COMMUNICATION PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT:
An Operational Framework
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Each year about 1,500 men and women from the United States and some 40 countries in the Asian/Pacific area exchange ideas and cultural insights in Center programs. Working and studying with the multinational Center staff on problems of mutual East-West concern, participants include students, mainly at the postgraduate level; Senior Fellows and Fellows with research expertise or practical experience in such fields as government, business administration or communication; mid-career professionals in non-degree study and training programs at the teaching and management levels; and authorities invited for international conferences and seminars. These participants are supported by federal scholarships and grants, supplemented in some fields by contributions from Asian/Pacific governments and private foundations.

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THE EAST-WEST COMMUNICATION INSTITUTE concentrates on the use of communication in economic and social development and in the sharing of knowledge across cultural barriers. The Institute awards scholarships for graduate study in communication and related disciplines, primarily at the University of Hawaii; conducts a variety of professional development projects for communication workers in specialized fields of economic and social development; invites Fellows and visiting scholars to the Center for study and research in communication and to help design projects; offers Jefferson Fellowships for Asian, Pacific, and U.S. journalists for a semester at the Center and the University of Hawaii; conducts and assists in designing and carrying out research; arranges conferences and seminars relating to significant topics in communication; conducts a world-wide Inventory-Analysis of support, services, and country program needs in communication programs; assembles relevant communication materials with emphasis on Asian and Pacific material and makes these available for students, scholars, and practitioners at the Center and elsewhere; and publishes papers, reports, newsletters, and other materials emanating from the above activities.

EAST-WEST COMMUNICATION INSTITUTE

- Wilbur Schramm, Director
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COMMUNICATION PLANNING FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

by

ALAN HANCOCK

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ABSTRACT

Given the fragmentation of work on communication planning for development, this paper attempts to evolve a simple and operational planning design that can encompass elements of research and analysis, planning methods and principles, and decision-making processes. The paper sets down the parameters of planning, the overall framework in which it is conducted, the constraints that it inevitably faces, and the factors that it must accommodate. Basically, it is a framework of communication planning for development. As such, it is assumed that planning is initiated by some perception of a need for change.

ALAN HANCOCK, who is Chief, Communication Planning and Studies, in the Division of Development of Communication Systems, Unesco, Paris, was a Consultant at the East-West Communication Institute during 1976.
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This paper is one of the products of the East-West Communication Institute's project activities on communication policy and planning. Alan Hancock spent a short time at the Institute in early 1976 as a consultant and participated in the Institute's planning conference entitled "Communication Policy and Planning for Development" held in April 1976. The idea of developing a framework for communication planning appealed to him, and he agreed to write an exploratory paper. Since then Alan Hancock has continued to develop his ideas. In addition, the Institute's project on communication planning has made further progress in this area. We hope that our subsequent papers and monographs will cast more light on the problem of communication planning. In the meantime, this paper should generate interest among communication scholars and practitioners.

The paper is not intended to present any theory or methods and techniques of communication planning for any particular setting or media of communication. Rather, it is a simple framework categorizing relevant communication activities and their interrelationships. In so doing, it takes the initial steps in formulating a basis on which subsequent research can develop more elaborate models and tools of communication planning.

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INTRODUCTION

In an international conference on "Communication Policy and Planning for Development," held at the East-West Communication Institute from April 5 to 10, 1976, a number of speakers regretted, in their various ways, the fragmentation of work on communication planning for development. One paper offered a "paradigm," connecting together the related fields of communication policy studies, communication planning, and communication resource management. Another advocated a systems approach, not so much as a planning tool or method of operational control, but as an aid to understanding. Although the emphases were different, both were apparently making the same point: that the intricacy of the problem stems from a need to retain an overall perspective, even while investigating particular facets. Research into communication planning has to consider communication in two respects: it must focus attention on the system of communication and the relationship of its component parts, but it must also view communication as a component in the larger system of development.

It is apparent that most of the current writing in the field is highly assorted and not properly a literature of communication planning at all, but rather a series of partial insights derived from sectoral and institutional studies of communication or from individual aspects of communication research. Since communication planning is a new and synthetic field, it has necessarily to make its way by borrowing and adaptation. Unfortunately, the character of this borrowing often makes it difficult to retain the sense of a planning continuum.

This paper attempts, tentatively, to evolve a simple and operational planning design that can encompass elements of research and analysis, planning methods and principles, and decision-making processes. It does so, hopefully, in a context of reality; indeed, it begins by tracing the concepts of communication policy and planning, the crystallization of opinion, and the tenor of discussion thus far.

The paper is not in any sense a prescriptive model of how to plan. It tries to set down the parameters of planning, the overall framework in which it is conducted, the constraints that it inevitably faces, and the factors that it must accommodate.
No particular planning models or tools are prescribed, although some consideration is given of what tools are needed. No particular social structure or political ideology is assumed. The paper is, however, a framework of communication planning for development. In other words, it is assumed that planning is initiated by some perception of a need for change.

The framework is presented, at this stage, very simply. Activities to follow must include an evaluation of the framework against communication planning case studies already carried out, as well as its incorporation and testing within future survey designs.

It is hoped that the paper will be of use to the decision maker (to describe what the concepts of communication planning entail), to the planner (to relate this new field to other planning disciplines), and to the researcher (to define the orbit of communication planning as it impinges upon parallel fields). For the communication planners themselves—who are rare in number—it is offered as a tentative vehicle for their consideration, adaptation, and use.

THE WIDER CONTEXT

Concepts like those of communication policies and planning do not emerge, fully formed, from a vacuum; and something can be learned from the ways in which they are described and initiated. We talk, first of all, about policies in the plural: implying that there is no such thing as a single, normative policy, but rather a collection of differentiated approaches. Also we rarely talk of "policies" or "planning" on their own, presumably implying that a necessary, even a prescriptive link exists between the two.

The first "official" description of communication policies is usually quoted from a 1972 Unesco document entitled Report of the Meeting of Experts on Communication Policies and Planning. It reads:

Communication policies are sets of principles and norms established to guide the behaviour of communication systems. Their orientation is fundamental and long-range, although they may have operational implications of short-range significance. They are shaped in the context of society's general approach to communication. Emanating from political ideologies, the social and economic conditions of the country and the values on which they are based, they strive to relate these to the real needs and prospective opportunities of "communication" . . . .

Communication policies exist in every society, though they may frequently be latent and disjointed, rather than clearly articulated and harmonised. What is proposed therefore is not something radically new, but rather an explicit statement and deliberately prospective formulation of practices already established in society . . . .
One needs practice in the reading of such a document, which tends to reflect a careful consensus of opinions, and hence of political systems.

But there are other kinds of consensus. Beginning in the early 1960s, some of the earlier basic concerns of communication research—with content, objectivity, scientism—also changed, particularly as encounters with the developing world and the imperatives of technical assistance (into which communication researchers were increasingly drawn) focused attention on what communication might, in controlled circumstances, achieve. A trend initiated by Wilbur Schramm’s classic book Mass Media and National Development, written in 1962 and published in 1964, finally drew commentators of very different persuasion together. Take, for example, these three statements:

Too many communicologists have chosen the convenient role of an indifferent observer in relation to the ethics and ideology of communication; and this has been done for the sake of “objectivity of science”. . . . In the current research tradition, normative considerations have been too much masked by factual documentation, thinking about the goals of communication in various situations has been replaced by experimentation with different means of communication. (Nordenstreng, 1968, pp. 207-216)

The very professionals who specialise in the study of human conduct and in the design of behavioural change in people, without which modernity is unattainable, have been almost totally absent from the scene of strategy making. The implication of that absence is that Latin American development has been, and is being, blue-printed almost exclusively on the basis of attempting to predict or regulate non-human behaviours. (Beltran, 1969, p. 22)

We must remember that the full power of mass communication has never been used, in any developing country, to push economic and social development forward. This is the really exciting question . . . the challenge of the evidence presented here. (Schramm, 1964, p. 271)

These three authors come from different backgrounds and have quite separate views of the communication process. But in each quotation there is a reaction against purely detached analysis, and a move toward some kind of commitment.

Commitment—whether it implies persuasion or something less radical—also implies planning; and here again the summative Unesco record is of interest. Descriptions like that given above of communication policy may appear prima facie, to be no little more than a rationalization of existing practices, whether these are good or bad. In fact, the text is saying something rather different. It is admitting that, without a clear analysis and articulation of existing structures and influences upon communication, we cannot plan at all, in any meaningful or realistic way. Indeed, the Unesco document goes on to discuss implications for planning.
The elaboration of communication policies proceeds, therefore, simultaneously, from the analysis and acknowledgment of existing practices, and the formulation of new principles and norms suited to the attainment of desirable future goals. The blending of pragmatic experience of the past and forward looking may lead societies to new principles and norms . . .

Beyond policies is strategic planning, which determines the alternative ways to achieve long-range goals and sets the frame of reference for shorter-range operational planning. Strategic planning translates into quantified targets and systematic approaches the general objectives of communication policies.

Naturally, a good deal is still unsaid in this document. It does not attempt (nor could it, in context) to cope with questions such as: what happens when the analysis of communication policies apparently reveals structures and pressures that work against individual or even collective goals? By what means and mechanisms are communication policies reoriented and redirected, and under whose authority? The document could hardly begin to do so, emanating as it does from an international forum that is built upon the sovereignty of its member states.

However, the emphasis being given in this brief preface to Unesco papers is not meant to applaud or sanction the work of the agency in any particular way, but rather more to serve as a means of measuring barometric pressure. International agencies have to be good barometers. And an earlier document also produced by Unesco at least stated the polarities of planning (by which are meant the polarities of regulation and independence). The discussion is found in the report of a 1971 experts’ meeting entitled Proposals for an International Programme of Communication Research.

There are two diametric positions between which individual countries would choose individual positions: the intrusion of planning on communication services exclusively when the emergence of new technologies requires regulation and definition or when broad new communication services are required which will not be provided by a market economy; and the integrated, centralised planning of the communication sector in all its dimensions as an essential part of the political and state-building process.

Central to this opposition is the relationship between policies and planning. Again the document has something to say, even if in general terms.

Conceptually, it would be most satisfactory if action could go successfully through the indicated stages: policies, strategies, operational planning, budgeting. In reality, however, planning and operational action can precede the formulation of policies. The emergence of new technologies, particularly striking in the communication field, the initiatives of powerful enterprises, either publicly or privately owned and externally generated, and the immediate needs of communication
networks to extend their range and improve their quality, lead to action wherein the long-range effects have never been considered. Engineers and regulatory agencies are often not aware of the fact that their decisions, made within a limited context to achieve immediate ends, may determine the future of communication for decades to come. If operational planning and policies are not co-ordinated, considerable wastage and conflict may result.

There is, in this statement, a clear recognition of a functional relationship: policies determine the context and objectives of planning; planning articulates and embodies policies. What is absent, to some extent for political reasons, is an admission of the fact that policies are more than sets of norms; they must (if they are to be more than abstract descriptions) include an evaluation of political structures, the means of arriving at and regulating policy. Planners must necessarily interact with decision makers and politicians, as well as with theoretical constructs. This is a reality with which this paper will be much concerned.

