of speaking, past suppositions may have been verified or the hearer may have changed his attitude. Also an utterance as 'He thinks that's $4.00,' could be a Reportative as, 'I report that . . . .', or, 'He said that he thinks that's $4.00.' On the other hand, it could be an Opine as 'I suppose he thinks that's $4.00.' The decision as to which class such an utterance belongs to rests on other situational factors and often it is not possible to determine. 13
An utterance is classified as an Opine if in that utterance the speaker assesses a referent by assigning it some degree of certainty or uncertainty as in

b) its frequency of occurrence

This characteristic includes the adverbs of frequency. Examples included 'sometimes' as the most frequent, e.g., 'I am at sometimes compulsively, neurotically ... ah, uh, you know, 'usually,' '(not) often,' 'always.'

c) its approximate size or amount.

This characteristic includes approximations and estimations, e.g., 'some' as the most frequent, e.g., 'Yes, well some of them are but,' 'a lot of,' 'most,' 'a little,' 'a few,' 'mostly,' 'more,' 'many,' 'a great deal of,' 'less/more than,' '(not) enough.'

A speaker assesses a referent by assigning it some attribute characteristic or quality with or without a positive/negative value judgement.

Attributes, characteristics or qualities with a value judgement are subjective evaluations¹⁴ and the data include the Adjectives 'good,' 'nice,' and 'better' as the most frequent, e.g., 'I will get better, that I can promise,' 'neat,' 'strange,' 'far out,' '(not) worth,' 'alright,' 'ok,' 'beautiful,' 'special,' 'pretty,' 'not good,' 'great,' 'fine,' 'not that great,' 'crazy,' 'terrible,' 'bad,' 'wrong (not working),' 'sharp' (intelligent). Nouns include 'the devil' (FDR), e.g., 'You've got to give the devil his due,' 'fault,' 'good will,' 'benefit,' 'criticism,' 'compliment,' 'excellence.' Verbs include 'I like,' 'I want,' 'help,' 'I hate,' 'should,' throw away,' 'I hope,' e.g., 'I like these.' The same constraint on verbs that appeared with Suppositions
can be seen to be operating here as well (cf. p. 17). Adverbs included 'too + Adj.' 'so + Adj.' 'in our interest.' e.g., 'That was so kind of you.'

Some expressions which occurred are 'never mind,' and 'it doesn't matter' both meaning something is not important. 'I wonder if . . . would be better,' I've never thought about it,' 'not much of a . . . ,' 'it would be better to . . . ,)' '(If I were you) I would not worry about it,' 'it's about the,' 'it would be much better if . . . ,)' 'I'm glad to say.'

Other conditionals, not included above, are problematic and can be Opines or not. Examples from the data include the following:

1) C8:39
   A: If you keep them like that, you might destroy the stones.

2) C9:64
   A: This is a nice color, if you have things to wear with it.

3) C10:4
   A: If he is an American citizen, he has every right to serve in the US military.

4) CB:276
   A: If I get out from under this (. . . ) trip I'll be (. . . ).

Example 1) was counted as a negative evaluation, i.e., 'keeping them like that is bad' because of the negative result.

Example 2) was counted as an Opine because it is a positive evaluation in that 'the color is nice if you have things' and 'the color is not nice if you don't have things to wear with it.'

Example 3) was counted as a Reportative because being an American or not is an absolute situation not a relative one and his having the
'right' or not is dependent on that absolute condition.

Example 4) could be an Evaluation as 'At the time when I get out from under this trip, I'll be ( . . . ),' or it could be a Tentative with 'if' indicating a possibility that A will not 'get out from under this trip.' Either way it is an Opine.

Again, the decision as to whether or not a given conditional is an Opine or not depends on other situational factors and at times it was impossible to determine.

Examples which report some fact or state about the mental or physical condition of the speaker were not considered Opines even though they may contain evaluative adjectives. The hearer assumes the proposition is true because the speaker is using himself as the referent, e.g., C3:3

A: I feel terrible.

C3:28

I'm hungry.

c3:33

A: Well, I had better go back to work.

C14:18a

A: I agree.

On the other hand, examples which included a referent other than the speaker were counted as Opines. He is assessing something outside himself, something other than his own condition. e.g., C28:14

A: I'm happy about that.

CB:128

A: Well, it really hurts, when somebody - when you spend time with somebody.
Opines occur simply as the opinion held by the speaker about some referent. They can also occur as compliments. e.g.,

S1

A: Great speech Brown.

Sometimes they occur as confirmation checks

Cl:143

C: You've done the socio course haven't you?

In addition offers, advice, recommendations and apologies can be said to contain an implicit Opine regarding benefit to the hearer. Offers are acts to be carried out by the speaker, but the offer is made because the speaker believes the act will benefit the hearer. The same is true of advice and recommendation although the act in question is to be carried out by the hearer for his own benefit. Apologies have the implicit speaker belief that some act carried out by the speaker has or will be of negative value to the hearer. In this study offers and apologies were not counted as Opines since the implication is a weak one. However, recommendations and advice were counted as Opines since the implication of positive or negative value for the hearer is much stronger. As advice or recommendation 'should' and 'ought to' mark Opines.

Attributes, characteristics or qualities without a value judgement are also subjective evaluations and the data includes the Adjectives 'smaller' as the most frequent, 'too much . . .', 'slow,' 'surprising,' '(too) big,' '(too) easy,' 'understandable.' Nouns include 'wrong with (not operating properly),' 'of interest.' Adverbs include 'sort of,' 'literally,' 'very,' 'rather.'
Another characteristic of Opines, although not a defining one, is that a speaker may assign only one Opine marker to a proposition or he may assign more than one.

C1: 87a

D: It should probably be just pilot tested. . . .

where both 'should' and 'probably' are both Opine markers.

C32:18, 19

C: I don't really really think you should have laws against any kind of a drug.

B: I think maybe I agree with Bette.

This double marking is probably an attempt by the speaker to emphasize his uncertainty or the subjective quality of his utterance. According to House and Kasper (1981:167) such utterances would "lower the degree to which X commits himself to the state of affairs referred to in the proposition."

A characteristic which Opines share with Reportatives is that of embedding.

1) A Reportative can be embedded in an Opine, e.g.,

I think he said he went to Waikiki.

The Opine appears as the supposition, 'I think,' while 'he said he went to Waikiki' is the Reportative. This is counted as an Opine.

2) A Reportative can be embedded in a Reportative, e.g.,

I report that he said he went to Waikiki.

'I report' and 'he said that he went to Waikiki' are both Reportatives. This is counted as a Reportative.

3) An Opine can be embedded in a Reportative, e.g.,

I report that this is good.
The Reportative appears as 'I report,' while 'this is good' is a positive evaluation of the referent 'this.' This is counted as an Opine.

4) An Opine can be embedded in an Opine, e.g.,

I think this is good.

'I think' is a tentative Opine, and 'this is good' is an evaluation Opine.
NOTES

1 Her data cited for the study she was conducting at the time include "conversations between friends, people speaking in public meetings, both from the stage and from the audience, work situations where the participants are colleagues and those in which there are asymmetrical relationships involved, conversations between children and parents and between parents and children, narratives recorded from TV talk shows and newspapers, from conversations during service encounters, and from those among neighbors as well as among family members" (Wolfson 1976:204).

2 Regarding the collection of data she says, "one can obtain data by listening and, if possible, recording wherever people meet and speak. . . . One has only to listen and write quickly, or, if the noise level permits, record. These are, as Labov has so truly termed them, anonymous observations. From the point of view of the speaker, they have not occurred at all. From the point of view of ethics, it need only be said that the investigation is looking only at speech forms; he neither knows nor cares who the participants are and his observing has nothing to do with gathering information specific to individuals" (Wolfson 1976:204).

3 In the cases where a telephone was tapped, it was not possible that the interlocutors be unaware that data was being collected, both participants always had to know. In some of the service-encounters taped, the researcher asked a friend to buy something or to do some errand and the researcher tagged along to tape it. In these cases, one of the interlocutors knew she was being taped.

4 Some of these preliminary hypotheses included:

- Agree/disagree may only occur as a response to an 'opinion.'
- The speech acts 'confirmation' or 'denial,' 'acceptance' or 'rejection' did not constitute 'agreement/disagreement.'
- An opinion was not something that was 'binary,' i.e., either 'x' or 'not x,' e.g., 'He is 72.'
- An 'opinion' was a belief, a criticism, a value judgement or evaluation.
- A 'statement' was about a fact that was verifiable as true or false.
- Opinions and agreement/disagreement belonged to Searle's class of Representative.

5 When either occurred alone as a one utterance turn it was considered to be a reflection of the same level of assessment of the referent as that of the initiation Opine since no explicit expression of upgrading or down scaling was produced (cf. Chapter IV).
6 The speech act 'agreement/disagreement' examined in this thesis is the speech act 'agreement with/disagreement with.' 'Agreement to/disagreement to' is another speech act involving the performance of some action subsequent to and as a consequence of the speech act agreement to/disagreement to.

7 In addition to being an intensifier, 'definitely' is also a certainty marker.

8 For descriptive statements the question of truth or falsity is objectively decidable, because to know the meaning of the descriptive expressions is to know under what objectively ascertainable conditions the statements which contain them are true or false. To know the meaning of evaluative expressions is not by itself sufficient for knowing under what conditions the statements containing them are true or false, because the meaning of the expressions is such that the statements are not capable of objective or factual truth or falsity at all.

Descriptive statements are thus objective evaluative statements subjective. (Searle 1969:183).

9 Both can and could occur in Opines as possibility and ability although it occurred more frequently as possibility.

10 I.e., examples of deontic modality were not considered to be Opines.

11 Palmer (1979:43), following Karttunen (1972:12), states that "factual assertion is not an expression of certainty or of 100% probability; rather, it makes no epistemic judgement at all. Epistemic necessity, unlike factual assertion, makes such a judgement: making the strongest of all judgements is not the same as making a factual assertion. Indeed, in language, a factual assertion makes a stronger claim than the strongest of all epistemic judgements." Factual assertion is a Reportative, epistemic necessity is an Opine.

12 Palmer (1979:72) refers to this type of verb as "private verbs."

13 Throughout this study when it was not possible to determine the classification of a particular example, it was not counted as an Opine.

14 and "are judged by the speakers perception" (Richards 1983, private discussion).

15 'Should' here is the 'should' of advice and recommendations which indicates that some situation or condition X is better or worse (with a negative) for the hearer than the situation or condition at the time of speaking.
CHAPTER IV

THE SPEECH ACT AGREEMENT/DISAGREEMENT

This chapter reports the results of the research done on the speech act agreement/disagreement and discusses those results. The results begin with a definition of the speech act along with its structural characteristics. Then the result that agreement occurs more frequently than disagreement is discussed and possible reasons for the result that Opines occur much more frequently than agreement/disagreement are suggested. Following that is a discussion of the six levels of politeness which were found to make up this speech act. The sociolinguistic variables collected in the data are then discussed. The speech act as a function in discourse is explained and possible responses to it are suggested. The relevance of the findings from this research to the ESL/EFL classroom/learner are suggested by discussing the structural politeness factors of the speech act which should be known to an intermediate level learner. Following that the levels and forms of the speech act which should be included in an intermediate level student's repertoire are suggested.

When a speaker assesses a referent by assigning it

1) some degree of certainty/uncertainty as in
   a) its likelihood of occurrence or of being a state of affairs
   b) its frequency of occurrence
   c) its approximate size or amount.

2) some attribute, characteristic or quality with or without a positive/negative value judgement

then 1) Agreement can optionally follow as a response if the responder
holds the same assessment of the same referent as the producer of the prior Opine, or 2) Disagreement can optionally follow as a response if the responder holds a different of a qualified assessment of the same referent as the producer of the prior Opine.

This speech act usually occurs as a declarative sentence which typically is also an Opine. The structure is sequential in that it appears only as

1) Action\textsubscript{2} of an 'action chain' (cf. p. 47 and fn. 14 in Chapter II) with Action\textsubscript{1} being an Opine, or as

2) a response to an Opine, and as such it cannot be used to initiate a sequence, of as an Action\textsubscript{1}. There must be a previous utterance, Opine.\textsuperscript{2}

CB:171-2 Agreement as Action\textsubscript{2} following an Opine:

B: He's a rat. A rat fink.
A: He really is.

Agreement as Action\textsubscript{1} prior to an Opine.

A: He really is.
B: He's a rat. A rat fink.

Fab. Agreement without a prior utterance, Opine.

A: —

*B: I agree.

Fab. Agreement as Action\textsubscript{2} following a Reportative.

A: He said that it was yesterday.

*B: I disagree.
The data in this study indicate that Agreements are the preferred seconds occurring 137 times as a response to 1,170 occurrence of Opines, while Disagreements are the dispreferred seconds occurring only 49 times in response to Opines. The reason for this preferential difference is not difficult to understand as the review of the literature on politeness indicates.

Leech (cf. p. 37) maintains that conflict or situations that lead to conflict should be avoided. Disagreement can be taken as a criticism of the prior speaker and criticisms threaten the hearer's face according to Brown and Levinson (cf. p. 38). Labov and Fanshall (cf. pp. 53–54) suggest that criticisms along with challenges lower the status of the other participant. Edmondson and House (cf. p. 64) give "Anticipate any case in which you might give offense" as one of their 'social rules of conduct.' Lakoff (cf. p. 35) notes that the need for politeness supercedes that for clarity because following the 'Rules of Politeness' will cause the interlocutor "to think well of one." She mentions "making A feel good—be friendly" as one of the Politeness rules.

Disagreement which is heard as a criticism wouldn't cause a hearer to feel good. Rehbein and Ehlich (cf. p. 51) express the idea that a negative attitude held by a hearer may break off further relations while a positive attitude would continue the relationship. Brown and Levinson (cf. p. 39) suggest that a person's face is vulnerable in face–Lo–face interaction and cooperation in face maintenance is necessary in such situations of interaction.

The literature would indicate that disagreement has negative interactional qualities which could potentially result in a breech in the relationship. Therefore an interlocutor must weigh the degree of
potential risk involved against his desire/need to be honest and to express his own feelings and attitudes.

On the other hand, agreement has positive interactional qualities expressing friendliness and support for the hearer which make him feel he is liked and appreciated.

The data collected for this study indicate that Opines occur frequently in discourse. Being marked for uncertainty and being expressions of the speaker's own subjective feelings and attitudes, their assertive force is diminished, they are less direct, which, as Leech (cf. p. 37) suggests, means they are more polite and tactful. For Brown and Levinson (cf. p. 38), they are a type of 'negative politeness,' and when they occur as tag questions or as negative questions Sinclair and Brazil (cf. p. 59) suggest that the hearer's happy because he has some indication of the speaker's position. However the data indicate that the speech act agreement/disagreement occurs relatively infrequently in discourse.

In the normal course of a conversation, speakers often produce more than one speech act during their turn at talk. 'Opines,' therefore, may occur as one in a succession of other acts and, according to Sinclair and Coulthard (cf. p. 57), the hearer knows he only has to respond to the last one which has the discourse function of being the initiating move so that unless an Opine occurs as an 'initiating move,' a next speaker is under no obligation to produce agreement/disagreement.

