COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION
IN SUNDANESE VILLAGES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

Karl D. Jackson and Johannes Moeliono
October 1972

East-West Center
East-West Communication Institute
1777 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822
FOREWORD

A basic concept underlying the existence of the East-West Center is that of "mutuality." The full name of the Center, "Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West," demonstrates its intention to be a multicultural institution, and the Center's organization into five problem-solving institutes is an attempt to provide a framework in which scholars from different cultures can work together on problems common to mankind.

We are particularly pleased that this report is a small but significant embodiment of the "mutuality" for which we strive. The original research was done jointly by an American scholar, Dr. Karl Jackson, and an Indonesian scholar, Dr. Johannes Moeliono, in 1969; in 1972, the East-West Communication Institute supported Dr. Jackson's work in analyzing those aspects of their data which have relevance to communication. Because we deplore the scholarly tendency to enter a foreign culture, study and learn from it, and depart without sharing data with the nationals of the country which has been their host, we are in this report publishing a summary in the Indonesian language. Further, we are sharing in the support needed to publish the entire report in Indonesia as a special issue of a journal there.

As we strive continually to emphasize interchange and mutuality, we hope that this modest effort will encourage others in the free exchange among nations of scientific data and in collaborative efforts with scholars from other cultures.

Michio Nagai
Director
East-West Communication Institute
Research projects are but the sum total of the persons and institutions that have given their time and resources. The research project of which the present report is but a small part was especially well endowed with the creative efforts of many persons who generously gave their advice, encouragement, and resources. In fact it is impossible to acknowledge all of the persons who made contributions, and hence, the list that follows must include only the most important contributions.

Without the advice and support of Professors Lucian W. Pye and Daniel Lerner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology the overall research project would never have been initiated. The Center of International Studies of M.I.T. as well as the National Science Foundation supplied the financial resources for conducting the field study and carrying out the initial data analysis.

The East-West Communication Institute of the East-West Center provided a fellowship, computer time, editorial services, and secretarial support, all of which facilitated this report's appearance. We owe particular thanks to our colleagues at the Communication Institute, Florangel Rosario and Wilbur Schramm, for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Also we benefited in many ways from the wit and wisdom of Hideya Kumata. In addition Virginia Jamieson, with the assistance of Cynthia Shklov, is responsible for greatly clarifying the language of the report and for handling a host of details leading to its production. Finally we would like to thank R. Lyle Webster, former director of the Communication Institute, and his successor, Michio Nagai, for the support they have so generously provided for this project.

By far the most important contributions to the project were made by Indonesians. Many persons and institutions were indispensable to the completion of this bi-national research undertaking. The project reached fulfillment only because of the open-minded attitude toward social science research displayed by LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences), the provincial government of West Java, and the officers of the Siliwangi Division of West Java.

Several universities contributed their facilities and students. The UNPAD (Universitas Padjadjaran) made students available as interviewers and contributed mimeograph facilities. The UNPAS (Universitas Pasundan) provided a valuable group of student interviewers, and the UNPAR (Universitas Parahianan) supplied facilities for interviewer training as well as a team of student interviewers.

Among the many persons who helped us, six stand out as particularly important. We owe our thanks to A. Nasuhi, the Vice Governor of West Java, whose help assured us the cooperation of the many District and Subdistrict officials who participated in the project. Koen Abas and Lt. Kolonel Soemantri of the Siliwangi Division supplied information as well as practical assistance. In addition, Djuhro Sumitradiaga, Koesna Purnaradja, and W.M.F. Hofstede assisted us greatly in the early planning and conceptualization of the project.

Of all the persons who spent long hours on the project none gave more willingly than Ajatrochaedi, Machhuddin Adam, Sjam Hutome, Abdurrahman, Edi Ekadjati, Sudirman, Kuraesin, Karmini, Ade Budi Permana, Jugosariun, and Teddy Suherman. These university students formed the regular interviewing team. Not only did they deliver high quality interviews but in addition their good fellowship and team spirit sustained us through the long months of field research.
Also, we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to the many village leaders and common people who contributed approximately 1,000 hours of time as respondents in formal and informal interviews. Finally we must thank our wives for patiently enduring as well as actively participating in the research project of which this report is one of the first products. In spite of all the help listed above the authors alone must bear total responsibility for the material presented here.

K.D.J.
J.M.

Honolulu
September 1972
CONTENTS

Foreword ........................................................................................................ iii
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................... iv
Map of the Study Area .................................................................................. 3

SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT .............................................. 1
  Purpose and Subject Areas of the Research .............................................. 1
  Data Collection ......................................................................................... 1
  Findings ..................................................................................................... 2
  Implications ............................................................................................... 2

RINGKASAN DAN TINJAUAN DARI PROYEK (Indonesian Summary) .............. 5
  Tujuan dan bidang-bidang pokok penyeleidikan ...................................... 5
  Pengumpulan data ................................................................................... 5
  Penemuan-penemuan (pokok-pokok kesimpulan) ....................................... 6
  Implikasi-implikasi .................................................................................. 6

I. COMMUNICATION AS AN AID TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: 9
   THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUALITY .......................................................... 9
   The Problem .......................................................................................... 9
   Organization of the Study .................................................................... 10
   Constraints on the Analysis .................................................................. 10

II. CONTACTS WITH THE NATION-STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE COMMUNICATION IN NINETEEN VILLAGES 11
   Description of the Villages .................................................................... 11
   Location, Population, and Ethnicity ...................................................... 11
   Economic Factors ................................................................................ 11
   Religion .................................................................................................. 12
   Village Administrative Structures ......................................................... 12
   Administrative Communication: Exposure to the Government Apparatus 12
   Access to Services .............................................................................. 12
   Frequency of Visits by Officials ............................................................. 14
   Government Employment of Villagers .................................................. 15
   Conclusions: How Extensive is Administrative Penetration? ................. 18

III. MASS MEDIA, KNOWLEDGE OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS, 18
    AND CORRELATION WITH VILLAGE BEHAVIOR ................................ 18
    Data Collection .................................................................................... 18
    Selection of Villages: Three Distinct Patterns ...................................... 18
    Selection of Respondents .................................................................... 18
    Interviewing ......................................................................................... 19
Amount of Mass Media Exposure .......................................................... 19
Printed Media .......................................................................................... 19
Cinema ........................................................................................................ 20
Radio ........................................................................................................... 21
A Scale of Mass Media Exposure .............................................................. 22
Knowledge of National Symbols ............................................................... 24
PANTJASTA: The Five Principles of Indonesian Nationalism ..................... 24
REPELITA: The Five-Year Development Plan .............................................. 26
Knowledge of National Symbols and Mass Media Exposure ................. 28
Relationship of Exposure and Knowledge to Village Behavior ............... 29
The Hypotheses ........................................................................................ 29
Differences in Village Histories ................................................................. 30
Relationship to the Hypotheses ................................................................. 30
The Villages Compared: A Test of the Hypotheses ..................................... 31
Knowledge of Pantjasila and Political Behavior ........................................... 33
Knowledge of Repelita and Economic Behavior ........................................ 35

IV. TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS AND
VILLAGE BEHAVIOR ................................................................................. 39
The Networks Defined ............................................................................. 39
Data on The Networks .............................................................................. 39
Perception of Self as Advisor ................................................................. 40
Perception of Self as Advisee ................................................................. 40
Differences Among Strata ........................................................................ 41
Frequency of Network Use ..................................................................... 41
The Binding Nature of Traditional Communication ............................... 42
Characteristics of Chief Patrons ............................................................... 44
Traditional Communication Networks and Political
Behavior: The Dar'ul Islam Rebellion ...................................................... 45
The Pro-government Village ...................................................................... 45
The Swing Village .................................................................................... 46
The Dar'ul Islam Village ........................................................................... 48
Traditional Communication Networks and Economic
Behavior: Implementation of Repelita ................................................... 50

V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
COMMUNICATION STRATEGY ................................................................. 52
Conclusions .............................................................................................. 52
Policy Implications ................................................................................... 52

TABLES

1. Access to Social and Economic Services: Ranked
   From Most to Least Accessible ............................................................ 13
2. Index of Frequency of Visits by Officials
   Residing Outside of the Village ........................................................... 14
3. Social Strata Utilized for Sampling
   in the Three Villages .......................................................................... 20
4. Exposure to Mass Media in Three Villages ........................................ 21
5. Radio Exposure by Strata .................................................................... 22
6. Mass Media Exposure Scale Divided into Quartiles ......................... 23
7. Mass Media Exposure Scale and Respondent Types ....................... 24
8. Knowledge of the Pantjasila Among the Combined
   Elite, Elite Women, and Village Poor ................................................... 25
9. Meaning and Aims of Repelita ............................................................. 27
10. Knowledge of Meaning and Aims of Repelita Among
    Combined Elite, Elite Women, and Village Poor ............................... 28
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT

PURPOSE AND SUBJECT

AREAS OF THE RESEARCH

The primary question addressed by this report is: Which means of communication, if any, can be demonstrated to influence village political and economic behavior in ways desired by a national government? The question was one of many asked during a field study of problems of national integration, exemplified by reactions to the Dar'ul Islam rebellion in West Java. The purpose of the present analysis is to develop data gathered during that larger project which have relevance to and implications for communications strategy as a means of achieving national integration.

Specifically, this report provides data and analyses in three main areas:

• Administrative Communication between the village and the "outside world," as determined by the accessibility of government services to the villagers, the frequency of visits to the village by government officials, and the extent of government employment of villagers outside of the village.

• Exposure to and Effects of Mass Media, in terms of the extensiveness of penetration, the correlation of exposure to media with knowledge of national programs, and the correlation of knowledge about national programs with action desired in connection with these programs.

• Communication to and Effects of Traditional Communication Networks, as determined by documenting and describing the existence and pervasiveness of these networks, the message load they carry, and the binding nature of the messages conveyed through them; and by correlating information on the traditional networks with that on village behavior.

DATA COLLECTION

Through the use of trained Indonesian interviewers who spoke the regional language, comprehensive data were gathered about nineteen rural villages in southeastern West Java. The villages were selected to represent pro-government, pro-rebel, and neutral stances toward the Dar'ul Islam rebellion. Detailed histories of each village were compiled through formal interviews with subdistrict officials, village headmen, and former military leaders of the Dar'ul Islam rebellion. Data on administrative communication were also collected at this stage of the project. The formal interview data were supplemented by extensive informal conversations in the villages.

From the data collected at this stage, three villages--representing the three distinct patterns of political behavior and also three distinct patterns of economic behavior, but otherwise representative of the nineteen--were selected for intensive study. Through use of a disproportional, stratified sampling frame, 206 villagers were selected, supplying an essentially "elite" sample along with a separate sub-sample of the village "poor." A battery of questions was administered to each person in the sample, including questions designed to assess exposure to media, knowledge of national symbols and programs, and perception of self and others as participants in traditional communication networks.
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT

PURPOSE AND SUBJECT
AREAS OF THE RESEARCH

The primary question addressed by this report is: Which means of communication, if any, can be demonstrated to influence village political and economic behavior in ways desired by a national government? The question was one of many asked during a field study of problems of national integration, exemplified by reactions to the Dar'iul Islam rebellion in West Java. The purpose of the present analysis is to develop data gathered during that larger project which have relevance to and implications for communications strategy as a means of achieving national integration.

Specifically, this report provides data and analyses in three main areas:
- Administrative Communication between the village and the "outside world," as determined by the accessibility of government services to the villagers, the frequency of visits to the village by government officials, and the extent of government employment of villagers outside of the village.
- Exposure to and Effects of Mass Media, in terms of the extensiveness of penetration, the correlation of exposure to media with knowledge of national programs, and the correlation of knowledge about national programs with action desired in connection with these programs.
- Exposure to and Effects of Traditional Communication Networks, as determined by documenting and describing the existence and pervasiveness of these networks, the message load they carry, and the binding nature of the messages conveyed through them; and by correlating information on the traditional networks with that on village behavior.

DATA COLLECTION

Through the use of trained Indonesian interviewers who spoke the regional language, comprehensive data were gathered about nineteen rural villages in southeastern West Java. The villages were selected to represent pro-government, pro-rebel, and neutral stances toward the Dar'iul Islam rebellion. Detailed histories of each village were compiled through formal interviews with subdistrict officials, village headmen, and former military leaders of the Dar'iul Islam rebellion. Data on administrative communication were also collected at this stage of the project. The formal interview data were supplemented by extensive informal conversations in the villages.

From the data collected at this stage, three villages—representing the three distinct patterns of political behavior and also three distinct patterns of economic behavior, but otherwise representative of the nineteen—were selected for intensive study. Through use of a disproportional, stratified sampling frame, 206 villagers were selected, supplying an essentially "elite" sample along with a separate sub-sample of the village "poor." A battery of questions was administered to each person in the sample, including questions designed to assess exposure to media, knowledge of national symbols and programs, and perception of self and others as participants in traditional communication networks.
According to the aggregate data about the nineteen villages, penetration of the villages by the government apparatus remains low. Officials visit the villages only infrequently, and social services are available only if the village resident is willing and able to travel outside the village.

Among the individuals interviewed in the three villages selected for intensive study, exposure to modern mass media is low: exposure to newspapers, magazines, light reading, and the cinema is minimal, and only exposure to radio is relatively high, with most of those interviewed indicating that they listen on a daily basis.

Knowledge of the primary national symbol (Pantjasila) and the five-year plan (Replihita) is low. This does not mean that mass media have been ineffective in spreading information, but signifies that those respondents who are low in knowledge of national symbols are also low in exposure to mass media relative to the other respondents. Levels of information and levels of mass media exposure are related at a statistically significant level.

Although mass media exposure and knowledge of national symbols are significantly related, there is no discernible relationship between either of these measures and the political and economic behavior of the villages in regard to the Darul Islam rebellion and efficiency of execution of the five-year plan. The villages' behavior cannot be predicted from the level of mass media exposure or the knowledge of the national symbols and programs present in each village.

Traditional communication networks exist between advisor-patrons and advisee-clients in each village. The behaviors manifested by the three villages can be predicted from the character of the traditional communication networks connecting the chief patrons of each village with the world outside the village.

Because of the high correlation between information levels and exposure to mass media, policymakers may feel encouraged to increase vastly the mass media inputs to the villages, especially as this becomes less and less expensive with the advance of technology. Yet it is clear that insuring that people know about a government program is not equivalent to motivating people actually to carry out that program. The extent of active implementation or acceptance of government programs in the villages studied is determined by the position taken by the six to ten most powerful leaders in each village. If mass media are to play a role in furthering national programs, it is this small group which must become the primary target audience for mass media efforts.

Further, there must be a change in basic orientation away from devising methods aimed solely at spreading information and toward strategies focused directly on changing behaviors. Communication strategy should be aimed at maximum, short-run behavior change in the villages, and this can be accomplished by increasing use of the mobilization potential of the traditional networks. Administrative and mass media communication become effective tools for change only when they succeed in harnessing the power resources of important traditional leaders who can mobilize each village to carry out specific programs.

To reach these chief people, mass media appeals must not be aimed at the "lowest common denominator" of village life; instead, special segments of radio programming and the output of government information activities should be targeted on the very small audience of chief men in each village. A limited circulation newspaper could be printed in the local language with only a few copies being distributed in each village, thus enhancing the status of those individuals receiving it. Many other techniques should be tested for their effectiveness: radio forums for village elders, seminars conducted in nearby towns and universities for the top informal and formal leaders of the villages, and so on. In all these areas, the intent is to reach the many only as an aftereffect of reaching the few.

An important requirement of a communication strategy based on utilizing traditional structures is that the bureaucrats must become active change agents by getting out of their offices in the towns and going into the villages. The primary objective of stepping up administrative communication is contacting and mobilizing the traditional leaders of the village. Yet the administrators of the central government must not move in and take over the village administration; they must build an advisor-adviser and perhaps even patron-client relations between the last rung of the governmental bureaucratic
ladder and the top level of the village authority structure. To do this, the bureaucrat's residence in the subdistrict must be prolonged and his contact with village life must be intimate.

Large-scale programs should be brought into the village only after the program has been accepted by several chief patrons of a village: only at this point should the bureaucracy attempt to bring to bear the resources necessary for the whole village to take advantage of the program. Scarce resources should, therefore, be husbanded for expenditure only in villages where the traditional authority figures are known in advance to be willing to supply the leadership requisite to a program's success.

The advantages of using the existing, demonstrably effective traditional networks as vehicles for modernization are accompanied by some dangers which might diminish their effectiveness. One such danger is inherent in the strategy's "success": to the extent that the strategy proves successful, there will be a temptation to overload the network and to use it in pursuing governmental goals of all kinds, including unpopular ones. The traditional networks must not be used for normal executive functions, but must be used sparingly to bring about the adoption of major innovations. They must not be used in any way that would discredit or diminish the authority of the traditional leaders (such as using them to collect taxes).

Finally, the emphasis on traditional networks to bring about change in the next few decades is not intended to diminish the importance of mass media as a long-range influence beneficial to modernization. Raising levels of information, bringing new images of the world outside into the villages, and inducing the villagers to imagine themselves occupying new roles are all long-range effects that can be well served by increasing mass media inputs to the traditional sectors of society. However, it is our belief that a balanced communication strategy must give increased emphasis to the effects achieved by increasing reliance upon traditional communication networks as a means of spreading critical innovations to the village level. The modernizing impact of mass media will naturally increase as villages begin to prosper, but the first halting steps toward prosperity will come as the result of vital behavior changes generated largely by successful utilization of traditional communication networks.
RINGKASAN DAN TINJAUAN DARI PROYEK

TUJUAN DAN BIDANG-BIDANG
POKOK PENTELIDIKAN

Pertanyaan utama yang diajukan oleh proyek ini ialah: alat komunikasi yang mana, sekitanya ada, dapat membuktikan dengan nyata mampup mempengaruhi tingkah laku desa dibidang politik dan ekonomi seperti yang dikehendaki Pemerintah Nasional? Pertanyaan ini adalah salah satu dari banyak pertanyaan yang diajukan dalam rangka suatu penelitian lapangan yang tujuannya ialah menyelidiki masalah-masalah proses integrasi nasional, khususnya sebagai yang dipercontohkan oleh reaksi-reaksi terhadap pemberontakan Dar'ul Islam di Jawa Barat. Tujuan analisa proyek ini ialah memperkembangkan data-data yang terkumpul pada saat proyek tersebut dilaksanakan, yang mana mempunyai relevansi dan implikasi bagi suatu strategi komunikasi sebagai suatu alat untuk mencapai integrasi nasional.

Laporan ini khusus menyajikan data dan analisa ditiga bidang utama yaitu:

- Komunikasi administrasi (-pemerintahan) antara desa dan "dunia luar desa," yang ditentukan oleh mudah tidaknya penduduk desa memperoleh perlayanan (jasa atau service-sosial) dari Jawatan Pemerintah, dan oleh frekwensi petugas pemerintah mengunjungi desa dan juga sampai dimana pemerintah memperkerjakan penduduk desa diluar desanya.

- Pengenaan (exposure) terhadap massa-media serta pengaruh dari massa media, dalam hal luasnya penambahan atau penetrasi mengenai rencana2 nasional, dalam hal korelasi antara pengenaan terhadap media dengan pengetahuan akan rencana2 nasional serta dalam hal korelasi antara pengetahuan tersebut dengan kegiatan yang diinginkan oleh rencana2 itu.

- Pengenaan terhadap Jaringan Komunikasi Tradisionil dan pengaruh2-nya, yang mana dibuktikan dan diterangkan tentang adanya serta mendalamnya jaringan2 tersebut. Juga diterangkan apa pesan yang disalurkan melalui jaringan2 tersebut dan sifat yang mengikat daripada pesan2 itu.