Nevertheless, the Unesco papers clarified, to the best of their ability, the nature of the problem. Since 1972, a good deal has been completed on an individual or institutional basis, but rather less has emerged from the international scene. There have been a number of descriptive studies of communication policy, originally of European countries (Ireland, Hungary, the Federal Republic of Germany, Yugoslavia, and Sweden), followed by studies in the developing world (Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, India, and Sri Lanka). Some experiment has been made with planning methodologies (communication indicators and the preparation of economic guidelines for communication inventories).

We have reached a point where the main dimensions of the problem are known, and we can enter into specifics: of creating methodologies, of investigating policies, of practicing planning in experimental situations, of searching out means of putting the plans into practice.

The remainder of this paper is intended as one kind of specific contribution, which is rooted in planning realities. It concentrates upon development planning (and as such it is more often concerned with the model of choice described above—integrated, centralized planning, directed toward overall nation-building). But with this orientation, the paper cannot afford to ignore the competencies, and the difficulties, of communication planning in industrialized and technologically secure societies, any more than it can ignore the reservoir of skills that those societies possess. We have suffered from insularity too much already; and while the framework being constructed is most obviously focused upon work within the Third World, other realities—of technology transfer, market forces, the interplay of information, ideas, and expertise—also enter directly into the framework.

**THE PARAMETERS**

It will also be well to define the understanding of communication planning and of development assumed in this paper, since both concepts are subject to particular and personal interpretation.
By communication planning, we mean the preparation of both long-range and short-range plans (that is, strategic and operational) for the efficient and equitable use of communication resources and for the realization of communication policies, in the context of a particular society's goals, means, and priorities and subject to its prevailing forms of social and political organization.

A society in this case may be as small as a community or institution, or as large as a regional grouping. Obviously, the resources of planning, the complexity of the planning process, and the constraints placed upon it will differ in proportion to the planning universe, but it can be argued that in essence the same kinds of process apply at each level.

Planning does not, however (or should not), take place in a vacuum; and in its execution, we have to take account not only of the norms of communication policy, whether expressed or latent, but also of the characteristic processes of decision making, the allocation of financial and supporting resources, and the economic and social behavior. In other words, communication is both a theoretical and an applied discipline: it is subject to all the forms and pressures of compromise that characteristically operate in applied fields. Its study, therefore, includes analysis of the constraints placed upon it, as well as means of promoting its recommendations.

The account of policy that is given below is consequently of a particular kind. Its orientation is not so much toward policy per se or the description and normalization of communication roles in society, but more with that specific categorization of policy that is an a priori facet of the planning process. It attempts to find a means of identifying the priorities, possibilities, and pressures—without which planning becomes an abstract and sterile exercise.

The understanding of development is likely to cause more difficulty. There are many definitions of development; unfortunately, most of these are couched in somewhat abstract terms. Development, in theory, normally implies a telescoping of change in a given society that will allow it, in a shorter span of time than would be the result of random historical growth, to escalate to the living standards, economic climate, and social and educational level of industrialized societies. In practice, however, development is most often equated with industrialization and with technological innovation; it is measured by the degree to which an "underdeveloped" society matches indices evolved by industrialized countries.

This simplistic hypothesis has, of course, been challenged in many places; and much greater caution is now exercised, to the extent that not only the appropriateness of a particular technology but even the appropriateness of technology at all are no longer taken for granted in resolving a particular country's problems. Today, at least in theory, our preference is to analyze the social environment and goal structure of a developing society and to see what specific prescriptions, among which technology is included, can best advance these goals and help solve fundamental problems. This is not to say that technical assistance or commercial advisory programs always reflect such caution or that task analysis is always complete,
whether by assistance agencies or by the country's leaders themselves. But it does reflect a climate of opinion.

For our purposes, we need an understanding of development that does not make too many prejudgments about the best manner in which to proceed. We also need an understanding that does not draw too arbitrary a line between the so-called "developed" and "developing" countries, since one of our dilemmas is how to use the resources of the industrialized world in less rich environments. It is easy enough to argue that the industrialized world provides the expertise, the tools, the methodologies, and the technologies that can be adapted to Third World situations, but is this all that it can do? Is there no other kind of interchange between the two worlds? At least the question should be left open.

By development, therefore, it seems better to agree upon a basic notion of reduction in inequalities: of opportunity, of resources, of information access. This kind of inequality is normally associated with the gap between technologically advanced and technologically poor countries, but it goes deeper. Within industrialized societies, similar inequalities exist between urban and rural societies, between social strata, or between economic groups. Development can therefore be understood to approach the reduction of such inequalities through a deliberate planning process whose objective is to accelerate the transition. Communication planning for development implies the use of communication understandings and technologies as part of this process.

It is certainly true that the majority of our arguments and concerns will be for Third World countries, since those have the greatest needs. At the same time, there will be planning experiences and models in the industrialized world, focusing upon the improvement of conditions for underprivileged groups, that will most probably have relevance to Third World situation and vice versa. Even today, there are some ironies in communication experience that have led to greater experiment and analysis in the developing world than in industrial societies. For example, in the context of extension work with agricultural communities (although early studies of diffusion and information flow occurred in the United States and early uses of communication media for rural groups were focused upon Canada) today far more experience is available in developing countries. In the context of instructional radio and television, the needs of a number of smaller developing countries, coupled with the provisions of technical assistance and the willingness of some governments to act in a more arbitrary manner than in the West, have meant that more complete and comprehensive experiences are found in, say, El Salvador or Singapore than is the case in the United States or Great Britain.

The adaptation of models and the transfer of experiences (not just technologies) are in consequence a two-way process and need to be approached as such. For this reason, the wider definition of development is preferred.

Finally, before we advance a possible framework for communication planning in development, we should also pause to consider what such a framework should contain and what outcomes it should facilitate. We need to define both its character and the constraints with which it must be able to deal.
It has to be emphasized that this is intended as a framework for planning and not a planning model. Planning designs will be different for any given set of problems, but they may still follow the same main sequence. It should be possible to devise such a sequence as a guide to the construction of planning strategies: as a general vehicle, from which variations may be proposed.

Some special preconditions exist for such a framework. It must first of all be flexible, capable of adapting to the variety of forms that occur in communication systems. It must also be dynamic, able to respond to change, to new trends and orientations of opinion. Our knowledge of communication planning is bound to develop; but it will do so, not by negating earlier work, but by making the overall picture more complete (as has happened with communication research in general).

A second precondition is that the framework must be realistic, striking an even balance between theory and practice; and in so doing, it must embody a continuum between policies and planning concepts. This implies that it must also treat the context of planning, as well as its exercise; it must allow for the interaction of planning groups, role definitions among the professions, the interplay of policy-making institutions.

Third, the framework must take account of planning methodologies, as well as the adaptation of tools and indicators from other disciplines.

Finally, it must be oriented toward implementation: toward the maximum probability of being put into practice.

If these parameters are met, we can envisage a framework that will accommodate research (theoretical and applied), the improvement of methodology, and the construction of planning designs with sufficient comparability so that general principles may be drawn from their experience. As a generalized framework, it should accommodate a number of levels and contexts of communication planning (vertical and horizontal) and thus help to break down some of the fragmentation of our current activities, but without sacrificing realism in the interests of academic consistency.

THE FRAMEWORK

In Table 1, a basic matrix is proposed for a framework that will be developed through the remainder of this paper in a number of formats.

It can be seen that the horizontal axis of this matrix corresponds in general with a basic systems planning and curriculum development model (a sequence of: setting goals, defining objectives, planning systems, implementing systems, evaluating and regenerating systems).

The vertical axis follows a continuum of theory (research); planning; and decision making (policy): that is, those activities that, it was argued below, must be reconciled in applied planning processes.
**TABLE 1. BASIC PLANNING MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>System Planning</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The horizontal axis is therefore time- and activity-based, in a sequence that includes feedback. The vertical axis reflects roles, context, and coordination. The letters in the grid are purely references; they relate to activities that are amplified in Table 2.

**TABLE 2. MATRIX COMPONENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>System Planning</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analysis of policies</td>
<td>Research on planning strategies</td>
<td>Research on and monitoring of operational programs</td>
<td>Development of methodology and evaluation studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Framing of goals and targets</td>
<td>Strategic and operational planning</td>
<td>System refinement and control</td>
<td>Planning and conduct of evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td>Review, modification, and articulation of policies</td>
<td>Assessment and modification of plans</td>
<td>Implementation and coordination of policy decisions at agency and institutional levels</td>
<td>Interpretation of evaluation data and redefinition of policies and strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, each of the entries in this table is, in itself, a complex activity that will need further breakdown and contextual placing. However, it should serve
as a guide to some major functions required of the framework, namely:

1. Showing the relationship, and sequence, of various blocks of activities that are contingent in the planning and implementation process;

2. Showing activities that are to be examined conjointly (that is, from the viewpoints of planning, research, and decision making); and

3. Clarifying the combined relationship of items 1 and 2 above, in a systemic planning process.

In other words, item 1 is a reflection of the horizontal or lateral axis of the grid; item 2 is a reflection of the vertical one; and item 3 interrelates both axes.

If the framework is to be useful, it is important that it should accommodate many kinds of communication systems—present and projected, local or national. This capacity will be demonstrated later. However, it must again be emphasized that this is a development planning framework that will only be applicable where a prior development commitment exists. It will not be helpful in the analysis of a laissez faire situation, since it is geared toward desired change. Consequently, the possibility, at the very least, of planning and policy-making groups interacting in a controlled way must be taken as an a priori assumption for its use.

This paper moves from the general to the particular. We shall begin therefore by looking at functions 1 to 3 above in a macro context, and then proceed (in the following section) to greater detail.

The lateral sequence (item 1) is the most familiar, since it reflects the traditional model of planning by objectives. This model is further illustrated in Figure 1. It is a process that, with the introduction of a continuous evaluation component, can be seen as a cyclic network.

The vertical axis is less familiar but incorporates a basic relationship that has been already argued in this paper: between planning, research, and decision making. Planning is the central thread that draws upon research and evaluation tools to provide basic information and to test hypotheses and models; it then adapts its findings to the decision-making apparatus, which in turn makes its own modifications and ratifies both policy and plan. This axis is seen as critical to realistic planning and informed decision making.