On the other hand, a speaker desires/needs to express his own sincere feelings and attitudes in an assessment of a referent while at the same time he/she desires/needs to have the interlocutor think well
of him/her by acting in a polite manner. As has been noted above, indirectness which expresses a lesser degree of forcefulness and less speaker commitment to a proposition is a manifestation of politeness. Opines, by definition, are the expression of a speaker's feelings and attitudes as an assessment of a referent and, at the same time, are indirect in that they also display less speaker commitment to his/her proposition than do Reportatives. Opines, therefore, offer the perfect solution for the speaker. However, by producing his own subjective assessment of a referent in an Opine as an 'initiation' move, a speaker is voluntarily placing himself in a position where he can be threatened, i.e., his assessment can be challenged by his interlocutor. He is dependent, therefore, on his interlocutor's cooperation in maintaining his (the initiator's) face (cf. Brown and Levinson, p. 38). This obligates the responder to some extent to be polite and to protect the initiator's face by agreeing or not disagreeing, or at least by providing an accounting for his disagreement.

The data show individual expressions of agreement/disagreement appearing under points along a continuum of politeness and tact. This scale proceeds from a point of maximum H-support/minimum threat, 'Equal,' at the farthest end of the Agreement scale to a point of minimum H-support/maximum threat, 'Opposite,' at the farthest end of the Disagreement scale. Six levels of politeness could be distinguished along this continuum.

A. Agreement/Disagreement: A Scale of Six Levels of Politeness

In producing the speech act agreement/disagreement the responder produces an utterance in response to an Opine offered by the prior
speaker by producing his own assessment of the same referent by assigning it a(n) _Mx_ Polite _Least Polite_

assessments in relation to that of the originally proffered assessment. 'Equal,' 'Upgraded,' and 'Scaled-Down' are the three levels of Agreement, while 'Qualified,' 'Different,' and 'Opposite' are the three levels of Disagreement.

Assessment shifts in responses were determined according to the definition of an _Opine_. If the degree of certainty changed to a stronger degree, the respondent's assessment was determined to be 'upgraded.' If the degree of certainty became less, it was considered to be 'scaled-down.' If a term assigning a characteristic or quality were strengthened, e.g., 'unusual' to 'weird,' or an intensifier were added, it was considered to be an 'upgrade.' If positive or negative evaluations were made stronger, e.g., 'good' to 'better,' 'bad' to 'worst,' it was also considered to be an 'upgrade,' while 'scaled-down' were the opposite cases, e.g., 'terrible' to 'bad' or 'huge' to 'big,' or the dropping of an intensifier. 'Equal' assessments were cases of repeated assessment terms or rephrasings but with assessments that were of similar level, e.g., 'large' to 'big.'

Determination of the level of agreement/disagreement by a comparison of the responder's assessment to that produced by the prior speaker is a further indication of the interactional quality between the initiation utterance and the response.
In the following discussion, the different levels will be illustrated by means of the situational context. Speaker_1 assesses a referent 'X' by assigning it 'R' degree of certainty and/or 'E' characteristic or quality with or without positive/negative value. (For charts containing sociolinguistic information cf. Appendix I, Chart 1.) The sub-categories are listed according to the frequency of their occurrence in the data.

I. 'Equal.' Speaker_2 assesses 'X' by assigning it 'R' and/or 'E' with or without positive/negative value, i.e., in a manner that is equal to the degree and/or characteristic assigned it by Speaker_1. This type of response was the most frequent in the data occurring a total of 80 times. It is considered to be at the farthest end of the Agreement scale expressing maximum X-support and minimum threat because it places the relationship in a position of balance and harmony, of speaker-hearer equality, and creates a feeling of good-will. The relationship can continue employing this shared attitude/knowledge as a building block upon which to grow. This type of agreement was generally found to occur throughout all the data and would be crucial to an ESL/EFL learner.

1) a token of agreement as a one-word utterance (cf. pp. 45, 47). This occurs 34 times making it the most common form of agreement. It occurs nine times as an interruption: 2 times in Group 2, and 7 times in Group 8 indicating that topics eliciting personal commitments are also important here as well in contributing to the occurrence of interruption. There are 25 examples of tokens occurring without interruption of the prior speaker. Appearing 12 times in Group 1, 3 times in Group 2, 1 time in Group 3, 1 time in Group 4, 6 times in Group 5, 1 time in Group 8,
and 1 time in Group 9 would indicate its usefulness in telephone conversations between friends and in service encounters. Tokens are an easy and useful tool for ESL/EFL students to acquire.

CB: 38, 39

A: It is the only sensible thing to do Nark. Everything else is stupid.

B: Yeah.

2) repetition of assessment employing a verb of supposition (cf. p. 90) and/or ellipsis. This occurred a total of 15 times: 2 times in Group 1, 8 times in Group 2, 1 time in Group 4, 1 time in Group 5, 1 time in Group 7, and 2 times in Group 9 indicating it is used among friends but could also be employed in all types of situations. The frequency with which it occurs would make this an essential form for ESL/EFL learners besides being an easy one.

C: 34: 30, 31

D: Oh Gary, but you miss all the fun.

A: Yeah, that's what I think.

3) direct repetition of assessment occurs 14 times: 4 times in Group 1, 3 times in Group 2, 1 time in Group 3, 1 time in Group 5, 3 times in Group 8, and 2 times in Group 9 fadinating general distribution and frequency of occurrence which would make this type a useful tool for expressing agreement for ESL/EFL students.

Cl: 53

D: Freeman Reports is good

C: It is good.

4) repetition of assessment rephrasing the prior assessment but on the same level. This occurred six times: 2 times in Group 1, 1 time
in Group 4, 1 time in Group 7, and 2 times in Group 8. Again distribution is fairly even making this a useful expression of agreement.

CB:270, 271
A: Things are really good for you now, huh?
B: Sure, it's far out (,3) well, keep bright, huh?

5) equal level of assessment indicated by S2's interruption of S1's turn at speaking in order to finish the utterance for S1. This occurred five times: 1 time in Group 1, 1 time in Group 3, and 3 times in Group 8. These interruptions with agreement occurred with some emotional overtones where topics involved personal commitments.

Cl:129a, 130, 129b
B: They're not necessarily comparable.
C? not comparable.

6) repetition of an assessment by an explicit performative occurring four times: 2 times in Group 1, 1 time in Group 8, and 1 time in Group 9, an adversary relationship indicating that both types of situation, adversity and good friendship allow direct communication of speaker feelings.

C36:18, 19
C: I don't think they're (children) ready for socializing outside of the family, you know, before the age of about 5 or 6.
D: Yeah, I agree with you.

7) Token plus support/expander. There are two examples in the data, both from Group 2, among friends (cf. Appendix 1, Table 8, Examples 79–80). (Cf. Appendix 1, Table 8, Examples 1–80 for data classified as 'Equal' assessments.)
11. 'Upgraded.' Speaker assesses 'X' by assigning it 'R' plus and/or 'E' plus with or without positive/negative value. This is the second most frequently occurring form of agreement appearing in the data 38 times. It is considered to be less H-supportive, and more threatening than the 'Equal' because even though the speaker is expressing a higher level of assessment, it is still a different assessment so that the relationship does not reflect the same measure of balance and harmony as from an 'Equal.' This type of agreement was also found to occur throughout the data.

1a) upgrading an assessment with a stronger evaluation accomplished by an intensifier but not to the level of a fact. This occurred nine times: 2 times in Group 1, 3 times in Group 2, 2 times in Group 3, 1 time in Group 7, and 1 time in Group 9 indicating that this type also occurs most frequently when a speaker is among friends or colleagues and its frequency of use would make it a form ESL/EFL students should be aware of.

C25:21, 22

C: You're rather formalistic.
D: Very much so.

1b) tokens of agreement appear in three types of combinations totalling nine times.

a) token and 'right' upgrading the assessment to the level of a fact. This occurred three times: 1 time in Group 2, 1 time in Group 5, and 1 time in Group 8.

Cl:141, 142

A: Goffman's stuff probably
C: Yeah right.
b) token and support evidence upgrading the assessment to the level of a fact. This occurred three times: 1 time in Group 3, 1 time in Group 8, and 1 time in Group 9.

A: I think they (poinsettias) grow here, don't they.
B: Yeah, there's a gorgeous bush of them just down the hill.

c) token and an expression upgrading the level of assessment. This occurs three times: 1 time in Group 1, 1 time in Group 2, and 1 time in Group 7.

CA:69, 70
B: Oh that (cold) sounds bad.
A: Uh I'm going to die. And then everybody'll be sorry.

(cf. Appendix I, Table 8, Examples 81-118 for data classified as 'Upgraded' assessment.)

2) upgrading an assessment by raising the level of certainty but not to the level of fact. This occurred seven times: 1 time in Group 1, 3 times in Group 2, 1 time in Group 8, and 2 times in Group 9 indicating that this occurs usually among friends and again would be useful to an ESL/EFL learner but not as easy as some others.

C35:21, 22
B: It (house cleaning) depends on how many other people you affect.
A: Well, of course.

3a) Upgrading of assessment occurring with a Verb of Supposition so that the speaker is upgrading his assessment but adding a marker which lowers the degree to which he is committed to that assessment. This occurs four times: 3 times in Group 3, and 1 time in Group 8
indicating that it occurs in situations where participants are colleagues and are perhaps more formal and guarded.

C15:10, 11

A: It seems that everything here **eminates** from the top.
B: Yes, yes—uh I-I think that is right, this would be another basic difference.

3b) upgrading an assessment with a stronger term of evaluation but not to the level of a fact. This occurs four times: 1 time in Group 8, and 3 times in Group 9. The occurrences in Group 9 were all produced by women.

S17

A: Isn't he cute.
B: **Oh** **oh** **oh** adorable.

4) an explicit **performative** with an intensifier occurs three times: 1 time in Group 2, 1 time in Group 3, and 1 time in Group 9.

CB:40, 41

A: Doesn't make any sense for me to be getting hurt over and over again.
B: Well that's certainly—I agree with that.

5) an upgraded assessment to the level of a fact, i.e., upgraded to the level of a **confirmation**, without any **uncertainty** markers occurred only twice: 1 time in Group 2 and 1 time in Group 7, i.e., among friends and in an adversity relationship where direct expressions can be used.

C35:19, 20

A: I don't think it's (house cleaning) so important if you're comfortable. I don't think it makes much difference.
C: That's true. That's true.

111. 'Scaled-down.' Speaker assesses 'X' by assigning it 'R' minus and/or 'E' minus with or without positive/negative value. This is the fifth most frequently occurring form of the speech act agreement/disagreement appearing only 19 times in the data. Scaled down agreement and qualified agreement, which is really disagreement, are very similar to the extent that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them. It is considered to be less H-supportive and more threatening than the 'Upgrade.' In addition to being a different assessment, the speaker is downgrading the level so that it is the closest form of agreement to disagreement. The relationship between the interlocutors reflects less harmony and good will than in the Upgrade. This type of agreement also occurs throughout the data.

1) scaling down an assessment by the use of a more moderate evaluation term. This occurs seven times: 1 time in Group 1, 1 time in Group 4, 1 time in Group 5, and 4 times in Group 9. Frequency makes this a useful type for ESL/EFL learners to know.

C9:30, 31a

B: I really like these. These're great.

A: Nice yeah. It all depends on the style of the shoe.

2) scaling down an assessment by decreasing the degree of certainty. This appeared four times: 2 times in Group 1, 1 time in Group 5, and 1 time in Group 8.

CB:25, 26

B: You know perfectly well what's going on, don't you.

A: I guess I must. I ought to by now.
3) scaling **down** of an assessment is accomplished through redirecting a positive evaluation. This occurs three times: 1 time in Group 1, 2 times in Group 5.

**C9:28,** 29

B: Oh these're beautiful.
A: They fit you (., .,) too.

(Cf. Appendix I, Table 8, Examples 119–137 for data classified as 'Scaled-down' assessments.)

4a) scaling down an assessment by the removal of an intensifier. This occurred two times: 1 time in Group 3, and 1 time in Group 4.

**C22:9,** 10

A: This must be very expensive . .
B: Yes it is an expensive technique.

4b) **an explicit performative** appearing with a scaled down degree of certainty occurs two times: both in Group 2.

**C32:18,** 19

C: I think the choice should be up to the individual.
B: I think maybe I agree with Bette though—I mean why should there be a law against drugs.

5) scaling **down an assessment** by the use of a more moderate **intensifier.** This occurred only once in Group 2 (cf. Appendix I, Example 121).

**IV. 'Qualified.'** Speaker_2_ assesses 'X' by assigning it 'R' and/or 'E' with or without positive/negative value, or upgraded 'R' and/or 'E,' or scaled down 'R' and/or 'E,' with a qualification added. This is the 'I agree but . . .' type of disagreement. **It is the second**
most frequently occurring type of disagreement in the data occurring 21 times, and is the fourth most frequent type of speech act agreement disagreeing in the data. It is considered to be the most supportive and least threatening type of disagreement although it is less 

**H-supportive** and more threatening than the lowest level of agreement, 'Scaled down.' It occurs in two parts. Part 1 is agreement which can be the same level of assessment, or upgraded, or scaled down from that of the prior Opine. Part 2 contains the qualification which the speaker assigns to his previous agreement in Part 1. This qualification usually takes the form of some explanation by citing an exception to the prior's referent and his/her assessment of it. Most of the data appearing in this category used the marker 'but' as an introduction to Part 2 although no explicit marker appeared in some examples and 'though' appeared once. Occasionally a speaker began his response with 'but' or with a token of agreement followed by 'but.' This form is considered to be the most polite form of disagreement due to the fact that by beginning with agreement it shows support for the hearer and friendliness towards him thereby reducing the force of the threat of the disagreement. It represents a solution to the dilemma of 'not disagreeing' but still expressing a different assessment. This type of disagreement is found throughout the data. Because of its high level of politeness and frequency of occurrence, this would be a good type of disagreement for ESL/EFL learners to be exposed to.

1) the speaker's qualification takes the form of 'Opine But Opine' and occurs 11 times: 3 times in Group 2, 1 time in Group 3, 1 time in Group 5, 2 times in Group 6, 2 times in Group 7, and 2 times in Group 8
indicating frequency of use in situations where social relationships
are not so solid or in adverse relationships. The Opine appearing in Part 1 as agreement is a 'Scaled down' assessment of the prior
speaker's Opine in 9 of the 10 instances and it is an 'Equal' level
Opine in the other instance. This 'scaling down' in Part 1 could serve
as a warning to the hearer of possible disagreement. It is possible
that 'Scaled down' agreement is Part 1 of 'Qualified' disagreement
without the following expression of explanation.

C9:64, 65

A: This is a nice color if you have things to wear with it.
B: Well the color would be ok, but the style is (...).
   I guess for today just these two then.

2) the speaker's qualification takes ellipted forms of Part 1-agree, or Part 2-disagree
   a) the response begins with 'but.' This occurs three times:
      1 time in Group 1, 1 time in Group 2, and 1 time in Group 8.

C8:27, 28

B: (LF) You didn't know that?
A: But I guess I wasn't accepting it.

b) the response begins with a token of agreement followed by an
   Opine. This occurs once in Group 8 (cf. Appendix I, Table 8,
   Example 152).

c) the response begins with a token of agreement followed by a
   Reportative, i.e., as an exception. This occurs once in
   Group 7 (cf. Appendix I, Table 3, Example 153).
d) the response takes the form of 'Reportative But Reportative' with the intervening 'But' removed. This occurs once in Group 7 (cf. Appendix I, Table 8, Example 154).

e) the speaker employs 'though' instead of 'but' and follows it with an Opine. This occurs once in Group 2 (cf. Appendix I, Table 8, Example 155).