Pemantuan mengenai pengenaan terhadap jaringan komunikasi tradisionil dan pengaruh2-nya dilakukan pula dengan menghubungkan keterangan2 mengenai jaringan tersebut dengan tingkah-laku desa.

PENGUMPULAN DATA

Dari data2 yang terkumpul pada taraf tersebut diatas, maka 3 buah desa dapat dipilih untuk penelitian selanjutnya secara mendalam. Masing2 desa representatip untuk ke 19 desa tadi itu, serta representatip pula untuk 3 macam pola kelakuan yang jelas berbeda dibidang politik dan ekonominya. Dengan menggunakan rangka penarikan contoh (sampling frame) yang tak berbanding dan bersipas (disproportional and stratified) 206 penduduk desa terpilih merupakan pada hakekatnya sebuah sample dari "elite" desa berasama subsample tersendiri dari golongan "miskin."

Kepada tiap orang didalam sample diajukan sejumlah pertanyaan, diantaranya pertanyaan2 yang disusun guna memperoleh gambaran tentang derajat exposure terhadap media, pengetahuanannya tentang lambang2 nasional serta rencana2 nasional dan bagaimana dia melihat dirinya sendiri dan orang lain sebagai peserta didalam jaringan komunikasi tradisionil. 

**PENEMUAN-PEMENMUAN**

**POKOK-POKOK KESIMPULAN**

- Berdasarkan data2 bulat dari ke-19 desa yang diteliti, perembesan atau penetrasi dari aparatur negara masih sangat sedikit. Pejabat jaring mengunjungi desa dan juga tidak teratur waktu kunjungannya. Perliayan masyarakat hanya dapat diperoleh kalau penduduk desa mau dan mampu membuang langsung keluar desanya.
- Diantara orang2 yang diwawancara diketiga desa itu, pengenalan (exposure) terhadap mass-media yang modern adalah rendah : minimal terhadap surat kabar, majalah, bacaan ringan dan bioskop, hanya terhadap radio exposure itu relatif tinggi ; kebanyakan yang diwawancara itu menyatakan bahwa radio didengarannya setiap hari.
- Pengetahuan akan lambang nasional yang utama (Panca Sila) dan atau Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Repelita) sedikit saja. Hal ini bukan berarti bahwa mass-media gagal dalam menyebaran penerangan, tapi menunjukkan bahwa responden2 yang kurang tahu tentang lambang2 nasional kurang pula terkena oleh mass-media kalau dibandingkan dengan responden responden lainnya. Tingkat penerangan dan tingkat exposure saling berhubungan pada tingkat statistik yang bermakna atau signifikan.
- Sekalipun exposure terhadap mass-media dan pengetahuan akan lambang-lambang nasional hubungannya signifikan, antara masing2 hal itu dengan tingkat laku politik dan ekonomi desa2 itu dalam soal pemberontakan Darul Islam dan dalam soal pelaksanaan yang efisien dari Repelita, tidaklah terdapat hubungan yang jelas. Tingkah laku dan sikap desa tidak bisa diramalkan berdasarkan tingkat exposure terhadap mass-media ataupun dari pengetahuan tentang lambang2 nasional serta rencana rencana seperti yang terdapat pada desa2 yang bersangkutan.
- Ditarip-tiap desa terdapat jaringan komunikasi yang bersifat tradisionil antara penasehat-sesepuh dengan pengikut-anakbudinya. Tingkah laku atau sikap yang diperlihatkan desa dapat diramalkan berdasarkan sifat jaringan2 komunikasi tradisionil yang menghubungkan para sesepuh desa dengan dunia luar desa.

**IMP LIKASI-IMP LIKASI**

Karena korelasi yang tinggi antara tingkat2 penerangan dengan exposure terhadap mass-media, pengatur kebijaksanaan mungkin saja mempunyai alasan untuk melipat gandakan "input" mass-media kedalam desa, lebih lagi kalau pembiayaannya akan makin rendah dengan makin majunya teknologi. Namun jelaslah bahwa menjamin pengetahuan rakyat akan rencana2 pemerintah tidaklah sama dengan memberi motivasi kepada rakyat untuk sungguh2 melaksanakannya. Implementasi yang jelas serta meluasnya ataupun penerimaannya mengenai rencana-rencana pemerintah di-desa2 yang kami teliti, tergantung dan ditentukan oleh sikap yang dibimbing oleh 5-10 orang pemimpin yang paling ber-kuasa di-tiap2 desa. Sekiranya massa-media dikahendaki berperan dalam penyuluhan rencana2 pemerintah, maka golongan kelit itulah yang harus menjadi sasarannya utama dari segala usaha dibidang massa-media.

Selanjutnya, orientasi yang pada dasarnya hanya tertuju pada pemikiran cara2 untuk menyebarkan penerangan saja harus dirubah haluannya dengan lebih memeningkkan strategi2 yang langsung tertuju untuk mengubah kelakuan manusa. Strategi komunikasi hendaknya diarahkan untuk dal
1. COMMUNICATION AS AN AID TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: 
THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUALITY

The problem

There exists a continued, if somewhat vague, willingness on the part of development administrators and scholars alike to recognize that communication effects are important to modernization in general and to specific problems of development administration in particular. However, as one moves from abstract to concrete— from discussing policies as "universal principles" to implementing them locally—the discussion of communication effects decreases in amplitude and certainty. This willingness to respond with certainty decreases when the policy-maker or operator asks this question: Which particular communication effects are expected to be the most important in a particular cultural setting with regard to a specific development program? Even less willingness to discuss communication effects is demonstrated when policy advisors are asked to pick and choose among alternative communication strategies on the basis of their predicted effectiveness in achieving particular goals.

The sudden hush which falls over a room when specific questions are put is often broken by effusive affirmations of the importance of the various mass media facilities that already exist or might be built. The effectiveness of mass media hardware is deemed so obvious as to be beyond question. However, if the policy-maker or operator continues to press the communication experts to demonstrate either short-run effects on behavior or long-run effects on attitudes and behavior, he is usually asked to accept the efficacy of communication instruments as an article of faith rather than as a predictable, demonstrable policy outcome. As a result, either the communication aspect of the particular policy is entirely neglected or, worse still, false expectations are built up in the mind of the policy-maker concerning the ability of communication instruments to "sell" a new or an unpopular policy.

The problems just cited are the fruits of ignorance growing from the lack of research systematically comparing various communication strategies within the same cultural context in regard to particular policies. This paper is an attempt to delineate some, but not all, of the parameters of the communication process in a few villages in West Java. It supplies part of the information requisite to choosing intelligently among alternative strategies for communicating with villages in West Java.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The remainder of this report is divided into four sections, dealing with the types of communication networks that link the Sundanese villages studied to the more modern, urban, and national way of life found in the towns and cities of West Java. Section II deals with administrative communication. It presents aggregate data collected in nineteenth villages in southeastern West Java to describe the villages, define their economic and political histories, and analyze the extent to which the government administration penetrates village life. Data are presented on the frequency of official visits to the villages, the degree of access by village residents to modern social services, and the amount of villagers contact with the government through employment outside of the village.
I. COMMUNICATION AS AN AID TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE IDEAL AND THE ACTUALITY

THE PROBLEM

There exists a continued, if somewhat vague, willingness on the part of development administrators and scholars alike to recognize that communication effects are important to modernization in general and to specific problems of development administration in particular. However, as one moves from abstract to concrete—from discussing policies as "universal principles" to implementing them locally—the discussion of communication effects decreases in amplitude and certainty. This willingness to respond with certainty decreases when the policy-maker or operator asks this question: Which particular communication effects are expected to be the most important in a particular cultural setting with regard to a specific development program? Even less willingness to discuss communication effects is demonstrated when policy advisors are asked to pick and choose among alternative communication strategies on the basis of their predicted effectiveness in achieving particular goals.

The sudden hush which falls over a room when specific questions are put is often broken by effusive affirmations of the importance of the various mass media facilities that already exist or might be built. The effectiveness of mass media hardware is deemed so obvious as to be beyond question. However, if the policy-maker or operator continues to press the communication experts to demonstrate either short-run effects on behavior or long-run effects on attitudes and behavior, he is usually asked to accept the efficacy of communication instruments as an article of faith rather than as a predictable, demonstratable policy outcome. As a result, either the communication aspect of the particular policy is entirely neglected or, worse still, false expectations are built up in the mind of the policy-maker concerning the ability of communication instruments to "sell" a new or an unpopular policy.

The problems just cited are the fruits of ignorance growing from the lack of research systematically comparing various communication strategies within the same cultural context in regard to particular policies. This paper is an attempt to delineate some, but not all, of the parameters of the communication process in a few villages in West Java. It supplies part of the information requisite to choosing intelligently among alternative strategies for communicating with villages in West Java.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The remainder of this report is divided into four sections, dealing with the types of communication networks that link the Sundanese villages studied to the more modern, urban, and national way of life found in the towns and cities of West Java. Section II deals with administrative communication. It presents aggregate data collected in nineteen villages in southeastern West Java to describe the villages, define their economic and political histories, and analyze the extent to which the government administration penetrates village life. Data are presented on the frequency of official visits to the villages, the degree of access by village residents to modern social services, and the amount of villagers' contact with the government through employment outside of the village.
After a preliminary analysis had been carried out on the data from the nineteen villages, three of them were selected for intensive study. These three villages represent distinct patterns of political and economic behavior, but are otherwise typical of the nineteen villages. Section III presents data gathered by interviewing in depth a sample of 206 individuals in these three villages to estimate the degree of penetration of mass media and its effectiveness in spreading knowledge of national programs and symbols such as Repelita, an acronym for the Five-Year Development Plan, and the Pantjasila or "Five Principles" of Indonesian nationalism. In addition, by comparing this information with the village histories, it confronts the question of whether knowledge of national symbols and programs is directly related to behaviors conducive to the implementation of government-sponsored programs: Are the villages with the highest knowledge of the Five-Year Plan indeed moving most rapidly to implement it? Have the villages manifesting the greatest knowledge of the Pantjasila behaved most loyally to the national government in the past?

Section IV describes in detail the structure of traditional communication networks within villages and assesses their importance in determining whether or not a village actively supports programs promulgated by the central government.

Section V presents the policy conclusions drawn from the comparison of administrative, mass media, and traditional communication networks as devices for promoting development. The section surveys the possible advantages and disadvantages of adopting a development strategy using the traditional communication networks as the chief instrument for inducing behavior change at the village level in West Java.

CONSTRANTS ON THE ANALYSIS

Because the present analysis is drawn from a larger study, several caveats are in order. First, the villages in the study were selected to investigate the problem of national integration as exemplified by reactions to the Dar'ul Islam rebellion that raged in West Java from 1948 to 1962: communication contacts between villages and the government, as well as communication patterns within the villages, were only one constellation of independent variables. While communication variables were important to the study, they were not the only subject of the research endeavor, and hence their coverage is less than complete.

Secondly, the nineteen villages used for aggregate data collection and the three of these used for collecting data about individuals do not constitute a representative sample of all West Javanese villages. In fact, they are not a representative sample even of all villages in the arch stretching southeastward from Bandung to Garut. They do form, however, a sample of the variance found on a political variable of importance throughout West Java: that variable is the village position on the Dar'ul Islam rebellion. Six of the nineteen villages were selected because they actively supported the rebellion to establish an Islamic state. Seven were equally active in their opposition to the Dar'ul Islam. The remaining six villages are referred to as "swing villages" because they alternately supported both sides in the conflict.

Given that the political variable sampled was of great pertinence to most villages in the area and that the most important parts of the spectrum of political choice were covered by the sample, it can reasonably be assumed that the findings regarding communication patterns can be generalized to villages faced with similar political choices in southeastern West Java. When in the course of this report the words "West Java" and "West Javanese villages" are used, they are meant to refer only to those villages in southeast West Java which were faced with the political problem of choosing sides in the Dar'ul Islam conflict. A very large number, but not all, of the villages were faced with this problem of political choice. Therefore, while we do not have a random sample of all villages, we do have a sample of the variation of political behavior common to many villages in southeastern West Java.
II. CONTACTS WITH THE NATION-STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE COMMUNICATION IN NINETEEN VILLAGES

DESCRIPTION OF THE VILLAGES

LOCATION, POPULATION, AND ETHNICITY

The nineteen villages surveyed are all in the districts (kabupaten) of Bandung, Sumedang, and Garut in West Java (see map, page 38). Ethnically, they are entirely Sundanese, and Sundanese rather than Indonesian is the language of village life. All but two of the villages are located off of the main, hard-surfaced roads, but all can be reached by car or jeep during the dry season. Total population varies from 3,566 to 11,446, and in mid-1969 the mean total population of the villages was 6,070. The villages are not unified settlements; the average village in our sample was composed of twenty or more small settlements (lembur or habakan).

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The chief occupation of the villagers is wet-rice cultivation. Dry field cultivation, vegetable crops, tobacco, and chicken raising represent important secondary sources of income.

The land situation varies considerably. All but four of the villages indicated that some land was held as tiarik, land set aside for the support of members of the village administration, and as wakaf, land donated to support local religious teachers. The amount of tiarik and wakaf land is small, both absolutely and in relation to the number of officials or religious teachers who derive a portion of their livelihood from it.

Although the figures presented here are at best only very rough approximations, land ownership appears to be relatively widespread. In ten of the nineteen villages, officials estimated that more than 75 percent of the total working males owned some land. In only three of the villages did this percentage fall below 50 percent of the working males. However, "owning some land" is far from having enough land to be self-sufficient in food. For many the gap between what they can raise on their own land and what they need to survive is closed by working as sharecroppers. In only five of the nineteen villages does the percentage of males who work land belonging to others fall below 25 percent, and in most of the villages the percentage is between 25 percent and 50 percent. In essence, the picture presented by land-holding patterns is one of a widely divided but basically inadequate supply of land.

In addition to agriculture, half of the villages had some small manufacturing activities (e.g., brick-making) which supplied part-time employment for as much as 10 percent of the male working population. Also, a few villagers (10 percent or less) are employed outside the village in the civil service or in petty trade.

The perennial poverty of the villages studied is clear from the fact that the village officials in five of them admitted that there had been real food scarcity in their villages in 1963-64. Further, 75 percent of the villages indicate that the rice raised is insufficient to cover current levels of rice consumption. The villages are rice-deficit villages in spite of the fact that most have more than one harvest per year.
The index was formulated by using the following scoring procedure. If a village reported a service as available inside the village, the village was given the score "2" for that particular service. If the social service was unavailable within the village itself but was available within 15 km., a score of 1 was given for the particular service. If the service was not available at all or available only to the villager who was willing to travel more than 15 km. from his village, the village received a score of 0 for the service. A total score was then computed for each village for the 21 different services. Theoretically the total scores for each village could range between 0 (indicating that none of the 21 services was available within the village or within 15 km. of the village) and 42 (a perfect score indicating access to all 21 services within the confines of the village itself).

On this index the total scores actually achieved by the nineteen villagers range from 10 to 34 with a mean of 23.5. The mean, 23.5, approximates the average access of the nineteen villages to all 21 services. It signifies that on the average the 21 services are not available in the villages themselves but are available within a distance of 15 km.

Table 1 presents the same data from a slightly different perspective. The 21 social and economic services are ranked in order of their average availability in all nineteen villages. The numbers were computed by averaging the score achieved by a particular service across the nineteen villages. The possible scores for each service are 0 to 2. An average score of 0 indicates that the particular service is not available to any village, while a score of 2.0 signifies that the service is available within all nineteen villages. Between these two extremes are the services that are found in some villages, available within 15 km. for other villages, and not available at all for the remaining villages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Accessibility Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>2, 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Official</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital/Clinic</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Official</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained Midwife</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Mail</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Official</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical School</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High School</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening Courses</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemba and Military</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VILLAGE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

The connection between the sub-district officer, the tijamat, and the village headman, the lurah, is the most vital official link between the village and the central government. The most interesting aspect of this connection from the viewpoint of communication is the rapid turnover in these key positions. Most of the sub-district officers as well as village headmen are of very recent vintage. The headman of longest tenure in the area derivatively referred to these new officials as "the '67 lurahs." In responding to the question "How long has the present headman held his office?," seven villages report that the headman has held office for less than two years. In nine villages the headman has been in office for only two to five years. Thus the majority (84 percent) of villages have had at least one new headman since 1965, and some villages have had more than one change during the five-year period from 1965 to 1969. High instability of office-holding at the village level is a probable cause of the lack of coordination of village activities with policy initiatives from the central government. In some cases the headman's office is merely the political window-dressing shown to the outside world. The window-dressing is changed with each turn of the political wheel at the center.

While this may be an apt strategy for adapting the village to the politics of the national center, it has obvious deleterious consequences for the effectiveness of village administration.

While the connection between the village and the Department of the Interior has been weakened by the high turnover among tijamats and lurahs, the connection of the village with the military bureaucracy has also been affected by the same factor. If anything, high turnover has been even more characteristic of the local army representatives, the pemba and military. One of the nineteen villages surveyed reported that it had had seven different pemba and military between 1965 and 1969. Five of the villages have gone through six local military representatives, and three other villages have known five changes each. In only two villages has the same local representative of the army been posted in a village for the duration of the period 1965-69. High turnover prevents the pemba and military from becoming a local influential of major magnitude. Its ability to serve as an effective link between the village and the outside world is decreased by the transience of his residence in the village.

ADMINISTRATIVE COMMUNICATION: EXPOSURE TO THE GOVERNMENT APPARATUS

Contact between the government apparatus and the villages is an important channel of communication with the supra-village world. The two main indicators of the volume of communication between the village and the government sector are access to social services supplied directly or indirectly by the central government and frequency of visits by officials of various departments of the central government to the villages. In addition, the government's role as employer must be examined by considering the number of civil servants and army personnel drawn from the villages.

ACCESS TO SERVICES

Village officials were given a list of 28 economic and social services and were asked to specify if each service was available in the village. If a service was not available within the village itself, the officials were asked if it was available within a radius of 15 km. of the village.

For analysis purposes the 21 social services directly or indirectly a product of government activity or supervision were included in the index of access to social services reported in Table 1.
The most omnipresent service of the state is the village school. An elementary school (sekolah dasar) is present in each of the nineteen villages. What respondents refer to as a library is probably a reference to the school as a source of books. Public health service is also available in most villages; however, this does not mean that villages have doctors and nurses residing in the immediate locality, only that medicine and an occasional injection are available from time to time in the villages. The remainder of the services have low availability, if judged in light of the difficulty and expense of traveling 15 km. to reach them. This is true of medical services provided by doctors and trained midwives (bidan). Mail service, telephone, and telegraph are also obtained only by traveling a considerable distance. The officials of the agriculture and forestry departments as well as social, workers reside in small towns adjacent to the villages, rather than in the villages themselves.

Similarly, the school system above the elementary level continues to be largely limited to the towns.

Aside from the degree of difficulty in reaching various social services, the frequency of visits to the village by outside officials supplies an indicator of the volume of government-tillage interchange.

A second battery of questions was asked to estimate the frequency of visits by officials not residing in the village. The line of inquiry pursued is a sensitive one, because the village officials are implicitly asked to tell whether sufficient personal attention is being given the village by various officials. Given the desire to avoid condemnation of government officials, the estimates of frequency of visitation given in Table 2 should not be taken as an indication of absolute frequency, but as high estimates of the attention paid by outside officials to the villages.

The six types of officials constituting the index are the sub-district officer, an agricultural official, a health official, the postman, an official of the Department of Social Affairs, and a representative of the district office, the kabupaten.