The transition from this grid to Figure 2 may appear abrupt, but on closer inspection it will be seen to be logical. Figure 2 illustrates function No. 3 above; it places the two axes together and expands the original matrix into a more comprehensive set of systemic relationships, showing the interaction in the planning process, between research and evaluation, the main planning strand, and various kinds of decision making. The route indicated by the directional arrows is not, of course, invariable, but it reflects an approach to planning that takes proper account of decision-making needs at various points in system development and makes full use of research analyses to guide its progress. The normal sequence of planning by
FIGURE 1.
SYSTEMS PLANNING BY OBJECTIVES

1. Determine needs
2. Set goals and targets
3. Frame objectives
4. Devise strategic plan for system
5. Devise operational plans for system
6. Pilot system
7. Implement system
8. Evaluate system
9. Modify and extend system
FIGURE 2.  
A PLANNING NETWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>PLANNING</th>
<th>RESEARCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MODIFY OR ENDORSE STATEMENT 3.</td>
<td>MAKE PRELIMINARY POLICY STATEMENT 2.</td>
<td>ANALYZE POLICIES 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REVISE STATEMENT 4.</td>
<td>RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS OF STATEMENT 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODIFY OR ENDORSE GOALS AND TARGETS 7.</td>
<td>STATE GOALS AND TARGETS 6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DRAW UP POLICY SUMMARY 8.</td>
<td>AMPLIFY AND PROJECT SUMMARY 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODIFY OBJECTIVES 11.</td>
<td>SET OBJECTIVES 10.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REFINE OBJECTIVES AND QUANTIFY 12.</td>
<td>TEST OBJECTIVES AND 13. RESEARCH QUANTIFICATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPROVE STRATEGIC PLAN AND MODIFY 15.</td>
<td>DRAW UP ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC PLANS 14.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REVISE STRATEGY AND EXPAND TO 16. OPERATIONAL PLAN</td>
<td>TEST PLANS 17. AND PROJECT FORWARD, PROPOSE PILOTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PILOT SYSTEM 18. AND COMPONENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REVISE AND 22. EXPAND SYSTEM PLAN</td>
<td>DEVELOP SYSTEM 24. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPLEMENT SYSTEM 23.</td>
<td>MONITOR IMPLEMENTATION 25.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION AND MODIFY 28.</td>
<td>ANNOTATE 27. EVALUATION</td>
<td>EVALUATE 26. SYSTEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REDESIGN SYSTEM 29.</td>
<td>RESEARCH DESIGN IMPLICATIONS 30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVIEW 33. CONTINUOUSLY</td>
<td>REVISE AND 32. EXTEND SYSTEM</td>
<td>MONITOR 31. CONTINUOUSLY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
objectives, moving from policy to goal statement, objectives, strategic and operation-
planning, prototyping, and implementation, is related throughout to a sequence of
key decisions (thus avoiding arbitrariness in planning and ensuring full consideration
of alternatives and political involvement); it is also reinforced by an integral evalua-
tion cycle (embracing formative, process, and summative elements).

Figure 2 is therefore a basic network, to which a great deal of reference will
be made in the paper. Nevertheless, it has a number of limitations, to which recog-
nition should be given at the earliest stage, even though in most cases it will be
beyond the scope of the paper to resolve them.

Figure 2 is essentially two dimensional: it correlates activities and roles
over a period of time, but it ignores other dimensions of coordination, integration,
and structure. It does not differentiate readily between and among the many levels
of analysis and decision making that must be pursued in a complex planning network,
especially one pitched at a national level where many agencies and institutions are
involved, often hierarchically.

Figure 3 adds a simple three-dimensional analogy, although as a model it is
only illustrative and not intended to be complete. Its purpose is to make clear that
the kind of network envisaged in Figure 2 also penetrates downwards and sideways
through the institutional and decision-making structures of a society. We can best
approach this idea by assuming that the network of Figure 2 is overlaid across the
top surface of Figure 3 (as marked), but that, like the motif in a piece of rock candy,
it imprints through to other levels.

Quite clearly, all the activities isolated in Figure 2 have ramifications at
many different levels of organization. The setting of objectives, for example, is
a function of a large number of separate agencies, each of which is required to
evolve its own planning framework and mechanism and to construct its program in
accordance with overall goals. Such levels of decision making are illustrated in the
vertical axis of Figure 3, which will include a range from the national (at the apex)
through regional to local and parochial levels. The pyramidal and hierarchical
nature of most national structures also calls for a lateral planning framework, de-
voted to the coordination of various subsystems, and this is expressed in the horizon-
tal axis of Figure 3. All three dimensions have to be acknowledged and reconciled
within the planning process for it to be successful. But in fact the constraints go
still deeper.

There is also the impact of evaluation and feedback. If there is continuous
monitoring and assessment of the planning and implementation process, this permits
constant modification and sensitivity to changed circumstances and demands: conse-
quently, the time-based continuum of the planning process is false. It does not have
a beginning and an end as shown in Figure 3; it is basically cyclic and repetitive.
Moreover, the analogy of imprinting, used to clarify Figure 3, is itself incomplete
because, while a version of the planning network will be found in each institution or
agency connected to the process at whatever organizational level, in fact the specif-
ics of the network will be different in each case. Figure 2, after all, maps an over-
all process, to which connected agencies will relate in different ways. Not every
FIGURE 3.
LEVELS OF DECISION MAKING AND COORDINATION

SYSTEMS PLANNING
(AS EXPRESSED IN FIGURE 4)

VERTICAL LEVEL OF DECISION MAKING

HORIZONTAL LEVEL OF COORDINATION
agency will be involved to the same extent in policy formulation; or rather, different policy demands will be made at different levels. One aspect of this situation is somewhat roughly illustrated in Figure 4, which emphasizes that the most significant items of policy formulation occur at upper organizational strata; and it is not until we come to implementation that lower levels are fully engaged.

Admittedly, this is only one aspect—of overall policy definition. Each organization will also have its own policies to determine, and this may be said to constitute a common component of decision making. But such subordinate policies cannot often be articulated until overall policy parameters have been set (or if they have been set, for historical and pragmatic reasons, then they will need reinterpretation). Policy-making and planning, even implementation and evaluation, tend to be stepped processes (as illustrated in Figure 5), in which parameters set from above are reinterpreted and expanded at regional and local levels.

This argument may immediately be queried by those who resist hierarchical planning. It will certainly have been noted that the models of Figures 3 and 4 assume a pyramidical structure, which is now, of course, being vigorously challenged in many societies, irrespective of ideology. The problem of participant planning is to make of the vertical structure a genuine two-way or multi-way flow, moving policy formulation and planning processes upward as well as downward (indeed, originating with an upward movement). To whatever extent this is successful, the penetration of Figure 2 through Figures 3 and 4 will become proportionately more complex.

It is hardly possible to model such complex networks, except in computerized formats. Some experimentation is proceeding along these lines, but it is well beyond either the scope of this paper or the competence of its author. Also some doubt exists as to how valuable the exercise may be. This is not a mathematical sphere, governed by the operation of natural laws. It is subject to constant change and shifts of emphasis; and there is a limit as to how far simulations may go.

In all events, the purpose of introducing this discussion at this particular stage is not to set up a framework in order to annihilate it immediately, but rather to make clear some of the limitations that must be placed upon it. It will not always be possible in the body of the paper, which is mostly devoted to an exposition of Figure 2, to retain, at every point, perspectives of planning beyond the time and activity frame of the basic network. Obviously, more will have to be said, in order to distinguish between activities that must be differently interpreted at specific organizational levels or to discuss problems of coordination, as well as methodological constraints. More will certainly be said about participant planning. But the biggest constraints of all stem from the complexity of the structures with which planning has to deal and their shifting dynamics as circumstances and social options change. These constraints certainly cannot be programmed here; they have been raised to ensure that they are recognized and that the necessary reservations are made in putting the framework to use.
FIGURE 4.
LEVELS OF POLICY MAKING
FIGURE 5.
STEPPED PROCESSES IN POLICY MAKING AND PLANNING

NATIONAL

REGIONAL

LOCAL

POLICY → STRATEGIC PLANNING → OPERATIONAL PLANNING → IMPLEMENTATION → EVALUATION

POLICY → STRATEGIC PLANNING → OPERATIONAL PLANNING → IMPLEMENTATION → EVALUATION

POLICY → STRATEGIC PLANNING → OPERATIONAL PLANNING → IMPLEMENTATION → EVALUATION
EXPANSION OF THE FRAMEWORK

This section is based upon the tasks described, in general terms, in Figure 2. It is in no way an exhaustive commentary; but it is intended to continue the analysis some stages farther and to prepare the ground for further study. Most of the discussion in this section is pitched at a national level of communication. However, some reference is made to other levels (see Figure 3); and the argument is continued in the following section.

In order to proceed at all, however, we must assume that certain infrastructures exist, or can be created, that will support the related activities of research and analysis, planning, and policy and decision making. The form of these structures is variable; but, as has been argued earlier, they are a precondition for communication planning for development, if a definite commitment to rational communication deployment exists.

Infrastructures

We can begin by distinguishing between the kinds of organism most likely to be entrusted with each activity. Planning, at all levels, is likely to be handled by a group, in order to combine the wide range of specialisms involved in communication. It may, as in most technical assistance projects, be a specially created group: a mission or a planning team. Institutionally, it may be a committee representing different interests and units within the institution. At the national level, the nature of the group is more difficult to define because at this level communication planning is rarely practiced, at present, as a coherent activity; it happens more by default than by design. In some developing countries, with a strong tradition of centralized government and administration, it may be the responsibility of the central economic planning board or a subunit within that entity, drawing upon representatives of interested ministries. They are likely to be professional, civil service appointees, rather than politicians or decision makers, since their function is operational, not one of assessment.

The research level is more probably institutional. Individual researchers or research institutes or a network of research agencies, depending upon the complexity of the tasks to be performed, are recruited to the planning process. They deal directly with the planning organisms to which they may be in practice administratively affiliated; they reinforce planning activities or validate proposals rather than enter political arenas to which they are often neither institutionally nor temperamentally suited.

Decision making is usually the most long-established and, at the same time, the most complex area of all. We cannot proceed without policy decisions; and a variety of institutional and political formats have been created to deal with them. At the national level, we are therefore contemplating organs of government, and ultimately political ideologies; at other levels, we are faced with diverse mechanisms such as boards of governors or ministries or even commercial sponsors. Into this discussion, however, must enter the more recent concepts of participation in decision making—which seek to increase the base of representation.
This concept is well illustrated by the proposal for Communication Policy Councils promoted by Unesco. The proposal was included in the 1972 Unesco document entitled Report of the Meeting of Experts on Communication Policies and Planning and partly approved by the meeting. It was conceived as a representative forum that would debate the main issues of communication policy and safeguard the rights and interests of particular groups, although not necessarily with regulatory powers. Its composition would reflect groups such as government bodies and ministries, professional organizations, commercial enterprises, and citizens, although with a different mix depending upon the society in question.

Obviously, the desire to make decision making in communication at once a more coherent and a more participatory process will have its impact upon the model of communication planning. To date, however, except at the local and community level, these concerns have not progressed much beyond consumer representation on advisory bodies; and participation in planning is still a speculative concept. While recognizing needs and aspirations, the basis of this report is more that of existing practice. But while the framework of Figure 2 deliberately avoids normative statements about the structures that may support these functions, it attempts, specifically, to direct the ways in which they are carried out.

It has already been emphasized that, in constructing Figure 2, a main concern was to introduce adequate decision-making points into the communication planning process. Principal criteria employed were: (1) that the outcomes should show a balanced and consistent use of communication resources, oriented as precisely as possible to societal goals; (2) that outcomes should be efficient and economical; (3) that evaluation, prototyping and piloting, and other corrective tools should be introduced to allow the system to redress mistakes as early as possible; and (4) that the system should reconcile conflicting and competing interests to the maximum satisfaction of each. This orientation will become clearer later in this section.

But a secondary purpose of the framework, linked to the first, affects the planning process. It is considered important that not only are research, planning, and decision-making roles identified properly, and institutionalized as necessary, but that there should be continual interaction between them. However separate these processes, and their instruments, may be organically, there must be cross-fertilization: this is quite as important as the interdisciplinary form of the planning team. The network of Figure 2 contains a number of crossover points that catalyze exchange; but the exchange should be far more than nominal. The main possibility for synthesis is within the planning base itself; and here it is important that representatives of the research and decision-making organ should be included, at an appropriate level and as regular, permanent members. (In practice, this usually means as high a level as is feasible.) Although this position is easier to argue than to see accepted, this kind of participation will finally save both time and resources--by avoiding misunderstandings, false interpretations of data, feelings of noninvolvement, and awkward compromises that erode system integrity. The difficulty of practicing this argument is further examined in the section below entitled "Constraints Upon Communication Planning."
Development of the Framework

We can now continue with the analysis of Figure 2, referring as appropriate to tasks as identified and numbered in the network, and reflecting the major blocks (cf. Table 2) within which these tasks are located.