(Cf. Appendix I, Table 8, Examples 149-155 for data classified as 'Qualified' disagreement.)

3) the speaker's qualification takes the form of 'Reportative But Opine' and occurs two times: 1 time in Group 1, and 1 time in Group 7. The agreement expressed by the speaker in Part 1 as a Reportative upgrades the assessment to the level of a fact. The fact that Part 2 is an Opine indicates that the speaker is lowering his degree of commitment to the disagreement (as in 1)'above), thereby reducing the force of the threat.

C32:6, 7, 8

A: But I think . . . that's good (.) because I think often people depend on (.) medicines too much when they could get by without taking stuff.

D: *mmmm

C: Well I know but-uh h you know, I don't really think you should have laws against any kind of a drug.

4) the speaker's qualification takes the form of 'Reportative But Reportative' and occurs once in Group 8 in an adversity relationship. The level of assessment in both Part 1 and Part 2 is raised to that of a fact indicating the speaker's commitment to both parts (cf. Appendix I, Table 8, Example 158).
V. 'Different.' Speaker₂ assesses 'X' by assigning it a different, 'T,' degree of certainty and/or a different, 'F,' characteristic or quality with or without positive/negative value. This is not an opposite assessment to that of the prior speakers, it is a different assessment. This occurs only twice: 1 time in Group 7, and 1 time in Group 8 neither of which is an example of closely solid relationships. Both examples occur as interruptions and display emotional overtones. The example in Group 7 occurs in an explicitly adverse relationship and the one in Group 8 is a sarcastic joke. (Cf. Appendix I, Table 8, Examples 159, 160.) By proposing a 'Different' assessment from the prior speaker's instead of an 'Opposite' assessment, the speaker can reduce the threat of disagreement but not to the extent that a 'Qualified' assessment does.

VI. 'Opposite.' Speaker₂ assesses 'X' by assigning it 'Negative R,' or opposite 'R' and/or 'Negative E,' or opposite 'E' with or without positive/negative value. Not only a different assessment, this re-assessment of 'X' stands in opposition to the assessment made by the prior speaker. This is the most frequent type of disagreement X found in the data occurring 25 times, and it is the third most common form of the speech act agreement/disagreement. It is considered to be at the farthest end of the disagreement scale of politeness displaying minimum H-support/maximum threat because it carries the greatest risk to the continuation of the relationship. Harmony is damaged and the speaker-hearer equality balance in strained. Following this type of disagreement there explicitly exists no shared knowledge between the speaker and hearer toward that particular referent. The responder's desire/need to
be truthful overrides his desire to be polite. He runs the risk of offending the hearer and damaging his face.

This type of disagreement is both the most frequent which appeared in the data and the least polite. However, most of the examples found in the data occurred with some form of accounting as an explanation, reason or cause for the disagreement. Another strategy for reducing the threat of an opposite assessment was the use of uncertainty markers to show a lower degree of speaker commitment to his assessment. Out of 25 occurrences of *Opposites*, only seven occurred without an accounting or an uncertainty marker. Three of these were tokens of disagreement and four were explicit negatives.

1) an opposite assessment is produced through the use of an explicit negative together with an accounting realized as a second assessment or as a cause/reason for the disagreement. This occurs seven times: 2 times in Group 1, 1 time in Group 2, 1 time in Group 3, 1 time in Group 5, 1 time in Group 6, and 1 time in Group 7 indicating a frequent and general useability of this form making it a good one for ESL/EFL learners to be familiar with.

C9:33, 34

A: You don't want to try these on too?
B: No huh uh. No, I want these.

2a) an opposite assessment is produced without the use of an explicit negative through the use of an antonym or through the expression of an accounting only. This occurs four times: 1 in Group 1, 1 in Group 2, 1 in Group 8, and 1 in Group 9.
D: If you do it that way Mike, with one person on one side and the other person on the other, it's very hard to record overlaps.

A: It's easy to record overlaps, that's just—oh well—I mean it depends on what detail you want on an overlap.

2b) An opposite assessment is produced through the use of an explicit negative with an uncertainty marker, but no accounting to reduce the force of the assessment. Although the uncertainty marker displays a lower degree of commitment to that assessment by the speaker. This type occurs four times: 1 time in Group 1, and 3 times in Group 9.

S8

A: Chinese food is so good.

B: I don't think so.

2c) An opposite assessment is produced through the use of an explicit negative without any accounting. This occurs four times: 1 time in Group 1, 1 time in Group 2, and 2 times in Group 7. The example in Group 1 occurs in a very solid relationship during a moment of depression. The example in Group 2 occurs among good friends and displays shock. Group 7 is an explicit adversary relationship and the examples occur during an emotionally charged exchange. This would indicate that this form occurs in moments of stress in situations where speakers may directly express their feelings.

Cl2:16, 17

B: Well see, the Bible—the Lord wrote the Bible.

A: I don't believe that either.
3a) an opposite assessment is produced through the use of an explicit negative together with an uncertainty marker and an accounting as a second assessment or as a reason for the disagreement. This occurs three times: 1 time in Group 1, and 2 times in Group 2, all among friends.

C33:21, 23
B: I really do. I-1 think from the beginning children should have their own rooms.
C: I don't. I think-uh for like a small baby, you know, until you're maybe at least a year or 2 years old-uh just the sense of security that develops in a child in the presence of other people.

3b) an opposite assessment is produced through the use of a token of disagreement (Huh uh). This occurs one time as a token alone without an accounting in Group 5, and once as a token plus a negative in Group 5, and once as a token plus an accounting in Group 1.

C8:12, 13
A: Too easy (.) you need at least (,2) half a size smaller.
B: Huh uh (shaking head).
(Cf. Appendix I, Table 8, Examples 161–195 for data classified as 'Opposite disagreement.)

The frequency of occurrence of this type of disagreement, i.e., 'Opposite,' makes it important for ESL/EFL learners to know, but at the same time it should be pointed out to them that this type of disagreement can bring about speaker-hearer disharmony and negative attitudes because of its threatening nature. Therefore, they should be made familiar with the strategies employed by native speakers in reducing
this threat, i.e., uncertainty markers, and accounting.

Sociolinguistic variables are important considerations in discourse analysis as pointed out by Erwin-Tripp (cf. p. 33) and others. Nevertheless the results of this study did not reveal any of the variables collected as being decisive factors affecting the occurrence of the speech act agreement/disagreement.

This research was conducted for the purpose of examining the speech act agreement/disagreement in 'natural conversation' which is how it is purported to be presented in most Notional/Functional texts. The data collected, therefore, had to be data that could be used as a basis for comparison to the presentation of the same speech act in Notional/Functional texts. Unfortunately, the data collected did not show any significant relationships because the ranges within the variables were not wide enough and the number of conversations was not sufficient. However, frequency ratios of agreement to Opines, and disagreement to Opines were calculated for each of the eight groups (cf. Appendix I, Table 5). The data is insufficient and not decisive but it does indicate that interactions among strangers in service encounters have higher percentages of both agreement and disagreement. Adversity roles among strangers have the least agreement and the most disagreement. Adversity roles among acquaintances have relatively low levels of each. Acquaintances on the telephone agree much more frequently than they disagree. Friends and colleagues appear to be mixed so that obviously other variables are at work, topic may be one. The results would indicate that people express agreement/disagreement more often when the relationship is not one in which they have a vested interest. But this
conclusion is very tentative and needs further research for verification.

Further research related to that presented here would be an investigation into which variables (including that of topic and probably more importantly, that of individual personality) or combination of variables affect a speaker in choosing which category of agreement/disagreement to produce as a second following an initiation Opine. This would seem to be a more relevant avenue of research than that into the frequency of occurrence of agreement/disagreement.

In discourse, an Opine can function as an 'Initiation move' or a !Proffer (cf. Appendix I, Table 2) to open an exchange. Agreement follows as a 'response' move for Sinclair and Coulthard and as a *Satisfy* for Edmondson. Disagreement, on the other hand, is a 'response' move for Sinclair and Coulthard which can be optionally followed by a 'comment' or a 'follow-up' to close the 'exchange.' For Edmondson, disagreement occurs as a 'contra' or 'counter' and must be followed by a 'Satisfy' before the 'exchange' can be completed.

As Rehbein and Ehlich (cf. p. 50) have pointed out, a hearer has options open to him following a noncomprehension. Disagreement, being an Action, in a 'action chain,' is an optional, although dispreferred, response to an initiation Opine. A hearer who holds a different assessment of a referent from that of the prior speaker's initiation move has the same options. He may indicate his disagreement or not. If he chooses to express his disagreement, the hearer who initiated the original Opine also has options open to him. He may choose not to respond, or he may change the topic to reduce further threat/lrisk to the relationship by recurring disagreement. He may produce a 'confirm
check to be certain that the disagreement actually occurred, as a 'pre-sequence' before producing disagreement again (cf. Sacks, p. 43). He may put off a response with or without an accounting (cf. Labov and Fanshall, p. 55). He may support his original Opine with evidence, contradict his own initiating Opine, 'mitigate' or aggravate his original Opine, or break the relation (cf. p. 55).

If, on the other hand, a hearer shares the speaker's assessment of the referent, or determines that any form of disagreement would present too great a risk to the relationship, he may produce the preferred response to an initiation Opine, 'agreement.' Agreement which is a type of 'satisfy' according to Edmondson (cf. p. 61) allows the ongoing exchange to come to an end and the speakers are free to proceed to a next topic or to terminate the interaction (cf. Appendix I, Table 8, examples of next speaker response moves following disagreement).

B. Relevance to the ESL/EFL Learner

This research has been carried out with the intent of applying the findings to the ESL/EFL situation, i.e., to the needs of the ESL/EFL learner. All of the results might be useful and/or interesting for a very advanced learner but would not be necessary for the needs of the typical learner. Therefore, this discussion will center on those results that would be necessary for an intermediate learner to know or be aware of in order to produce, understand, and respond to the speech act agree/disagree.

1) Structural Factors

a) Action₂ in an Action chain. Agree/disagree occur only as optional responses to an Action₁ which functions as an initiation move.
being either the last move in the prior speaker's turn or an only move in his turn.

b) Action must occur as an initiation Opine, not an initiation Reportative; an Opine being a marked subjective assessment of a referent in that it expresses some degree of uncertainty and/or assigns some characteristic and/or value to the referent. Opines are not factual assertions, as are Reportatives.

c) When the hearer shares the same assessment of the same referent, he may respond to an initiation Opine with some form of agreement. When the hearer holds a different assessment of the same referent, he may respond with some form of disagreement. It is important that the referent be the same in both cases, only the assessment changes in the case of disagreement.

d) The declarative form of sentence is the most typical found in this speech act.

e) Agreement is the preferred second following an Opine while disagreement is the dispreferred second.

A presentation of this speech act which deviates from the above factors would not be truly representative of the real world occurrence of agreement/disagreement.

2) Politeness Factors

Brown and Levinson (1978) claim that concepts of 'face' and politeness are universal. This may be true, but different cultures appear to assign different levels of importance to the various concepts and to employ different means in expressing them. ESL/EFL students should perhaps be reminded of some of the basic concepts of politeness.
which are universals. More importantly, they should be made aware of the levels of **importance** and the **means** of expression used to perform **agreement/disagreement** in English speaking cultures. The following is a list of universal factors of **agreement/disagreement** which students and teachers alike should be aware of when studying this speech act in English.

a) In usual friendly conversational interactions it is generally more important to create a positive attitude in the hearer **toward** the speaker than to be clear. A positive attitude will **improve** the quality of the relationship and/or allow it to continue, while a negative attitude would **damage it or** even break it.

b) Positive attitudes are generated by politeness, and two rules of politeness directly affecting this speech act are

1) make the other person feel good, *i.e.*, be friendly.

2) anticipate cases of possibly giving offense to the other person and make adjustments in your actions accordingly.

c) **Opines** are more polite expressions than are Reportatives. Uncertainty and subjectivity on the part of the speaker soften their assertive force. *Being* less direct, they are more polite. Tag questions and negative questions are useful **forms** of initiation Opines because they elicit agreement, and make the hearer more comfortable in **knowing** the speaker's position.

d) Agreement contains positive interactional qualities. It expresses friendliness and supports the hearer's self-image (face). The hearer feels he is liked and appreciated and creates an atmosphere of good **will** in which the relationship can continue to grow. Agreement is polite.
e) Disagreement contains negative interactional qualities. It expresses criticism and challenges the hearer's self-image, i.e., it damages his face and lowers his status. It creates an atmosphere of tension in which the relationship is damaged or broken. Disagreement is not polite.

f) A person's 'face' is vulnerable in face-to-face interactions and it is generally a rule in such situations for participants to cooperate in maintaining each other's face. Relationships in which the participants are involved in explicit adversary roles are exceptions, but these are not the norm.

g) Agreement/disagreement occurs less frequently when the interlocutors highly value the relationship between them.

3) Politeness Levels and Forms of Agreement/Disagreement

The results of this study have indicated that forms of agreement/disagreement occur on a scale from most polite to least polite. Six categories were proposed with 30 sub-categories. All occurred in native speaker data, all may potentially be important for the ESL/EFL learner to be able to recognize and produce. But an intermediate student needs to be familiar with a broad range of speech acts, it simply would be unrealistic to require him to be fluent with all of them. Therefore, a choice was made as to which categories and sub-categories would be the most essential for him/her to learn in an intermediate level presentation of agreement/disagreement. The factors taken into consideration in making these choices were:

1) frequency of occurrence of a form. The more frequently native speakers produce a form, the more likely it is that
the ESL/EFL learner will encounter it, and would be in situations where he could produce it appropriately.

**ii)** politeness levels of both categories and sub-categories.

**iii)** breadth of distribution of occurrence. Related to (i) and (ii) above, this factor is related to the number of situations in which a form could be used appropriately.

**iv)** ease of learnability and production for the learner.

Some forms which would be useful for the learner to know according to the three factors above are also difficult for a learner to master, e.g., raising degree of certainty under 'Upgraded' which involves substitution of modality markers. In general modality in English is difficult for most intermediate level students to cope with. Such forms should be presented for recognition only at this level, mastery of production being left for a later time.

The following list consists of the forms chosen according to the above factors. Those forms marked with a 'P' are those which a learner should acquire for 'Production' as well as recognition. Those marked with a 'R' are those which a learner at this level should acquire for 'Recognition' only. For examples of each sub-category see the discussion above and the Appendix, Table 8. *(Cf. Appendix I, Table 5 for a breakdown of the Forms and Frequencies of the Speech Agreement/Disagreement listed by categories of Politeness.)*

**Agreement:**

1) 'Equal' assessments

- **P** - direct repetition
- **P** - Verb of Supposition and/or ellipsis
R - rephrasing
P - token only without interruption
R - token only as interruption

2) 'Upgraded' assessments
P - added intensifier but not to fact
P - tokens plus 'right,' support, upgrading
R - raising degree of certainty

3) 'Scaled-down' assessments
P - more moderate term of evaluation
R - decreasing degree of certainty

4) 'Qualified' assessments
P - 'Opine' But 'Opine'
P - 'Reportative' But 'Opine'
P - 'Reportative' But 'Reportative'
P - response beginning with But
R - token plus 'Opine' or 'Reportative'
R - 'Reportative' - 'Reportative'
R - though plus 'Opine'

5) 'Deferent' assessment
R

6) 'Opposite' assessment
P - explicit negative plus accounting
P - explicit negative plus uncertainty marker and accounting
P - antonym or accounting only without explicit negative
R - explicit negative plus uncertainty marker, no accounting
R - token of disagreement
No occurrence of the performative verb 'disagree' occurred in the data. The performative verb 'agree' occurred infrequently as a direct form in each of the three levels of agreement. None of these forms are included in the list above because of their infrequency of occurrence and directness. Also an ESL/EFL learner at the intermediate level would probably be familiar with these vocabulary items and would recognize their meanings if heard.