The respondents were given six time intervals: daily; once a week; twice a month; once a month; less than once a month; and never. In constructing the index these responses were given scores of 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0 respectively. The possible range of total scores for a village is from 0 to 30, where 0 indicates that none of the six officials ever visits the village and 30 means that all six officials enter the village daily.

The total scores reported by the nineteen villages ranged from 6 to 20 with the average being 12.4. When this number is transformed into the average frequency for all types of officials, the mean frequency of appearance is 2.1, or once a month. Thus even according to estimates that are probably very much inflated, each official on the average visits the village only once a month.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Average Accessibility</th>
<th>Accessibility Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Service available in most villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Official</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital/Clinic</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Official</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained Midwife</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Mail</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry Official</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical School</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Worker</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High School</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening Courses</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>at all in 25% of the villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>Service not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The most omnipresent service of the state is the village school. An elementary school (sekolah dasar) is present in each of the nineteen villages. What respondents refer to as a library is probably a reference to the school as a source of books. Public health service is also available in most villages; however, this does not mean that villages have doctors and nurses residing in the immediate locality, only that medicine and an occasional injection are available from time to time in the villages.

The remainder of the services have low availability, if judged in light of the difficulty and expense of traveling 15 km. to reach them. This is true of medical services provided by doctors and trained midwives (bidan). Mail service, telephone, and telegraph are also obtained only by traveling a considerable distance. The officials of the agriculture and forestry departments as well as social workers reside in small towns adjacent to the villages, rather than in the villages themselves. Similarly, the school system above the elementary level continues to be largely limited to the towns.

FREQUENCY OF VISITS BY OFFICIALS

Aside from the degree of difficulty in reaching various social services, the frequency of visits to the village by outside officials supplies an indicator of the volume of government—village interchange. A second battery of questions was asked to estimate the frequency of visits by officials not residing in the village. The line of inquiry pursued is a sensitive one, because the village officials are implicitly asked to tell whether sufficient personal attention is being given the village by various officials. Given the desire to avoid condemnation of government officials, the estimates of frequency of visitation given in Table 2 should not be taken as an indication of absolute frequency, but as high estimates of the attention paid by outside officials to the villages.

The six types of officials constituting the index are the sub-district officer, an agricultural official, a health official, the postman, an official of the Department of Social Affairs, and a representative of the district office, the kabupaten.* The respondents were given six time intervals: daily; once a week; twice a month; once a month; less than once a month; and never. In constructing the index these responses were given scores of 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0 respectively. The possible range of total scores for a village is from 0 to 30, where 0 indicates that none of the six officials ever visits the village and 30 means that all six officials enter the village daily.

The total scores reported by the nineteen villages ranged from 5 to 20 with the average being 12.4. When this number is transformed into the average frequency for all types of officials, the mean frequency of appearance is 2.1, or once a month. Thus even according to estimates that are probably very much inflated, each official on the average visits the village only once a month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Approximate Frequency</th>
<th>Index of Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Official</td>
<td>Every two weeks</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Official</td>
<td>Every two weeks</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-district Official</td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Advisor</td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Carrier/Mailman</td>
<td>Less than monthly</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Officer (bupati)</td>
<td>or representative</td>
<td>Less than monthly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* If the survey were being replicated, a wider range of officials might be used. In particular the mantri polisi (usually the second in command at the sub-district office) and the tax officials should be added to the list. However, the present range of officials is still wide enough to form at least a rough picture of the frequency of contact between the village and the central government through visits by officials.
According to the index, public health officials and agricultural officials are the most frequent visitors to the villages. On the average each of these appears in the village every two weeks. In contrast, the sub-district officer, or more probably his representative, and an official from the Department of Social Affairs each visit the villages only once a month. And finally, the mailman and the bupati himself or his representative are almost never seen in the villages. If these data are representative of southeast West Java, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the level of administrative penetration remains low in spite of the massive number of bureaucrats employed by the government. *

The central government's paid bureaucrats usually do not reside in the villages which contain the bulk of the population. Instead the administrators reside and do their work in the sub-district and district towns, seldom visiting the villages under their guidance. This is particularly true of the Department of the Interior, which is the most important office for regulating village affairs but whose representatives are located only at the sub-district level.

There are important exceptions to the generalization that the level of administrative penetration is low. The Department of Education, the Department of Religious Affairs, the Department of Health, and the Department of the Army all station representatives in the villages. For all departments the total number of part- and full-time employees pursuing their tasks in villages where they also reside is approximately twenty for a village of 8,000 inhabitants or 3.3 full- or part-time civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants. **

This does not include the village administration, which is not paid by the central or provincial government. The village administrators are locally elected with the approval of the sub-district office. The headman attends meetings called by the sub-district officer, and by reason of the regulations and information transmitted through these meetings he is the most important communication link between the village and the Department of the Interior.

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OF VILLAGERS

In addition to the headman's contact with the subdistrict administration, the contacts with civil servants who both work and reside in the village, and the visits by outside officials, there is an additional source of contact between the villages and the government sector. This is a by-product of the government's role as an employer of bureaucrats and soldiers. On the average approximately ten residents from each village are employed as civil servants working outside of the village where they reside. *** In addition, there are approximately ten families in each village that have relatives serving elsewhere in the armed forces. **** Employment outside of the village, especially in the case of the civil servants, supplies a regular channel for information about government programs and practices for the villages.

* Of course, the low frequency of visits by officials of the central government to the villages is not unique to West Java. Low bureaucratic penetration is typical in the rural areas of most developing countries. However, to the extent that a government opts for a development strategy in which the bureaucracy is expected to play a crucial part in modernizing the countryside, the frequency of contact with the villages must be escalated. Even if the development strategy adopted de-emphasizes the role of the bureaucracy and instead seeks to maximize the role of market mechanisms, it could be argued, as it is here with regard to Indonesia, that the bureaucracy's contact with the villages must still be expanded in order to facilitate the diffusion of innovations which are critical to a village's ability to respond to the incentives provided by market mechanisms.

** These figures were based on the eighteen villages for which we have data.

*** This figure is based on only sixteen villages. The village located near Bandung, with 18.3 civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants employed outside the village, was omitted. To include this 'begawai negri (civil servant) village' would have overestimated the number found in most other villages.

**** The mean number of families with members in the armed forces outside the villages was computed from data on only 16 villages. Two villages gave no data and a third indicated a very high number of military families which would have overestimated the number found in most villages.
What propositions can be drawn from the information on village-government communication links in the nineteen villages? First, the villages are not within easy reach of services provided by the central government with the exception of elementary school and some public health services. From doctor to veterinarian, from agriculture to the forestry department, from S.M.P. (junior high school) to other forms of higher education, the story is the same. If the villagers are to avail himself of these services of the modern world he must travel to the towns. The services simply are not available in most of the villages. This fact greatly lowers the probability that the information and attitudes typical of modern Indonesian urban life will be channeled into the village as a spillover effect from routine government operations.

Secondly, the low level of attention paid to the villages by officials is probably a major blockage in the whole communication system. Officials expected to play vital roles in such programs as the Five-Year Plan have only scant knowledge of the past and present problems, issues, and leadership structure of the villages in their jurisdiction. This generalization is derived from numerous informal interviews conducted with officials in many sub-districts of southeastern West Java. The sub-district offices were often poor sources of information about the most basic aspects of the economic and political affairs of villages, even when these villages were within twenty minutes’ horse-cart ride from the offices.

One reason for the shortage of knowledge is the inability or reluctance of the officials to visit the villages frequently. Another is the job mobility, both voluntary and enforced, which characterized the changing of regimes during 1966–67. Whatever the cause, the lack of intimate knowledge of the villages on the part of officials charged with guiding them precludes maximal administrative effectiveness.

From the communications standpoint the low volume of messages flowing between the government apparatus and the villages may explain the resistance of some villages to following new government initiatives. The villages do not expect to receive vast amounts of attention from outside officials. They expect to solve their own problems such as building schools and repairing roads and irrigation ditches. The complement of village self-reliance, however, may be a resentment of the infrequent sharp fora of government officials into the villages. Part of the resentment kindled by the Bimas Project may have arisen from the combination of past indifference to village problems and the sudden influx of officials carrying orders tailored in a variety of far-away departments.

This brings us to the feedback problems derived from the volume and direction of the village-government communication process. The communication process tends to be primarily a unidirectional one flowing downward from the sub-district office to the village administration. The sub-district official communicates with the village administrations by calling his headmen to meetings, at which new regulations and instructions on how to enforce them are given out. However, the headman’s psychological set is primarily a local one. The headman often serves as a buffer between the villagers.

* The Bimas Project was a massive agricultural extension project aimed at rapidly increasing rice production through a non-market, heavily bureaucratic strategy in which government decisions were largely substituted for the peasant’s role as the critical decision maker in the agricultural sector. The project was temporarily canceled by President Suharto in mid-1970 because of growing peasant resistance and because of the program’s evident failure to usher in the green revolution. For a highly perceptive analysis of the failure of the Bimas Project, see the following articles by Gary Hansen: "Indonesia’s Green Revolution: The Abandonment of a Non-Market Strategy toward Change," Working Paper of the East-West Technology and Development Institute (Honolulu: The East-West Center. 1971); "Episodes in Rural Modernization: Problems in the Bimas Project," Indonesia, No. 11 (April), 1971, pp. 63–81; and "Rural Administration and Agricultural Development in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, Fall, 1971.

** The incongruence between the "upward" or "cosmopolitan" orientation of the lowest rung of the professional government bureaucracy and the "downward" or "local" orientation of the village headman is found in disparate peasant cultures. For similar observations see Frederick W. Frey and Leslie L. Roos, Social Structure and Community Development in Rural Turkey: the Village and Elite Leadership Relations (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967); and Manning Nash, The Golden Road to Modernity: Village Life in Contemporary Burma (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965).
and the national administration, and his ability and willingness to enforce government edicts is low when these edicts conflict with the local, short-run interests of prominent men of his home village.

When conflict occurs between external administrative goals and village interests the usual strategy employed by the headman is ritualistic obedience to outside officials, combined with a willingness to overlook and conceal the failure of villagers to carry out the administrator's plans. Rather than send negative feedback up the line to the administrator early enough in the program to allow adaptation of the program to village conditions, the headman either remains silent or states that all is well. As a result the failure of the program only becomes apparent when it is too late to change it. Lack of early negative feedback, combined with the low frequency with which officials personally monitor activities in the villages, produces policy failures as a direct outcome of the low-volume, uni-directional communication process.
III. MASS MEDIA, KNOWLEDGE OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS, AND CORRELATION WITH VILLAGE BEHAVIOR

How extensive is the penetration of mass media into these villages? Are differences between individuals on mass media exposure a good predictor of the different levels of knowledge possessed by individuals about national symbols and programs? When villages are considered as units, are different levels of knowledge about national symbols an accurate guide to their political behavior vis-a-vis the Dar'iul Islam rebellion? Likewise, can we predict the efficiency and execution of a program from the extent of knowledge about that program possessed by the villagers?

The last two questions are part of a larger question: How important is the symbolic information transmitted by the mass media in determining the political and economic behaviors adopted by the villages?

DATA COLLECTION

SELECTION OF THE VILLAGES: THREE DISTINCT PATTERNS

To answer these questions we must shift from aggregate data about whole villages to more extensive data on individuals within villages. Three villages, each representing a distinct level of national integration, were selected from the nineteen for intensive study. One village had fought heartily for the Dar'iul Islam rebellion against the central government—an attempt to establish an Islamic state—and its past political behavior is taken as an indicator of relatively low integration into a nation-state. The second village, here referred to as the "pro-government village," actively fought for the central government against the rebellion. The third or "swing village" initially joined the rebellion but subsequently assumed a neutral position, alternately cooperating with the rebellion and with the government forces fighting against it.

The interviews drawn from these three villages provide data on the penetration of the mass media and allow analysis of its effect on political behavior, past and present.

SELECTION OF RESPONDENTS

In the three villages selected for intensive study, a disproportional stratified sampling frame was employed to select the 206 villagers to be interviewed. Approximately twenty community leaders, ten religious leaders, ten economic leaders, ten elite women, and twenty members of the village poor

* Karl W. Deutsch has also used the presence or absence of internal warfare as an indicator of national integration. See his definition of "security communities" in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 5-9.
were picked for interviews in each village. * Four out of five of the sampling categories were taken from the village elite. In essence, then, the samples derived were elite samples, although the inclusion of a small sample of the village poor allows one to make certain judgements about the contribution of social status differences to the variation present on particular variables.

The elite character of the sampling affects the findings presented in this section and the next. For instance, exposure to mass media increases with social status. Therefore, the figures presented do not represent the degree of penetration of mass media into the entire village population: with the exception of the village poor, the figures refer only to the penetration of mass media into the uppermost reaches of village society. Mass media exposure of the whole village population would be substantially lower than the figures presented in this section.

Table 3 details the strata from which the interviews were taken in the three villages.

### INTERVIEWING

The interview schedule for individual respondents contained 229 separate questions, some of which included as many as ten distinct answers, and it required three and one-half to four hours to administer; the language for interviewing was Sundanese. The interviewers were students from three universities in Bandung: Universitas Padjadjaran, Universitas Parahyangan, and Universitas Pasundan. Most of the students had been born in villages in West Java, and the mother tongue of all was Sundanese. They were trained in interviewing techniques for two months prior to entering the field.

### AMOUNT OF MASS MEDIA EXPOSURE

One question in the survey contained eighteen separate sub-questions concerning exposure to mass media, covering frequency of attendance to newspapers, magazines, light reading, the Koran and other religious works, the radio, and the cinema. Table 4 gives the frequency of attendance to these media.

### PRINTED MEDIA

With the exception of the Koran and religious material, the penetration of printed media into the village is low. Out of 203 persons responding to the question, 101 (50 percent) have never or nearly never read a newspaper. This is particularly impressive because the level of exposure for the population as a whole is probably even lower; the samples utilized in deriving the figures were primarily elite samples, with a much higher level of exposure to media than the general population. Nevertheless,

---

* The community leaders were the most heterogeneous sub-elite sampled and thus received the largest sampling fraction. The community leader strata included all the general leaders of the village, all the holders of village offices, the political party leaders, and the leaders of non-political organizations in the villages. If a religious leader was reputed to be both a general leader and a religious leader, he was included on the sampling lists for both strata.

Religious leaders as a category included religious teachers at the village religious schools in addition to those referred to as tokoh agama (religious leaders).

The economic leaders of the village were taken to be the large landowners, the petty traders, and the shop owners of the village. In addition, persons reputed to be the most innovative farmers in the village were included in this sampling list.

The elite women were selected from among the wives of the community leaders who had already been chosen to be interviewed.

The village poor were selected by randomly drawing from the tax records respondents whose total land holdings were between .02 and .5 hectares of land. This would be enough land to build a house on, but not enough to raise crops sufficient to support a family. In addition, it was specified that the persons in this category must be male and less than 65 years old. From the village land records it was clear that the village poor were in the lower half of the village social structure but that there remained another still poorer stratum of the village population, the landless, from which no interviews were drawn.
Table 4
Exposure to Mass Media in Three Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Rarely or Never</th>
<th>Yearly or Sometimes</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(128)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Reading</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koran and Religious Works</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>2900</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(117)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinema</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>205</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(141)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table. For instance, 50% of the 203 respondents answering the question rarely or never have read a newspaper.

RADIO
The extent of radio's penetration sharply contrasts with the other media. Radio messages from the outside world reach the village elite with high frequency. A majority of those interviewed, 57 percent, stated that they listen to the radio daily, and an additional 21 percent listen to it at least weekly. Radio has the highest impact of any mass medium. Even the Koran and religious works receive less frequent attention than radio.

As Table 5 indicates, the impact of radio, like all mass media, is structured by a person's place in the social hierarchy. It costs money to buy a radio, as it does to acquire magazines and newspapers. However, the possibility of gaining access to someone else's radio and the fact that literacy is not required result in a higher percentage of listeners than readers in each stratum. Even among the village poor, who manifest the lowest exposure to radio, only 22 percent stated that they listen to radio less frequently than monthly.

It is clear that radio is the only mass medium with the outside world that reaches the majority of all strata on at least a weekly basis. While the respondents probably overestimate the frequency of attendance to modern media such as radio and newspapers, the evidence clearly suggests that radio is more important than any other mass medium from the standpoint of relative frequency of attendance.

Table 3
Social Strata Utilized for Sampling
In the Three Villages
(n=206)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strata</th>
<th>Completed Interviews</th>
<th>Partially Completed Interviews</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Leaders</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Leaders</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Leaders</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Women</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Poor</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>206</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Interview mortality was high among the village poor: only two-thirds of the desired number of interviews were completed. This decreases the confidence we can place in the village poor as a randomly selected sub-sample. The chief reason for high interview mortality is that the poor are less well known and harder to find. Also, because they work for others from morning until night, they often do not have the surplus time and energy to be interviewed. In spite of the large number of interviews that were not begun or were not completed, the sub-sample of village poor still supplies a valuable counterweight to the otherwise wholly elite character of the samples taken in the three villages.

even among the community leaders and the religious leaders, 32 percent and 33 percent respectively have never or nearly never read a newspaper. Among the randomly selected sample of the village poor, the proportion having no contact with newspapers rises to 75 percent.

The other two printed media originating outside the village, magazines and light reading (buku tajari), are even less frequently read than the newspapers. Sixty-two percent of the total sample specify that they either have never read a magazine or have read one only once or twice in a lifetime. The majority of the total sample, 59 percent, specify they have had no exposure to the pulp magazines referred to as light reading. By any absolute standards penetration by the printed media is very low, even though the three villages are not far removed in distance from the provincial city of Bandung and the district town of Garut.

CINEMA

Among the electronic media the cinema has not yet touched the lives of the majority of villagers interviewed. Nearly 89 percent of the total sample have not had any contact with the movies. Among various sub-elites of the sample, the community leaders stratum is the only one in which the percentage that have never seen a movie falls below 50 percent. The religious and economic leaders, the elite women, and the village poor responding stated that 73 percent to 86 percent of them have either never, or only once or twice in a lifetime, seen a motion picture.
Table 4

Exposure to Mass Media in Three Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Rarely or Never</th>
<th>Yearly or Sometimes</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>50% (101)</td>
<td>16% (33)</td>
<td>16% (22)</td>
<td>12% (24)</td>
<td>8% (13)</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>62% (128)</td>
<td>14% (29)</td>
<td>19% (39)</td>
<td>4% (9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Reading</td>
<td>59% (121)</td>
<td>16% (32)</td>
<td>18% (37)</td>
<td>6% (13)</td>
<td>1% (2)</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koran and Religious Works</td>
<td>9% (19)</td>
<td>2% (4)</td>
<td>10% (21)</td>
<td>49% (100)</td>
<td>29% (60)</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>15% (31)</td>
<td>4% (8)</td>
<td>3% (7)</td>
<td>21% (42)</td>
<td>57% (117)</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinema</td>
<td>69% (141)</td>
<td>24% (50)</td>
<td>6% (12)</td>
<td>0.5% (1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table. For instance 50% of the 203 respondents answering the question rarely or never have read a newspaper.

RADIO

The extent of radio's penetration sharply contrasts with the other media. Radio messages from the outside world reach the village elite with high frequency. A majority of those interviewed, 57 percent, stated that they listen to the radio daily, and an additional 21 percent listen to it at least weekly. Radio has the highest impact of any mass medium. Even the Koran and religious works receive less frequent attention than radio.

As Table 5 indicates, the impact of radio, like all mass media, is structured by a person's place in the social hierarchy. It costs money to buy a radio, as it does to acquire magazines and newspapers. However, the possibility of gaining access to someone else's radio and the fact that literacy is not required result in a higher percentage of listeners than readers in each stratum. Even among the village poor, who manifest the lowest exposure to radio, only 22 percent stated that they listen to radio less frequently than monthly. In contrast, the same figure for reading newspapers is substantially higher: 36 percent of the village poor interviewed read newspapers less than monthly.