In the discussion, the principal Blocks of: (1) Policies, (2) System Planning, (3) Implementation, and (4) Evaluation will be taken separately; within these, Tasks will be grouped according to their common logic.

Analysis of Tasks

Block one: policies

Tasks 1-9

Overall objective: To evolve a statement of communication policy in which general goals and targets for the overall communication system are specified to the best possible satisfaction of all interested agencies, institutions, and bodies.

Tasks 1 and 2 (Policy Analysis)

This initial pair of tasks, intended to lead toward a comprehensive policy statement, is illustrated in Figure 6, which reflects the organization of data so as to focus down particular categories of policy. The diagram is pitched at a national level of communication policy: the top column gives an overall account of data required or likely to be available; and the bottom column shows those coherent groupings that will facilitate planning and policy review.

The sequence of tasks (like most of the sequences illustrated in Figure 2) is one of gradual selection, consideration of alternatives, weeding out of contradictions, reformulation, and articulation.

In some situations, these data will already have been collected to frame earlier policies. In others, they will be in random places; and some may be unobtainable or require specific research or further data processing. Sources of information are statistical, in published plans, in academic literature, or in some cases through interview and inquiry (for example, information on the commercial sector). The data base has been deliberately set wide, as it is information that will be required perennially for communication planning. Therefore, a good deal of attention has to be paid to its storage and coding, in such a way that access is simple and cross-referencing possible. An illustration (not comprehensive) of the kinds of data required is provided on the following page. In practice, the level and detail of data needed will vary from country to country and from problem to problem. Initially, it will only be possible to collect bones of this data base (such as has happened in the Unesco monographs on communication policies referred to earlier). As planning proceeds and becomes both more comprehensive and more institutionalized, the data base will be enlarged.
FIGURE 6.
ORGANIZATION OF DATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL RESEARCH</th>
<th>MARKET AND COMMERCIAL STRUCTURES</th>
<th>INFORMATION STRUCTURES</th>
<th>MEDIA STRUCTURES</th>
<th>EDUCATION PLANS AND STRUCTURES</th>
<th>ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS</th>
<th>POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES</th>
<th>SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PLANS AND STRUCTURES</th>
<th>TELECOMS AND TRANSPORT PLANS AND STRUCTURES</th>
<th>URBAN AND RURAL PLANS</th>
<th>DEMOGRAPHIC DATA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ATTITUDES</td>
<td>ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES</td>
<td>SECTORAL POLICIES</td>
<td>ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT GOALS</td>
<td>TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURES</td>
<td>REGULATORY PROVISIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## EXAMPLES OF DATA REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. SOCIAL RESEARCH</th>
<th>Social structures; media effects; community organization; media consumption patterns.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. MARKET AND COMMERCIAL STRUCTURES</td>
<td>Production and distribution; investment patterns; entrepreneurial habits; advertising, promotion, and sales.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. INFORMATION STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION</td>
<td>Library storage and retrieval; computer storage and capacity; information handling capacity; links with international networks; copyright.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MEDIA STRUCTURES</td>
<td>Organization, management, ownership, financing, marketing, production, transmission and distribution patterns for radio, television, film, audio-visual media, press, publishing, news agencies; international flow and exchange patterns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. EDUCATION PLANS AND STRUCTURES</td>
<td>Organization, management, and financing of education; curriculum objectives and priorities; data on enrollment, wastage, class size, access, literacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS</td>
<td>Development plans, priorities, goals and targets; input/output data; employment and manpower data; investment patterns and constraints; technical assistance forms and international relations; economic planning constructs and mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES</td>
<td>Patterns of government; legislative procedures; social policy; geo-political data; administrative patterns; decision-making structures and processes; attitudes to international regulation; censorship and control assumptions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PLANS AND STRUCTURES</td>
<td>Technological infrastructures; industrialization and technological dependence; electrification; science policies and objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. **TELECOMS AND TRANSPORT**
   Telecommunications infrastructures; telecommunication plans; local and international regulations, norms and standards; organization, management, financing capacity and marketing patterns of telecoms; transport plans and structures; organization, management, financing, capacity, and investment patterns of transport industries.

10. **URBAN AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT**
    Urban and rural development policies; regional policies; agricultural patterns and practices; extension work and structures; community development plans and structures.

11. **DEMOGRAPHIC DATA**
    Population size, growth, attitudes to control; birth and death rates; statistical breakdowns by sex, age, occupation, and social stratification.
In Figure 6, a number of cross-references are shown, not necessarily comprehensive, between the raw data sources and the more ordered, intermediate position of the lower horizontal column. These represent a preliminary analysis. At this stage, they should provide the following:

- A statement of explicit policies now in force (that is, a description of infrastructures and a summary of constitutional or regulatory provisions).

- A review of implicit policies (for example, those apparent from social research or embedded in societal and developmental goals).

- A summary of sectoral policies that impinge upon communication (for example, education, rural development, telecommunications, and the relevant orientations of the commercial sector).

The analysis will also highlight a number of inconsistencies and contradictions. These should also be described in the policy statement, with annotations (for example, how they have arisen, how they may be resolved, how immutable they appear to be), but without prescriptive recommendations.

The outcome should be a clear, relatively short, but statistically supported statement of current conditions and mores.

The fact that this analysis has been pitched at a national level does not materially affect the character of analysis at other levels, only its complexity. At the national level, more data is needed; more coordination is required; more feedback is needed between institutions. At other levels (for example, sectoral), many of the information sources illustrated will not be relevant if policy is problem-oriented. Yet even in these analyses, links with national policy formulation have to be forged, even if this national policy has to be inferred because it has never been properly articulated.

Tasks 3–6 (Evolution of Goals and Targets)

Task 3 represents the first phase of decision making: an examination of the preliminary statement of policy, and its interpretation, including the removal of inconsistency. Even at this stage, there is already room for decisions against particular aspects of policy, once these are recognized to be contradictory. Whatever policy organ is available, it will inevitably have to include means for negotiation and arbitration. Where contradictions occur, their eradication will not benefit all parties uniformly. Subsequently, a revised statement, not yet an agreed strategy but at least free of ambivalence, is returned to the planning agency for revision (that is, for improved wording and amplification). This new statement (corresponding to Task 4) then requires analysis of a somewhat different order than before. Task 5 proceeds to develop such an analysis. The six separate categories indicated in the lower column of Figure 6 now require cross-referencing, comparison, and where possible testing (including on occasions, projections and computer simulation), to see what kind of common picture emerges.
Figure 7 illustrates this process. What it amounts to is a gradual reconcilia-
tion of separate political statements, and their equation with capacities (the ability
of the infrastructure to support the goals) and with constraints (social attitudes and
regulatory conditions). It should end with a clear statement of goals and targets,
which corresponds to Task 6.

In most cases, there will be in existence a coherent statement of overall
development objectives, relatively well amplified and quantified. Similar sectoral
statements (for example, for each ministry or industry) will exist, but these will
rarely have been compared and negotiated. This process of negotiation is illustrated
in block A of Figure 7. The bargaining that it involves (since there are bound to be
contradictions between the various positions) is in the hands of decision makers, but
the willingness to bargain rests upon the ability of planners and researchers to point
out fundamental inconsistencies. Block A in the diagram therefore conforms to an
agreed position after negotiation.

This is modified by other evidence. Social research, or articulated social
pressures, may show popular resistance to some assumptions; and the degree to
which this is, or can be, accommodated will depend upon the political system of the
society concerned and upon its degree of maturity. The new synthesis is in block B.

Regulatory provisions (legislation, subscription to international or regional
codes) may produce a new version, block C. While contradictions may have existed
for some time (for example, in copyright), once they are pinpointed, they have to be
faced and then either accepted or rejected.

The final set of modifications is pragmatic. A particular set of goals implies
certain sustaining structures, technical and organizational (each of which, of course,
also implies a financial base).

If a technical capacity, for electrification or for media production, is inade-
quate, it either has to be improved or the goals have to be correspondingly reduced.
The same is true of organizational capacities. Thus two further versions, blocks D
and E, are produced. Out of this process comes a final version, F, that at least
has the virtue of consistency. It will not be firm, but it provides a reasonable base
upon which other levels of planning can build. It corresponds to the statement of
goals and targets envisaged as Task 6.

Every stage of this process necessitates regular interaction between and
among the researchers (who derive the basic data), the planners (who organize it
and perceive implications), and the decision makers (who face up to these implica-
tions). The process is likely to be delicate and often long-winded; and thus tact
and advocacy are needed.

Tasks 7-9 (Preparation of Policy Summary)

In these tasks, overall policy formulation is completed. In practice, they
may be broken down still farther, but only to accommodate prolonged negotiation:
the outlines remain firm.
SUMMARY OF REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS

STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL/DEVELOPMENT GOALS

ASSESSMENT OF SECTORAL GOALS AND POLICIES

SUMMARY OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND ASPIRATIONS

ASSESSMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

FIGURE 7.
ESTABLISHMENT OF GOALS AND TARGETS
Task 7 provides a modification and endorsement of goals and targets, under the scrutiny of decision makers. Subsequently, Tasks 8 and 9 formalize an agreed summary of policies upon which system planning can be based. They are by no means immutable, but they do constitute a basic platform. The summary should be clear, relatively brief, statistically supported, and quantified where possible.

Of particular importance in Task 9 is the devolution and expansion of policies, in institutional and agency terms. This stepped process (see Figure 5) is elaborated in a later section.

Block two: system planning

Tasks 10-17 (System Design)

Overall objective: To develop strategic and operational plans for the communication system that articulate policies already described.

It will not be necessary to break down the tasks in this block in such detail as before, since they mirror the same processes. But this group of activities is still the crux of the planning process: interpreting policies and devising systems and subsystems for implementation.

Task 10 is technical and devolves upon the planning group. The setting of objectives has already become a specialized function, demanding both logical analysis and experience of systems development. The main character of objectives, if they are well framed, is that they assist not only the planning, but also the implementation and evaluation processes. They lay down criteria that infer specific outcomes and imply particular courses of action, needs, and methodologies. They therefore look forward to evaluation; and this is a further reason why a planning group should contain implementers and evaluators, as well as planners. A slight difference in the emphasis or expression of objectives may make all the difference to their successful attainment.