In Chapter V, the presentation of the speech act agreement1 disagreement as it appears in two conversational Notional/Functional ESL/EFL textbooks will be examined in light of the factors outlined above.
NOTES

1 There are exceptions when agree/disagree occurs as a Reportative. These will be noted in the following discussion.

2 In the data there were no examples found of side sequences occurring between the Opine and the responding agreement/disagreement. The only examples of other speaker turns occurring between the two acts were in conversations involving more than two participants.

3 Agreement and disagreement, once defined, were easily countable since they occur as individual moves in discourse. Opines, on the other hand, presented problems. Within one move there can be more than one marker of uncertainty, e.g., 'I think maybe I agree with Beth.' The problem was whether to count 'think' and 'maybe' as two Opines therefore counting Opine markers, or to count moves as being one Opine whether they contained one or two markers. Agreement and disagreement occur as moves and therefore it was decided to count Opines as moves rather than by markers.

4 Also, the conversations themselves fit into eight groupings displaying many similar variables within each group thus reducing the affective number of comparable units to eight, not a sufficient number to produce reliable results.

5 Group 9, being a random selection of overheard examples, would not have been comparable.

6 This study cannot produce empirical evidence for these proposed options open to a next-speaker after disagreement. This area awaits further research.

7 This has been included here as a factor but it requires verification to support its inclusion.
CHAPTER V

COMPARISON OF FINDINGS WITH TWO CONVERSATIONAL NOTIONAL FUNCTIONAL ESL/EFL TEXTBOOKS

Two conversational ESL/EFL textbooks were selected for comparison with the findings of this study. They were chosen because they both explicitly present the speech act agreement/disagreement for the student to master. Impact by Watcyn-Jones, a text the researcher has used in an EFL situation for two years, is for intermediate and advanced students. Advanced Speaking Skills by Harmer and Arnold is for advanced students. The purpose of this investigation is to determine the degree to which these two textbooks present the speech act agreement/disagreement as it appears naturally in native-speaker discourse. The basis for the comparison will be the factors discussed in Chapter IV (cf. p.

Harmer, J. and J. Arnold. 1978. Advanced Speaking Skills. Longman. The introduction states that "the main concern of this course is appropriateness, that is the choice of a way of saying something which expresses our attitude appropriately, i.e., showing that we are being 'polite,' 'informal,' 'tentative,' and so on" (Harmer and Arnold 1978:vii). They later mention that one of the aims of the book is "to enable the students to choose ways of saying things which are appropriate to different situations" (Harmer and Arnold 1978:x). They list several 'attitudes' which they consider to be crucial for the learner to be aware of and for him/her to be able to assign to particular language forms. For example, 'Tentative' means "unsure" and is used
a) "when we are genuinely unsure of our facts or of how we feel,

b) when we want to give the impression of being unsure in order
to be tactful and diplomatic" (Harmer and Arnold 1978:xvii).

As an example they give: "If we want to disagree with a superior, it
would probably be too strong to say, 'I can't agree with you' and it
would be more appropriate to be tentative, say 'I'm not sure if I'd
agree with you'" (Harmer and Arnold 1978:xvii).

'Direct' is defined as the opposite of 'tentative' and gives the
hearer the impression that the speaker is very sure. This impression
they maintain "is appropriate if, for example, we want to agree with
someone, but it can sound presumptuous and rude in a great many situations
and would be inappropriate in such situations (e.g., inviting a superior
to a party)" (Harmer and Arnold 1978:xvii).

'Polite' language is used "when we want to sound particularly
'polite' without being 'tentative'" (Harmer and Arnold 1978:xviii).

They suggest that "in most situations we use 'normal/neutral'
language," expressing a normal/neutral attitude (Harmer and Arnold 1978:
xviii).

Each 'part' of the text presents a "specific language area," e.g.,
Section III Part 1 presents 'Opinionating.' A diagram 'followed by a
model conversation show how the language works, and a chart lists
appropriate language to use. This 'presentation' is followed by a
'controlled practice,' a 'situational practice,' and 'role simulation
practice,' all practicing the forms given in the chart.

The introduction mentions that "the teacher should point out any
areas of particular grammatical difficulty" in the forms listed in
the charts. The presupposition that all teachers would recognize such
'areas,' would know the grammatical point and would be able to explain it has not been born out by this researcher's experience. The text has no teacher's book and very little in the introduction to inform an untrained and/or inexperienced teacher. Other than what was quoted above there is no information given to help either the teacher or the student in realizing the intricacies of appropriate language use.

The diagram presenting the language of 'opinionating' is as follows:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asking for Opinions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing Personal Opinions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressing Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

This chart indicates that agreement/disagreement are responses to an expression of personal opinion, but nothing is mentioned about such responses being made to the last move of a prior speaker's turn.

The model conversation is as follows:

A = interviewer, young woman

B = interviewee, middle-aged male politician

C = interviewee, middle-aged female politician

A: Mark Cummings, how do you feel about this latest tax increase?

B: Well, as far as I'm concerned it is of course regrettable. But it is necessary, I'm afraid.

C: I wouldn't go along with you there Mark. The government could have avoided this increase if only they'd . . .
This model gives an example of an opinion which fits the description of the proposed sub-class Opine used in this study—'regrettable' is a value judgement. 'necessary' and 'I'm afraid' are markers of tentativeness. The disagreement which follows mentions the same referent (anaphoric 'this') with an accounting for an opposite assessment and it appears as a declarative sentence. However this is the only 'model given.' There is no 'model' for agreement which is the preferred second following an Opine. The learner must infer a lot from one model.

The text makes no mention of any of the aspects of politeness affecting the production of agreement/disagreement, universals or culture specific. Either it assumes that students (and teachers) are already aware of these or it assumes that they are outside the area of language. In either case, a rash assumption.

The universal positive qualities of agreement (which make it the preferred second) are not pointed out to the learners, and no examples or indications of possible offense resulting from disagreement are given.

**Forms of Agreement/Disagreement**

Each form of agreement/disagreement presented in the charts (in table form) which the learner is to acquire for production and recognition will be discussed in turn.

**Expressions of Agreement:**

a) I'd go **along** with you. {on that **there**}

b) I take your point.

c) (Yes) I'd tend to agree with **you**. (**there** on that) 'tentative'

d) I couldn't agree more. 'direct: strong'

e) I'm with you {on that **there**} 'informal'
a) This is an idiomatic expression of agreement which could be classified as an idiomatic performative with or without anaphoric reference to the referent. It is a member of the category 'Equal' and a sub-class that ranked six out of seven in frequency of occurrence.

b) Another idiomatic expression but without specific reference to the referent this may be an idiomatic token but it will be counted here as an 'Equal,' an idiomatic performative because its force is stronger than that of a token.

c) A 'scaled-down' explicit performative with a scaled down degree of certainty. *i.e.*, speaker commitment. This type occurred twice in the data ranking fourth out of six sub-categories of scaled down.

d) An upgraded explicit performative with an intensifier, this ranked fourth out of five sub-categories of upgrades.

e) Another idiomatic expression of agreement with or without anaphoric reference to the referent.

Three of the five forms occurred as idiomatic expressions of agreement which may be acquired and stored as lexical items. The data in this study did not contain the idioms presented here. This does not mean that they don't occur, only that they didn't occur once out of 136 occurrences of agreement in conversation among native speakers. The explicit performative verb, agree, occurred more frequently. Is it necessary for ESL/EFL learners to learn formulas which do not occur with more frequency? Even the sub-category in which they belong is infrequently employed. Before memorization of such forms perhaps it would have been more appropriate in terms of frequency, politeness, and ease of learnability, for the learner to have been presented with
'direct repetition' of the prior speaker's Opine; and 'V of Supposition. and/or ellipsis,' e.g., 'I think so too,' 'So do I.'

Both the 'scaled down' and 'upgraded' expressions occur relatively infrequently in the native speaker data. The addition of an intensifier or an upgraded term of evaluation, e.g., 'good' to 'better,' would have been more useful as forms of upgrades while the use of a more moderate term of evaluation, e.g., 'worse' to 'bad,' or decreasing the degree of certainty, e.g., 'probably' to 'possibly,' would be more frequently appropriate as scaled down forms.

As both 'Equals,' and 'upgrades,' tokens alone, e.g., 'yes' or 'yeah,' or in conjunction with other expressions are the most frequent types of expression of agreement and occur in all the types of situations collected in the data, but they are not found in this textbook.

**Expressions of Disagreement:**

a) Do you really think so?

b) I wouldn't go along with you {there on that}

c) I'm not really sure if I would.

d) I wouldn't agree. 'direct'

e) I can't accept that. 'direct:strong'

f) You can't be serious, 'very strong:informal'

must be joking

a) In the data for this study this expression would not have been counted as an expression of disagreement. It would have been considered a confirmation, or opinion 'check' perhaps as a 'pre-sequence' (cf. p. 43.
b) This would have been counted as an 'Opposite' sub-categorized as an explicit negative without accounting, number three out of four in rate of frequency.

c) An opposite sub-categorized as an explicit negative plus an uncertainty marker, this has the same rate of frequency as b) although the addition of the uncertainty marker makes it less direct and more polite.

d) This belongs to a subcategory of 'Opposite' which didn't occur in the data, i.e., an explicit negative performative plus uncertainty marker, without accounting. It has more force than any form found occurring in the strongest adversity relationships among strangers.

e) This would be an 'Opposite' which would occur as an explicit negative without accounting, number three out of four in frequency.

f) This is a direct challenge to the speaker which this text suggests would be appropriate for use among friends. This goes counter to the tentative findings discussed on p. 121 above.

None of these expressions occurred in the data although three of them belong to sub-categories which did occur in the data with very low frequency.

No forms of the category 'Qualified' appeared at all. Those are the most polite forms being a sort of solution to the preferred vs. dispreferred dilemma facing a hearer who does not want to disagree but who wants to express a different assessment.

All of the forms which were presented were 'Opposites' and were quite direct expressions. Are forms that occur rather infrequently, are direct and therefore not polite forms which could be appropriately used in a variety of situations? Not according to the findings of this
study. Does this text present the speech act as it normally occurs in conversation among native speakers? No, not according to the findings here.

Watcyn–Jones, P. 1979. Impact. Penguin. This text explains its aims as giving "intermediate and advanced students thorough and meaningful practice in the language they will need to master in order to be able to perform important linguistic functions" (Watcyn–Jones 1979:11). Each unit begins with a specially written dialog containing many examples of the related functions to be covered in the unit. This is followed by a section in which "the function is presented and the appropriate language needed to perform it introduced, clearly set out in substitution tables" (Uatcyn–Jones 1979:12). The introduction indicates that "the teacher reads the description of the function to be taught and explains it to the student" (Watcyn–Jones 1979:13). The description of the function agreement/disagreement is in four parts: 1) How to agree strongly with a person,’ 2) How to half-agree with an opinion,’ 3) How to disagree politely with an opinion,’ 4) How to disagree strongly with an opinion.’ Each part is followed by a chart listing several expressions which are examples of the description. This then is followed by pair-practice. The description above is the sole and total description/explanation of the function in the book for both teachers and students. Apparently there is an underlying assumption that this speech act has the same definition, constraints on usage, and factors of politeness affecting its production and reception, across all cultures. More research is needed to verify such an assumption.

Advanced Speaking Skills gives definitions of attitudes expressed by certain forms, and at least claims to be teaching appropriate language
based on what appears to be the authors' intuition. Impact makes no such claim and the author's intuition seems to be directed towards listing as many forms of agreement/disagreement as possible.

Under How to agree strongly' the following expressions are presented.

a) So do I.
b) I (quite) agree.
c) I entirely agree with you.
d) they certainly should

eyes e) they should, shouldn't they?
f) you're quite right.
g) that's just how I see it.
h) that's exactly my opinion.
i) that's how I feel.
j) exactly!

The use of a token is presented and a, b (without intensifier), g and i are all 'Equals.' a and i are members of the most frequently occurring sub-category of 'Equals' while 'b' and 'g' are members of a low-frequency and direct sub-category. b (with intensifier). Being 'Equals,' all of them are polite. c, d, f, h, and j are all 'upgraded.' b, c, and f are members of infrequently occurring categories while d, h, and j are members of a frequent sub-category. There was only one example of 'scaled-down,' i.e., 'e' but this is problematic in that without the prior Opine it's difficult to know how the agreeing speaker means his utterance. Examples a, b, and i occurred specifically in the data, once each.
Examples of 'How to half-agree with an Opinion,' are:

- Well, yes
- Yes, I agree
- Yes, perhaps
- Yes, in a way
- Mmm, possibly but (it would be a very difficult thing to do).
- Yes, I agree to a point
- Yes, I suppose so
- Yes, I dare say you're right

All of these belong to the category of disagreement 'Qualify,' i.e., 'Agree But Disagree.' c, d, e, f, g, and h are all examples of the most frequently occurring sub-category while a and b occur less frequently. None of the expressions occurred in my data.

Under 'How to disagree politely with an opinion' are:

- I'm not so sure really.
- Do you think so?
- Well, it depends.
- Mmm, not so certain.
- Well, I don't know.
- Well, I'm not so sure about that.
- Mmm, I'm not really sure you're right.
- No, I don't think so really.

When these types of expressions occurred in the data, they were usually followed by some type of accounting, as an explanation, reason or cause of the disagreement. As presented here they would all belong to a middle frequency sub-category of 'Opposite.' b is again an exception as noted above.
'How to disagree strongly with an opinion' contains the following:

a) I disagree
b) I disagree with you entirely
c) I'm afraid I don't agree
d) I don't agree with you at all

No, e) I'm afraid you're wrong there
f) I really can't agree
g) I wouldn't accept that for one minute
h) I don't think they should

A token of disagreement is used with explicit performative verbs of disagreement and negative agreement although c includes an expression of regret. Only h is a member of a sub-category appearing in the data, but infrequently. This entire group of expressions is of doubtful use for EFL learners. Even in the case of explicit adversary relationships among strangers such strong and direct forms did not occur.

Generally speaking, the expressions presented in Impact were members of sub-categories of higher frequency of occurrences as found in the data although most of the expressions themselves were not found. More data would be needed to determine exactly which expressions occur most frequently in conversation among native speakers.

The category 'Qualified' was presented as a section in itself and although presented as agreement, the description reflected the in-between nature of this category.

In conclusion, both textbooks contain inadequate descriptions and/or explanations of both the structural and politeness factors affecting this speech act. Advanced Speaking Skills acknowledges the importance of speaker attitude but does not explain how a student can
decide how to realize an attitude outside the meagre number of examples presented in the text. **Impact** is better in **presenting** more examples **and within** the context of a model conversation but there is no concern given to **speaker** attitudes.