It is clear that radio is the only mass medium that reaches the majority of all strata at least on a weekly basis. While the respondents probably overestimate the frequency of attendance to modern media such as radio and newspapers, the evidence clearly suggests that radio is more important than any other mass medium from the standpoint of relative frequency of attendance.
by chance, and gamma (an ordinal measure of association) is very high for all four items; i.e., the gamma for all four media when run separately against the low and high quartiles is above .9800. The conclusion to be drawn is that high exposure to one medium correlates well with high exposure to other media. The same person who shows high exposure to radio also has relatively high exposure to newspapers, magazines, and the cinema. Likewise, the respondent who states that he reads the newspapers very infrequently tends to listen to the radio with low frequency relative to his peers.

Table 6
Mass Media Exposure Scale Divided into Quartiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stratum</th>
<th>Rarely or Never</th>
<th>Yearly, Sometimes</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Total Responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Leaders</td>
<td>14% (9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14% (9)</td>
<td>73% (48)</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Leaders</td>
<td>13% (4)</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23% (7)</td>
<td>60% (18)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Leaders</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td>10% (3)</td>
<td>7% (2)</td>
<td>23% (7)</td>
<td>57% (17)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Women</td>
<td>29% (10)</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td>6% (2)</td>
<td>12% (4)</td>
<td>50% (17)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Poor</td>
<td>16% (7)</td>
<td>7% (3)</td>
<td>7% (3)</td>
<td>33% (15)</td>
<td>38% (17)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15% (31)</td>
<td>4% (8)</td>
<td>3% (7)</td>
<td>21% (42)</td>
<td>57% (117)</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

A SCALE OF MASS MEDIA EXPOSURE

Knowing that radio has permeated the villages while newspapers receive much less frequent attention does not tell us whether separate media penetrate independently or whether their entrance into village life is part of an underlying phenomenon of general mass media penetration. Do persons manifesting relatively high attendance to radio also tend to read newspapers more frequently than do their peers? Likewise, does relatively high exposure to newspaper and radio characterize persons who are relatively high in exposure to magazines and the cinema? The question of whether distinct groups of high and low media consumers exist can be resolved by testing to see if the four media (radio, newspapers, magazines, and cinema) form a scale. *

To accomplish this, the distribution for each medium was roughly trichotomized, and weights of 1, 2, and 3 were assigned to responses for low, medium, and high exposure to each medium. A total score was calculated for each individual for the four media. The total scores ranging from 4 to 12 were ranked, and the total sample was divided into the four quartiles shown in Table 6. Subsequently the quartiles with highest and lowest mass media exposure were separated and each medium was run against the scale to determine whether an individual’s score on a single medium predicted his score on the scale as a whole.

The statistical tests run on the four different media show that they are strongly interrelated. Using chi-square, the chances are less than one in ten thousand that the results could have been obtained * The scaling technique used here is a Likert or summed rating technique. For a description of the technique, see Allen L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude Scale Construction (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1957), pp. 149 ff. For details on the mass media scale see Kari D. Jackson, "Traditional Authority and National Integration: The Dar’ul Islam Rebellion in West Java" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971), pp. 467-72.
by chance, and gamma (an ordinal measure of association) is very high for all four items; i.e., the gamma for all four media when run separately against the low and high quartiles is above .9800.

The conclusion to be drawn is that high exposure to one medium correlates well with high exposure to other media. The same person who shows high exposure to radio also has relatively high exposure to newspapers, magazines, and the cinema. Likewise, the respondent who states that he reads the newspapers very infrequently tends to listen to the radio with low frequency relative to his peers.

The identity of the high-media-consuming groups is disclosed in Table 7. There are statistically significant differences between groups of respondents. The community leaders and the religious elite of the villages generally are high media consumers, while the elite women and the village poor have very much less contact with the mass media. The economic leaders assume a middle position: they have more exposure than the women and the poor but less exposure than the community and the religious leaders. *

Of all types of respondents the community leaders' group has the highest proportion (46 percent of their number) who fall into the fourth quartile, signifying relatively high contact with all four media. They read the newspaper daily or weekly, listen to the radio every day, go to the cinema several times a year, and read magazines at least several times each year.

The second highest media consumers are the village religious leaders. Fifty percent of them fall into the third quartile and another 17 percent are found in the fourth quartile. This means that the majority of religious leaders have daily, weekly, or monthly contact with newspapers as well as daily exposure to radio broadcasts. However, the religious leaders show little if any exposure to magazines and motion pictures.

The economic leaders are much less exposed to mass media than either the community leaders or the religious elite. However, 46 percent of their number still fall into the medium and high media consumption quartiles. This is distinctly higher than the women and the village poor. A heavy majority of both of these groups are found in the low and very low media consumption categories. Thirty-eight percent of the elite women and 42 percent of the village poor fall into the first quartile, which is characterized by almost no contact with the mass media. In addition, another 32 percent of the elite women and 27 percent of the poor are found in the second quartile. This also signifies relatively low mass media exposure, because the typical respondent in the second quartile reads the newspaper only monthly or yearly, and listens to the radio weekly or monthly, but neither reads magazines nor goes to the movies.

* By (1) collapsing the community and religious leaders into one group called the high media consumers, (2) combining the elite women and the village poor to form the low media consumers, and (3) considering the economic leaders as representing a middle level of media consumption, a table can be formed on which statistical significance tests can be run. The differences between the three groups of respondents across the four quartiles of the scale of mass media exposure yield a chi-square that is significant at the .0000 level. This means that the probability of obtaining this result by chance alone is less than 1/10,000. In addition, the ordinal measure of association, gamma is fairly strong—a .4568.
Table 7
Mass Media Exposure Scale and Respondent Types
(n=205)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very Low Exposure: 1st Quartile</th>
<th>Low Exposure: 2nd Quartile</th>
<th>Medium Exposure: 3rd Quartile</th>
<th>High Exposure: 4th Quartile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Leaders</td>
<td>17% (11)</td>
<td>13% (9)</td>
<td>24% (18)</td>
<td>23% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Leaders</td>
<td>20% (6)</td>
<td>13% (4)</td>
<td>50% (15)</td>
<td>17% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Elite</td>
<td>27% (8)</td>
<td>27% (8)</td>
<td>33% (10)</td>
<td>13% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Women</td>
<td>38% (13)</td>
<td>32% (11)</td>
<td>18% (6)</td>
<td>12% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Poor</td>
<td>42% (13)</td>
<td>27% (12)</td>
<td>22% (10)</td>
<td>3% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28% (57)</td>
<td>21% (44)</td>
<td>28% (57)</td>
<td>23% (47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

KNOWLEDGE OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS

In addition to identifying the high mass media consumption groups, the mass media scale can be used to answer questions about the effectiveness of mass media as an instrument for spreading knowledge of important national symbols and government programs. Correlations between mass media exposure and measures of knowledge can indicate whether the mass media are an efficient means for raising the village's level of knowledge about the outside world.

Before such tests can be made, two measures of knowledge of national symbols and programs must be described. These involve the Pantjasila, a primary national symbol of long standing, and Repelita, the recently created symbol of the current five-year development plan.

PANTJASILA: THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

The Pantjasila is the primary over-arching symbol of Indonesian political unity. It was coined by Sukarno in 1945, written into the preamble of the Constitution of 1945, and generally is accepted as the philosophical foundation stone of the modern Indonesian state. The five principles of the Pantjasila are: belief in one God, humanitarian internationalism, the unity of the Indonesian people, democracy, and social justice. As a formulation the Pantjasila has been used by Sukarno and Suharto alike as a rubric under which to gather the disparate groups and factions of opinion into a single national coalition. The five principles of the Pantjasila are seen everywhere in West Java, posted in all public offices, in private homes, and on public notice boards. Within a few miles of the villages in this study,

the Pantjasila has even been chiseled out of the mountainside as a forty-foot tall reminder of its importance. The present salience of the Pantjasila as a political symbol, as well as the effort expended in disseminating it over the last 25 years, make it an ideal measure for testing the degree to which national symbols have entered the understanding of the villagers.

During the course of the interview each respondent was given a piece of paper containing the Pantjasila.* The respondent was asked to read each sila (principle) aloud, and after each he was asked to give his opinion of what it meant in his own words. The interviewers were instructed to record every word the respondent uttered. The results of the five-part open-ended question were coded according to whether the respondent was able to give an answer that was more than a mere parroting of the exact words he had just read aloud. The coding of the meaning attached to the five silas was very lenient. Only flagrant errors of interpretation and complete direct parroting were taken as indicators of lack of knowledge.

In spite of the lenient coding, the lack of knowledge of the Pantjasila was striking. The level of knowledge of the Pantjasila held by most of those interviewed was summed up by one respondent who said, "I know the Pantjasila but I don't know its contents.''

Table 8 below gives the number of errors or parroting for the different types of people sampled. As can be seen in the first column, 32 percent of the total sample have perfect or near perfect knowledge of the Pantjasila as measured by our lenient coding criteria. This group with high knowledge is composed primarily of the combined elite,** that is, the combined responses of community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Errors or Instances of Parroting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The "n" for knowledge of the Pantjasila is 192 because the seven respondents who refused or were unable to complete their interviews have been dropped and because the seven instances of either interviewer error or refusal by the respondent have been excluded.

2 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

* The long form of the Pantjasila was used: (1) the existence of one God, (2) Humanity which is just and civilized, (3) Unified Indonesia, (4) Democracy which is led by wisdom and discretion in collective consultation and representation, and (5) Social justice for all Indonesian people.

** The responses of the three sub-strata have been given different weights in each village in order to make each village elite sample conform with the parameters of each village elite population. For details on the weighting procedure used for combining sub-strata, see Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority and National Integration, op. cit., pp. 114-24.
religious, and economic leaders. Fifty of them, 41 percent of the combined elite, manifest high knowledge of the Pantjasila. In contrast, only 13 percent of the elite women and 21 percent of the village poor have the same high level of knowledge of the symbol.

The third and fourth columns contain the 41 percent of the total sample which made errors or parroted either four out of five or five out of the five Silas. This very low level of comprehension characterized 30 percent of the combined elite, 54 percent of the elite women, and 64 percent of the village poor. The fact that 30 percent of the most prominent village leaders have at best only scanty knowledge of the nation’s primary symbol bodes ill for the successful communication of symbolic information to the villages over both the long and the short run. Given the vast effort expended upon communicating this symbol during the post-war era, the generally low level of comprehension indicates the difficulty of communicating abstract national symbols to the villages.

REPELITA: THE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The lack of in-depth understanding of the Pantjasila is matched by low levels of knowledge about Repelita, the current five-year plan. Repelita is different from the Pantjasila as an indicator of knowledge of national symbols. It was a brand new symbol at the time of the research during the late summer of 1969. The symbol referred to an on-going program that had already manifested itself at the village level through the 100,000 Rp. development grants from the central government. In addition, the primary aim of the five-year plan was raising agricultural production, an activity of central interest to the villagers.

The following open-ended questions were asked about Repelita:

183. What does Repelita mean and what in general are its aims?
184. What will the influence of Repelita be on your life, now and in the future?

Given both the amount of publicity devoted to Repelita during the first half of 1969 and the behavioral impetus supplied by the 100,000 Rp. development grants, we expected most respondents to possess a very concrete image of the aims of Repelita and its possible effect upon their own lives. This did not prove to be the case. Almost all respondents understood the literal meaning of the acronym but little more. In responding to Question 183, almost all respondents stated that Repelita meant *Rental Pemabangunan Lima Tahun* (five-year development plan). However, very few possessed a concrete programmatic image of Repelita’s aims. Instead of stating that Repelita’s aim was increasing rice production or improving irrigation or helping villages to build new schools, most respondents explained Repelita by giving yet another symbol such as *subur makmur, ioh dinawi, adil makmur* (prosperity, fertility, peace, and justice). The most frequent single response was *pemabangunan* construction or development, with no specific objects being mentioned. Respondents knew it was about construction, but they could not say what was to be constructed or developed.

The following literal replies indicate the largely symbolic, as distinct from programmatic, understanding of Repelita that was prevalent at the time of the survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Respondent A</th>
<th>&quot;I keep hearing about it, but I don’t know what is meant by it.&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respondent B</td>
<td>&quot;All those things from that five years and the aim is construction.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respondent C</td>
<td>&quot;Rental Pemabangunan Lima Tahun. Moral and material up-building in the mental and material field.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respondent D</td>
<td>&quot;You have to construct. Its aim I don’t know yet.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respondent E</td>
<td>&quot;Rental Pemabangunan Lima Tahun. Fufilling the ideals of the people of Indonesia.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respondent F</td>
<td>&quot;Rental Pemabangunan Lima Tahun. Construction, ’mental,’ economics, education, and increasing knowledge about the state.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 contains the categories into which the responses were eventually sorted and the number of persons falling into each one. The categories are mutually exclusive and run from high to relatively low knowledge of Repelita. If a response contained a programmatic goal in addition to
the acronym and various slogans (as in the case of Respondent F), the response was coded only as programmatic. Any person mentioning a concrete goal or activity was classified as high in knowledge. Most persons mentioning programs also mentioned symbols as well as giving the literal meaning of Repelita.

In sum, only 19 percent of the respondents gave answers that referred to programs and specific activities. The majority of respondents, 59 percent, explained Repelita by referring to other symbols rather than to activities having to do with rice, irrigation, and food production. Most respondents were capable of manipulating the acronym as a symbol, but as of late 1969, there was little sense of Repelita as a concrete program at the village level.

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Response</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program or goal mentioned: agriculture, irrigation, roads, bridges, schools, education, family planning, trade, or construction of buildings</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slogan or abstract answer only: construction with no object mentioned, mental upbuilding, subur makmur, lob djinawi, adil makmur</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal meaning of Repelita acronym only: Rentjana Pembangunan Lima Tahun</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The breakdown of the Repelita question by sub-strata of the sample differs from Table 8 which concerned the Pancasila. In the case of Repelita, the combined elite is not significantly higher in its knowledge than the village poor and the elite women (see Table 10). This is probably because Repelita was so new at the time; if the survey were replicated today there would probably be a substantial rise in the number of combined elite who would specify programs rather than answering with symbols and slogans.

The second question on Repelita focused on its effects upon the respondent's life. This probe was expected to bring forth specific personal expectations. However, instead Question 184 revealed that only a few respondents had a well-defined concept of how the five-year plan would affect them. If anything, the responses to Question 184 betrayed an even vaguer understanding of Repelita than the responses to Question 133. First of all, the proportion of outright "don't knows" more than doubled, rising from 14 percent to 34 percent. Second, the number of persons who gave specific instances of how they expected it to affect their lives was only 19 (10 percent). The remaining majority answered either in terms of slogans (e.g., subur makmur) or stated that Repelita had begun to influence them without mentioning the character of this influence.

The overall conclusion to be drawn thus far is that the Pancasila and Repelita have barely scratched the surface of village consciousness. Perhaps this is because the Pancasila is too abstract and Repelita is as yet too new. Be that as it may, the findings still attest to the difficulty of bringing the programs of the central government to the villages. The Pancasila is not understood after 25 years of reiteration and the five-year plan is understood only as a symbol, an acronym to be manipulated, rather than as a practical program affecting the villagers' lives.
Table 11

Knowledge of the Pancasila (n=192)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Exposure</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Exposure:</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>112%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=25)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Exposure:</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=23)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Exposure:</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=5)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low Exposure:</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=8)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The "n" is different from that in Table 9 because the category "refused" has been eliminated. Also, rounding off decimals in the last stage of the weighting process eliminated one respondent from the total.

2 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

---

RELATIONSHIP OF EXPOSURE AND KNOWLEDGE TO VILLAGE BEHAVIOR

As stated earlier, the three villages sampled were chosen for their markedly different political and economic behavior patterns in the past. With regard to politics, one of them fought for the Dar'ul Islam rebellion, the second fought against it, and the third vacillated between the two sides; in economic behavior, one village has been extremely efficient in its use of the Repelita development grant, a second village has made almost no progress along this dimension, and the third village has had a middling performance in utilizing Repelita funds.

THE HYPOTHESES

From this information two separate typologies of behavior can be constructed. The first contrasts the Dar'ul Islam village, the swing village, and the pro-government village. The second

---

Table 11 displays the positive, statistically significant interrelationship between the mass media exposure scale and knowledge of the Pancasila. The majority of persons in the highest quartile of the mass media exposure scale also have the greatest knowledge of the Pancasila. Likewise, the majority of persons having almost no contact with mass media (the 1st quartile) make errors in or parrot five out of the five silas. The same findings are true for knowledge of Repelita: high knowledge correlates with high exposure to mass media.

---

KNOWLEDGE OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS AND MASS MEDIA EXPOSURE

So far we have established that the villages are characterized by low mass media exposure and low knowledge of national symbols and programs. However, this does not mean that mass media have been ineffective in the past or that they will be ineffective in spreading information in the future. It only means that at present both mass media exposure and knowledge are almost equally low. With the partial exception of radio, mass media have only begun to reach the villages. The critical policy question is, "Would a higher investment in mass media lead to sharp increases in knowledge of national programs and symbols?" The answer to this question provided by the data is a broad "yes." Knowledge of the Pancasila and Repelita is positively related at a statistically significant level to the scores on the scale of mass media exposure.

---

* The relationship between exposure to mass media and knowledge of the Pancasila produces a chi-square that is significant at the .000 level. The ordinal measure of association, gamma, is .5114.
** The table containing knowledge of Repelita and exposure to mass media is not displayed here because the results are almost identical to those obtained by running knowledge of the Pancasila against exposure to mass media. The cross tabulation of knowledge of Repelita and exposure to mass media results in a chi-square that is significant at the .000 level and a gamma of .5133.
contrasts the villages according to high, medium, and low efficiency in the use of Repelita funds in 1969. Efficiency is measured by the number and size of the projects carried out with the 100,000 Rp development grant in each village.

The objective of the research that follows is to discover whether variations in exposure to mass media, knowledge of the Pantjasila, and knowledge of the aims of Repelita predict the largest differences found with regard to defending the nation state and executing the five-year plan. Thus, the behaviors of the villages regarding the Dar'ul Islam rebellion and Repelita are the dependent variables. Pass media exposure, knowledge of the Pantjasila, and comprehension of the aims of Repelita are the independent variables. Reduced to bare essentials the two independent, quasi-experimental paradigms are meant to test the following hypotheses:

**HYPOTHESIS 1:** The village that fought for the government against the Dar'ul Islam rebellion will be significantly higher in exposure to mass media and in density of spread of national symbols than the village that fought for the establishment of an Islamic state. The swing village will fall in between the Dar'ul Islam and the pro-government village on the independent variables, media exposure, and knowledge of national symbols.

**HYPOTHESIS 2:** The village that has been most efficient in utilizing its development grant under Repelita will display significantly greater knowledge of the aims of Repelita than the village that has been distinctly ineffectual in utilizing Repelita funds. In turn, the village manifesting a middle level of effectiveness in utilizing the Repelita grant will display a middle level of knowledge of the aims of Repelita.

**DIFFERENCES IN VILLAGE HISTORIES**

The Dar'ul Islam village in this study supported the Dar'ul Islam rebellion against the national government for fourteen years. A large number of village males fought and died in the service of Sartosoewirjo's vision of a state based upon the Islamic law. By ferrying ammunition, supplying intelligence, and providing both men and material, the Dar'ul Islam village supported the rebellion steadfastly from beginning to end.