Objectives are derived from an analysis of needs and goals; and they point the way toward system design. The relationship between goals and objectives, and the process by which greater particularity is achieved, has been extensively discussed in the literature of educational planning and curriculum development and thus it will not be pressed here. In many ways, it is a habit of thinking that translates diffuse notions of "what ought to be done" into precise statements of "what has to be done." This translation is important in order to make clear the implications of loose thinking: to point up, in advance, irrelevant outcomes and to help frame alternative approaches that may be compared, as the basis of strategic planning. But it is also important as a means of introducing members of other disciplines into the planning and implementation process, those who cannot work without better specifications. Economists require figures and variables to quantify and compare; engineers need system outlines; producers require behavioral and curricular information. All of these people will be frustrated and ineffective if they are faced only with general goal statements, advocating little more than the greatest good for the greatest number.
The preparation of objectives is therefore a critical stage. It is not a one-time process. At each stage of planning and implementation, the same precision is necessary; and each set of objectives will subsequently be translated into sub-objectives, for each task, at each level. Practical consideration of its importance (and how satisfactory statements of intent may be arrived at) is given in a later section, focused on a specific, although hypothetical system; and in the same section, problems of integration and coordination will also be discussed.

Once the catalog of objectives is prepared, however, it is proposed that it should be reviewed at once by the decision makers (Task 11) before it is exhaustively quantified. This procedure will avoid redundancy and provide a further opportunity for checking planners’ proposals against other understandings, including the politicians’ grasp of possibility.

Task 12 is one of organization: the objectives, once received, are formalized, and where possible quantitative targets are set.

Task 13 therefore gives a renewed research opportunity for measuring objectives (after quantification) against the sum of policy assumptions and against generalized targets. By now, validation should have proceeded to a point where it is possible to draw up, first, alternative strategic, long-range plans, and then second, short-range operational plans. The presentation of alternatives (Tasks 14 and 15) is crucial: the best way to allow decision-making groups to discover their real positions is to provide them with some choice and to let this focus down their thinking and judgment. They will not, in all probability, prefer a particular alternative but will wish to synthesize permutations of each. They are unlikely to do this in specific terms, but the overall range of their comments should provide enough information to allow the planning group to complete the synthesis. Once this is done, an overall operational plan can be prepared (Task 16) and then further broken down into individual plans that refer to specific sectors and agencies or institutions (that is, expressions of a subsystem, conforming to the overall system design). This process is illustrated in Figure 8. Strategic, and especially operational, plans exist at many levels: the implementation of a system implies a network of agencies and institutions. The conception of the overall strategic plan is one that unifies independent inputs. Conversely, each independent plan must be described in terms of its relationship to the whole that it serves. The nature of operational plans, which will be extensively networked, and the results of detailed logistical and economic analysis, are such that they cannot easily be reviewed by politicians, without more expenditure of time than they are likely to be able to give. This point of reference is therefore omitted from Figure 2 since it is likely to be confusing and counter-productive.

Operational plans may be amenable, on the other hand, to extensive testing by researchers (Task 17), particularly in the form of simulations (not necessarily computer models). These simulations can cover all aspects of planning, from the conceptual to the strictly material (for example, from the projection forward of a particular curriculum approach to the verification of budgets for construction work). The other facet of testing is that of piloting, which properly belongs to the next block called implementation. However, it is in the final stages of planning that evaluators
will be expected to confirm their plans for field tests, hence their inclusion within Task 17.

**Block three: implementation**

Tasks 18–25 (System Development)

**Overall objective:** To pilot and implement the system.

The phase of implementation is the most familiar of all, and in itself can occupy pages of systems drawings. Because it is familiar, and well documented, its main component is summarized in Figure 2 as a single activity: Task 23 (Implement System). What is stressed here, however, is the continued involvement of research and evaluation, into and within the implementation cycle (Tasks 18–22; 24–25). In the majority of cases, given adequate planning time and some (not necessarily substantial) financial resources, components of the communication system can be piloted (Task 18) in limited environments that are more controllable, have better evaluation potential, and are less costly, being prototypes. After evaluation (Tasks 19–20) the overall design can then be modified on the basis of empirical, as well as simulated experience (Task 21).

In the past, evaluation has been traditionally summative: implying that it gives up its data too late to be of practical use. The recent stress upon formative evaluation is in keeping with the whole trend of communication planning, where as many checks as possible are run upon system performance in advance.

A critical task at this stage, therefore, is not only to evaluate prototype versions of the communication system plan, but also to devise an evaluation framework to run parallel to, and feed into, system implementation. Thus, for the first time in the framework, parallel rather than sequential tasks are indicated (Tasks 24 and 25). While the intricate business of implementation is proceeding (Task 23), arrangements for monitoring and for continuous evaluation are being set in motion (Tasks 24 and 25).

By the time of implementation, the separation between different levels of activity has become far sharper than before (as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4). Coordination now presents special problems. At the policy level, while coordination of a number of sectors is important, this can usually be achieved through personal involvement; in later stages, large numbers of agencies and institutions are concerned. By implication, the more separate these levels of activity become, the more critical is the need for horizontal coordination. It is only too easy for activities, once disconnected or having an independent life, to move out of phase, dissociated from the whole. Monitoring arrangements and warning signals are important, not just to continue the evaluation process, but also to keep track of all the system's diverging parts and to assess the significance of component failure. Further discussion of this problem will be found in the section entitled "Deepening the Framework."
Block four: evaluation

Tasks 26-33 (Evaluation and Refurbishing)

Overall objective: To evaluate and refurbish the system on a continuing basis.

With Tasks 26 to 33 we are again faced with two systems running concurrently: the first a continuation of the implementation process; the second, an expansion of the monitoring network. However, considerable interpenetration exists between the two.

A diagrammatic illustration is given in Figure 9. Here, evaluation is represented somewhat externally from the triad of policy-making, planning, and implementation, in order to illustrate its impact on policy and planning at all levels. Evaluation throws up judgments that may cause decision makers to alter their consensus in many different ways, seen in terms of programs (from policy down to administration), of institutional relationships (at the vertical level), or of coordination arrangements (at the horizontal level). Some of these changes may take a long time to effect: major policy changes, for example, may require substantial redefinitions of role and have to await a complete reappraisal of communications policy. Other items may be trivial enough to be included without causing any system disturbance (for example, a change in coordination patterns). Nevertheless, it is important both that change should be accommodated in system design as early as possible and that planning frameworks should be flexible enough to incorporate shifts of emphasis. This has been expressed as a principle of redundancy. It is argued that what may seem to be unnecessary duplications of structure, at a theoretical level, may in practice be quite the reverse, because they allow for the shoring up of weaker links in the system and some reallocation of functions, without major disturbance. It is certainly important in planning, to be consciously aware that not all institutions, or components, will be as strong as they appear in theory; and even in mechanical and electronic systems, fail-safe mechanisms are included. The position is much more complex, and difficult, in human-based systems. Redundancy and flexibility are, in fact, another expression of pragmatism in planning design; and they are entirely in character with the framework that we have been devising.

Most planning is iterative, in a way that linear presentations such as the present framework cannot faithfully record, but the Tasks numbered 26-33 are particularly so: they are intended to review different stages of implementation and to modify the system, especially its component parts, as it develops. Certain defects highlighted will be capable of immediate modification; others will have to await a major new planning phase. Tasks 26-28 deal more with component parts; Task 29 contemplates a major overhaul, which is confirmed (through renewed testing and research) in Task 30. Finally, Tasks 31-33 are interconnecting tasks, allowing for continuous monitoring and reformulation of the system, as it is expanded and as its experiences are assimilated.
FIGURE 9.
EVALUATION RELATIONSHIPS
DEEPENING THE FRAMEWORK

This section has two purposes. First, it extends the discussion of vertical and horizontal planning, already begun in the section entitled "The Framework" and specifically illustrated in Figure 3. Second, building upon this discussion, it attempts to exemplify the practice of communication planning as carried through a number of institutional levels by elaborating upon a single hypothetical planning strand (in other words, by overlaying Figure 2 upon Figure 3).

Horizontal Planning

The problem of coordination (horizontal planning) is perhaps the easier problem to analyze. Figures 3 and 4 showed how, at lower levels of planning and implementation, the number of agencies involved may be such that the main thrust of an overall policy can be easily neglected or forgotten. Coordination difficulties arise from two causes: 1) a lack of identification and value sharing among those involved as to the significance or priority of the overall task; and 2) a lack of information and communication exchanged between them. Both of these difficulties can recur throughout the entire system, extending from policy formulation through to implementation.

A study by an East-West Communication Institute research associate, John Middleton, of coordination arrangements within an American instructional television consortium, has been helpful to this author in identifying some basic principles that can improve this situation (Rahim and Middleton, eds., 1977, pp. 273-303). His study is particularly valuable in that it concerns a consortium bound by common production and utilization arrangements. It is not that lesser kind of coordination that seeks only to avoid duplication of efforts, while retaining institutional sovereignty. In communication planning for development, we are also envisaging a coherent system, in which an organic and functional relationship exists between component parts, not a loose association. We are in many cases talking of integration, rather than coordination, though admittedly a fine line separates the two (and the term "integration" can have an inhibiting effect upon institutions that are willing enough to connect their work through a common program but nonetheless prize their individual character and identity). These provisos apart, we shall still use the term "integration" to distinguish those forms of coordination that demand subordination to common tasks, rather than merely a regular correspondence.

Middleton offers a number of preliminary hypotheses on the principles underlying successful coordination, but they seem to amount, in summary, to the following:

- That coordination is most successful when common goals, criteria, philosophies, patterns of needs determination, problem perceptions and corporately evaluated patterns of experience exist among the agencies involved.

- That when it comes to the specifics of production, centralized control will lead to better products.

- Ergo, that overall, a sensitive balance has to be struck between participation and control in planning.
The argument is that certain activities (for example, production) demand centralization of control and that an acceptance of such centralized arrangements will be readier if other determinant processes (of policy formulation, prior to production, and of evaluation, post-production) have been based upon fully participant formulae.

Although these principles were deduced in a context of media production, they seem to have some relevance to overall communication planning for development (which is also a task and product-oriented process, even though its tasks and products are far more numerous; and the agencies involved, much more diffuse). They are represented, in their own way, in Figure 10, where "integration" and "coordination" are distinguished in respect of the main strands of planning and implementation, as these appeared in Figure 2. Integration is most needed at the fundamental stages of policy and planning, while implementation depends upon coordinated arrangements between separate production agencies. In other words, the planning stages demand a pooling and synthesis of ideas, designed to lead to a coherent understanding of what the communication system is to achieve; and implementation necessarily breaks down into separate but related groupings. Evaluation, on the other hand, is designed to bring together disparate experiences, so that policy and planning can be uniformly reinterpreted.

We should relate Figure 10, however, to the two causes of dysfunction that, it is suggested, may vitiate coordination arrangements: a lack of identification or a lack of information and communication, since these, in their way, reflect the same pattern. Identification demands a common goal structure, a shared perception of priorities in the communication planning task. It can only come from a deep and sustained interaction between parties. This need is most critical in the policy formulation stage, at senior planning levels, because if it does not occur here, nothing else can follow. Yet if a mirror of the same understanding is not found at other levels, the implementation stage will not succeed, because it will reflect the work of separate agencies, each working to differentiated patterns and most probably in mutual competition. "Identification" therefore correlates with "integration."

"Information and communication" needs are less value-oriented. They ask for a sufficient sharing of information to allow parts of the overall system to function both independently and in unison. This activity is more in keeping with older, traditional concepts of coordination.