The introductory model **dialog/conversation** in both texts is a specially written one explicitly containing the expressions to be taught. There are no examples of the occurrence of this speech act as **it** appears in real normal native-speaker interaction. **Impact** is a bit better in that the **model** conversation is longer.

Both texts present example expressions as lists **in** a chart, **i.e.**, phrase-book fashion, as lexical Items to be memorized through practice so that they can be plugged verbatim into the learner's speech whenever he so desires. The speech act **agreement/disagreement** is presented as being realized mostly by marked formulaic expressions rather than as second speaker's concept related to the **prior** speaker's assessment of a referent.

The research carried out **in** this study was for the purpose of **formulating** a description of what constitutes **agreement/disagreement** and of **discovering** the rules of speaking within which **it** operates **in** native **speaker conversation**. The findings were then applied to two **conversation oriented** notional functional ESL/EFL textbooks to **determine** the degree to which the presentation of this **speech** act correlated with its appearance in native speaker conversation. The results of these comparisons show that the native speaker intuition **of** the writers of these two textbooks does not accurately reflect what native speakers actually say in expressing agreement and disagreement. Perhaps textbook
writers should be more careful about making claims that their texts are teaching authentic language until they can base their materials on more empirical research into what authentic language really is.
Many textbooks do not explicitly present this speech act as an item to be acquired by the learners.

In this study, tentativeness was considered as a manifestation of politeness because it expresses a lowered degree of commitment on the part of the speaker, thus softening the assertive force of the proposition.

Language use is one of the prime manifestations of politeness and it should not be assumed that learners from other cultures are aware of their own culture's rules of politeness and ways of manifesting them much less that they be aware of those of another culture. Pragmatics is a part of linguistics. It is the opinion of this researcher that even though rules of politeness are universal many students are not explicitly aware of them and that reminding them of these rules would make them more sociolinguistically aware of the world.
## APPENDIX I

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Austin</th>
<th>O'Haraon</th>
<th>Fraser '74</th>
<th>Fraser '83</th>
<th>Hampshire</th>
<th>Bach &amp; Harnish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>representatives</strong></td>
<td>expositives</td>
<td>representatives</td>
<td>acts of asserting</td>
<td>acts of evaluating</td>
<td>representatives</td>
<td>(singular, multiple, and collective)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>verdictives</strong></td>
<td>attesters</td>
<td>sequences</td>
<td>positions</td>
<td>emphatics</td>
<td>status fixtures</td>
<td>verdictives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>directives</strong></td>
<td>behabittles</td>
<td>exercitives</td>
<td>expositives: quires</td>
<td>future directors:</td>
<td>indirecters</td>
<td>requests</td>
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<tr>
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<td>commissives</td>
<td>future directors:</td>
<td>commissives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>expressives</strong></td>
<td>behabittles</td>
<td>responsibility</td>
<td>establishes:</td>
<td>implicitors</td>
<td>executor:</td>
<td>ceremonial acts of reflecting</td>
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<td><strong>declarations</strong></td>
<td>exercitives</td>
<td>status fixtures:</td>
<td>operatives</td>
<td>executor:</td>
<td>ceremonial</td>
<td>acts of stipulating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>verdictives</td>
<td>status fixtures:</td>
<td>verdictives</td>
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<td>(no provision)</td>
<td>(no provision)</td>
<td>future directors:</td>
<td>(no provision)</td>
<td>(no provision)</td>
<td>(no provision)</td>
<td>(no provision)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX I

Table 2
Conversational Structures Compared

Sinclair & Coulthard (1975)

TRANSACTION

Boundary Teaching Teaching
Exchange Exchange Exchange

Initiation Move Response Move

Sinclair & Brazil (1982)

TRANSACTION

Boundary Exchange Ex Sequence Ex Exchange

Framing Focus Ex Ex Move

Edmondson (1981)

ENCOUNTER

Opening Core Closing

PHASE

Initiation/Satisfy

Exchange (Contra or/and Counter) (Re-proffer)

types of linkage:
pre-exchange
pre-responding exchange
post-exchange
APPENDIX I

Table 3

Structure of Analysis, Labov & Fsnshall (1977)

Discourse Divisions ➞ Episodes ➞ Units ➞ Sub-units

Analysis

Expansion

Propositions:
- Status Predicates
- Performance Predicates
- Constitutional Predicates

Verbal Interaction:
(hierarchical speech actions)
- 1. Meta-actions
- 2. Representations
- 3. Requests
- 4. Responses
APPENDIX I

Chart 1

Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group 1. 7 telephone conversations with the same 2 interlocutors who are very good friends.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>CB</th>
<th>CC</th>
<th>CD</th>
<th>CE</th>
<th>CF</th>
<th>CG</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Tel</td>
<td>Tel</td>
<td>Tel</td>
<td>Tel</td>
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<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
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<td>A-B</td>
<td>A-B</td>
<td>A-B</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Full Transcription</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>RT</td>
<td>RT</td>
<td>RT</td>
<td>RT</td>
<td>RT</td>
<td>RT</td>
</tr>
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<td>No. of Minutes</td>
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<td>40-45</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency Ratio:
- A/B to Opines: 0.1688
- Agreement to Opines: 0.1333
- Disagreement to Opines: 0.0355
APPENDIX I

Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group 2. 12 conversations or segments of longer conversations all among the same 4 interlocutors who are roommates in their kitchen.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>C25</th>
<th>C26</th>
<th>C27</th>
<th>C28</th>
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Frequency Ratios:
- A/B to Opines: 0.1769
- Agreement to Opines: 0.1316
- Disagreement to Opines: 0.0452
APPENDIX I

Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group 3. 11 discussions, reports and conversations in an office among different interlocutors about different aspects of business.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>C16</th>
<th>C17</th>
<th>C18</th>
<th>C19</th>
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<td>F-F</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>D</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>O</td>
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<td>A-M</td>
<td>A-M</td>
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Frequency Ratios:

- A/D to Opines: 0.0511
- Agreement to Opines: 0.0447
- Disagreement to Opines: 0.0063
### APPENDIX I

**Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources**

**Group 3. (Continued) II discussions, reports and conversations in an office among different interlocutors about different aspects of business.**

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<th>C24 F-F</th>
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</table>

**TOTALS**

158-173

313

14

2
APPENDIX I

Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group 4. 4 telephone conversations between different interlocutors who are all acquaintances rather than friends.

<table>
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<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>A-F</td>
<td>A-F</td>
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Frequency Ratios: A/D to Opines: 0.1388
Agreement to Opines: 0.1388
Disagreement to Opines: 0.0000
APPENDIX I

Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group 5. 4 service encounters between strangers, 3 in stores and 1 in the post office.

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<th>C9</th>
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<td>A=sales</td>
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<td>B=customer</td>
<td>B=customer</td>
<td>B=customer</td>
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Frequency Ratios: A/B to Opines: 0.3541
Agreement to Opines: 0.2708
Disagreement to Opines: 0.0833
APPENDIX 1

Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group 6. 1 discussion interview recorded from a TV program. The 6 interlocutors were acquaintances but expressed differing views so it was counted as an adversity relationship.

<table>
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<th>Event</th>
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<th>No. of Interlocutors</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Arches</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Full Transcription</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>No. of Minutes</th>
<th>Opine</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>TV studio</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>A,B,C,D=guests</td>
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Frequency Ratios: AID to Opine: 0.035
Agreement to Opine: 0.008
Disagreement to Opine: 0.026
APPENDIX I

Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group 7. 5 conversations recorded from a radio talk show. The host was the same in all 5, but the guests who called in were all different. The relationship is classified as definitely adversity, except C13 which displayed no manifestations of adversity.

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<th>C12</th>
<th>C13</th>
<th>C14</th>
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<td>D radio talk show</td>
<td>D radio talk show</td>
<td>D radio talk show</td>
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<td>A-host B=caller</td>
<td>A-host B=caller</td>
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Frequency Ratios: A/D to Opines: 0.3409 Disagreement to Opines: 0.227
Agreement to Opines: 0.1136
APPENDIX I

Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group B. 1 discussion among 3 professors and 1 student

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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Interlocutors</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sex                    | A,C,D=M \  
                         | B=F |
| Roles                  | A,C,D=professors \  
                         | B=student |
| Ages                   | A=30-40  
                         | B=37 \  
                         | C=40-45 \  
                         | D=40-45 |
| Relationship           | P  |
| Status                 | A,C,D > B |
| Full Transcription      | Y  |
| Method                 | R  |
| No. of Minutes         | 40-45 |
| Opines                 | 125 |
| Agree                  | 24  |
| Disagree               | 6   |

Frequency Ratios:  
A/D to Opine: 0.240  
Agreement to Opine: 0.192  
Disagreement to Opine: 0.048
APPENDIX I

Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Group 9. 22 snippets overheard by the researcher and written down immediately.

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<td>F-F</td>
<td>F-F</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>TV studio</td>
<td>library</td>
<td>pool side</td>
<td>reception</td>
<td>room</td>
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<td>A=F, B=F</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B=40-50</td>
<td>B=60-50</td>
<td>B=40-50</td>
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### Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

**Group 9. (Continued) 22 snippets overheard by the researcher and written down immediately.**

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<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>WN</td>
<td>WN</td>
<td>WN</td>
<td>WN</td>
<td>WN</td>
<td>WN</td>
<td>WN</td>
<td>WN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Minutes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX I

#### Chart 1. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group 9. (Continued)</th>
<th>22 snippets overheard by the researcher and written down immediately.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>Y-F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Interlocutors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages</td>
<td>A, B=30-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B=30-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Transcription</td>
<td>MN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>MN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Minutes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opines Agree</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**APPENDIX I**

Table 4

**Breakdown** and Comparison of Data Sources (Explanations)

**Explanation of Abbreviations**

Situation:  
- F-F = Face to Face,  
- Tel = Telephone

Event:  
- SE = Service Encounter,  
- C = Conversation,  
- R = Report,  
- M = Meeting,  
- D = Discussion,  
- DI = Discussion Interview

Location:  
- H = Home,  
- S = School,  
- R = Restaurant,  
- O = Office,  
- RS = Radio Studio,  
- P = Public

Relationship:  
- F = Friends,  
- S = Strangers,  
- A = Acquaintances,  
- AR = Adversary Roles,  
- BC = Business Colleagues,  
- IC = Professional Colleagues,  
- F = Family

Full Transcription:  
- Y = Yes,  
- N = No (selections were extracted)

**Method of Collection:**  
- R = Recording,  
- RT = Recorded Telephone,  
- WN = Written Note,  
- RTV = Recorded from TV,  
- RR = Recorded from Radio

**Definitions of Terms**

**Conversation:**  
"Any stretch of talk which involves two or more speakers and in which what is said is more or less unprepared, and not overtly predetermined in terms of topic or procedure"  
(Edmondson 1981:6)

**Report:**  
An account presented in a formal and organized form usually by one person without any interaction with any other interlocutors.

**Meeting:**  
A formal gathering of two or more people for the express purpose of coming to some joint understanding about an overtly predetermined topic by means of an organized set of procedures.
APPENDIX I

Table 4. (Continued) Breakdown and Comparison of Data Sources

Definition of Terms (Continued)

Discussion: An informal gathering of two or more people whose purpose
is to make their views known to each other about some topic of
mutual concern or interest.

Public: Not private property and usually associated with a community
of people.

Friends: People who know each other well, trust, like and feel
comfortable with each other. Interaction occurs frequently and
both people feel they benefit from the relationship and wish to
continue it.

Strangers: People who have never before been known to each other.

Acquaintances: People who know each other only slightly. Interaction
is infrequent or only for business or professional purposes.

Adversary Roles: People who are adversaries due to their inherent role/
relationship, e.g., talk-show guests and hosts, and some types of
rival business relationships.

Business Colleagues: People who are in contact through their business
but who do not seek each other's companionship outside of business
situations.

Professional Colleagues: Same as business colleagues except that they
are members of a profession, not business.

Full Transcription: A full transcription of a tape recorded conversation,
discussion, etc. Was made = Yes, was not made = No.
APPENDIX I

Table 5

Frequency Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement to Opines</th>
<th>Disagreement to Opines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group 5 (Strangers Service Encounters)</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 4 (Acquaintances-- Tel.)</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 1 (Friends)</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 2 (Friends)</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 3 (Business Colleagues)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 8 (Professional Colleagues)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 6 (Adversity Roles-- Acquaintances)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group 7 (Adversity Roles-- Strangers)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX I

Table 6

Forms and Frequencies of the Speech Act Agreement/Disagreement
Listed by Categories of Politeness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement Type</th>
<th>'Equal' (80)</th>
<th>Upgraded (38)</th>
<th>Scaled-down (19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) Token only (34)</td>
<td>1a) Added intensifier</td>
<td>1) More moderate term of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as interruption (9)</td>
<td>(not to Fact) (9)</td>
<td>evaluation (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = G1 1 = G7</td>
<td>2 = G1 1 = G7</td>
<td>1 = G4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = G2 1 = G8</td>
<td>3 = G2 1 = G9</td>
<td>1 = G5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>without interruption (25)</td>
<td>2 = G3</td>
<td>4 = G9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 = G1 1 = G4</td>
<td>1b) Token plus (9)</td>
<td>2) Decreasing degree of certainty (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = G2 6 = G5</td>
<td>a) plus 'right' (3)</td>
<td>2 = G1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G3 1 = G8</td>
<td>(to fact)</td>
<td>1 = G5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G4 2 = G9</td>
<td>1 = G2, 1 = G5, 1 = G8</td>
<td>1 = G8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) V of supposition and/or ellipse (15)</td>
<td>2 = G1 1 = G5</td>
<td>1b) plus support (3)</td>
<td>1 = G3, 1 = G9, 1 = G9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = G2 3 = G8</td>
<td>(to fact)</td>
<td>c) plus upgrading (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G3 2 = G9</td>
<td>1 = G1, 1 = G2, 1 = G7</td>
<td>(not fact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Direct repetition (14)</td>
<td>4 = G1 1 = G5</td>
<td>2) Raising degree of certainty (not to Fact) (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = G2 3 = G8</td>
<td>1 = G1 1 = G8</td>
<td>1 = G1, 2 = G5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G3 2 = G9</td>
<td>3 = G2 2 = G9</td>
<td>4a) removal of intensifier (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Rephrasing (6)</td>
<td>2 = G1 1 = G7</td>
<td>3a) V of supposition with</td>
<td>1 = G9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G4 2 = G8</td>
<td>upgrading (4)</td>
<td>4b) explicit performative with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Interruption and</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 = G3, 1 = G8</td>
<td>scaled down degree of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finishing (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3b) Stronger term of evaluation (not to a fact) (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4) Explicit performative with</td>
<td>1 = G1, 1 = G3, 1 = G9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Repetition of assessment by explicit performative (4)</td>
<td>2 = G1 1 = G8</td>
<td>intensifier (3)</td>
<td>5) To a Fact without uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G9</td>
<td>4 = G2</td>
<td>markers (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Token plus support (2)</td>
<td>2 = G2</td>
<td>5) To a Fact without uncertainty</td>
<td>1 = G2, 1 = G7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>markers (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. (Continued) Forms and Frequencies of the Speech Act Agreement/Disagreement Listed by Categories of Politeness.

**DISAGREEMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualified (21)</th>
<th>Different (2)</th>
<th>Opposite (25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) 'Opine' But 'Opine' (11)</td>
<td>1 = G7, 1 = G8</td>
<td>1) Explicit negative plus accounting (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = G2 2 = G6</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 = G1 1 = G5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G3 2 = G7</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G2 1 = G6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G5 2 = G8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G3 1 = G7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Opine = scaled down (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2a) Antonym or accounting only without explicit negative (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G1, 1 = G2, 1 = G8, 1 = G9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ellipted forms (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2b) Explicit negative plus uncertainty marker, no accounting (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) response begins with</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G1, 1 = G9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2c) Explicit negative without accounting (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G1, 1 = G2, 1 = G8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G1, 1 = G2, 2 = G7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) token plus 'Opine' (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3a) Explicit negative plus uncertainty marker and accounting (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = G1, 2 = G2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) token plus 'Reportative' (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3b) Token of disagreement (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G7</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 = G5, 1 = G1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) 'Reportative'='Reportative' (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) 'though' plus 'Opine' (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) 'Reportative' But 'Opine' (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G1, 1 = G7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 'Reportative' But 'Reportative' (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = G8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Symbols: The bracketed numbers indicate the number of times the
G: Group
1 = G7: one occurrence in Group 2.

in the data.
**APPENDIX I**

Table 7

Transcription Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: xxx xxx</td>
<td>speaker A was interrupted by speaker B and stopped speaking while A was speaking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: xxxx</td>
<td>speaker B interrupted speaker A's speech without a turn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: xxx</td>
<td>between utterances with no time gap (no pause between the end of one utterance and the beginning of the next) (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: xxx</td>
<td>stressed word or utterance is underlined (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>very slight pause (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(.2), (.3), etc.</td>
<td>pause longer than .1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>discourse not transcribed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(...)</td>
<td>unclear reading (words on tape are incomprehensible)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>point of self-interruption/repair (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>::::</td>
<td>lengthened syllable (each : = one &quot;beat&quot;) (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>period at end of sentences (L&amp;F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>!</td>
<td>exclamation mark following exclamatory utterances (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>,</td>
<td>comma shows falling intonation that does not aim towards the lowest pitch level, but levels off or rises slightly (as in counting 1, 2, 3, etc.) (L&amp;F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>question mark shows a syntactic question only, but in elliptical fragments or declarative forms it marks rising intonation (L&amp;F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LF)</td>
<td>laugh (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(WH)</td>
<td>whisper or said in a very low voice as when the speaker is speaking to him/herself (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>laughter heard as audible in-breath (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-h</td>
<td>audible in-breath (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7. (Continued) Transcription Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>audible out-breath (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. The letters in brackets after the explanation of the symbol indicates the initial of the source.

(L&F):


(0):


(S):


NUMBERING SYSTEM

The numbering within the conversations has been done according to the speaker. Each consecutive speaker change has been given a consecutive number, but if the speaker appears to be only momentarily interrupted by another speaker and goes on continuing to develop the same train of thought after the interruption, the part before the interruption is given a number and the letter 'a,' e.g., la. The part after the interruption is labeled with the same number but as 'b,' e.g., lb. Also, when the end of a page interrupts a speaker, the first part is labeled 'a,' and the part on the following page is labeled 'b.'

ORTHOGRAPHY

Conventional English orthography is used throughout. The phonological aspects of normal native-speaker spoken discourse such as 'kind of' → 'kinds,' have been left out of the written transcription except where they are unusually obvious in the tapes.

INTONATION MARKING

Intonation marking has been supplied where the interpretation of the utterance may depend on the intonation.

PAUSES

(pause) = pause of some duration while some intervening action takes part on the part of one or both of the interlocutors.
APPENDIX I

Table 3

Explanation of the Presentation of the Examples of Agreement/Disagreement Taken from the Conversational Data

Model

5 Topic is TV shows.

Cl:53, 54

D: Freeman Reports is good.
C: It's good.

The number to the extreme left is the Example Number (5). Some information about the context/situation follows the Example Number if such information is needed for comprehension of the utterances (Topic is TV shows). Below the contextual information the number or letter of the conversation is given (Cl), and the line numbers (53, 54) within that conversation. Interlocutors are specified by letter. Chart 1 gives the sociolinguistic information for each Conversation, Table 4 gives the explanation of the abbreviations used in the chart, and Table 7 gives the transcription symbols.

The Examples are grouped according to the Scale of Politeness and frequency of occurrence of each sub-category according to the description outlined in Chapter IV, p. 105 and Table 6 of the Appendix.

A star (*) placed before the letter indicating the interlocutor specifies which turn contains the example of agreement/disagreement.
I. 'Equal'

1) Token only

1. C1:49, 50, 51
   B: f Yeah but that is a staged thing isn't it.
   *A: Yeah
   D: * It appears not to be so staged, but it is.

2. (Topic is TV shows that are edited.)
   C1:44a, 45, 44b
   B: f That I'm sure is really doctored up But you see C n' n-
   *C: Yeah
   B: the night that guy was at the Washington monument . . .

3. C31:11, 12
   D: Well, maybe it's a confusion of terms. A person, I think, can be stingy, then a person can be thrifty. And so many times those two terms are—uh confused.
   *C: Yeah

4. (Topic is how to keep up with all the new developments in the world.)
   C30:3, 4, 5
   B: Even in your own field, you know, you'd have to read 20 or 30 magazines a month in order to keep up.
   A: Just to know what's happening, that's right
   *B: Yeah
   A: * And especially so when you consider the whole world.
(Overheard at a party.)

S13
A: He couldn't get over what a good buy that was.
*B: Yeah.

6 (Topic is situations of adversary relationship.)
Cl:20, 21
A or in department meetings, yeah
*C: yeah, yeah

7 (Topic is the variables which affect discourse.)
Cl:15, 17
A: Of course it might, yeah, it might cross-cut these things 'n there might be other dimensions like sex probably plays a role in
*C: yeah
A: this 'n age 'n you name it 'n that's why I say why these three rather than some of the others.

8 (Topic is TV shows that are edited.)
Cl: 44, 4s
B: That I'm sure is really doctored up. But you see, C 'n N
*C: Yeah Yeah
B: the night that guy was at the Washington Monument.

9
Cl:49, 50
B: Yeah but that is a staged thing, isn't it.
*A: Yeah
(Topic is ESL textbooks.)

Cl:57, 58

A: ... the kind of stuff they are purporting to teach is usually informal conversation among equal status peers ...

*C:

A: Yeah

11 (Topic is variables that affect sales.)

Cl7:10, 11

B: Yes that's quite obvious because the two graphs look so similar.

*C:

A: Yes

12 ('them' refers to a pair of shoes customer B wants to buy.)

C9:68, 69

A: Yeah it's too bad we don't have them.

*B: Yeah.

13 (A is a shoe salesman, B is his customer.)

C9:26, 27

A: They look like they fit you fine. Lengthwise they're all right.

*B: Yeah.

14 (Topic is a pair of suede boots customer B is contemplating.)

C9:50, 51

A: These are suede 'n if you're going to go to Chicago you—you'll need to spray them with a water protector.

*B: Oh yeah.
A: Seventeen dollars that's probably hard bound isn't it?
*B: Uh huh.

A: So you're ok In any event.
*B: Yeah.

A: Ok (.2) I don't understand what happened between seven o'clock and eight thirty that would make not occur.
*B: Yeah

A: It's very unusual behavior.
*B: Yeah.

A: Next Saturday's the night, though, huh?
*B: Yeah.
20 (Topic is A's new boyfriend who seems very nice.)

CC:40, 41
A: (LF) So I'll find out, huh?
*B: Yeah.

21 (A apologizes for troubling B with her boyfrined problems.)

CB:214, 215
A: I'm sorry. It'll be over soon.
% Yeah, yeah.

22 (Topic is how to make the best use of the huge amount of information available to people.)

C30:15, 16
D: You have to learn to pick and choose information too.
*C: Yeah.

23 (Topic concerns the vast amount of information available.)

C30:3, 4, 5
B: Even in your own field, you know, you'd have to read twenty or thirty magazines a month in order to keep up.
A: Just to know what's happening, that's right.
*D: Yeah.

24 (Discussion is about a presentation B is going to make in a few minutes but he has made no preparations.)

CF:24, 25
A: Oh dear! (LF) That should be interesting.
*B: Yeah.

25 (A is talking about how well she treats her boyfriend but how badly he treats her.)
B:52, 53
A: Nobody's worth that.
*B: Yeah.

26 (Topic is A's boyfriend and why she must break up with him.)
B:38, 39
A: It is the only sensible thing to do Hark.
Everything else is stupid.
*B: Yeah.

27

A:7, 8
B: Oh the cold is worse.
*A: Yeah.

28 (A has a bad cold and B is describing how he supposes she feels.)
A:9, 10
B: and your head is exploding
*A: Yeah

29 (Speaker B the customer, is referring to two rings worn together.)
C8:63, 64
B: This is nice too with just another one, you know, smaller one with rubies 'r something.
*A: Yeah.
(In 65, speaker B is referring to "the two" rings worn together.)

**C8:65, 66**

B: Yeah the two together're really pretty.

*A:* Yeah.

**CB:9, 10**

B: You're going out tomorrow?

*A:* Yeah.

**C1:75, 76**

D: Depends on whether you want to simply collect a big range of ways of agreeing or disagreeing or whether you want to relate then to those variables.

*B:* Yeah!

**C34:32, 33**

B: You know, every time the plane taxis and the minute it leaves the ground, I think it's like a miracle.

*A:* Yeah.

**C5:4, 5**

A: As for the tape recording I don't think it may be a good idea.

*B:* No. (it's not a good idea)
V of Supposition and/or ellipsis

35 (Discussion centering around 'emotions."

C28:25, 26
C: Well, sometimes, you know, you can understand a situation, but, uh-huh, still be upset by it.

*B: I think so.

36 (Topic is the age children should start school.)

C36:9, 10
A: I think it depends very much on that family's situation and that particular child.

*B: Yeah, I think so.

37 (Conversation is about flying in airplanes. D has said that he's afraid of flying and so he takes a sleeping pill before take-off.)

C34:30, 31
D: Oh Gary, but you miss all the fun.

*A: Yeah, that's what I think.

38

C33:21, 22
B: I really do. I-I think from the beginning children should have their own room.

*A: Yeah, I think so too.

39

C35:31, 32
C: Housecleaning! Yeah, I just have to.

*D: Yeah, yeah, yeah (. . .) I feel the same way.
40 (Overheard in a private home B played a record especially for A.)

S14

A: Its the loveliest record I've ever heard.
B: Well thank you.
A: And the organ—the organ music came out so beautifully in it.

*B: I thought it did too.

41 (Topic is A's breaking up with her boyfriend.)

CB:94, 95

A: Guess it happens to everybody, huh?

*B: Far as I know. All the normal people. Maybe the prophets are different. But as far as the normal people are concerned, I think that is so.

42 (The topic is A's bad cold and how she feels.)

CA:11, 12

B: The world isn't understanding.

*A: Nope.

43

C3:26, 27, 28

A: Boy, have I got some fat gekkos.
B: Oh, that's neat.

*A: Yeah. it is (neat).

44 (Spoken after the customer has received the ring she had repaired.)

C8:54, 55

A: Looks like a brand new ring.

*B: I know, now it does (look new).
(Topic is taking flying lessons.)

C34:9, 10, 11, 12a, 13

D: **Everytime** I get on a plane my—the palms of my hands start to perspire.

A: Oh, I like flying.

C: I do too Gary (speaker D), but

A: Really Bette?

C: (. ) uh, I took flying lessons myself simply because I was so terrified.

B: 'Did you really?

46 ('that' refers to waiting for a taxi but none comes.)

C26:4, 5

B: Oh, I hate to wait like that, you know.

*D: I do too.

47

C25:1, 2

A: I **like** giving gifts very much on times when I just feel like doing it.

*B: I do too. And I give gifts to a lot of people that way.
(In 2 speaker B is referring to a political "system.")

C14:2, 3, 4, 5, 6
B: It would be much better if we had a little different system, and--uh (.) yes
A: Harry Truman's one of my favorite people
B: uh huh. Well--uh he was really a dynamic person.
*A: Yes he was.

49 (Overheard in library between 2 female students.)

s22
A: You look tired.
*B: You're right. I am (tired).

3) Direct repetition

50

C1:53, 54
D: Freeman Reports is good.
*C: It's good.

51 (Topic is method of transcription.)

C1:92, 93
A: It's much more difficult to read it that way if you are going to read over speakers--awkward that way, you have to read over speakers.
*B: It is sort of awkward, I find.
C1:166a, 167a, 166b
C: I would say just the general conversation one for

*B:* Yeah, general conversation

C: (...) language teaching might be more useful, n'est pas?

53 (In a previous turn it was opined that a person could be stingy and thrifty.)

C31:14, 15
C: And a person can be poor too.

*D:* And poor.

54 (D had gone to a pharmacy to get some medicine.)

C32:4, 5
B: Didn't he have it?

*D:* Yeah, he had it. And it was the kind of medicine I had bought before but—uh apparently now you have to have a prescription from the doctor to buy it.

55 (B is a customer trying on shoes in a shoe store and A is the salesman.)

C9:24, 25
B: These'll stretch, won't they.

*A:* Yeah they will stretch, yeah. (...) You'll have to wear them a few times.
(Examining a graph of sales statistics.)

C17:17, 18

B: It's a very bumpy curve though, isn't it?

*A: Yes it—it's very bumpy and it shows some trends, and trends that we might hope to be able to model by reference to other variables as yet unconsidered.

(Topic is management training courses.)

C25:14, 15, 16

B: Do you see a growth in that area?

C: No, I don't myself.

*B: No, I don't either.

(A is breaking up with her boyfriend.)

CB:160, 161

A: Oh Mark, it's going to stop hurting isn't it?

*B: Yeah it's going to stop. It's going to stop for sure that's the one certainly.

(Topic is A's head cold.)

CA:17, 18

B: Oh that sounds really serious, that's a bad cough.

*A: Uh, it's a bad cold.

(A has a bad cold.)

CA:18, 19

A: Uh, it's a bad cold.

*B: It's a bad cold, yes.

CA:5, 6

B: You sound like you're still dying.

*A: I am dying.
(Overheard in private home.)

11
A: He should have arrived by now. The plane was to land at 8:50 and it's now 9:30.

*B: should be here then. The phone will ring any minute.

(Overheard at a party after these 2 interlocutors had met the governor's wife.)

16
A: She is a nice lady. I really liked her.

*B: I liked her too.

Rephrasing

64 (Topic is the paper a student wrote for D.)

C1:11, 12
D: His hypothesis was the more disagreement you have, the more interruption there would be.

*A: As was mine—would be mine as well ( . . . )

(implication = A has the same hypothesis as the person D is referring to)

65 (Speaker B is an engineering technician talking to a host on a radio talk show.)

C1:28, 29
B: We're getting Vietnamese technicians. They're very sharp. They've been here three years 'n they know as much as an engineer that's been in the business forty years.

*A: yeah that's what I mean when I say we have the benefits of the great brain drain.
66 (Topic of conversation is the research B is doing.)

CA: 58, 59, 60, 61

A: So is the desocs working good?

B: Oh the desocs is just rushing out—it's pulling everything out. Just like a comb.

A: Far out.

*B: Yeah. Like taking an enema, you know? Cleans everything up.

67 ("Things" in 270 refer to the general state of affairs in B's life.)

CB: 270, 271

A: Things are really good for you now, huh?

*B: Sure, it's far out. (,3) Well, keep bright, huh?

68 (In 13 'that' refers to a proposed trip to Maui.)