In contrast, a second village nearby fought hard on the side of the central government forces trying to suppress the Dar'ul Islam rebellion. Not only did this pro-government village provide a safe haven for government troops on patrol, but its men also participated in raids against a nearby Dar'ul Islam village. As a result of its strong support of the central government, the pro-government village was repeatedly subjected to fierce attack by the Tentara Islam Indonesia, the army of the Dar'ul Islam.

The third village in this study initially joined the Dar'ul Islam rebellion by providing troops. However, after the Indonesian Republic had been granted full sovereignty, the troops that had joined the Dar'ul Islam returned to the village. From that point onward the village assumed a neutral position between the bitterly contesting forces. This "swing" village cooperated with both sides alternately. Whenever one side brought force to bear in the village or called a meeting, the village elders and the people enthusiastically attended. In turn, when the opposite side held a meeting in the village the attendance was similarly prompt and enthusiastic.

**RELATIONSHIP TO THE HYPOTHESES**

One of the primary hypotheses with which this study began was that the pro-government village would be significantly different from the Dar'ul Islam village in exposure to mass media and knowledge of national symbols. It was felt that this hypothesis could be sustained, because the study of political integration has far more been dominated by a concern for various kinds of communications transactions as indicators of the level of political integration. In studies carried out largely in Western settings, emphasis has been given to communications transactions (such as message counts for mail, telephone, and radio broadcasting), trade transactions (with counts of the exchange of goods and services), and interpersonal transactions (concerning the frequency of personal contact). The basic assumption of for a review of the literature on political integration see Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," in James V. Toscano, Philip E. Jacob, and Henry Teune, eds., Political Communities (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 1-45.

The policy maker can expect that by increasing the number of radios and newspapers in the villages, and by increasing the proportion of radio programming devoted to development topics, he will increase the levels of knowledge of policy aims and national symbols. However, unfortunately, this does not mean that by increasing mass media exposure (and hence knowledge levels) he will achieve more voluntary and widespread implementation of his policies. Although mass media and levels of information are strongly related to each other, the next section shows that these two cognitive phenomena are not necessarily related to actual behaviors. Knowing about Repelita is not tantamount to adopting new rice strains, fertilizer, and pesticides. Likewise, the village with the greatest knowledge of national symbols may not be the most integrated into the nation state when it comes to political behavior.

**RELATIONSHIP OF EXPOSURE AND KNOWLEDGE TO VILLAGE BEHAVIOR**

As stated earlier, the three villages sampled were chosen for their markedly different political and economic behavior patterns in the past. With regard to politics, one of them fought for the Dar'ul Islam rebellion, the second fought against it, and the third vacillated between the two sides; in economic behavior, one village has been extremely efficient in its use of the Repelita development grant, a second village has made almost no progress along this dimension, and the third village has had a middling performance in utilizing Repelita funds.

**THE HYPOTHESES**

From this information two separate typologies of behavior can be constructed. The first contrasts the Dar'ul Islam village, the swing village, and the pro-government village. The second

---

**Table 11**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Exposure</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Exposure: 4th Quartile</td>
<td>56% 1</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Exposure: 3rd Quartile</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Exposure: 2nd Quartile</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low Exposure: 1st Quartile</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

---

The transaction studies is that there will be "a close correlation between relative frequency of trans-
action and the amount of political agreement and corporate activity among members of a particular
community." The underlying assumption is that the more frequent the interaction, the
greater the tendency toward agreement. In its essence, the constellation of hypotheses in the trans-
action studies contends that the transaction map of a territory should have a high correlation with
the political boundaries marking the landscape. *"The transaction theory of political integration is centrally concerned with patterns of informa-
tion exchange. It contends that political integration can be measured by investigating the communica-
tion system of a political unit. Political cohesion will be high between groups that exchange large
amounts of information over a wide range of topics. `** The assumption is that the quantity of
communications alone, regardless of the particular temporary political issues, will tell us a good
deal about the strength of a political organization as a unit. Thus, by looking at communications
'flows it is possible to predict political cohesion without the interference imposed by fleeting political
issues. Such indicators as dispersion of radio, newspapers, and magazines should provide formid-
able clues to the direction in which the struggle for integration is going at any one time. ***"Through
the mass media as well as via face-to-face communication, the shared myths and memories vital to
the cohesion of a nation are dispersed.

In studying the rebellion in West Java we expected that discontinuities in the level of integra-
tion into the nation state would be paralleled by differences in exposure to national mass media and
variations in the density of national symbolism. The measures of mass media exposure and lmowl-
knowledge of national symbols will now be examined to determine whether differences in political integration
are reflected by differences between the Dar'ul Islam and pro-government villages in media exposure
and the spread of the symbols of the nation.

THE VILLAGES COMPARED: A TEST OF THE HYPOTHESES*****

Table 7 (p. 16) shows that there are significant differences in mass media exposure between
different types of respondents. None of the differences between the villages is as great as the difference
between types of respondents. The variation between villages reported in Table 12 does not reach


**** Karl W. Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion, " Jacob and Toscano,
op. cit., pp. 75-97.

****** In the quasi-experimental paradigm used for this study the dependent variable, the behavior of
the villages, was not determined by the questionnaire data. The respondents were never asked
directly whether or not they had participated in the rebellion to found an Islamic state. Asking
such a question directly in a formal interview would have been counterproductive. The respon-
dents, quite understandably, would have concealed their participation in the rebellion.

Instead, the dependent variable was defined through extensive formal and informal inter-
views with sub-district officials, military officials, village headmen, informal village leaders,
and former leaders of the Dar'ul Islam rebellion both within and outside the villages. We asked
all of these men to tell us about the degree of participation of the villages in the Dar'ul Islam
rebellion. They were asked which villages participated and the extent of involvement in supply-
provisioning. Defining the dependent variable in this manner was in many ways the
most difficult and time-consuming part of the research project, and because of the importance
of this classification extreme care was lavished upon gathering and comparing informal data
from a multitude of sources.

To be absolutely sure of our classification of the sample drawn in the Dar'ul Islam vil-
gege the man who led the Dar'ul Islam forces out of the village to tell us the extent of participation in the rebellion by each person interviewed. As a result of his franimess as well
as subsequent conversations with others, we became convinced of the veracity of one woman's
description of how village life now differed from the way it had been during Dar'ul Islam times.
She replied, "Different? Things were the same then because we were all in the Dar'u1 Islam.''

RELATIONSHIP TO THE HYPOTHESES

One of the primary hypotheses with which this study began was that the pro-government village
would be significantly different from the Dar'ul Islam village in exposure to mass media and knowledge
of national symbols. It was felt that this hypothesis would be sustained, because the study of political
integration has largely been dominated by a concern for various kinds of communications transactions
as indicators of the level of political integration. " In studies carried out largely in Western settings,
emphasis has been given to communications transactions (such as message counts for mail, telephone,
and radio broadcasting), trade transactions (with counts of the exchange of goods and services), and
interpersonal transactions (concerning the frequency of personal contact). The basic assumption of

* For a review of the literature on political integration see Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The
Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community," The Integration
of Political Communities, Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.) (New York: J. B. Lippin-
the transaction studies is that there will be "a close correlation between relative frequency of trans-
action and the amount of political agreement and corporate activity among members of a particular
community." * The underlying assumption is that the more frequent the interaction, the
greater the tendency toward agreement. In its essence, the constellation of hypotheses in the trans-
action studies contends that the transaction map of a territory should have a high correlation with
the political boundaries marking the landscape. **

The transaction theory of political integration is centrally concerned with patterns of informa-
tion exchange. It contends that political integration can be measured by investigating the communica-
tion system of a political unit. Political cohesion will be high between groups that exchange large
amounts of information over a wide range of topics. *** The assumption is that the quantity of
communications alone, regardless of the particular temporary political issues, will tell us a good
deal about the strength of a political organization as a unit. Thus, by looking at communications
flows it is possible to predict political cohesion without the interference imposed by fleeting political
issues. Such indicators as dispersion of radio, newspapers, and magazines should provide formid-
able clues to the direction in which the struggle for integration is going at any one time. **** Through
the mass media as well as via face-to-face communication, the shared myths and memories vital to
the cohesion of a nation are dispersed.

In studying the rebellion in West Java we expected that discontinuities in the level of integra-
tion into the nation state would be paralleled by differences in exposure to national mass media and
variations in the density of national symbolism. The measures of mass media exposure and knowl-
edge of national symbols will now be examined to determine whether differences in political integration
are reflected by differences between the Dar'ul Islam and pro-government villages in media exposure
and the spread of the symbols of the nation.

THE VILLAGES COMPARED: A TEST OF THE HYPOTHESES*****

Table 12 (p. 10) shows that there are significant differences in mass media exposure between
different types of respondents. None of the differences between the villages is as great as the difference
between types of respondents. The variation between villages reported in Table 12 does not reach

---

* Ibid., p. 24

** The point being made here is not that one would expect all political behavior to be predictable
from differences in levels of political knowledge and exposure to the national mass media but
only that the gross difference between being part of the nation and joining a rebellion aimed at
completely reconstituting the nation might be expected to coincide with distinct differences in the
levels of exposure and knowledge about the symbols of the legitimate government.


**** Karl W. Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion," Jacob and Toscano,
op. cit., pp. 75-97.

***** In the quasi-experimental paradigm used for this study the dependent variable, the behavior of
the villages, was not determined by the questionnaire data. The respondents were never asked
directly whether or not they had participated in the rebellion to form an Islamic state. Asking
such a question directly in a formal interview would have been counterproductive. The respond-
ents, quite understandably, would have concealed their participation in the rebellion.

Instead, the dependent variable was defined through extensive formal and informal inter-
views with sub-district officials, military officials, village headmen, informal village leaders,
and former leaders of the Dar'ul Islam rebellion both within and outside the villages. We asked
all of these men to tell us about the degree of participation of the villages in the Dar'ul Islam
rebellion. They were asked which villages participated and the extent of involvement in supply-
ing men and material. Defining the dependent variable in this manner was in many ways the
most difficult and time-consuming part of the research project, and because of the importance
of this classification extreme care was lavished upon gathering and comparing informal data
from a multitude of sources.

To be absolutely sure of our classification of the sample drawn in the Dar'ul Islam vil-
lage we asked the man who led the Dar'ul Islam forces out of the village to tell us the extent of
participation in the rebellion by each person interviewed. As a result of his frankness as well
as subsequent conversations with others, we became convinced of the veracity of one woman's
description of how village life now differed from the way it had been during Dar'ul Islam times.
She replied, "Different? Things were the same then because we were all in the Dar'ul Islam."

31
and fighting for the nation is not reflected by an equally sharp distinction in the amounts of mass media exposure. This interpretation is sustained when we turn to density of knowledge of national symbols in each village.

Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass Media Exposure for the Combined Elites of the Dar'ul Islam, Swing, and Pro-Government Villages (After Weighting)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(n=125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole Villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High: 4th Quartile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar'ul Islam Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

When we turn from whole villages to just the combined elites of each village, the differences become larger but still remain insignificant. Chi-square reaches a confidence level of only .2492. In Table 13 the percentages failing in the high- and medium-exposure quartiles for the Dar'ul Islam and pro-government villages are virtually identical at 65 percent and 63 percent respectively. In addition, the village with the largest percentage in the upper two quartiles is the swing village, with 72 percent.

These data do not support the interpretation that high exposure to national mass media is a quality that sharply distinguishes among various levels of national integration. The differences, though in the correct direction and order for the villages as a whole, are not sufficiently strong to sustain the prediction that the map of mass communication transactions will distinguish between high and low levels of integration. The variations within the villages between types of respondents are much greater than the variations between the villages. The clear difference between revolting against

(contd) Similar investigation revealed that our classification of the swing and pro-government villages was also correct. In the pro-government village there were virtually no recruits to the rebellion and a large number of the villagers participated in military activities against the Dar'ul Islam. In the swing village, upwards of 200 men had originally gone off to join the rebellion but all but a handful returned once Indonesia had obtained full sovereignty.

In sum, two months of micro-historical investigation were devoted to specifying the dependent variable in regard to the Dar'ul Islam rebellion.
and fighting for the nation is not reflected by an equally sharp distinction in the amounts of mass media exposure. This interpretation is sustained when we turn to density of knowledge of national symbols in each village.

Table 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass Media Exposure for the Combined Elites of the Dar’ul Islam, Swing, and Pro-Government Villages (After Weighting) (n=125)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exposure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Village Elites</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar’ul Islam Village Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing Village Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government Village Elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|<sup>1</sup>The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

Knowledge of the Pantjasila and Political Behavior

When we compare the three villages in regard to knowledge of the Pantjasila, the data fail to confirm Hypothesis 1: knowledge of national symbols is not significantly greater in the village that fought to defend the Republic based upon the Pantjasila. In fact, the data run toward contradicting the hypothesis that density of national symbols will correlate with a map of political cohesion.

Tables 14 and 15 contrast the Dar’ul Islam, swing, and pro-government villages according to amount of knowledge of the Pantjasila. When just the combined elites of the three villages are considered (Table 14), the Dar’ul Islam village evinces the greatest knowledge of the Pantjasila and the pro-government village shows the least comprehension of the symbol. The swing village is almost identical to the Dar’ul Islam village and considerably higher in its level of knowledge than the pro-government village. Forty-eight percent of the combined elite in the Dar’ul Islam village have

<sup>1</sup>It might be argued that the absence of sharp differences among the villages in mass media exposure and knowledge of national symbols is an artifact of the research design because the measures of exposure and knowledge were taken six years after the conclusion of the rebellion. The critique would be devastating if there had been substantial changes in one village that were not paralleled in the other villages. This has not been the case. The three villages in 1969 had a greater number of radios than they had had six years previously but there was no evidence that there had been any changes that would have altered the relative positions of the three villages. There had been no major transformations in the incomes, education, and general life styles of the three villages over the intervening six years.
high knowledge of the Pantjasila and only 13 percent are found in the low knowledge category. In contrast, only 26 percent of the pro-government village's combined elite reach the high knowledge category and 31 percent are classified as having minimal knowledge.

Table 14
Knowledge of the Pantjasila Among Combined Elites in the Dar'ul Islam, Swing, and Pro-Government Villages (After Weighting)
(n=122)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village Elites</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dar'ul Islam Village</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Elite</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing Village Elite</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government Village</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Elite</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

The variation in Table 14 does not reach the level of statistical significance. The confidence level for chi-square is only .1024. However, the findings run in the opposite direction from the hypothesis.

The pro-government village elite has much lower knowledge of the Pantjasila than the elites of the swing and Dar'ul Islam villages. Thus we find that the elites of the Dar'ul Islam and swing villages, which both had been at least initially involved in the fight to destroy the state based upon the Pantjasila, together share higher knowledge of the primary nationalist symbol than the elite of the pro-government village, which made heavy sacrifices to protect and defend the state based upon the Pantjasila. This can be clearly shown at a statistically significant level if we collapse the first two rows of Table 14, thus combining the elites of the Dar'ul Islam and swing villages for the purpose of contrasting them with the elite of the pro-government village.

When the village poor and the elite women are added, similar results are apparent. As Table 15 discloses, the Dar'ul Islam village as a whole has 41 percent of its respondents in the high knowledge category, while only 22 percent of the respondents from the pro-government village display such comprehension of the meaning of the Pantjasila.

The village that sought to found a nation where the Shariat Islam would replace the Pantjasila as the prime dictum of the state has higher comprehension of the meaning of the Pantjasila than the village that fought for more than a decade to defend the state based on the Pantjasila. The behaviors of fighting for or against a government based on the principles of the Pantjasila are not related to knowledge of the contents of this symbol. At least in this case, knowledge of the nationalistic symbol is unrelated to nationalistic (that is, pro-government) political behavior.

* If national integration as a variable is dichotomized with the elites of the Dar'ul Islam and swing villages being collapsed and contrasted with the pro-government village elite, the differences are statistically significant. Chi-square reaches a confidence level of .0280 and gamma is .4079.

** One might hypothesize that the greater level of knowledge found results from a higher general level of education in the Dar'ul Islam village. This is not the case. If anything, the pro-government village as a whole has enjoyed slightly more exposure to secular education than the Dar'ul Islam
suppose that more than mere chance alone accounts for the close correlation between the headman's new-found prosperity and the dearth of Repelita achievements in the village."

The third village occupies a middle position with regard to project output from the 100,000 Rp. Two small schools had been started and a proportion of the casement for the village road in the central kampong had been repaired. As in the case of the low efficiency village, wage labor consumed a large share of the 100,000 Fps. This village will be referred to as the medium efficiency village, although the quality and quantity of its Repelita achievements are closer to the low efficiency village than they are to the high efficiency village.

Given that highly efficient use of Repelita funds in one village was achieved through the mobilization of large amounts of unpaid, "voluntary" labor, it is worthwhile to question whether the presence or absence flowed from large differences in knowledge of Repelita. The answer to this question is "no": the three villages possessed approximately the same levels of information.

Table 16 compares the combined elites of the three villages in regard to levels of knowledge of the five-year plan. The expectation was that the high efficiency village would display much greater knowledge than either the medium or low efficiency village. This expectation is seemingly confirmed by Table 16 in which high, medium, and low efficiency in execution of Repelita are paralleled by the differences in knowledge among the combined elites. However, the differences are too slight to confirm the hypothesis.

Chi-square reaches the confidence level of only 0.1321. Furthermore, the magnitude of the differences within the table does not reflect accurately differences in the behaviors of the village elites.

Table 15
Knowledge of the Pantjasila for Whole Villages:
The Dar'ul Islam, Swing, and Pro-Government Villages (After Weighting)
(n=192)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whole Villages</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dar'ul Islam Village</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing Village</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government Village</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

KNOWLEDGE OF REPELITA AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

The findings on Repelita are not substantially different from those on the Pantjasila. The villages as whole units and the combined elites alone display only small differences with regard to knowledge of the five-year plan. The pro-government village does not manifest substantially greater knowledge of the five-year plan than the Dar'ul Islam village; in fact, when the three villages are compared as whole units, the Dar'ul Islam village has greater comprehension of Repelita. Past differences in political behavior are not matched by equally sharp differences in knowledge of national symbols and programs.

At this point the political typology is replaced by an economic one: high, medium, or low efficiency in the use of funds from an ongoing development program.

Of the three villages, one was much more efficient in the use of its 100,000 Rp. Repelita grant. It completed five separate projects, a large school with three airy classrooms and four other projects of road, bridge, and dike reconstruction. The 100,000 Rps. were used only to pay for materials. All labor was supplied through communal labor (gotong royong) organized by the energetic and commanding village headman. In addition to grant-related activities, the village was undergoing major economic change. The proportion of land in rice and cassava was being lowered. The land taken out of these basically subsistence crops was being converted to tobacco and vegetables. Both of these were cash crops sold in the cities, and an increasing concentration of them indicated a growing market orientation in the village economy.

A second village contrasted sharply with the village just described. The 100,000 Rps. were used inefficiently in some instances and pilfered by the village officials in others. A small school had been built in the central kampung and one very minor repair had been carried out on the village road. In addition, the foundations had been laid for a new madrasah; however, during the last three months of 1969 no further work had been done on it. In contrast with the high efficiency village, the 100,000 Rp. grant was spent on wage labor as well as on materials. And finally, the headman of this low efficiency village (who was not a wealthy man and did not engage in activities likely to bring windfall profits) was engaged in building for himself a fine stone house with expensive roof tiles. One can only

village. In spite of this slightly greater exposure to the national school system, the pro-government village still scores systematically lower on knowledge of the Pantjasila.
suppose that more than mere chance alone accounts for the close correlation between the headman's new-found prosperity and the dearth of Repelita achievements in the village.*

The third village occupies a middle position with regard to project output from the 100,000 Rps. Two small schools had been started and a proportion of the casement for the village road in the central kampung had been repaired. As in the case of the low efficiency village, wage labor consumed a large share of the 100,000 Rps. This village will be referred to as the medium efficiency village, although the quality and quantity of its Repelita achievements are closer to the low efficiency village than they are to the high efficiency village.