The resolution of both these needs requires management and administrative frameworks, but of somewhat different kinds. The deeper sense of "integration" assumes sustained, task-force structures, where goal sharing comes about through regular contact, personal intimacy, shared experience. It assumes the same kind of profile that can emerge in a communication planning team, composed of many different disciplines, or in a commission or working party at an interagency or inter-ministerial level, which draws its membership from senior executives, professionals, academics, nominated ad personem. This structure is actually much easier to visualize at senior policy levels, where agencies are fewer and the appropriate membership is simpler to identify, once the first hurdle of promoting the structure has been overcome. At other levels (for example, among supporting institutions), added difficulties will be caused by distance, by an inability to perceive common loci of interest, and by pressures of operational work.
FIGURE 10.
COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION
The more traditional function of "coordination" is often already served by committee and data exchange frameworks, although in practice these do not always operate as regularly or effectively as might be wished. Securing information, after all, is primarily a matter of: (1) the desire for access and (2) the framework for access. If the desire can be instilled, the frameworks can be found. (We must assume, in this argument, that the information is available somewhere or can be found.)

It is not a part of this paper to be prescriptive about institutional forms, although in general it is assumed that a task force structure, on the one hand, and a committee structure, on the other, will be adopted. Nevertheless, one additional need has to be met; and this must be pressed here. It is one of cohesion. The cohesive need is to forge links between the two continuums of integration and coordination. Stated more directly, it means imposing the sense of an overall policy and overall plan upon all parts of the system, thus bringing together what will otherwise be seen as discrete exercises, particularly when the stage of implementation is reached. Communication planning, as we have seen, is a matter of reconciling the whole of a communication system with, on the one hand, its component (and individually active) parts and, on the other hand, the social system that it serves. It may be argued that, at least at the time of policy formulation, this functional relationship will be expressed, if the framework that we have proposed in Figure 2 is followed through. But it certainly cannot be anticipated that this systemic perception will be maintained through the whole sequence of implementation, with its inevitable (and necessary) decentralization of energies.

Therefore, it does seem that throughout the communication planning process, there should be some common strand of planning and executive responsibility that can penetrate the entire framework and can devote itself to drawing together loose ends, as well as to promoting a consciousness of the overall design. This may be undertaken by a small, professional communication planning unit, possibly set within a central economic planning board (although this is proposed to illustrate the character of the unit, not to dictate its form). It should also be extended to regional levels, where local members can apply basic principles to the practical business of decentralization. The unit would, patently, be directly involved at senior levels with the planning process itself. It would most probably initiate and synthesize the process, drawing in additional members to its professional nucleus, so orchestrating the sequence of Figure 2. But it would have other responsibilities. It would act as a source of feedback (of information and of opinion) from regional and local to upper levels. It would act as a means of dissemination and promotion—of overall plans and priorities as these emerge and of the rationale on which they are based. It would seek to bring together, catalytically, institutions and agencies with relevant roles in the planning and implementation process. It would try to identify opposite numbers in these agencies (if they were not specifically appointed to coordination functions) and to build its work upon a personal network. All of this activity would run like a core cable through the intricate network embodied in Figures 2, 3, and 4.

The means by which these tasks can be completed are diverse and finally depend upon the creative energies of the people involved. There are many constraints to be acknowledged and overcome; and these are considered—especially the promotional need—in the section entitled "Constraints Upon Communication Planning."
should be remembered, however, that all these problems are not confined to the communication sector; and there is a relevant literature of experience to be explored in management and industrial psychology. We have written of planning by objectives and of the need both to make explicit the perceived outcomes of what we are doing and to seek to have these outcomes accepted. The barriers likely to be encountered in this process were summarized, in an industrial context, a number of years ago by Peter Drucker, in his 1961 classic *The Practice of Management*.

Management by objectives requires major efforts and special instruments. For in the business enterprises, managers are not automatically directed towards a common goal. On the contrary, business, by its very nature, contains three powerful factors of misdirection: in the specialised work of most managers; in the hierarchical structure of management; and in the differences of vision and work, and the resultant insulation, of various levels of management.

For "business," read communication; along with "manager," include decision maker; and the point is made.

**Vertical Planning**

In what has been written thus far, the question of vertical planning has already been raised, in considering levels of authority. But there has been, in this discussion, an implicit acceptance that hierarchical forms of organization are inevitable and that planning structures will follow the same pyramidal model.

Our problem is to overcome the *a priori* assumption of verticality and to introduce greater opportunities for participation. This is not only a fashionable idea, but also it has important practical implications. Arguably, if it is not met, many of the principles defined in discussing coordination and integration will have little real chance of being practiced. Goal sharing and the common perception of problems demand participation in the early stages of policy formulation.

Access and participation are not new phrases (in the industrialized world, at least); but they have tended to attach themselves to particular spheres. In communication, they have mostly been associated with program and materials production and distribution: through forms of community media, cable television, and so on. The difficulty of penetrating mass media structures has been mostly side-stepped by concentrating upon micro forms, where the dominance of mass agencies and multinational interests is either unimportant or can be overcome. As a practical approach, this was no doubt the best way to proceed; but it leaves us in some difficulty in considering participant planning, especially at national levels.

What we have seen of participatory planning is both limited and of a particular kind. In the industrialized world, we have tended to stress participation in political activity (at least, in democratic societies) and to leave planning somewhat aside, as a technical prerogative of professional cadres. The inference has been that greater political participation will necessarily lead to planning based upon different, more liberal parameters. The same is true of industrial organization, where worker
participation has been construed in terms of access to decision-making bodies that will act upon the technical advice of planners, rather than direct involvement in the planning process. In this assumption, there seems to be at least some danger of control through mystification by planners.

The position (in the industrialized world) with respect to private mass communication enterprises is even worse. Traditionally, consumer interests have been reflected only in the demand analyses of market research; and the pressures of organized consumer groups have been mostly concentrated either upon messages (for example, advertising or environmental issues) or the manipulative tendencies of large business concerns (for example, the external activities of multinational corporations). Apart from the concerns of minority groups, such as those involved in public broadcasting campaigns, there has been little impetus toward a comprehensive overview of communication planning as a prerequisite to other specific kinds of reform.

In the developing world, the position has been rather different, although the same traditions of verticality have been stringently maintained, usually with more autocracy than in the West. Where notions of participation exist, they mostly do so in the sense of feedback, attached to extension work and to delivery-centered development programs. Every rural development or family planning communication model has its feedback component, by which is meant the return of opinion and reaction from the village to the production center, so that program success can be evaluated and so that elements of phasing, pace, motivation, face-to-face working, and so on can be continuously adjusted. The model is itself direct and persuasive; and the feedback occurs within that persuasive context. Often, the feedback system is very complex, involving a careful coordination of the activities of fieldworkers with the generation of communication messages.

This paper is not about the industrialized world; and it would be foolhardy to prophesy how patterns of participant planning (as opposed to political participation, consumer and worker participation, and participant programming) may develop. In the Third World, however, the kinds of structure that have been created, often sectorally, for extension work do appear to carry within them a basic potential for greater participation in communication (and development) planning, if these are finally consistent with the aspirations of their societies. There are, in many cases, local mechanisms—for discussion, for administration, for social organization, for decision making—that could be expanded to include both the upward movement of ideas and representative participation in planning activities. There would certainly have to be far more cohesion in the way development work operates; extension activities tend to be sectoral in approach and to reflect elements of interagency rivalry. There would have to be much greater flexibility in the upward transmission of information and conviction and in the downward transition of policy thinking (a flexibility of movement that the communication planning cadre mentioned earlier could do much to promote). But there has to be, initially, the will. There are many pleas for mobilization; but many of them are also demagogic.

In the multistep, reciprocal process envisaged here, some principles of construction would be important. There would have, first of all, to be a good deal of latitude and flexibility in arrangements. When we descend to regional levels, theoretical
models of organization are unlikely to work, since they must deal with residual factors of local culture, social organization, special interests, status, and the local innovation threshold. Moreover, a highly decentralized structure would be necessary, giving maximum identity to each level of the chain, including the ability to be accountable for its own affairs. Participation will only be valued if it contains responsibilities as well as rights. In the vertical framework, too, some elements of redundancy need to be incorporated, as remarked in an earlier section of this paper, facing up to the facts that some agencies will remain weak and that it is often easier to bring about radical change in the whole by restructuring component parts than by redesigning the basic system.

A Sample Case

Can we now attempt to bring together some of the earlier commentaries within a hypothetical example? We have argued that communication planning and implementation reflect an overlay of Figure 3 upon Figure 2, with the basic planning framework being continued and deepened at both vertical and horizontal levels. In this process, a number of threads take their separate paths, interconnected throughout, however, by the assumptions and goals of the overall design. We have presupposed a continuing interaction between functions (of planning, research, and decision making), between agencies and institutions, and between processes (that is, the phase planning and implementation sequence of Figure 2).

We shall now look briefly at one strand, as illustrated by the continuum of a single problem. In so doing, we must remember that this is only one strand to be associated with, and often contingent upon, many others. The practice of communication planning is a much more sophisticated affair, of which this is only a sketch and analogue. Nonetheless, even if we cannot trace all the microcircuitry without the benefit of mathematical and computer models, we can at least indicate the kinds of concern that the full process must have.

We shall take as our problem area the sphere of rural development; and we shall assume a country with a predominantly rural population. With a traditionally heavy dependence upon agriculture, this country, with a population of some ten million, is in the medium-term stages of development and already has a substantial investment in light and secondary manufacturing industries. Its own energy resources are few, apart from an early harnessing of hydroelectric power; and the emphasis to date has been upon assembly plant industries, using imported components. Technical assistance plays a major role in development. There are five major population centers, among which only the capital has a population in excess of one million. But the urban drift is considerable; and each year, the city population increases by an average of ten percent.

Urban migration has, therefore, already become marked and problematic. Labor is disappearing from the fields, and morale is not high in the agricultural sector. Technological spread in the meantime is principally confined to the urban areas—although 80 percent of the population still remain in the countryside. The agricultural base is being depleted, in spite of an insistence upon agricultural innovation within the national development plan, where rural development occupies the most
prominent position. Television is confined to the cities. Electrification covers only 60 percent of the country (and only 40 percent of the rural areas). The literacy rate overall is 60 percent, but in the rural areas it still stands at only 25 percent. The availability of secondary education is four times greater in the cities. Urban per capita income is three times greater, although its buying power is reduced by at least 50 percent.

This is only a brief cameo, and it does not pretend to be complete. But as a sketch, it is not uncommon in the developing world and one that is often given a different interpretation by those who experience it, as opposed to that of the economist. Urban inflation is overlooked by potential migrants who might be realistically better off in a rural economy closer to subsistence farming. Traditionally, education has been viewed as the highroad to social improvement; and this attitude persists, even though the relationship of higher education to employment opportunity is no longer consistent (except in some specific vocational categories). All of this is familiar territory; and it is made explicit in the discussions of the economic planning board that frames development programs. The same realization is not, however, reflected in every sector, such as educational policy (with an emphasis on secondary education, rather than extending primary or nonformal levels), telecommunications policy (with an emphasis upon commercial needs), and science and technology plans (with an emphasis upon improving the industrial base, irrespective of social parameters).

The communication planner is in a difficult position in such circumstances. Because a planner is forced to take account of a number of fields and of differentiated policies, many inconsistencies of approach are likely to be noticed. The planner will not necessarily be welcomed for externalizing these contradictions; and will certainly not be accepted as a supreme catalyst for development programs. The planner therefore must work, with some sensitivity, through the maze of sectoral approaches and to try to synthesize their aims without opening up too many hostilities. Fortunately, the current national development plan lays primary emphasis upon rural development and maintenance; and these are reflected in a number of goals. One is to stop the drift to the cities. Another is to create, if at all possible, a reverse trend: a return to the countryside. A third is to improve agricultural practice. A fourth is to improve the range and quality of educational opportunity in the villages. A fifth is to reinforce long-standing patterns of village organization, to maintain the integrity of rural social structures.