C3: 13, 14

A: But I'd sorta like to see Lucille get away for a couple of days 'n that—that—would be nice.

*B: Yeah maybe she would (like to get away) yeah that would be a good idea.

69 (Topic is to use TV for teaching or not.)

Cl: 57b, 59

A: . . . Oh, I'm not saying that it will be, but that it's another way into this 'cause maybe we do not want to use TV.

*C: That's what I was saying to you (speaker B) the other day.
5) Interruption and finishing

70

Cl: 87a, 88, 87b
D: It should probably be just pilot tested, just collecting little preliminary data at first to see what kinds of variables are going
*B: see what you run into.
D: to have to be carefully recorded.

71 (Topic is the variables that affect discourse.)

Cl: 19, 20
D: . . . I would think would be whether or not there was an explicit adversary relationship as in-uh::some of the TV stuff where they have some of the people on who are explicitly there to present different points of view
*A: or in department meetings, yeah.

72 (Topic is differences in management styles cross-culturally.)

Cl5: 11, 12
B: I think that possibly there is less delegation of certain matters
*A: And this would lead to a slowing down In the decision making process.

73 (Topic is what kinds of data are best for a certain study.)

CA: 128, 129
A: The thing is that it's not that it's not relevant data, It's just that it is (. . .)-we almost know in advance that it's sampling different kinds of discourse hence,
*B: They're not necessarily comparable.

74

*B: They're not necessarily comparable.

*C: Not comparable

6) Explicit Perfonnative

75 (A is a lawyer who has been criticized for making too much money. Taken as selection from tape of TV discussion program.)

S3:1, 2

B: I feel I am a credit to my profession. I have given indigenes the right to have free counsel and I have given people who were never able to go to court.

*A: ok, I agree with that, I agree with that.

76 (Topic is the age children should start school.)

C36:18, 19

C: I don't think they're (children) ready for socializing outside of the family, you know, before the age of about five or six.

*D: Yeah, I agree with you.

77 (Topic is recording conversations without the participants' permission.)

C7:70, 72

D: Whether its public, private, state to state, the law varies. The fact of the matter is though that nobody
is going to know.

'A: I agree.

78 (Conversation is about the age children should start school.)

C36:17

*a: Well Bette says that education is repressive and I agree.

7) Token plus support

79 (Topic concerns the problems involved in being an 'Informed adult'.)

C30:13, 14

B: But at the same time you feel that way, you think that as a (. . .) educated adult, you have to keep up with certain international events and affairs or else not really be a responsible person.

*C: Yeah:::yeah you know that—that's it—it's your responsibility in making decisions about not only your ova life, but you know—uh other things, contributing in some way and you have to be informed to be able to do that.

80 (Discussion is about keeping up with the news and information.)

C30:1, 2

C: You know, I feel really dumb. Um, there's so much that I don't know and so much happening and so much to read that I-I can't process all the information available. Do you all feel the same way?
I know—yeah, I know what you mean—There's so much to find out about in so many different ways nowadays. We have television, we have radio, we have all sorts of magazines.

II. 'Upgraded'

la) Added intensifier (not to fact)

81

C14:1, 2a

A: I think it's about time we had non-politicians in office from place to place.

*B: Well, it would be much better, I think.

82 (Topic is gift-giving habits.)

C25:21, 22

C: You're rather formalistic.

*D: Very much so.

83 (The topic is taking flying lessons.)

34:4, 5

B: Uh-huh. I'd like to, actually.

*A: So would I, very much.

84 (Topic is A's boyfriend.)

CB:42, 43

A: Well, it really hurts when somebody—when you spend time with somebody, when they're sick and take care of them and—then you get sick taking care of them and they disappear cause they got something better to do and tell you a--a lie. I mean can't you see that that would hurt anybody?

*B: Yes I do, I mean that's terrible. That's very unfriendly.
(Discussion is about how to deal with the vast amount of information that is available.)

C30:18, 19

A: Yeah, that's a good point though, picking and choosing information like (., .) and being able to depend on the sources of your information.

*B: Really!

(Rat fink refers to A's boyfriend.)

CB:171, 172

B: He's a rat. A rat fink.

*A: He really is.

(Extracted from tape of a party A and B are looking at pictures of furniture.)

S19

A: Aren't they pretty.

*B: They certainly are.

(Conversation is about the importance of house cleaning.)

C35:36, 37

A: But I just don't think it's so important. Sometimes, maybe.

*C: Yeah. There's a lot more important things to do.

(Conversation is about the importance of house cleaning.)

C35:36, 37

A: I think there are two things to note about this-

uh-uh

*B: Yen that's quite obvious because the 2 graphs look so similar.
lb) Token plus

90 (A is recommending authors.)
Cl:141, 142
A: Goffman's stuff probably
*C: Yeah right.

91 (Topic is how to make the best use of the vast amount of information available to people.)
C30:7, 8
You know now, whereas before our sphere of interest was maybe just our country or our area, because of communications systems—uh your sphere of interest is the whole world.
* Yeah, yeah, that's right.

92 (Saleswoman A doesn't want B's ring broken.)
C8:71, 72
A: I don't want you to have it broken.
*B: Yeah, right.

93 (Extracted from a tape of a party. A is B's stepmother.)
S20
A: I think they (poinsettias) grow here, don't they.
*B: Yeah. There's a gorgeous bush of them just down the hill.
(Topic is management styles across cultures.)

**C15:2, 3**

B: I think they (French companies) do go out of their way to involve themselves in-in-with their employees.

*A: Yes, I've noticed speaking to the French employees.

---

**C1:140, 141**

C: ... we could spit out names here forever

*A: Yeah Brown 'n Levenson

B: Yeah, uh huh

---

(Topic is A's bad cold. A supposes she will die as a result of the bad cold.)

**C:69, 70**

B: Or that (cold) sounds bad.

*A: Uh, I'm gonna die. And then everybody'll be sorry.

---

(Discussion centered around gift-giving.)

**C25:15, 16**

D: I like to give gifts.

*B: Yeah, I know you do.

---

(Topic is the unemployment insurance system.)

**C14:14a, 15, 14b, 16, 14c**

B: (. ) Um huh. Well there are some faults in it there's some good points in it but

*A: Oh yeah!

B: there's some bad faults who keeps these kinds of always!

*A: programs going. The people who are in government who have jobs.
2) Raising degree of certainty

99 (Conversation is about the importance of keeping one's apartment clean and neat.)

C35:21, 22

B: It (house cleaning) depends on how many other people you affect.

*A:* Well, of course.

100

C32:16, 17

A: Sharon, you told me recently about somebody who took an overdose of vitamin C. People are taking a lot of vitamin C and he took too much. That could happen to anybody. Didn't you tell me that?

*B:* Yeah, it could happen to anybody of course.

101 (Topic is discourse variables.)

Cl:14, 15

B: Well that may also vary within these ( . . . )

*A:* of course it might yeah it might cross-cut. . .

102 (Overheard in reception room waiting to enter the tea ceremony room.)

S7:5, 6

A: I suppose it will be crowded.

*B:* Probably.
103 (Preceding utterance was narration of something that someone did.)

C31:23, 24, 25

D: Oh, now that's *stingy*.

C: Yeah well'

*A:* Yeah that's definitely stingy.

104

cc: 34, 35

* A: Maybe *what* I really need is a nice, father *image* type
  *man who'll* take care of me. *(LF) Somebody* who is
  enough older than *me* to be *my* father, who'll treat
  me *good* and buy me things. Maybe that's what I need.
  Wouldn't that be nice to have? *I don't *suppose* that
  *would* make *any* sense to you but that would be nice.

*B:* Well (.2) I wouldn't doubt it.

105 *(Overheard at library reference desk. 2 librarians.)*

S4:1, 2, 3

A: I'm having trouble with this typewriter again. Could
  you help me with it?

B: I'll try, but don't *know* if I can, it's really a
  complicated machine.

*A:* For sure. You can say that again.
3a) Verb of supposition with upgrading

106 (Topic is differences in management styles cross culturally.)

C15:10, 11

A: It seems that everything here eliminates from the top.
*B: Yes, yes—uh I—I think that is right, this would be another basic difference.

107

C1:129, 130, 131

B: They're not necessarily comparable.
C: not comparable
*A: Well, not only that, which—uh I think is right, but also, ...

108 C20:7, 8

A: Well, I think if I—I can buy the idea of more productivity. I consider, with respect, the idea of a longer working week wishful thinking which will never happen.
*B: I believe you're right. Of course it's going to be very difficult to avoid this trend completely. ('trend' for shorter working hours)

109 (Topic is management—labor problems.)

C20:8, 9

A: But I do think that a very tough stand is appropriate.
*B: I think you make a very good point Bob that—uh in negotiations it tends to be sort of one way.
3b) Stronger term of evaluation (not to a fact)

110 (Topic is what affects the way people agree and disagree.)

C1:168c, 171

A: #uh and-uh status you can bet your life is going to affect, you know, how people do it.

*B: (.) Yeah, that's going to be crucial.

111 (Extracted from tape of a party. A = a guest, b = the hostess. A is admiring the view from B's apartment.

A is B's father.)

S18

A: Very pleasant spot Anne.

*B: Yeah-it's my favorite of all the places I've ever lived.

A: I can see why.

112 (Overheard at drugstore. 2 women admiring another woman's baby.)

S17

A: Isn't he cute.

*B: Oh he is adorable.

113 (Overheard as a conversational opener outside a church.)

S2

A: It's a beautiful day out isn't it?

*B: Yeah it's just gorgeous.
4) Explicit performative with intensifier

114 (A is getting hurt by her boyfriend.)

CB:40, 41

A: Doesn't make any sense for me to be getting hurt over and over and over and over again.

*B: Well that's certainly—I agree with that.

115 C20:2, 4

A: I think that we would all agree that—er carrying—forcing exporting industries to carry a higher cost—burden is certainly not the way to solve this problem.

*B: I agree fully, because—uh with the higher cost of production, the products—uh are becoming uncompetitive in the world.

116 (Overheard within family context. In 1, B implies that marrying "him" was a stupid thing to do. A agrees with B's evaluation about her ex-husband.)

S5:1, 2

B: Why in the world did you every marry him.

*A: I agree entirely.

5) To a fact without uncertainty

117 (Conversation is about how clean people keep their apartments.)

C35:19, 20

A: I don't think it's (cleaning the house) so important if you're comfortable. I don't think it makes so much difference.

*C: That's true. That's true.
118  (Topic is the unemployment insurance system.)

C14:14c, 17, 14d

B: *Who keeps* these kinds of programs going all the time?
   It's the people who are in *government* who have jobs.
   They *want* to get their pay checks. They're
   *A: That's right.*
   *B: the ones that's really putting this on.*

119. "Scaled-down"

1)  More moderate term of evaluation

119  (Overheard at library between *students.*)

S12

A: I've been offered a scholarship at Columbia.
B: *That's* fantastic.
   *A: Isn't that good.*
   B: It's *marvelous.*

120  (Overheard outside library between 2 male students who
   are *enjoying* the view.)

S15

A: Foxy lady.
*B: Yeah, she's a pretty girl.*

121  (Extracted from a tape of a party. The *interlocutors are
   admiring* a plant in the hostesses *home.*)

S21

A: Yeah, *isn't it* (a plant) weird. It has *some tiny
   little flowers on it.*
*B: It is* unusual. I like it though.
122 (A has boyfriend problems.)

CB:128, 129

A: I feel like such a jerk. I'm fucking sick because I took care of him. Do you know what an idiot that makes me feel like?

*B: Yeah, it's rough, kid.

123 ("These" in 30 refer to a pair of shoes speaker B is trying on. Speaker A is the salesman.)

C9:30, 31a

B: I really like these. These're great.

*A: Nice yeah. It all depends on the style of the shoe.

124

C3:29, 30, 31, 32

B: How do you like where you're living now?

A: Oh, I really really like it!

B: It's a lot better huh.

*A: Yeah! Well it's nice too 'cause, you know, it's a teacher.

125 (Overheard after Brown had made a speech at a conference.)

S1

A: Great speech Brown.

*B: Really wasn't very good, too brief.

2) Decreasing degree of certainty

126 (Topic is A's boyfriend who treats her badly.)

CB:25, 26

B: You know perfectly well what's going on. Don't you?

*A: I guess I must. I ought to by now.
127 (Topic is the cost of mailing a book.)

C6:47, 48
A: Oh God it would be expensive wouldn't it (.2) it's hard back.

*B: (.2) Could be yeah (,) regular mail ok.

128 (Discussion topic is variables affecting discourse.)

Cl:11, 14, 15
A: The reason I bring it up is, you know, that it might be the case that rather than different discourse domains or types like this, their relevant sorts of domains could be in terms of status of interlocutors like high to low or equal status vs low to high. We know it varies or some things vary that way.

*B: Well that may also vary within these (. . .)

A: Of course, it might yeah.

129 (B calls A a witch in jest because she can understand him. A has a bad cold so she feels "drained.")

CA:115, 116
B: (LF) You're a very wise witch.

*A: Sometimes. Right now I feel like my powers are drained.
3) Redirection of positive evaluation

130 (Topic is a pair of shoes A is trying on.)

C9:28, 29

B: Oh these're beautiful.

*A: They fit you too.

131 (A saleswoman in a jewelry store (A) admires a customer's ring.)

C8:49, 50, 51

B: This is the diamond is old but I remade it

A: Yeah but it's set so nice.

*B: Yeah, this is my own design.

132 (Topic of conversation is A's relation with her boyfriend.)

CB:92, 93, 94

A: I just don't like to have somebody that I want not want me.

B: Well::: you're faced with that, right now.

*A: Guess it happens to everybody, huh?

4a) Removal of intensifier

133 (Topic is a new production technique in manufacturing.)

C22:9, 10

A: This must be very expensive but if you syndicate the work then you can reduce costs to a certain extent.

*B: Yes it is an expensive technique and--uh the rationale for syndicating it has got a lot to do with that--uh line of thought.
(In 15 and 16 'that' refers to the situation of A and B giving each other the same Christmas present. A was shopping for the same pen to give B as B gave A, but A couldn't find that pen.)

C3:15, 16
B: That would have been really surprising. I'll be darned.
*A: Oh that would have been too much.

4b) Explicit perfonnnative with scaled down degree of certainty

(Conversation is about the best age for a child to start school.)

C36:12, 13
C: I think our educational system is very structured and very repressive, you're just starting the process a couple of years earlier if you
*B: well if it's more of the same thing, I agree, I think.

C32:18, 19
C: Well I know, but—uh you know, I don't really think you should have laws against any kind of drug. I think the choice should be up to the Individual.
*B: I think maybe I agree with Bette though, I mean, why should there be a law against drugs?
5) Mae moderate intensifier

137

C31:1, 2, 3, 4

C: You **know**, I used to have this boyfriend who was so stingy that he bought me paper flowers 'cause they **would** last longer *(LF)*.
B: Really?
A: Well, that's a good idea.
D: That's pretty stingy. That's pretty stingy.