Given that highly efficient use of Repelita funds in one village was achieved through the mobilization of large amounts of unpaid, "voluntary" labor, it is worthwhile to question whether the presence or absence of participation flowed from large differences in knowledge of Repelita. The answer to this question is "no": the three villages possessed approximately the same levels of information.

Table 16 compares the combined elites of the three villages in regard to levels of knowledge of the five-year plan. The expectation was that the high efficiency village would display much greater knowledge than either the middle or low efficiency village. This expectation is seemingly confirmed by Table 16 in which high, medium, and low efficiency in execution of Repelita are paralleled by the differences in knowledge among the combined elites. However, the differences are too slight to confirm the hypothesis. Chi-square reaches the confidence level of only .1321.** Furthermore, the magnitude of the differences within the table does not reflect accurately differences in the behaviors of

---

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency of Execution</th>
<th>High (programs)</th>
<th>Medium (slogans)</th>
<th>Low (don't know &amp; acronym only)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Efficiency Elite</td>
<td>28% 1</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Efficiency Elite</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Efficiency Elite</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(88)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.

* In the time period between the field research and the preparation of this report the particular headman has been relieved of his duties.

** If we follow the same procedure used for knowledge of the Puntjasila—that is, if we dichotomize the efficiency of execution of Repelita by collapsing the low and medium efficiency villages in order to contrast them with the high efficiency village—the differences do not reach statistical significance. The confidence level for chi-square is only .2221.
the villages. For instance, in spite of the large differences in efficiency, the knowledge levels shown by the high and medium efficiency villages are almost identical.

When the elite women and the village poor are added to the combined elites, the prospect of a positive correlation between Repelita behavior and knowledge of Repelita vanishes entirely. The differences derived from comparing whole villages in Table 17 yield a chi-square which is significant at the .0478 level. However, the differences between the villages are not ones predicted by the original hypothesis. The middle efficiency village has the greatest knowledge of Repelita as a program in spite of the fact that its behavior in executing Repelita was barely distinguishable in magnitude of inefficiency from the low efficiency village. Also, the high efficiency village rivals the low efficiency village for the largest proportion of persons with a low knowledge of Repelita's aims. When we consider the villages as whole units, the village distinguished by wide-spread participation in gotong-royong development schemes does not possess higher knowledge of Repelita than the medium efficiency village, where public participation in development projects has been much lower. Mobilization for Repelita activities apparently does not require high levels of understanding of its aims.

### Table 17

**Efficiency of Execution and Knowledge of Repelita in Three Villages as Whole Units (After Weighting)**

*(n=197)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency of Execution</th>
<th>High (programs)</th>
<th>Medium (slogans)</th>
<th>Low (don't know &amp; acronym only)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Efficiency Village</td>
<td>21%&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; (14)</td>
<td>56% (38)</td>
<td>21% (14)</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Efficiency Village</td>
<td>26% (17)</td>
<td>65% (43)</td>
<td>9% (6)</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Efficiency Village</td>
<td>14% (9)</td>
<td>57% (37)</td>
<td>29% (19)</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>20% (40)</td>
<td>60% (118)</td>
<td>20% (39)</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup>The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.
IV. TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS AND VILLAGE BEHAVIOR

Neither administrative communication nor mass media communication accounts for the great differences in political and economic behavior found in the three villages. But a third communication system has not yet been examined: the traditional networks of reciprocity running between patrons and clients within the three villages, and the linkages connecting the chief patrons of each village with the outside world. The traditional communication networks are the most important communication channels for village mobilization. These networks in each village and the links between the most influential persons in them and the world outside are the most important factors accounting for the differences in economic and political behavior found in the three villages.

THE NETWORKS DEFINED

The term "traditional communication networks" as used here refers to the intentionally sought out, face-to-face, dyadic relationships between individuals in which one individual is perceived as the superior and the other the subordinate. The words patron, advisor, and superior are used interchangeably to refer to the dominant partner in the dyad, and advisee, client, and subordinate refer to the passive member.

The communication process explored here is called a network because the same lines of frequent and regular communication endure over long periods of time and transcend immediate issues and circumstances. The communication process is a traditional one to the extent that placement in the hierarchy is established early--often at birth--and is sometimes inherited across generations.

The traditional communication networks prevailing in the villages have been described in detail in a separate volume, and hence the present description will be relatively brief.

DATA ON THE NETWORKS

A. battery of 53 questions covering five different kinds of relationships was used to investigate traditional communication patterns in the villages studied. The first group of questions concerned the respondent's perception of himself as a patron or advisor. The second group asked whether the respondent consulted another person as his general advisor. A third group inquired about the respondent's relationship with his financial patron. The fourth and fifth series of questions asked whether there was a person to whom the respondent went to obtain advice about essentially political questions, that is, advice about "problems outside of the village" and "problems of the region or country."

See Karl D. Jackson and Johannes Moeliono, "Participation in Rebellion: The Dar'ul Islam in West Java," Political Participation in Modern Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 18, in press).
IV. TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS AND VILLAGE BEHAVIOR

Neither administrative communication nor mass media communication accounts for the great differences in political and economic behavior found in the three villages. But a third communication system has not yet been examined: the traditional networks of reciprocity running between patrons and clients within the three villages, and the linkages connecting the chief patrons of each village with the outside world. The traditional communication networks are the most important communication channels for village mobilization. These networks in each village and the links between the most influential persons in them and the world outside are the most important factors accounting for the differences in economic and political behavior found in the three villages.

The networks defined

The term "traditional communication networks" as used here refers to the intentionally sought out, face-to-face, dyadic relationships between individuals in which one individual is perceived as the superior and the other the subordinate. The words patron, advisor, and superior are used interchangeably to refer to the dominant partner in the dyad, and advisee, client, and subordinate refer to the passive member.

The communication process explored here is called a network because the same lines of frequent and regular communication endure over long periods of time and transcend immediate issues and circumstances. The communication process is a traditional one to the extent that placement in the hierarchy is established early—often at birth—and is sometimes inherited across generations.

The traditional communication networks prevailing in the villages have been described in detail in a separate volume, and hence the present description will be relatively brief.*

DATA ON THE NETWORKS

A battery of 53 questions covering five different kinds of relationships was used to investigate traditional communication patterns in the villages studied. The first group of questions concerned the respondent's perception of himself as a patron or advisor. The second group asked whether the respondent consulted another person as his general advisor. A third group inquired about the respondent's relationship with his financial patron. The fourth and fifth series of questions asked whether there was a person to whom the respondent went to obtain advice about essentially political questions, that is, advice about "problems outside of the village" and "problems of the region or country."

* See Karl D. Jackson and Johannes Moeliono, "Participation in Rebellion: The Dar'ul Islam in West Java," Political Participation in Modern Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 18, in press).
PERCEPTION OF SELF AS ADVISOR

Most respondents—87 percent—indicated that persons visit them for financial help or advice or to pay deference. Only 13 percent denied that people come to them for advice or help. The number of persons coming for advice varied between less than five and more than 60 persons. Twenty percent of those responding to the question said that between 21 and "more than 50" persons regularly seek their advice. Thus the majority of all respondents play the advisor role and a minority of these indicated that they possess a considerable retinue of advisees. The respondents were also asked how frequently their advisees come to them. Of those responding, 60 percent stated that their advisees seek them out four or more times each month.

PERCEPTION OF SELF AS ADVISEE

When the respondents were asked whether they themselves also play the role of advisee in general, financial, and quasi-political situations, a heavy majority admitted having one or more advisors whom they consult frequently on at least one of these matters.

Table 18 below summarizes the overlap between the roles of patron-advisor and client-advisee for the five types of respondents in the sample. Eighty-three percent of the respondents answering the battery of questions state that they are both advisors and advisees. Another 15 percent indicate that they fill either the advisor role or the advisee role, but not both. Only 2 percent do not participate in traditional networks at all.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Both Roles</th>
<th>Neither Role</th>
<th>Just Advisor</th>
<th>Just Advisee</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Leaders</td>
<td>36%2 (57)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5% (3)</td>
<td>9% (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Elite</td>
<td>33% (27)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Elite</td>
<td>72% (21)</td>
<td>7% (2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21% (6)</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Women</td>
<td>97% (33)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Poor</td>
<td>66% (27)</td>
<td>5% (2)</td>
<td>10% (4)</td>
<td>20% (8)</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33% (165)</td>
<td>2% (4)</td>
<td>4% (8)</td>
<td>11% (22)</td>
<td></td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The "n" for traditional communication networks is 199 because the seven respondents who either refused or were unable to complete the whole interview have been excluded.

2 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.
DIFFERENCES AMONG STRATA

There are clear differences among strata. The overwhelming majority of community and religious leaders, 86 percent and 93 percent respectively, participate fully in the traditional communication system, giving advice to some and seeking advice from and giving deference to others. Almost all elite women consider themselves heavily involved in both roles. The economic leaders and the village poor have lower proportions involved in both roles, respectively 72 percent and 86 percent. However, this does not mean that 28 percent of the economic leaders and 34 percent of the village poor are not involved in the traditional communication networks. Instead it signifies only that they play one role, for instance advisor, but do not play the other role, advisee. Thus almost all persons in all strata are wired into the traditional network in at least one if not both roles.

FREQUENCY OF NETWORK USE

From the standpoint of communication analysis, the traditional communication networks not only link the strata of the village together but in addition the interpersonal channels between advisor and advisee are used with a higher frequency than the contacts with mass media. This is shown in Table 19. Modern mass media (in this instance radio, newspapers, and the cinema) and traditional communication networks are compared according to the relative frequency of attendance. Average attendance to the three mass media is much lower than the frequency of intentional visits to a general advisor. Seventy-eight percent of the sample visit the most important of their general advisors at least monthly, whereas only 41 percent of the sample attend to the three modern media at least monthly. If the sample were not primarily an elite sample the relatively greater frequency of attendance to traditional communication networks would be even more pronounced because of the very low access of persons outside of the village elite to mass media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Rarely or Never (kadang2)</th>
<th>Yearly or Sometimes (kadang2)</th>
<th>Monthly or Weekly or Daily</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modern Mass Media</td>
<td>44% (86)</td>
<td>15% (29)</td>
<td>41% (79)</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Communication Networks</td>
<td>20% (38)</td>
<td>3% (5)</td>
<td>78% (151)</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The "n" for both types of media is 194. The seven respondents who refused or were unable to complete their interviews have been dropped. In addition, four uncodable replies and one "don't know" response have been excluded from consideration for the question concerning the frequency with which respondents visit their general advisor. The same twelve respondents were also dropped from the average frequency of attendance to modern mass media.

2 The percentages refer to the sum total of each row in the table.
Of course if all that were involved here was casual communication with wife, family, and whom-
ever happened by, the finding would be trivial. However, the meetings referred to in the battery of
questions are intentional visits of a client to his patron rather than the larger set containing all inter-
personal communication.

THE BINDING NATURE OF TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATION

Not only do the traditional networks carry the heaviest message load in the village, but in
addition they are heavily endowed with a sense of binding mutual obligations. This can be seen from
replies to two questions about reciprocity. The first of these asked the respondent directly about the
sense of obligation felt toward a man who had lent him material assistance in time of need. The respon-
dent was asked if he felt hutang budi or moral obligation toward such a benefactor. Only 4 percent of
the respondents answering the question stated that they did not have a sense of moral obligation. A
follow-up question asked, "If you felt hutang budi, how far would you go in order to repay it?" Sixty-
five percent of those replying gave answers classified as "high hutang budi," while 27 percent were
coded as relatively low hutang budi. The deep sense of moral obligation typifying the category high
hutang budi is revealed by the following group of literal replies.

INTERVIEWER: If you felt hutang budi, how far would you go in order
to repay it?

RESPONDENT A: Repaying an obligation to a wealthy man is super-
fluous, but of course when he is in trouble, I will
help him as much as is in my power.

RESPONDENT B: If possible, until I die, wherever possible by labor
or advice—as for money—where should I get it?

RESPONDENT C: Even in situations of physical violence I will help
him when he is in trouble.

RESPONDENT D: When it comes to blows, I will come to his aid when
he is in trouble.

RESPONDENT E: Not only my earthly goods, but I will give my last
drops of blood . . .

The replies establish that the sense of obligation is both profound and diffuse, that it extends
far beyond the money debt itself. In fact, for several of the respondents repayment of the money debt
seems to be a side issue. The most important aspect of the patron-client relationship implied by these
literal responses is that obligations incurred in one type of relationship, e.g. a financial one, can
be transferred to other situations according to the needs of the benefactor. A debt of hutang budi is
an open-ended debt that may be called due in labor service or even in situations involving violence.

A second projective question depicts an insurrectionary situation in the making. A client's
patron is in danger and the respondents are asked to choose an appropriate response for him, either
doing nothing or aiding the benefactor in one of several ways. The projective question read to the
respondents follows. Its three most important elements are: (1) the personal and diffuse relation-
ship between patron and client; (2) the conversion of a money debt into an obligation for physical
mobilization in a dangerous situation; and (3) the willingness of clients to go to the aid of a patron
without asking the nature of the cause being fought for.

Here is a story concerning a man called Pa Dadap. After I have read this story to
you, I would like to ask you a few questions concerning this story. You don't mind, do you?

Pa Dadap has incurred a debt which also involves his son, and which would
make the future difficult. Pa Dadap's ex-commander, whom he hasn't seen for
10 years, hears of his difficulty and immediately sends money to the sum of about
100,000 rupiahs without any strings attached. Therefore, Pa Dadap can look for-
ward again to the future. But six months later, there is a disturbance in the
region where the commander lives, and Pa Dadap hears that his ex-commander's
Two further points need to be established about traditional communication networks. First, the series of dyadic bonds which we have been discussing endure over very long time periods. According to the respondents, the average length of time they have had the relationship with their advisors is in excess of fifteen years. The most frequent single answer in our out of the five questions concerning duration of relationship was "more than 25 years."

Second, each respondent stated that he had more than one advisor. Many stated that they had as many as five advisors. When this information is combined with the fact that most respondents have at least several, if not many, persons coming to them frequently for advice, the communication diagram of the village becomes one of multiple overlapping networks. Each respondent has multiple patrons as well as many clients. If a man is one of the chief patrons of a village, he is capable of mobilizing for economic or political activity. Large numbers of men because he mobilizes his immediate clients who in turn have an enduring and strong influence network of their own that can be placed at the disposal of the chief patron.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CI ' PATRONS

The number of chief patrons in a village of 4,000 to 8,000 is six to ten. These are the men who state that they have more than 20 persons coming to them for advice and in addition claim that they can raise more than 20 men to defend them in time of danger. The identification of the chief patrons on the basis of their own statements is verified by the statements of fellow respondents.

An analysis of the social background characteristics of chief patrons reveals that on several attributes they differ substantially from the respondents who state that they have fewer than 20 people coming to them for advice and could raise fewer than 20 men for their defense. First, the chief patrons tend to be 40 or more years old. Second, they have greater exposure to mass media and greater knowledge of national symbols. They are the gate-keepers of village contact with the outside world and this function is reflected in their systematically higher attendance to mass media. Third, they are more wealthy than men who have fewer followers. However, the most important distinguishing characteristic is not their wealth; they do not simply buy their followers. When the respondents are asked to describe the characteristics of their advisor, wealth appears only rarely. Instead, when asked "What are the traits of the chief advisor which lead you to seek his advice?" respondents most frequently mention his trustworthiness, the fact that he has always been their sevuh (father or elder), that he was the senuh of their father, or that he is very knowledgeable. The most important quality cementing the dyads together as a mobilization mechanism is the enduring nature of the relationship, the fact that for as long as a person can remember, the particular advisor has been the man who taught, advised and took care of him. It is important that the chief advisor have wealth to dispense, but the money value of the wealth being exchanged is not the affective heart of the relationship. The process of exchange rather than the matter being exchanged is valued in and of itself. The exchange of wealth is part of an elaborate ritualized chess campaign in which monetary values are but pawns, the strategems through which the more lasting personal gratifications of affect, power, and security are obtained.

Thus far we have established that traditional communication networks exist within and between different strata in the villages; they carry a heavy message load; they endure for a very long time period; and they can be stylized for manpower mobilization because they are heavily laden with affect and a binding sense of mutual obligation.

What has yet to be established is that they have a determining effect upon village behaviors.

Table 20 contains the marginal responses for the alternative courses of action that might be followed. Of 199 respondents, 85 (43 percent) chose the fourth alternative involving mobilization in defense of the patron. The most frequent single response affirms the connection between patronship and mobilization even in the extreme situation depicted by the projective essay.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative Actions Selected for PA DADAP (n=199)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wait or do nothing</td>
<td>32% (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediately send the money</td>
<td>19% (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go off and see the ex-commander even if many dangers would thereby be involved</td>
<td>43% (85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know and error</td>
<td>6% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>199</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The answer format for this question included a large space to record the respondent's literal comments in the event that he could not choose between the four alternative courses of action. However, the respondents displayed an unusual willingness to select from the given alternatives without hedging. No one asked why the ex-commander was in danger. No one inquired whether he might be in danger because he was a "communist remnant." Only one respondent stated that he could not decide because the story contained no mention "about government or religion." Thus, only a single respondent seemed irked by the fact that there was no mention of issues, ideologies, or value systems; he was the only one who felt that issues and values might be important to the decision. For the majority of the respondents, knowing that the ex-commander was in danger was sufficient information on which to base a decision. It was not necessary to reason why. It was sufficient to know that a person to whom hutang budi was owed was in trouble. Questions of values and ideologies and issues appear not to have been considered relevant to the decision-making process.

The projective essay supplies a clue to the lack of correlation between knowledge of symbols and actual behaviors. Knowledge of the ideological or symbolic content of a patron's plight is not requisite to the client's mobilization decision. The long standing, personal connection between client and patron is sufficient cause in itself to determine behavior. In communication parlance, the identity and the prestige of the communicator rather than the symbolic content of the message are uppermost in the recipient's evaluation of the message as a basis for his behavior.
The traditional networks described above are equally present in the Dar'ul Islam swing, and pro-government villages. The same system of linkages was used to lead one village into the Dar'ul Islam movement and another village into the struggle against it. The very strong set of obligations binding the communication networks together within each village and the character of the dyadic contacts extending outward from the chief patrons of each village to extra-village patrons determined the direction of each village's decision either to join, struggle against, or remain in the middle of the fight to establish an Islamic state.

THE PRO-GOVERNMENT VILLAGE

The history of the pro-government village revolves around its chief patron, who has served as village headman for the last 20 years. In addition to being the lurah, he also serves as a representative in the district level assembly. He is the son of a wealthy and orthodox Islamic trader, and his family is by far the richest in the village. He is an extremely dynamic, perhaps even charismatic, figure, and his power is unchallengeable from within the village.

Before independence, this village was not conspicuous for nationalistic political agitation; if anything, the village had a pre-war reputation for being slightly pro-Dutch. When the revolution came only a handful of villagers joined the various fighting youth groups later incorporated into the TNT, the Indonesian Army.

The present lurah became headman at the end of the revolution. He had just returned from fighting with the TNT. The village was surrounded by Dar'ul Islam bands, and the mountain overlooking the village was being used as a headquarters for the rebellion. However, rather than choosing the path of least resistance, the village at considerable sacrifice fought staunchly on the side of the central government.