The statement of communication policy necessarily reflects these goals that may be characterized more precisely, for the benefit of the planner, as "the reduction, wherever possible, of existing inequalities between urban and rural populations." Such an objective has some very precise communication implications. It infers, for example, the use of communication as a support to educational and development programs, especially where the infrastructures required to sustain these programs do not presently exist. It implies both a reduction of emphasis upon purely urban-based communications media, such as television, and an expansion of more universal media, such as radio or the telephone system (the former as a mass medium, accessible to the transistorized villager; the latter as a more specialized communications vehicle, which can help consolidate a decentralized extension network). It also implies the use of urban-based communications media to promote a message of return to the country-
side, which highlights the disadvantages of urban life. If we pause for a moment to return to Figure 2, we shall see that we have already glossed over, in general terms, some of the processes described in Tasks 1-10 of this framework. The analysis of existing policies has revealed some basic inconsistencies between overall development goals and their sectoral representations. It has restated the rural development priority by a summary objective that carries within it a number of implications for communication policy.

Each of these implications also suggests particular communication approaches. The supportive use of media, for example, may infer the development of radio-based functional literacy programs, the training of local monitors to operate with media support, and/or the spread of correspondence-based education. A technical emphasis upon communication systems with a rural bias may infer either the expansion of, say, the radio network, and a corresponding de-emphasis of the television network or the combination and consolidation of joint radio and telephone networks. The objective of combating urban drift implies the creation and distribution of special materials, addressed to urban audiences of television and radio, with a specific persuasive intent.

These inferences can be embodied within other, subsidiary objectives: "to reduce urban drift," "to provide educational opportunities for those presently without them," "to extend telecommunications to the rural sector." Each subobjective can and should be properly specified and quantified: to envisage numbers, percentages, and timescales (see Task 10). Their assessment, however, as mirrored in Task 11 of Figure 2, will not be entirely logical. While it may be rational, for example, not to press further with the consolidation of a television network because it demonstrably serves commercial and elitist groups, this logic is unlikely to be approved; there are too many interests at stake. The best that can be hoped for is some kind of preservation of the status quo. Here, the planner, researcher, and decision maker are inextricably involved in negotiation (which is unlikely to produce perfect compromises but may at least avoid counter-productivity). The results of negotiation are seen in Tasks 12 and 13. The process ends with the preparation of specific alternative plans for consideration by decision makers. In this example, however, we shall continue to narrow down options and follow through only a single thread. Task 14 is composed of the presentation, to decision makers, of alternative strategies; and here we shall focus upon one subobjective within rural development—that of improving educational opportunity. Several communication strategies are open, in association with educational authorities. One of these might be the development of the radio network, and its association with existing educational infrastructures, in order to create temporary ad hoc frameworks for instruction, especially for literacy, nonformal, and vocational education. This alternative would require a sophisticated pattern of integration between communications media and educational and development structures. If a network of trained monitors were to be created, who would train these monitors? Where would they meet? How would students be solicited? What materials would be used? How would these materials be produced?

A second alternative might be in the development of correspondence-based education. Here again, there are both conceptual and logistical implications to consider. Who would write the correspondence materials? Is the literacy rate high
enough to sustain this approach? How would materials be distributed? Are the postal services adequate?

A third alternative might involve the formation of a pool of mobile, touring units, visiting the villages, working with students on a peripatetic basis, endeavoring to maintain a face-to-face tutorial method.

Each of these approaches can be quantified—in terms both of gross and of unit cost—so that there is a base for cost comparison between them. (As usually happens in such cases, there is not really a basis for cost benefit analysis, since the whole strategy is designed to supply what would normally be unavailable. The only real basis of comparison would be to envisage the provision of full, tutorial facilities throughout the country, in a very short space of time; and if this were possible, it would presumably have been contemplated already.)

These alternative plans can now be presented, with appropriate commentaries, to those who will decide upon the correct strategy (Task 15). At this point, financial and economic arguments may be inspected with closer attention than occurred in some earlier political debates. Some strategies will quite probably be discarded immediately, on purely financial grounds: countrywide telecommunications expansion, for example. The habit of considering unit costs is not so engrained that it can overcome the reactions of decision makers when facing astronomical gross costs.

Whatever the nature of the alternative strategies proposed, the likelihood is that decision makers will not select any particular approach, but combine components of each. Thus, an expanded radio framework may be supported, in certain cases, by correspondence work or with some mobile tutorial teams. Undoubtedly, the planning team could have come up with such a synthesis in the first place, but this is not its intention. Decision makers have to be given a basis for making judgments; and the best way of achieving consensus is to involve them in some part of the problem under review. They will, in such cases, be participating actively in a planning process that would otherwise be conducted quite externally and with whose results they could not be assumed to identify.

From this point onward (Task 16 and following), the outlines are more familiar. The main strategic plan is broken down into operational plans—affecting technical matters (the extension of the transmitter network), construction (what additional facilities have to be built), organization (patterns of administration and supervision), finance, personnel (who is needed, how they are to be trained), coordination (how many agencies are to be involved, in what ways), curriculum (what materials are required, for what purposes; how are they to be prepared), and phasing (what is to be done first, second, etc.). The elements of an operational plan are well known, although for reference a summary is included on the following page. They do not depart materially from other kinds of planning conducted in the past. The difference is the conceptual base by which the guiding parameters for their construction have been reached and agreed upon. The kind of consensus that all the processes described so far have visualized is, admittedly, imperfect. It traces a route between influences that might otherwise destroy most traces of rationality in the process. But it is the preliminary stages—of negotiating strategic outlines—that are most important if implementation
COMPONENTS OF OPERATIONAL PLANS

1. OBJECTIVES (long-range and short-term objectives, categorized into main and subsidiary groups, with quantification, phasing, and time scales attached).

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION (an overall review and summary of the project and of its anticipated outcomes).

3. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION (a rationale for the project and its means of policy determination, including quantifiable and statistical determinants, and cost comparison, benefit and efficiency analyses).

4. ORGANIZATION (organizational infrastructures, existing and projected, and institutional framework for implementation).

5. TECHNICAL COMPONENTS (including designs at macro-level).

6. CONSTRUCTION COMPONENTS (including designs at macro-level).

7. STAFFING AND PERSONNEL COMPONENTS (including selection and training needs).

8. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING (including budgetary cycles, loan arrangements, materials costs, and salary structures).

9. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND NETWORKS (on both time and systemic frames, using programing and networking techniques).

10. ARRANGEMENTS FOR COORDINATION AND RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER PROJECTS (using networked as well as descriptive formats).

11. STATISTICAL ANALYSES AND SUMMARIES (including: 1) basic data upon which the plan is based; 2) statistical and comparative projections of outcomes; 3) illustrative data—for example, salary scales, sample construction costs; 4) relevant data on regulatory needs (for example, telecommunications); and 5) agencies and institutions involved in plan formulation.

of specific communication projects is to be based on anything other than prejudice or inertia.

Thereafter, the system develops its own momentum. The systematic reduction of functions to a phased sequence gradually produces a production, utilization, and evaluation framework about which much has been written elsewhere (including works by the present author). Research and information, as well as utilization and training needs, are fitted into this framework as the system develops, balanced to maintain its flexibility. A pattern of decentralization gradually comes into being, as regional mechanisms are created to operationalize the whole framework.
In summary, what does this brief hypothetical account have to say about communication planning? That it is intricate, certainly: it has to accommodate, and do its best to amalgamate, a large number of separate initiatives. It also depends upon pragmatism, particularly in its reconciliation of competing interests, and it relies upon active integration and coordination to assure the integrity of the whole.

Most of all, however, it shows that there is little that is new in the conception of communication planning, except at the original levels of policy formulation and strategic planning. We have always had plans; and the standards of networking that have been evolved for most commercial or national enterprises can be applied, equally, to the implementation of communication projects. But if the basis upon which these projects are constructed is not equitable, rational, informed, representative, and sensitive to real development priorities, we shall be faced once more with a miscellany of communication schemes serving random ends, with little understanding of their interrelationship.

CONSTRAINTS UPON COMMUNICATION PLANNING

The discussion so far—even though it has tried to incorporate realism and depth into its framework—has still been basically theoretical; and the record should be balanced by some account of planning constraints. What follows is derived from practical planning experiences, mostly those of the author in planning teams in Asian countries. Its conclusions have been compared, in a preliminary fashion, with other case studies of planning; and some synthesis has been made, but evidently far more remains to be done. The constraints described are all planning constraints; in other words, they relate to the central continuum in Figure 2. They persist, in general, throughout the planning process, from policy formulation to evaluation and back. But they are at their most marked in the earlier stages of policy and planning design; and it is to these areas that most attention will be paid.

In general, constraints experienced by planners for communication systems are of two kinds. One set is related to the status of the communication discipline itself: the value that is placed upon it by politicians and decision makers, the attention that it receives from other planners, and the contradictory positions and assessments that sometimes result. The second set is more methodological, affecting planning tools and the planning process.

Many of the constraints described will, inevitably, be summaries, from a different viewpoint, of situations already considered in earlier contexts. The intention is to group them together. The externalization of a constraint should also lead to some proposals on how to overcome, or reduce, inhibition, which will often demand some kind of modification in the positions of decision makers and researchers. That is the second purpose of this section.

1. Status Constraints

The main difficulties for the communication planner associated with the status of the discipline are those of time, resources, access, participation, and conflicts.
of criteria. They are listed in order of difficulty, both of understanding and of solution.

Time is not, of course, a problem confined to the communication planner. In many cases, planning is only stimulated by a perception of crisis. At such points, it is often too late to begin the genuinely comprehensive kind of planning that is really demanded. Time is needed for so many things—for the identification and collection of data and for its assimilation, analysis, and restructuring into appropriate formats for decision making. Time is needed for planning tools to be adapted to particular functions and for planning teams to come to know one another and settle their hierarchical anxieties. Time is needed for the results of analysis, once known, to be understood and agreed upon, first by the committed and initiated and then to be diffused to other levels of responsibility and interest.

Resources present a comparable problem. This is not only of a material kind, although planning obviously needs its fair share of finance, administrative and technical support, and so on. But there are also qualitative needs. If, under a technical assistance arrangement, a planning team is to work with counterpart officers, it is important that these officers should themselves be the best available, be informed, and be accessible full-time. It is the quality of the planning team that is likely to have the most impact upon final outcomes, even more so than the thoroughness of the system design. Particular kinds of vision are required of communication planners, which allow them to see beyond the narrow confines of a foundation discipline. This kind of trained empathy is not easily discovered.

Access (to both people and information) is a problem of a somewhat different order. It has its impact mostly in decision making, but similar constraints apply to research. It is necessary to be able, from the outset, to identify the correct levels and competency of decision making and to be able to gain access to them, not regularly, but at predetermined or at critical times. It is also important to be able to gain wide and prompt access to information, some of which may be restricted or need special processing or special means of collection.