IV. 'Qualified'

1) Opine But Opine

138

C14:13, 14a, 15, 16, 14c, 17, 14d

A: I'll tell you what I **think** the problem is 'n you can disagree with me if you want *(.) I think the unemployment insurance makes it too each for people not to work. *(.) they can make more money on unemployment sometimes than they can working on a job 'n it's terrible.
B: *(.) Um huh well there are some faults in it. there's some good points in it but
A: Oh Yeah
*B: there's some bad faults. **Who** keeps these **kinds** of
A: always
B: programs going all the time. **It's** the people who are in **government** who have jobs. They want to get **their** pay checks **They're** the one's who're
A: That's right
B: really putting this on.
(Topic is TV shows that are edited. Another participant believes all TV shows are edited. B does not agree. Here he compromises and the topic shifts.)

C1: 47d, 57d

*B: People were calling in on the spot, you could call in live and talk to him so, I mean, there may be aspects edited, but I'm sure some of that stuff."

A: "Anyway another issue re all this . . .

140 (Discussion topic concerns unemployment.)

C1: 26, 27

B: Yeah, but where are you going to get the skilled people Ira? I'm an engineering technician

*A: Well now wait. Now that's another thing. Uh, if you're saying that there aren't enough people with these skills then you maybe--you might have a point. But in general the reason is to encourage more people to hire regular employees.

141 (Topic is 'expressing anger.' "It" in 23 refers to 'the feeling of anger.')

C2: 23, 24

C: Actually that's (breaking dishes) a better way of coping with it, you know, rather than getting into a row with someone.

*B: Maybe, but it doesn't really solve the problem, if there's a problem.
C: So in that respect (Japanese desires for future market control) I'd have to challenge my good friend Mike over here on his assertion that the Japanese economy is controlled by open-market force. Of course, to a degree it is, but in certain very important areas—perhaps the most important for our future development and that of the free world's future development—it is controlled by forces that I would not be willing to acknowledge as fair and open.

(The topic centers around Prime Minister Nakasone's stand on defense spending and his problems with the Japanese public on the issue. A is a Japan expert and B is a U.S. senator who feels that Japan is not fulfilling her commitments.)

A: He (Nakasone) thinks it's (defense spending) more important, but he's got to move against an entire government, an entire public who does not share his views on defense. That's his problem. It's a big problem.

*B: I think that's very accurate. We have very grave political and economic difficulties here. I regret that he's got those difficulties, but I don't think that we can act out of his interest. I think we've got to act out of our own self-interest.
144 (Topic is TV shows that are edited.)

C1:46, 47a

A: * And I get the impression that that is live at the time they first broadcast it 'cause it's videoed then but I think it's-uh:but I don't think that's it, is it?

*B: * Well it may be it to some extent but to the way that Dick—sure 60 minutes is a carefully staged thing, but I suspect that a lot of these C 'n N reports—there's one woman on . . .

145 (Buying a pair of shoes.)

C9:64, 65, 66

A: This is a nice color if you have things to wear with it.

*E: Well the color would be ok, but the style is (. . .). I guess for today just these two then.

A: Uh huh. Ok.

146

C18:9, 10, 11

A: I think that's a bit purist, isn't it? To suggest that

*C: Well, it might be but

A: bearing in mind that it's going out with all this other literature.
(Discussion on nudity expressed in art.)

C29:11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16

C: The nude body is supposed to be the ultimate challenge to an artist.

D: Well, I, I

C: to be able to portray

B: Yeah

C: meaningfully

*B: I think so too, but I, I guess it depends on how it's done too.

C32:18, 13

C: Well I know, but—uh you know, I don't really think you should have laws against any kind of a drug. I think the choice should be up to the individual.

*A: Well, I agree with you that the laws certainly should be freer about dmgs, but I do feel that there're some drugs ( . . . ) that I do think ought to be sort of controlled.

2) Ellipted forms

CB:26, 27, 28

A: He's an inveterate liar. He just lies and lies man. He just—he can go on at great lengths.

B: (LF) You didn't know that?

*A: But I guess I wasn't accepting it. I didn't want to believe it. I guess.
150 (Topic is TV programs that are edited. The previous utterance mentioned the C 'n M program.)

C1:38, 39, 40
D: # They are still edited, they've got to get it down to exactly the right number of minutes.
*B: # But you see, I don't know, a lot of C 'n M stuff they'll just break up and say well we're out of time, I'm sorry and that's it.
A: # Maybe that's just to cake you think (. . .)

151 (Topic concerns the problems Involved in being an 'Informed adult. ')

C30:12, 13
A: But, I think-uh it's physically impossible-uh to keep up with everything that's going on all the time. And I think in our own adjustment we've got to realize that—that we just can't do it. And then we work from there somehow.
*B: But at the same time you feel that way, you think that as a (. . .) educated adult, you have to keep up with certain International events and affairs or else not really be a responsible person.

152 (Topic is about 'business discourse.')

C1:9, 10
C: (. ) Would it—this be representative of the sort of discourse in which they would normally partake?
*B: Yeah, but I wasn't thinking of that, that's not the reason I picked then.
(In the previous turn, Speaker B, has told about someone B knows who was born in a communist country, became a U.S. citizen and joined the U.S. military service. B asks A if it is possible for this person to return to "his communist country and exchange our most valuable military secrets."

C10:2, 3, 4, 5

A: Well, first of all, as an enlisted man he could not have our most valuable military secrets—uh that's simply not—I mean he— he wouldn't have them.

*B: Yeah, I—I have—I have been told that he knows certain things that you and I do not read in the papers. Our—uh force, you know, about a certain situation and I—I fear because I'm very patriotic, I've been born in this country and so have my parents and so on and so on and the fact that he can return to his country that is very close to the Russians, it really—uh shakes me up that we—uh we're training him 'n then when he comes yeah go ahead I

A: But—But—But

If he's an American citizen, he has every to serve in the U.S. military.

B: Right, so.
154 (Topic is FDR's strategies during the depression.)

C14:12, 13

B: You got to give the devil (FDR) his dues now.

*A: Oh I do. Oh you give them credit in some areas and take away from other areas, no question.

155 (Topic is about doing things that haven't been done before.)

C27:52, 53, 54

D: That's been done before.

*A: Well yeah, everytime they do it though it's different.

C: Hot to Venus.

3) Reportative But Opine

156 (D had tried to buy some medicine in a pharmacy which he had bought there before without a prescription. How, he has reported a prescription is needed.)

C32:6, 7, 8, 9, 10

A: But I think that's good because I think often people depend on medicines too much when they could get by without taking stuff.

D: Hmm

*C: Well. I know, but uh h you know, I don't really think you should have laws against any kind of a drug. I think the choice should be up to the individual. And if a person is really a hypochondriac, it doesn't make any difference whether you have to have a doctor's prescription or not.

B: Really?

C: Sure.
(In 10 B believes recovery started before WWII. In 11 A disagrees, he does not believe recovery started before WWII. In 12 a topic shift occurs and in 13A.)

C14:10, 11, 12, 13

B: Well we were on a start on a recovery before WWII. Don't you remember?

*A: Oh, I remember those days very well 'n I don't see a lot of recovery there.

B: You got to give the devil his dues now.

A: Oh I do. Oh you give then credit in some areas and take away from other areas, no question, but of course—but see I happen to be one who does not believe In the Federal government making jobs for people.

4) Reportative But Reportative

C14:14d, 18a, 19, 18b

B: If he (Reagan) wants to lay off anybody or cut down anything, let him cut down on these agencies, these people who're getting salaries up there in Washington.

*A: # Ok I—uh agree and he's talked about that but he can't do that the Congress has to do that I—uh

B: No

A: agree with you—that the—uh department of energy, I know you've done some reading on this . . .
V. 'Different'

159 (Topic is recovery from the depression in the 1930's.)

C14:8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13

B: . . . 'n he (FDR) got this country back on its feet, but-uh

*A: now wait a minute John, before you go further, the thing that got this country back on its feet financially 'n very other way was WWII.

B: (.2) Well we were on a start on a recovery before WWII. Don't you remember?

A: Oh, I remember those days very well 'n I don't see a lot of recovery there.

B: You got to give the devil his dues now.

A: Oh I do . . .

160 (Topic is the variables which affect discourse.)

C1:20, 22, 23

A: . . . or in department meetings, yeah!

*D: Well a department meeting is sort of in between because everybody has to pretend that it's not an adversary

B: . . .

A: # That was a joke Richard.

∀T. 'Opposite'

1) Explicit negative plus accounting
I think organized labor has—uh a little easier task here . . . because for organized labor it's simply a matter of reducing working hours . . .

*B: What we need in Europe is longer working working working hours and more productivity, not shorter working working working hours and more vacations . . .

(A is talking about her kindness and understanding in treating her boyfriend who treats her terribly.)

I kept believing that if I went on with it long enough, that he'd recognize and behave in a manner consistent with that recognition. What a fool, huh?

*B: No, not a fool, it was a hypothesis. You tried it, you paid for it, now it's your next decision. What's your next decision?

A: I want out.

B: Well (. . .) that's it.

I hate to see our money—but—just being thrown from (. . .) to (. . .)

*A: Well it isn't. That's what I'm saying. Whatever we spend, we spend with a
purposen

B: Well let's (. . .)

when we put money into rebuilding Beirut we're doing it because we feel it's going to benefit the U.S. in the long run.

R Oh, ok, let's see what (. . .) 'n America has to say about this issue.

164 (A is trying to decide to break up with a "rat-fink" boyfriend.)


B: That's all right, you're going to feel better.

A: If I just make the decision and stick by it eventually I'll feel better. The problem is that I keep going back on the decision, right? I mean isn't that what the problem is, really?

*B: No-no.

A: Don't you think (. . .)

B: The problem is that you're not finished.

A: Well what will finish me?

B Only the finish line.

165 (This discussion concerns the trade issue between Japan and the U.S. A is an expert on Japan and B is a U.S. senator.)

DI:1, 2

A: Basically the barriers are down and the Japanese are quite willing to relax.
*B: Well, as far as the barriers being down is concerned, that is clearly wrong. The barriers are still very very real and people who try to export fruit or tobacco, or telecommunications equipment or beef or lumber to Japan, I think would find the statement that the barriers are down to be totally incredible.

166 (Topic is taking flying lessons.)

C34:4, 5, 6, 7, 8

B: Uh-huh, I'd like to actually:
A: So would I, very much.

*D: Not me.
A: Really?
D: Everytime I get on a plane my—the palms of my hands start to perspire.

167 (Topic is shoes B is buying from A in a shoe store.)

C9:33, 34, 35

A: You don't want to try these on too?
*B: No huh uh. No, I want these.
A: Ok.

2a) Antonym or accounting only without explicit negative

168 (Topic is method of transcription.)

C1:96, 97, 98, 99a

D: If you do it that way Mike, with one person on one side and the other person on the other, it's very hard to record overlaps.
It's easy to record overlaps, that's just—oh well—I mean it depends on what detail you want on an overlap.

Presuming you want to know exactly where the overlap occurs.

Yeah, there're ways of doing that though as well.

I don't mind waiting so much.

Really? I'm—I'm a really impatient person when I'm waiting for people.

Really, Sharon?

Yeah. Or waiting for things like taxis.

I don't listen? Why don't I learn?

Oh well, I think you do. You know perfectly well what's going on. Don't you?

I guess I must. I ought to by now. He's—He's a liar.

Tomorrow it's going to rain.

Oh do you really think so? Look at the moon, no ring.
2b) Explicit negative plus uncertainty marker

172  (A woman tourist has been sitting in the sun all day next
to a pool. B and C are her female companions.)

S6
A: I feel faint.
B: I would advise that you take a stiff drink of whiskey.
*C: Oh I wouldn't if I were you.

173  (Overheard in private home.)

S10:16, 17
C: Don't you think Reagan is too old?
A: (President Reagan is) probably senile.
*B: Doesn't appear to be senile yet.

174  (Overheard in Mall at Ward Warehouse.)

S8
A: Chinese food is so good.
*B: I don't think so. (Chinese food is good.)

175  (The topic of conversation is how A's boyfriend treats her.)

CB:248, 249, 250, 251, 252
A: You know like all of a sudden he'll start acting really
nice and coming over everyday and he'll treat me sweet
and give me things and--and act like a real doll and I
believe chat that means something to him.
*B: Bullshit, bullshit. I just can't believe that.
A: Well that's what it feels like.
B: Look again.
A: I don't know, that's what it feels like to me.
Explicit negative without accounting

C12:4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

B: I read my Bible 'n everythiag 'n it says that everyone
will have the mark of the (., .) on their head or on
the back of their hand or something like this.

A: (,.) That's—uh the book of Revelations, right?

B: Right, uh huh.

A: Yeah, uh::: Ok, you really believe that, uh?

B: Yes sir, I do (LF).

*A: Ok, (LF) I don't.

B: 'n you don't believe it?

A: No! (.2) not at all.

B: Oh, what makes you not believe?

C12:14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22

B: You don't believe the Bible?

A: Not literally, no of course not.

B: Well see, the Bible—the Lord wrote the Bible

*A: I don't

believe that either.

B: ≠ You don't believe in God.

A: ≠ I didn't say that.

B: Oh, ok. Well, what it was, man was inspired by the
Lord to write the Bible (.4) 'n the Bible was the
word of God so (.) you know, I believe what it says
is true.
A: Well, fine. You're entitled to believe -uh::h that's ok.
B: Yes, uh huh

178 (Topic is 'house cleaning habits. ')

D: It (house cleaning) depends on what kind of animal you are, you how. It's like a pig. Living with a pig.
C: Oh, it is not Gary!
B: No Gary. Not really. (It's not really like living with a pig.)
A: Oh Gary!

179 (A is having a hard time breaking up with her boyfriend.)

B: Listen, isn't that stuff what you advocate for your patients? So if it's good for your patients it must be good for you (. ) What do you think? Or don't you believe in that stuff?
A: I don't believe in anything.

3a) Explicit negative plus uncertainty marker and accounting

180 (Topic is A's relationship with her boyfriend.)

A: It's a drag of a game cause I keep losing.
B: Oh I don't how about that if you kept losing you wouldn't be in it. You'd get rid of somebody the first day with no second thought about it. If you didn't have your interest in it; if you didn't get what you
wanted out of it.
A: I think it was just a challenge.

181

C33:21, 23
B: I really do. I-I think from the beginning children should have their own rooms.
*C: I don't. I think—uh for like a small baby, you know, until you're maybe at least a year or 2 years old—uh just the sense of security that develops in a child in—in the presence of other people.

182 (Conversation about buying drugs over-the-counter in drug stores.)

C32:11, 12, 13
B: But if you don't know what it (some drugs) is and you can go in and buy anything, don't you think there would be some trouble?
*C: I don't think so. People don't know what they take now, even with a doctor's prescription.
A: Well I agree with you that (,) the laws certainly should be freer about drugs.

3b) Token of disagreement

183 (Topic is ring size in a jewelry store.)

C8:12, 13, 14, 15
A: Too easy (,) you need at least (.) half a size smaller.
*B: Huh uh. (shaking head)
A: (., .,) these rings're ok because between six and a half (,) 'n seven. All right?
B: I hope so. Yeah (LF).

184 (Topic is ring size in a jewelry store.)

C8:9, 10, 11

A: You want at least a half a size smaller. Too big.

*B: Huh uh, it's not too big.

A: Here, try this. It's not too big at all?

185 (Topic is A's boyfriend.)

CB:69, 70, 71, 72

B: Wait a minute, you're not that stupid, are y–are you trying to tell me you're stupid. Is that what you're trying to tell me?

A: h Maybe I am.

*B: Uh huh. Well I don't buy it. .

A: I don't know Mark. I don't—I just find it so difficult to believe that he can just—he can just not care about me.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