Why? The answer to this question lies in the traditional communication networks that connected the lurah and his family to the outside world. The lurah's father, in spite of his strong santri values, became a financial contributor to the nascent nationalist party by becoming the personal backer of a young nationalist politician named Gatot Mangkupradja. Gatot Mangkupradja was not well known in the village. He had no contacts there outside of his relationship to the present lurah's father. The lurah remembers Gatot Mangkupradja frequenting the house during his childhood, and to this day the lurah, who is a proud and headstrong man, still speaks reverently of Gatot Mangkupradja as his sepuh, his elder or father. Through his relationship with the lurah's father, this nationalist politician acquired and maintained a position of at least partial dominance over the lurah.

The inherited relationship between the headman and Gatot Mangkupradja had a dynamic effect upon the village's relationship to the outside world. This was true in regard to both the Dar'ul Islam rebellion and party politics during the 1950's. The advice given by Gatot Mangkupradja was undoubtedly that the village should oppose the Dar'ul Islam rebellion and this advice from a trusted advisor was not ignored. The degree of Gatot Mangkupradja's influence is measured by the fact that in the 1957 elections most of the villagers voted for the Gerakan Pembela Pantjasila, a splinter party of the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) founded by none other than Gatot Mangkupradja.

From the standpoint of the village's behavior toward the Dar'ul Islam, a second communication network relating the lurah to the outside world had a powerful effect upon the village's political behavior. This was a relationship of long duration encompassing several different social roles. The lurah's advisor in this case had originally been his religious teacher and later they served in the Indonesian Army together. The religious teacher rose to the rank of lieutenant while the lurah remained in the ranks. The lurah solved the problem of rationalizing his strongly santri upbringing with a pro-government political stance by taking the advice of his religious-teacher-turned-army-lieutenant. The lurah and his former teacher took the same position with regard to Dar'ul Islam. They remained true to their Islamic beliefs but continued to support the central government rather than joining the Dar'ul Islam rebellion.

In order to preserve the anonymity of persons who gave information about events in the Dar'ul Islam era, the names of the villages have not been included in the description and the names of all local officials have been changed. Only the names of nationally known figures, such as Kartosoewirjo, remain unaltered.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHIEF PATRONS

The number of chief patrons in a village of 4,000 to 8,000 is six to ten. These are the men who state that they have more than 20 persons coming to them for advice and in addition claim that they can raise more than 20 men to defend them in time of danger. The identification of the chief patrons on the basis of their own statements is verified by the statements of fellow respondents.

An analysis of the social background characteristics of chief patrons reveals that on several attributes they differ substantially from the respondents who state that they have fewer than 20 people coming to them for advice and could raise fewer than 20 men for their defense. First, the chief patrons tend to be 40 or more years old. Second, they have greater exposure to mass media and greater knowledge of national symbols. They are the gatekeepers of village contact with the outside world and this function is reflected in their systematically higher attendance to mass media. Third, they are more wealthy than men who have fewer followers.

However, the most important distinguishing characteristic is not their wealth: they do not simply buy their followers. When the respondents are asked to describe the characteristics of their advisor, wealth appears only rarely. Instead, when asked "What are the traits of the chief advisor which lead you to seek his advice?" respondents most frequently mention his trustworthiness, the fact that he has always been their sepuh (father or elder), that he was the sepuh of their father, or that he is very knowledgeable. The most important quality cementing the dyads together as a mobilization mechanism is the enduring nature of the relationship, the fact that for as long as a person can remember, the particular advisor has been the man who taught, advised and took care of him. It is important that the chief advisor have wealth to dispense, but the money value of the wealth being exchanged is not the affective heart of the relationship. The process of exchange rather than the matter being exchanged is valued in and of itself. The exchange of wealth is part of an elaborate ritualized chess campaign in which monetary values are but pawns, the strategems through which the more lasting personal gratifications of affect, power, and security are obtained.

Thus far we have established that traditional communication networks exist within and between different strata in the villages; they carry a heavy message load; they endure for a very long time period; and they can be utilized for manpower mobilization because they are heavily laden with affect and a binding sense of mutual obligation.

What has yet to be established is that they have a determining effect upon village behaviors.
Over the years the lurah's loyalty to particular figures within the army hierarchy in West Java remained strong. The general increase in the prominence of the military in all spheres of life, along with the passing of his father's old political advisor, Gatot Mangkupradja, made it predictable that the lurah would direct the village to support the government coalition, GOLXAR, which was the vehicle created to legitimize the government of President Suharto. The pro-government village of the Dar'ul Islam era backed GOLKAR in the election of 1971 by giving it 75 percent of the vote.

Thus, the political behavior of the village during the elections and the rebellion flowed directly from the traditional communication networks that connect the village, through its chief patron, to particular political and religious advisors in the world outside the village.

THE PRO-GOVERNMENT VILLAGE

The history of the pro-government village revolves around its chief patron, who has served as village headman for the last 20 years. In addition to being the lurah he also serves as a representative in the district level assembly. He is the son of a wealthy and orthodox Islamic trader, and his family is by far the richest in the village. He is an extremely dynamic, perhaps even charismatic, figure, and his power is unchallengeable from within the village.

Before independence, this village was not conspicuous for nationalistic political agitation; if anything, the village had a pre-war reputation for being slightly pro-Dutch. When the revolution came only a handful of villagers joined the various fighting youth groups later incorporated into the TNI, the Indonesian Army.

The present lurah became headman at the end of the revolution. He had just returned from fighting with the TNI. The village was surrounded by Dar'ul Islam bands, and the mountain overlooking the village was being used as a headquarters for the rebellion. However, rather than choosing the path of least resistance, the village at considerable sacrifice fought staunchly on the side of the central government.

Why? The answer to this question lies in the traditional communication networks that connected the lurah and his family to the outside world. The lurah's father, in spite of his strong santri values, became a financial contributor to the nascent nationalist party by becoming the personal backer of a young nationalist politician named Gatot Mangkupradja. Gatot Mangkupradja was not well known in the village. He had no contacts there outside of his relationship to the present lurah's father. The lurah remembers Gatot Mangkupradja frequenting the house during his childhood, and to this day the lurah, who is a proud and headstrong man, still speaks reverently of Gatot Mangkupradja as his sepuh, his elder or father. Through his relationship with the lurah's father, this nationalist politician acquired and maintained a position of at least partial dominance over the lurah.

The inherited relationship between the headman and Gatot Mangkupradja had a dynamic effect upon the village's relationship to the outside world. This was true in regard to both the Dar'ul Islam rebellion and party politics during the 1940s and 1950s. The advice given by Gatot Mangkupradja was undoubtedly that the village should oppose the Dar'ul Islam rebellion and this advice from a trusted advisor was not ignored. The degree of Gatot Mangkupradja's influence is measured by the fact that in the 1957 elections most of the villagers voted for the Gerakan Pembeia Pantjasila, a splinter party of the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) founded by none other than Gatot Mangkupradja.

From the standpoint of the village's behavior toward the Dar'ul Islam, a second communication network relating the lurah to the outside world had a powerful effect upon the village's political behavior. This was a relationship of long duration encompassing several different social roles. The lurah's advisor in this case had originally been his religious teacher and later they served in the Indonesian Army together. The religious teacher rose to the rank of lieutenant while the lurah remained in the ranks. The lurah solved the problem of rationalizing his strongly santri upbringing with a pro-government political stance by taking the advice of his religious teacher-turned-army-lieutenant. The lurah and his former teacher took the same position with regard to Dar'ul Islam. They remained true to their Islamic beliefs but continued to support the central government rather than joining the Dar'ul Islam rebellion.
Over the years the lurah's loyalty to particular figures within the army hierarchy in West Java remained strong. The general increase in the prominence of the military in all spheres of life, along with the passing of his father's old political advisor, Gatot Mangkupradija, made it predictable that the lurah would direct the village to support the government coalition, GOLKAR, which was the vehicle created to legitimize the government of President Sukarno. The pro-government village of the Dar'ul Islam era backed GOLKAR in the election of 1971 by giving it 75 percent of the vote.

Thus, the political behavior of the village during the elections and the rebellion flowed directly from the traditional communication networks that connect the village, through its chief patron, to particular political and religious advisors in the world outside the village.*

THE SWING VILLAGE

At different times during the Dar'ul Islam era the swing village flirted with the Dar'ul Islam movement. However, eventually it decided to pay heed to both sides with equal promptness and enthusiasm. Ritualistic obedience is the primary attribute of this particular village's adaptation to the vicissitudes of national political life. As one informant said, this village was "always the quickest to obey orders" regardless of whether these orders were from the Japanese, the Dar'ul Islam or the Republican government.

During the Japanese occupation the village enthusiastically cooperated with the conquerers. To this day the man who organized the press gang that extracted the forced laborers for the Japanese still brags about how much the Japanese loved him and trusted him.

As the Japanese tide waned and the Dar'ul Islam gained hegemony in the area, the village became affiliated with the movement to found an Islamic state. During the revolution the major youth group in the village was the Islamic fighting group, the Hizbullah, and at the time of the Indonesian withdrawal to Jogjakarta under the terms of the Renville Agreement** approximately 200 Hizbullah went into the mountains to join the Dar'ul Islam. However, the affiliation with the Dar'ul Islam was short lived. With the grant of full sovereignty to the Republic, all but approximately 20 persons abandoned the Islamic insurgency and returned to the village.

Political party affiliation in the swing village fluctuated with the tide of national politics. In the early fifties the village seems to have been mostly Masjumi (the Islamic modernists' party), but during the national elections of 1955 and 1957 the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) had grown to be at least the second largest party. Also in the period 1960-65 a small PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) grew up. However, after the attempted communist coup of September 30, 1965 the communist faction vanished and the nationalist party became dormant. The PNI in the swing village dissolved because it was affiliated with the "wrong" PNI, the Ali Sastroamidjojo faction most closely associated with the Old Order of President Sukarno. By the time this research project was conducted in 1969, the village had gone through another metamorphosis by transforming itself into a "strongly" NU *** village, and finally in

*) One might hypothesize that the pro-government village's political decisions in regard to party politics and the Dar'ul Islam rebellion were the product of syncretist as opposed to orthodox patterns of religious belief. This hypothesis was thoroughly tested, and the religious value system dominating the pro-government village was found to be basically orthodox (santri). The pro-government village did not differ significantly from the Dar'ul Islam village on a scale of religious values.

**) The Renville Agreement was signed on January 17, 1948. This agreement between the Dutch and Republican forces stipulated that the armed forces of the Indonesian nationalists would be withdrawn from West Java. The Islamic fighting groups in West Java under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo refused to comply with the Renville Agreement and continued armed resistance against the Dutch. The Renville Agreement thus marks the beginning of independent, non-Republican policy initiatives which would lead to the declaration of an Islamic State in a proclamation by Kartosuwirjo on December 21, 1948.

*** NU refers to the Nahdatul Ulama (Moslem Scholars) Party, which is the only major party of the parliamentary era of the 1960's that survived intact through Guided Democracy and its association with the Old Order of President Sukarno. It is generally regarded as being more traditional in its religious views than either the Masjumi of the 1960's or the new modernist Moslem party, the PARMUSI.
Tillage who entered the Dar'ul Islam had been part of the PSII organization. The most important men or majority linkages they of the Dar'ul Islam. Kartosoewirjo, frequented the village in his position as general secretary to the other village elders, he selected and legitimized the leaders of the fighting groups—Hizbuillah and the PSII hierarchy spawned by Tjokroaminoto has been consistently active in shaping activities in the village. Raden Tjentaka was instrumental in ratifying its selection. Thus, Sjarif Tjentaka Atmadja and Sjarif Abdullah. Raden Tjentaka was a village elder and religious advisor. Along with the village's mobilization were the link age with other powerful kijajis of the regions of Garut, Talangbong, and Limbangan. Abidin's relations with the village elders and PSII leaders. Rather than contesting the power of the village self-government for a decade posed as the government of the Republic while simultaneously acting as the Dar'ul Islam government of the village. The village self-preservation and opinion change, the alterations in the political stance of the village were a product of the binding nature of commands transmitted through traditional communication networks by the chief patrons of the village. in the words of a villager, the decisions were made by the elders and persuasion and opinion change, the alterations in the political stance of the village were a product of the binding nature of commands transmitted through traditional communication networks by the chief patrons of the village. The second relationship of importance revolving around Sjarif Abdullah was a familial one. His father-in-law was Hadji Zainal Abidin, one of the Dar'ul Islam's most successful recruiters. Abidin's relations with the Japanese and as a result of his father's position as head of the PSII sub-section in the village. This private event led the village to become involved in the Dar'ul Islam rebellion. In spite of the fact that Dadap was popular with the villagers, the change in direction at the national level was instrumental in bringing his downfall. He was deserted by the chief man of the village and by the commoners because he had become a threat to the village's ability to adapt to the outside world.

Waru himself has a considerable following in the village. His father was a wealthy farmer who had been a financial patron of many villagers. As Waru explained it, his father was important because he never refused to help. For example, he put up funds for wedding feasts when funds were lacking. Through these activities he acquired a position of such respect that even the headman respectfully called him Akang (older brother). Waru perceives himself as following his father's example by "never saying no." Waru's power in the village seems to derive mostly from financial patronage and hutang budi from his own and his father's activities. In spite of the almost conscious manipulation of these mechanisms by Waru, the family of Raden Sumantri continues to hold much more power in the village. This is because Raden Sumantri and his family operate from a spiritual and aristocratic base in addition to a financial one.

The village's political gyrations from Dar'ul Islam to neutral and from Masjumi to PNI to NU to GOLKAR were conducted through the traditional communication networks extending from Raden Sumantri through Dadap and Waru. The decisions were not produced at public meetings with Raden Sumantri exhorting the masses to new political courses; instead the decisions were made by the village sesepuh and passed downward through advisor-advisee networks. Rather than resulting from
persuasion and opinion change, the alterations in the political stance of the village were a product of the binding nature of commands transmitted through traditional communication networks by the chief patrons of the village. In the words of a villager, the decisions were made by the elders and then passed quietly "from heart to heart" as authoritative commands rather than as policy subject to public discussion and modification.

THE DAR'UL ISLAM VILLAGE

The Dar'ul Islam village participated wholeheartedly in the movement to found an Islamic state. It provided prominent leaders, many followers, ammunition, and food for the Dar'ul Islam bands. Its village government for a decade posed as the government of the Republic while simultaneously acting as the Dar'ul Islam government of the village. The village self-defense unit, which had been trained by the Indonesian Army, carried ammunition and information for the Dar'ul Islam on their nightly patrols. The major political leaders and most of the youth of the village took to the hills to fight against the troops of the Republic. According to most informants the village was solidly behind the Dar'ul Islam.

The story of how this village became involved in the rebellion is similar to the sketches of decision-making for the pro-government and the swing village. Although the results are very different, the elements constituting the process in all three villages are the same. The set of long-term, highly personal linkages between advisor-advisee, teacher-pupil, and superior-subordinate are vested with traditional authority allowing the bapak (father) in each dyad to mobilize the anak bugh (literally, "children") for action by activating a personal loyalty bond.

The road to participation in the Dar'ul Islam begins with the marriage of one of Tjokroaminoto's sons to a woman of the village in the 1920's.* This private event led the village to become involved in the PSII, the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, and the constellation of personalities surrounding party activities in the village eventually became involved in the Dar'ul Islam rebellion. Tjokroaminoto was often in the village during the 1920's. Party conferences were often held there, and the future leader of the Dar'ul Islam, Kartosoewirjo, frequented the village in his position as general secretary to Tjokroaminoto. The PSII hierarchy spawned by Tjokroaminoto has been consistently active in shaping the village's response to outside events, as evidenced by the 1971 elections in which the PSII garnered 72 percent of the votes. At least in regard to party affiliation, Tjokroaminoto performed the same function for the Dar'ul Islam village that Gatot Mangkupradja performed for the pro-government village.

The decision to join the rebellion was the natural outgrowth of the set of personal relations constituting the PSII hierarchy and its connection to the outside world. The prominent leaders of the village who entered the Dar'ul Islam had been part of the PSII organization. The most important men in the village's mobilization were Raden Tjentaka Atmadja and Sjarif Abdullah. Raden Tjentaka was a highly respected kiaji (religious teacher) and also a party leader from the nearby town of Kadungora. He provided the linkage with other powerful kiajis of the regions of Garut, Malangpang, and Limbangan. As the chief man in the PSII and Masjumi hierarchy in the village and Kadungora he must have been in frequent contact with Kartosoewirjo and the other leaders of the nascent Dar'ul Islam movement.

Raden Tjentaka played important roles as a village elder and religious advisor. Along with other village elders, he selected and legitimized the leaders of the fighting groups—Hizbullah and Sabiliullah—in the village. These youthful leaders acknowledged and reinforced the traditional authority linkages they had with the village elders and PSII leaders. Rather than contesting the power of the traditional hierarchy, they sought its blessing and thus reinforced its hold upon them.

Sjarif Abdullah was selected as the leader in his neighborhood as a result of his training in paramilitary activities by the Japanese and as a result of his father's position as head of the PSII sub-section in the village. Raden Tjentaka was instrumental in ratifying his selection. Thus, Sjarif Abdullah was beholden not only to the peers who agreed to follow him but to the influence of Raden Tjentaka, whose stamp of approval legitimized his mantle of leadership.

The second relationship of importance revolving around Sjarif Abdullah was a familial one. His father-in-law was Hadji Zainal Abidin, one of the Dar'ul Islam's most successful recruiters and a man destined to become the military commander of the Dar'ul Islam for all of West Java. Abidin's relationship to Sjarif Abdullah extended beyond the familial; in fact, Abidin was a patron in the full sense of the

---

*Tjokroaminoto founded the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) in 1912. It was the first mass organization of the pre-revolutionary era. At its zenith it had hundreds of thousands of members and branches in Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Java. It was also the forerunner of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, which has endured to the present. As one of the founders of Sarekat Islam, Tjokroaminoto was a figure of nationwide importance to the early anti-colonial movement.
word. When Abidin entered the Indonesian Army he brought Sjarif Abdullah and his Hizbullah-Sabilillah troops from the village with him. And with the Renville Agreement and the subsequent decision not to withdraw to Jogjakarta, Abidin led Sjarif Abdullah and his troops out of the TNI and into the Dar’ul Islam. During the fourteen-year conflict Sjarif Abdullah rose in rank with the successful ascent of Abidin and the Dar’ul Islam leadership. A promotion for Abidin was usually paired with a promotion for Sjarif Abdullah.

Considerable attention was devoted earlier to the feelings of obligation of a follower toward his patron. From this it can be deduced that Sjarif Abdullah felt hutang budi toward both Raden Tjen-taka and Zaimal Abidin. It is almost inconceivable that he could ever have been disloyal to either of them because both of them were superior in age and status, and he was beholden to them.

The final link that must be traced is that between Abidin and Kartosoewirjo. Kartosoewirjo founded the Sufiah Institute for religious and para-military training. Through it passed numerous Hizbullah and Sabilillah who were eventually incorporated into the Dar’ul Islam. As one of the most famous kiajais and politicians of West Java, Kartosoewirjo must have seemed a man of towering status to his pupils. In addition to his knowledge of Islam he was also a mystic thought to possess considerable supernatural power. Status and command over highly specialized knowledge enabled him to build traditional authority linkages with many of his pupils. Within the culture the teacher is a powerful patron figure. By dispensing knowledge he gives his pupils the ability to acquire their own pupils and clients in the future. Given the potential for accumulating traditional authority that exists in the teacher-pupil relationship it is of considerable importance to the mobilization of the Dar’ul Islam village that Zaimal Abidin was a former pupil of Kartosoewirjo.