Participation is a natural offshoot of the access requirement. We have seen, throughout this paper, that each step in the sequence assumes both full involvement by all those engaged in the planning process and a sharing of goals and priorities. The emergence of policies and plans comes from a gradual process of attrition and compromise. This participation is needed at a number of levels: among the planning team, among related agencies, and among the cadres of researchers, planners, and decision makers.

If these preconditions are not met, then a conflict of criteria will result. This is a more complex constraint to pinpoint, but it reflects differing—and contradictory—judgments made in various circumstances. Emphasis may be placed by decision makers upon the importance of policies and planning in certain situations (especially public situations, such as meetings or conferences). But thereafter, decisions may be made arbitrarily, responding to immediate political pressures. In other words, faced with conflicting pressures, the decision maker opts for the choice that, intuitively, he feels has the higher priority and the most immediate reward. Such conflicts are easiest to illustrate in political terms, but they are not exclusively so. When
there is no real fusion of interest and understanding mutually inconsistent value frames are likely to coexist; and any number of factors can destroy the integrity of the planning process—the overriding interest of a researcher in a research design the commitment of a planner to a particular methodology that he has made his own, the interests of a particular sector or institution.

Of course, such conflicts can be partly attributed to an incomplete analysis of the original situation. This paper has stressed often enough that an evaluation of political and personal influences, of the nature of the coordination and integration problem, and of interinstitutional dynamics is a basic part of the planning function. Situations have generally to be adjusted to, not fought.

Yet the problem is exacerbated by the contradictory values placed upon communication itself, vis-à-vis other fields and interests with which it must deal. A lack of time, resources, access, and opportunity often reflect, in some part, a sense that the communication planning activity is inferior as compared with other kinds of activity.

What can be done to mitigate these constraints, taken together?

Realism and rationality will obviously do much: realism in ascertaining the true status of the communication planner, and rationality in planning to circumvent engrained positions and unfavorable climates. A clear design, which acknowledges such difficulties in advance and which identifies and tries to evade them, will at least avoid confrontation.

Realism of another kind will also assist: in acknowledging the limits placed on resources and pitching activities accordingly, without trying to achieve the impossible. All too often, we have moved into new fields by making extravagant claims, as we can illustrate from the field of educational mass media.

Some of the earlier uses of mass media came about as a result of very rash promotion, claiming that mass communications could treat any problem under the sun, from shortages of schools and teachers to mass illiteracy. Possibly they might: the point has never been adequately investigated, because unfortunately, while the potential of mass media was publicized in exotic terms, far less was said about the system costs involved. Correspondingly, a kind of double-think began, often constructed around the phenomenon of the "pilot project." Because governments were unwilling to commit large resources to the creation of educational mass media systems and because technical assistance programs could not (or would not) cope with the volume of investment required to introduce or renovate a total mass media structure, we promoted action on a limited and experimental scale, arguing that once the pilots had proven themselves, they could be expanded. What we did not admit is that the pilot project can only prove itself within its own limited environment: lacking a massive appeal, it will not yield, even in microcosm, massive results. The majority of pilot schemes introduced in the sixties were of short duration (and this applied to industrialized as well as to developing countries). Lacking economies of scale, they could not maintain themselves. Lacking comprehensiveness, they did not furnish convincing evidence about large-scale futures. The same position could be true of communication planning.
This principle, which we can call "optimization," also implies that we should take a hard look at our resource base, to see if some possibilities are not overlooked. Most planning groups have a tendency to base inquiries exclusively upon their own work and to ignore contributions made by other groups and institutions, not always in identical fields. This situation calls for a deliberate act of enlargement of our own personal net of contacts, experience, and association. In such a broad field as communication, particularly when it is focused upon development processes, it is most unlikely that, without soliciting the help of others to survey unfamiliar fields, we can be sure that we have covered the range of available resources.

There are also some more positive lines to take. However unattractive the idea of "promotion" may be to the academic researcher, definite promotional needs for communication planning exist at all levels and stages of the planning and implementation process. If the image of communication is to be improved and its status enhanced, there are educational and orientation tasks to perform, which can be helped, at least, through special seminars for decision makers, production of special materials, and distribution of briefing aids. The assimilation of research results or of draft plans will be much enhanced by the preparation of special versions of these documents, edited with their ultimate audiences in mind and geared to a precise definition of expected outcomes.

The communication planner cannot expect the uninitiated to follow the intricacies of a network design, which is in any case intended as a tool for the informed not as a guide for the external world. Decision makers will not need to follow through all the detailed steps by which conclusions were reached, but will (if they trust their interpreters) content themselves with summaries that are argued fairly.

The need for explanation and education also goes further, into the implementation cycle. As we have seen, studies of coordination arrangements in media institutions suggest that successful coordination depends upon the extent to which problems have been corporately analyzed and goals mutually agreed upon.

Communication workshops that are addressed carefully to different levels of responsibility (from decision makers down to fieldworkers) can help overcome, in advance, traditional resistances that are usually based upon a sense of threat or prejudice or detachment. If they are based on problem solving, they will fare even better.

These research areas are all necessary; and there is ample room for experiment both in the strategies of education and promotion and in the appropriate methods of carrying them out.

2. Methodological Constraints

The second set of constraints has a more specific, methodological base. Here, planning problems are those of organization and structure: they are constraints of diffuseness, inflexibility, and dysfunction. Their correction demands far more in the way of communication planning experience than we have at the present time; but at least, in such cases, the remedial possibilities can be clearly foreseen.
Problems of diffuseness and inflexibility arise, basically, from defects in the original planning design, from inadequate preliminary task analysis, and from overly rigid or incomplete phasing. A major difficulty is that planning designs take too much account of the mechanistic sequence of events to be performed and too little of the psychological or political processes.

Task analysis and phasing are both more commonly associated with systems analysis, as planning tools and controls. Certainly, a systems approach serves to make objectives clearer, outcomes more specific, and the sequence of events both realistic and comprehensive. What it does not account for as adequately is the human environment.

Task analysis should, in practice, go beyond whatever can be rationally studied, derived from secondary research, or quantified. The latter are, of course, necessary and will certainly be demanded by those who evaluate and approve the results of planning. But there are other possibilities, which include as a first step:

- An evaluation is made of the structures and organizations involved in decision making and implementation; and an assessment is made of how they work, how they interact, and how they rank and regard one another.
- An analysis is done of the processes by which decisions are arrived at, at various levels within different sectors.
- There is some means of evaluating the degree of acceptance of planning as it proceeds—that is, planning sensitivity (as a prerequisite of flexibility).

Subsequently, the second step is to ensure that the results of these inquiries are incorporated into phasing, so that:

- Enough time is allowed for decision-making processes to operate.
- Enough latitude, in the way of "breath pauses," is included to make departures from schedule interfere as little as possible with the planning sequence.
- Enough flexibility is included in the design itself to accommodate the unexpected.

The demands of this kind of research go well beyond systems disciplines; and the help of psychologists and sociologists is needed (especially from industrial and management spheres).

It is only through such flexibility that planning and pragmatism can be effectively combined. The planning incentive is to make decision-making processes comprehensive, thorough, representative, reciprocal, synthetic. Without pragmatism, it will no doubt produce a consistent set of plans; but it will not achieve implementation.
From its inception, the planning design should be sensitive enough to face up to all known constraints, including personal, group, and hierarchical considerations. At the same time, it should be able to trace where its assumptions have been wrong and still be in a position to continue. A planning structure in which there is only one critical path is bound to fail; and as few activities as possible in the general framework should become, or be made, contingent to success.

Dysfunction, in this particular context, refers mostly to uncoordinated activities among members of the planning team. In communication planning surveys, we have paid relatively little attention to questions such as team selection, group dynamics, the emergence of consensus.

An analysis made by the author, of a survey on the future of educational mass media in Thailand, came up with a number of conclusions about the nature of team working in the context of communication planning (based, in fact, on a study conducted under technical assistance arrangements, although most of the conclusions were far more generalizable). They included the following principles:

- That in the selection of a team for communication planning, the ability to work corporately, to respond flexibly to arguments advanced to other team members, and to abide by corporate team decisions are quite as important as specialist experience.

- That adaptability to the unknown and an ability to work beyond a narrow professional discipline, focusing academic and professional experience practically on new environments and unfamiliar problems, are of equal importance.

- That the roles of team members have to be established very early in the planning process and patterns of work be established that assist role identification and confidence, without prejudicing conclusions and outcomes.

- That the overall composition of a planning team, its spread of personalities and experiences, has a significance beyond individual membership, because the team is itself a problem-solving entity.

- That more research is needed into communication planning teamwork, group dynamics, the time that team members need to adapt to one another or to a problem, the extent to which direction is needed, the ways in which interaction with participating agencies is conducted, and the planning environment. (Hancock in Rahim and Middleton [eds.], 1977, pp. 337-363)

These may seem truisms, especially to those who have been engaged in planning exercises in fields other than communication; but they are not generally put into practice.
POSTSCRIPT: THE NEXT PHASE

The framework described in this paper is a primitive attempt to lay some foundations for the organization and conduct of communication planning in the context of national development. It is open to correction through both theoretical analysis and practical experience; and the removal of inconsistency, and possibly the reformation of the framework, is clearly the next phase to be undertaken. Group analysis, from the point of view of a number of disciplines and professions, would afford the best approach.

There are other needs, however, which have to be met over the longer term.

The first is to face up to the specific limitations ascribed to the planning framework in the section entitled "The Framework" of this paper: its lack of depth and its inability to cope with vertical and horizontal planning at the present time. In the same bracket comes the need to investigate participant planning and management processes and to see how these can be realistically incorporated into planning strategies. In developing both descriptive and prescriptive commentaries of this kind, the assistance of computer models and simulations will be necessary.

A second need is for the extension of experiences of communication planning in team settings, as well as for their monitoring and evaluation. In such cases, the framework proposed in this paper may serve as a basis for rational design; and if this is done, at least some kind of comparability will have been secured.

A third need is for the development and application of relevant planning tools. A great deal is now being written about communication indicators that express more, in their assessment of human needs and social priorities, than the economics of cost benefit and efficiency. At present, more is being written about the need than is being done to devise such tools, in such a way that they are acceptable to agencies that determine resource allocation. The indicators of communication development that have been used in the past (for example, by Unesco) will not do, based as they are upon per capita distribution of radios, televisions, newspapers, transmitters, etc. Equally, purely economic indicators are insufficient, if we accept that human gain is not measured only in economic terms. But the development of improved indicators demands the active participation of economists, not only because these indicators will need some means of quantification but also because economists are in the best position to convince other economists (who dominate the planning cells of governments).

The fourth need--and a later one--is for the synthesis of what has gone before in accessible documentation. There is room, as Wilbur Schramm remarked in the East-West Communication Institute's international conference on "Communication Policy and Planning for Development," for a central text in the field, in the tradition of his Mass Media and National Development. The next text will have some very acute audiences to win over and will need to be grounded in economic and systems theory, as well as in sociology and communication research.

The major problems will be to pull all this experience together, given the present exponential trend of information and technological development, and to achieve
sufficient consensus among ourselves in order for the outside world to believe that there is any real base for agreement--and hence any common platform for action. We would do well to remember that if the concept of communication planning is a novelty even to communicators, to those outside the communication field--including political leaders and decision makers--it is probably either unknown or insignificant.