We contend that the village’s participation in the Dar’ul Islam rebellion resulted from the activation of the traditional communication networks just described. We have established that these bonds generally exist in Sundanese villages and that they are an important element in mobilizing insurrections. In the village histories just recounted, the traditional communication networks and the authoritative messages they carry allow us to trace the course of village political behavior. In the Dar’ul Islam village, it is possible to go one step further by providing documentary evidence establishing the connection between the messages flowing through the networks and the genesis of rebellion in a particular village.

The statement below is taken from Sjarif Abdullah’s confession to the military authorities after his surrender in Bandung in 1961. The quotation is the key paragraph of an essay entitled “Why I Joined the Dar’ul Islam: The Way of Thinking of Sjarif Abdullah in the Past.”

In the beginning we fought against the Dutch oppressors for the sake of the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed on August 17, 1945. Our Hizbullah organization had become part of a TNI fighting regiment. After the first clash we were still part of the TNI, Battalion No. 24, 4th Brigade, and we were still willing and able to fight to the death against the colonial army for the sake of the Republic of Indonesia. We were full of loyalty to the state and country.

Several grievous acts were committed by the TNI stationed in the regions of Garut and Sumedang. Several Islamic leaders were kidnapped and executed without trial by the TNI. Among these remember the cases of Kija J Tohâ and his followers from Sumedang, Saudara Endang the leader of the Sabilillah of the sub-district of Limbanggan, and Kija J Sadja of Sukramadja and Garut.

After this our trust in the TNI and other Republican institutions became less, and we even had the improper suspicion that the TNI at that time was only a tool and mask of the PKI. The facts indeed showed this, and because of this, the feeling of loyalty of friends in Islam began growing in our hearts. Indeed the grievous occurrences mentioned above were the cause of the civil war that started in the sub-district of Limbanggan. The anger of that Umat Islam in the region of Limbanggan, because of the loss of their bapak who was very much loved by them [emphasis added], was at that time a flood which could not be held back. With the help of the Sabilillah group of Oei from Tasikmalaja they rose as one man and fought against the TNI.

Rather than using his confession to articulate an ideological or religious defense for his actions, Sjarif Abdullah described his motivations in intensely personal terms. The death of “a bapak who was very much loved” is the central point offered to explain his behavior and the actions of others. After stating that the death of a bapak was the prime ignition factor for the conflict, Sjarif Abdullah goes on to detail his relationship to his patron Abidin whom he refers to as “Bapak Hadji
We had begun to frequent the village was where and how he could obtain a development loan of several million rupiahs in order to resuscitate the vegetable oil factory that had existed in the village before the Second World War.

The headman was very attuned to the mass media as an active rather than as a passive observer. Newspapers were in evidence in his house and he holds strong personal opinions of his own on subjects as far ranging as the virtues of Edward Kennedy as a leader and the methods used for selecting the provincial governor of West Java. He could see himself in other roles in society, and hence he showed unusual self-confidence in criticizing the actions of high-ranking government officials and in making fun of the "strange" research instrument constructed by us for use in his village. As a man the lurah was attuned to the events of the world outside and committed to reshaping his immediate environment for the good of his village.

Finally, as a result of his energetic leadership of the village over the twenty-year period he was able to organize large quantities of communal labor to carry out the building of the new village school and the other projects to improve the roads and irrigation system of the village. His ability to organize the village to work on the Repelita projects was so successful that he boasts, probably with accuracy, that not a single rupiah from the 100,000 rupiah grant had been used for wage labor.

In light of the pervasive influence of the key patrons over political events, it is not astonishing to find that village behavior with regard to Repelita disproportionately reflects the interests and attitudes of these chief men. The differences between the villages with regard to execution of the five-year plan can be sketched briefly. In the low efficiency village, the headman appropriated some, if not most, of the 100,000 Rp. village development grant to his own private use. His new-found source of wealth was amply manifest in his new stone house with its expensive roof tiles. The key strategy for obtaining maximum development output per unit of capital input is the ability to mobilize voluntary labor to supplement the Repelita grant. However, in the low efficiency village, the headman, because he had already used the Repelita capital for his personal betterment, could not gracefully ask the villagers to contribute their labor when no capital remained to buy the materials necessary for village improvements. In short, the headman's behavior decreased his ability as well as his inclination to bring about widespread participation in village development projects under Repelita, and hence the village made less progress than either of the other two villages during the first year of Repelita grants.

In the medium efficiency village, the headman, though personally honest in his use of Repelita funds, spent much of his time away from the village running his own trading company in Bandung. His less than total involvement in village affairs was a source of resentment which precluded his being a major mobilizing force able to bring forth large amounts of voluntary labor.

Furthermore, the medium efficiency village is the former Dar'ul Islam village of the first typology. One result of involvement in Dar'ul Islam is that the most forceful leaders of the village are either dead or have moved away from the village. Raden Tjentaka Atmadja is dead and Sharif Abdullah has moved to Bandung. While the present village leaders remain capable of maintaining the village's affiliation with the PSSI at election time, the administration of village affairs remains moribund because the present headman is not personally powerful and has not emphasized village development projects.

The high efficiency village is in sharp contrast to the low and medium efficiency villages. The high efficiency village, which was the pro-government village during the rebellion, is led by a dynamic, forceful leader personally committed to developing his village and personally connected to the sources of information and power most committed to the successful prosecution of Repelita. In describing the pro-government village we have already identified the village headman as a leader with great personal influence over the village and longstanding contacts with the TNI.

The most important factors in the successful execution of Repelita in the high efficiency village stem from the lurah's innovative personality and his ability to mobilize and command the village. The headman has been the motive force behind the reorientation of the village economy away from subsistence agriculture and toward market crops such as tobacco and hot peppers. That the lurah's son is studying in agricultural college supplies a link to vital technical information. More important, however, is the lurah's own enterprising spirit. For him, achieving five separate Repelita projects rather than merely one or two is only a starting point. One of the first questions he asked us after...
we had begun to frequent the village was where and how he could obtain a development loan of several million rupiahs in order to resuscitate the vegetable oil factory that had existed in the village before the Second World War.

The headman was very attuned to the mass media as an active rather than as a passive observer. Newspapers were in evidence in his house and he held personal opinions of his own on subjects as far ranging as the virtues of Edward Kennedy as a leader and the methods used for selecting the provincial governor of West Java. He could see himself in other roles in society, and hence he showed unusual self-confidence in criticizing the actions of high-ranking government officials and in making fun of the "strange" research instrument constructed by us for use in his village. As a man the lurah was attuned to the events of the world outside and committed to reshaping his immediate environment for the good of his village.

Finally, as a result of his energetic leadership of the village over the twenty-year period he was able to organize large quantities of communal labor to carry out the building of the new village school and the other projects to improve the roads and irrigation system of the village. His ability to organize the village to work on the Repelita projects was so successful that he boasts, probably with accuracy, that not a single rupiah from the 100,000 rupiah grant had been used for wage labor.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

CONCLUSIONS

Distilled, the argument presented thus far has the following broad outlines. First, penetration of the villages by the government apparatus remains low. Officials visit the villages only infrequently. In order to have contact with services important to modernization—such as agricultural extension and education beyond the elementary school level—the villagers must travel to the towns. The overall level of direct administrative communication by the government with the villages is at a sufficiently low level to preclude substantial developmental influence over events in the villages.

Secondly, the level of mass media exposure in the village remains low. In addition, the levels of information about national symbols and current government programs continue to be low in the villages studied. However, this is not because mass media have been ineffective in spreading information. Among the people they have reached, mass media are effective in raising levels of knowledge of symbols and programs: those persons with highest mass media exposure are also the highest in knowledge of national symbols and programs and display distinctly higher levels of information about national affairs.

The second conclusion could be used to support a policy proposal for vastly increasing mass media inputs to the villages. However, the unfortunate fact is that no connection can be established between levels of knowledge about national symbols and programs on the one hand and the economic and political behaviors manifested by the villages on the other hand. For instance, while great variation existed between the villages in efficiency of application of Repelita, it cannot be demonstrated that this resulted from the level of knowledge possessed by a village about Repelita.

Third, the nature and message-lead of the traditional communication networks within and extending outward from each village have had a demonstrable effect upon the behaviors manifested by the villages.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A second communication revolution is about to burst upon the world. Satellite communication for administrative as well as mass media usage will become increasingly common with the rapidly decreasing cost of ground stations. Pocket-size television sets costing under $50 will soon be mass-produced, offering the prospect of a second "transistor revolution" but in television rather than radio. These innovations, along with two-way communication through television and cable television, have great potential for increasing the ability of governments to communicate information to their peoples. The attractiveness of these communication instruments will be such that there will be a great temptation to invest large sums in them with a view toward producing rapid development via a massive communication impact upon the traditional sectors of society.

Yet the data from this research indicate that the high technology, mass media approach must not be the sole element of communication strategy. The analysis presented above implies that while
information levels may be vastly increased by applying "high technology," the short-run positive effects of these changes upon behavior will be minimal; and it is the short-run, program-oriented policy effects that will be crucial during the next decades. Rather than adopting technologically flashy, prestigious, expensive, and new communication alternatives, communication strategists should aim for maximum, short-run behavior change in the villages. In Sundanese villages this implies increasing the use of traditional communication networks to amplify the effectiveness of administrative and mass media communication.* Policy planners must resist the all too natural tendency to adopt the newest hardware as a means of avoiding the much more difficult job of connecting existing hardware and administrative capacity with the traditional leadership structures at the local level.

Utilizing the traditional networks to transmit messages with development content will require substantial modification of the basic approach to media policy. First there must be a change in basic orientation away from devising methods aimed solely at maximizing the dissemination of information and toward a strategy whose paramount goal is changing behaviors at the village level. Rather than trying to achieve Repelita goals by spreading information about the program throughout the general population of the village, policy should seek to promote behaviors conducive to Repelita goals by harnessing the mobilization mechanism contained within the enduring traditional communication networks.

The base-line assumption is that if real commitment can be obtained from the six to ten chief men in the village, there is at least the possibility of bringing change to the remainder of the village. Without the assent of these key gatekeepers in the opinion formation process, the transformations desired by the policy maker will not take place regardless of the effort expended upon a mass media campaign. If these assumptions are correct, the first priority of any change campaign must be locating and convincing the gatekeepers.

What are the possible ways of approaching the chief men of the village? First, mass media appeals should not be aimed at the lowest common denominator of village life. Instead special segments of radio programming and the output of government information activities should be targeted on the very small audience of chief men in each village. This could be done through blatantly playing upon status differences by advertising the radio program as being "for headmen and elders only."

The content of the programming should be pitched to problems of village leaders and should feature headmen and elders as guests. The mass media, instead of being used to infuse egalitarian values, should be directed to mobilizing traditional authority structures for modernization.

Secondly, a limited circulation newspaper could be printed in the local language with only a few copies being distributed to each village. Distribution of only a few copies would enhance the status of those individuals receiving it, whereas delivering too many copies would make it a commonplace article.

Other techniques that should be tested for their effectiveness are radio forums for village elders and seminars conducted in nearby towns and universities for the top informal and formal leaders of the villages. As in the case of the limited circulation newspaper, the intent is to reach the many only as an aftereffect of reaching the few.

Third, the most important part of a communication strategy based on utilizing traditional structures is that the bureaucrats must become active change agents by getting out of their offices in the towns and into the villages. The bureaucracy must be extended to the village level with frequency, vigor, and cunning. The primary objective of stepping up administrative communication would be contacting and mobilizing the traditional leaders of the villages. The information gained through increased bureaucratic penetration about local conditions, issues, and leadership structure could supply a meaningful local input to policy-making.

The word "cunning" was used above to describe the type of penetration required for successful implementation of a strategy utilizing traditional communication networks. The administrators of the central government must not move in and take over the village administration. Instead the purpose must be to build an advisor-advisee relation between the last rung of the bureaucratic ladder, especially the sub-district office, and the top level of the village authority structure. The administrator

* It should be mentioned that other researchers have drawn similar conclusions using different methods in other cultures. The most important single source summarizing this literature is Everett M. Rogers (in association with Lynne Svenning, Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969). His data collected in Colombian villages indicate that interpersonal communication channels are of greater importance than mass media at every stage of the decision-making process in which innovations are adopted. In "high technology" societies as well as in less developed countries,
must be trained to deal with village elders. He must know how to give respect and deference and how to accept it. He must also be encouraged to build a patron-client relationship in dispensing bureaucratic largesse to those who carry out programs with the greatest efficiency. But most important of all, he must be assigned to the same area, the same small group of villages, for decades in order to build up long-run, personal relationships with the most important village leaders. Bureaucratic regulations should be specifically structured to decrease mobility of officials. In essence, the _kamat_ must become the _sepah_ (father or elder) of the chief patrons in each village. To do this his residence in the sub-district must be prolonged, his contact with the village life must be intimate, and, of course, he must be deserving of the respect he is seeking.

Adopting a strategy based on using traditional communication networks would require alteration of the criteria used for allocating development resources among villages. Full-blown programs should only be brought to villages in which the chief patrons are known to have given their full backing to the programs. For example, there is no place in bringing family planning demonstration units to every village. Instead they should be brought only to villages where prominent women have already become adopters as a result of having been contacted personally and repeatedly by family planning agents. One socially well-placed, satisfied user is the most powerful demonstration effect that a birth control device can have, and it is worth more than all the posters and family planning films that can be disseminated to the village.

Whether the particular program is rice production or family planning it should only be brought to the village on a large scale after it has been accepted by several chief patrons of a village. Only at this point should the bureaucracy invest the resources necessary to bring the program to the whole village.

What are the advantages and difficulties of such a strategy? An important advantage is the increased efficiency of government programs per unit of input. This results because heavy commitment of scarce resources is not made to all villages, but only to villages where the probability of success is high because of the prior conversion of the most important men of the village.

If one convincingly communicates an innovation to the six to ten top advisors of the village, the innovation has a real chance of being rapidly diffused throughout the whole village. Paradoxically, by aiming mass media and administrative communication at the few rather than the many, a higher developmental impact may be achieved. Fewer radio sets and lower paper costs produce a higher communication pay-off if the traditional communication networks have been mobilized by the administrators. This is true because once the chief advisors begin pushing an idea the message is transmitted, albeit with some distortion, down through the multiple and overlapping village communication networks. The fact that the village leadership pyramid is very narrow at the top and that each individual is wired into several communication networks produces a resonating effect in which the same message reaches an individual through several different advisors.

Perhaps the most important potential advantage to be gained by using traditional communication networks is that the communicator, the advisor, is an established, authoritative source of advice rather than a voice coming in over the radio or an official who only infrequently visits the village. If the traditional communication networks can be mobilized behind an innovation, the project takes advantage of the long history of trust between advisor and advisee.

The increasing bureaucratic penetration demanded by the proposed strategy should result in more rapid feedback, both positive and negative, early in the policy execution stage of a program. If a program is not working well it should become evident more quickly because the chief patrons will be in frequent contact with the administrator. Even if the chief patrons are too shy (malu) to bring negative results to the official's attention, his more frequent presence in the villages should allow him to recognize danger signals before the program has been completely discredited in the eyes of the villagers.

The final advantage is that the strategy utilizes existing communication channels rather than expending energy to create new channels. The traditional communication networks already exist in each village. Transmitters do not have to be constructed and transistor radios do not have to be purchased.

---

Interpersonal communication channels are vitally important in diffusing technological innovation and securing changes in overt behavior (p. 118). The importance of interpersonal communication channels as the vital intervening variable between the mass media and the individual has been demonstrated in regard to voting behavior in the United States. See the pioneering work by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, _The People's Choice_, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, 1948, 1968. For further material on the two-step flow from the mass media through opinion leaders to the sections of the population that are less active in the opinion formation process, see Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up to Date Report on an Hypothesis," _Public Opinion Quarterly_, XXI (Spring 1957), pp. 61-78: Elihu Katz and
to transmit development messages if the bureaucrat as a change agent has convincingly communicated with the chief patrons of the village. Rather than derogating all that is traditional in the name of modernity, traditional forms can be held up as model modernizing tools.

It would be both myopic and utopian to pretend that the restructuring of communication policy implied by the strategy can be carried out without costs and disadvantages. Most of the costs, as in any change in procedure, are the psychological costs that must be borne by those presently administering the programs. Adopting new and some would say less modern ways is bound to be resisted by men who are trying to establish that they, as individuals, are modern men in the midst of a largely traditional society.

The most important cost involved in the change of orientation is increasing the amount of bureaucratic contact with the villages. Officials must go to where the people live, to where the successes and failures of their policies will be found. The measure of effectiveness must be the performance of the villages themselves rather than the quality of record-keeping in the sub-district office or, from the standpoint of communication alone, the quality and quantity of radio programs produced or the number of pieces of printed media distributed. No doubt it is extremely difficult to find talented men willing to spend the majority of their time in the villages rather than in the more comfortable and prestigious offices in the towns.

Another disconcerting aspect of adopting a strategy based upon traditional communication networks is that it forces the official away from comfortable reliance upon hardware such as posters and radio programs and compels him to rely upon his skill in evaluating and participating in interpersonal communication in village society. To perform the role suggested here the official must engage in informal research into the most basic aspects of political and economic life in his villages. Finding chief patrons and establishing enduring personal relationships with them may seem to smack of politicization of the bureaucrat's role. The type and personal intensity of involvement required may be rejected by the official as fitting only for politicians. He may even tend to derogate the strategy based on patron-client networks as being "corrupt" and "non-modern" and therefore, "bad."

Furthermore, one of the major obstacles to adopting the strategy is the response likely from donor country officials. Indicating that a program will only be carried out in villages where the chief patrons are willing to support it will be resisted by donor country officials because it does not fit their idealized model of bureaucratic organization, which requires the impersonal, universal application of the same criteria of allocation to all administrative units.

One final difficulty with using methods rooted in the traditional authority structure of the village is that the structure is fragile and cannot, therefore, be overloaded. If the proposed strategy were carried out and began to achieve satisfactory results, there would be a tendency to overload the traditional communication networks, to use them for the transmission of all messages. For example, if efficiency of execution of Repeltita increased, there would be an immediate temptation to use the strategy for increasing tax yields or pursuing other unpopular goals, a strategy which would soon discredit the chief patrons of the village. The traditional communication networks must not be used for normal executive functions. Instead they should be used sparingly to bring about the adoption of major innovations in fields such as rice cultivation and family planning.

This tendency to overload traditional communication networks with the first flush of success results from desiring modernization so intensely that results are expected with near cosmic speed. Accepting the fact that the process of introducing innovations to a general audience is one of years rather than months is basic to employing the strategy outlined here. Otherwise, the first hint of success will bring forth almost irresistible pressure to apply the method to all villages in all regions simultaneously, with the certain consequence being that plans will totally outstrip resources and the program will collapse in general failure. There is no quick and easy way to village development, and the ideal program is one that conceives its goals only after stringently analyzing the resource base it can reasonably expect to mobilize within a particular time frame in a specific place; it is far better to have modest aims and limited success than repeated cataclysmic failures resulting from hopelessly inflated aims.

Finally, the emphasis on traditional communication networks is not intended to diminish the importance of mass media as long-range influence beneficial to modernization. Raising levels of information, bringing new images of the world outside into the villages, and inducing villagers to

imagine themselves occupying new roles are all long-range effects that can be well served by increasing mass media inputs to the traditional sectors of society.* However, it is our belief that a balanced communication strategy must give increased emphasis to the effects achieved by increasing reliance upon traditional communication networks as a means of spreading critical innovations to the village level. The modernizing impact of mass media will naturally increase as villages begin to prosper, but the first halting steps toward prosperity will come as the result of vital behavior changes generated largely by successful utilization of traditional communication networks.