CREATING URBAN VIABILITY AND VITALITY:
THE VISION OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Carol; daughters Jennifer and Emi; and parents, H. Howard and Virginia Stephenson.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Projects such as this represent the combined work of many individuals besides the nominal author. I wish to recognize the contributions of three specific groups:

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 REVITALIZING COMMUNITIES

Changing global economic conditions frequently require communities to reinvent themselves in order to retain their vitality and remain economically viable. This requires that community organizations become involved, decide on a vision, create goals, develop plans to meet those goals, and follow those plans through to completion.

1.1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

The development of effective citizen participation is an incredibly complex, time consuming process that often discourages many potential practitioners. This paper will focus on two major challenges faced by community organizations involved in urban revitalization:

1. the importance of creating and maintaining broad based community organizations focused on a general topic rather than a single issue. Such broad based community organizations allow development of extensive “networking” between interested individuals, improved consensus building skills, detailed understanding of the local political jurisdiction’s planning process peculiarities, and favor long term planning. This is in contrast to the more frequent “single issue” nature of most community groups, a limited focus that leads to a short organizational “life cycle” and none of the preceding advantages enjoyed by more broad based organizations.

2. popular misconceptions of what constitutes project success. Community organizations, quite naturally, are activist organizations often engaged in a number of different initiatives to improve their area’s vitality and economic viability. Unfortunately, many of these projects fail the test of “a public action that will produce a sustained and
widespread private market reaction," because proponents failed to address any one of
the following elements necessary for project success: market, location, design,
financing, entrepreneurship, or timing. Examples include:

...housing where there is no market, commercial centers that are in the
wrong location, civic centers for which financing is not available, places
whose design makes them unpleasant and unsafe areas in which to
congregate, economic development projects whose completion is beyond
the entrepreneurship of the responsible public agency, and public works
whose time has passed but are still under way.

(Alexander Garvin 1996)

1.1.2 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

This thesis seeks to discover successful methods for creating, maintaining, and
enhancing urban viability and vitality. Using the Downtown Improvement Association
(DIA) of Honolulu as an example, emphasis is on private interests, their interaction with
one another, and their interaction with government. This is done by providing
documentation and analysis of the major initiatives by the DIA, and then evaluating the
legacies resulting from those DIA activities. The evaluation employs a multi-disciplinary
approach, including planning theory, planning history, existing government programs,
economics, and stakeholder participation.
1.1.3 GOALS OF THE THESIS

This thesis has five goals:

1. documentation of the role of private business interests, especially landowners, in post-World War II urban renewal efforts in central city areas, particularly the DIA in Honolulu.

2. examination of public-private cooperation in the planning process.

3. analysis of how successful the Downtown Improvement Association was in its efforts. The stated goals of the DIA for individual “key” projects will be compared to the results to determine whether the project contributed to the vitality and viability of the central city.

4. analysis of the “Planning” and “Built” legacies designed to aid in the understanding of today’s downtown Honolulu.

5. identification of successful project elements that can be replicated elsewhere.

1.1.4 WHY STUDY DOWNTOWN HONOLULU?

The Downtown Improvement Association of Honolulu provides an excellent example of long term citizen participation in the planning process. The DIA, a collection of business organizations and individuals with a vital interest in maintaining and improving the economic climate of Honolulu’s Downtown district, operated from 1958-96. During that time the DIA employed the considerable skills and resources available to its members, and entered into coalitions with groups such as the O‘ahu Development Conference, the Honolulu Redevelopment Agency, and the Hawai‘i Housing Authority, to turn much of its vision into reality. Although the DIA did not realize all of its goals for the Downtown district, it provides a model of private sector planning initiative and success.
Downtown Honolulu has undergone a similar journey in urban metamorphosis as have other American cities. This includes transportation mode change, decline of central retail function, blight, peripheral mall development, urban renewal, changing demographics, office development, and issues of government attention.

Private citizens and government have a long history in Honolulu of both separate and cooperative efforts toward civic projects. Efforts by community groups and government entities mean that downtown Honolulu enjoys close government-business proximity, renewed physical plant, and increasing numbers of mixed income residential projects.

1.2 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The thesis takes a case study approach to examine strategic initiatives, programs and projects that the Downtown Improvement Association undertook in its efforts to realize its vision of downtown Honolulu. “Strategic” is defined as a project deliberately designed by the DIA to act as a catalyst to ignite desired complementary functions within a district.

1.2.1 INFORMATION GATHERING METHODS

Three types of information gathering were undertaken during the thesis. These were background research, examination of original source materials, and interviews.

Background information gathering was done to understand the national, historical, and philosophical context of urban renewal efforts. Topics included intra- and inter-government interaction, and public-private and private initiatives. Materials were gathered from the Sinclair and Hamilton Libraries of the University of Hawai‘i, and the State of Hawai‘i Main Library.

Research of original resource materials included review of documentation from the Downtown Improvement Association; O‘ahu Development Conference; City and
County of Honolulu’s Honolulu Redevelopment Agency and Department of Housing and Community Development; the State of Hawai‘i’s Hawai‘i Housing Authority; period articles from the Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu Star Bulletin, Pacific Business News, Hawai‘i Business, and Hawai‘i Business and Industry. These materials can be located at the Honolulu Municipal Reference and Records Center; the University of Hawai‘i Sinclair Library, Hamilton Library Hawaiian and Pacific Collection, Department of Urban and Regional Planning Document Center; the State of Hawai‘i Main Library Hawaiian Collection, the Bernice Pauahi Bishop Museum, and the Hawai‘i State Archives.

Personal and telephone interviews were conducted with individuals having intimate knowledge of events. Individuals interviewed included members of the DIA and the ODC, Fort Street Mall merchants, government planners and politicians, and private developers and landowners. Such interviews were conducted during 1997-98.

1.2.2 CONTEXT DISCUSSION

Utilizing the materials gathered from the preceding research effort, a context discussion of post Depression urban renewal efforts within the United States was developed. Also included in this discussion are development factors specific to Honolulu during the same period.

1.2.3 EVALUATION OF DIA INITIATIVES, PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

Specific DIA initiatives, programs and projects within the thesis are organized in chronological order to explain prevailing urban renewal theory; district, economic and government conditions; and introduce participants involved.

Detailed evaluation of the DIA’s revitalization effort was undertaken using two methodologies.
The first uses a series of criteria developed by Alexander Garvin, involving background requirements for successful projects, framework of government programs to encourage private investment, and ingredients for specific project success.

The second method involves examination of the “Planning” and “Built” Legacies left behind by individual projects. This methodology was patterned after those contained in a paper by Gail Atwater, entitled *Best Laid Plans: An Historical Analysis of Land Use Planning on Oahu 1900-1964*. The criteria for the Planning Legacy includes envisioning desired futures, development and implementation of new concepts, use of strategic and large scale planning, and effectiveness in meeting declared goals. The Built Legacy includes the physical manifestation of the project, how it functions within its environs, evidence that the project impacted the shape and form of nearby development, and aesthetics.

Both evaluation strategies are displayed in tabular form to standardize the evaluation process and to ease comparison of project features.

### 1.2.3.1 The Methodologies of Alexander Garvin

Alexander Garvin, formerly a New York City Deputy Commissioner of Housing and the Director of Comprehensive Planning, and in 1996 a faculty member at Yale University and member of the New York City Planning Commission, defines urban planning as a “public action that will produce a sustained and widespread private market reaction” (Garvin 1996). Thus planning must be viewed in the context of change: creating positive change and preventing negative change.

Garvin believes that, “much of the nation’s unsuccessful urban planning arises from the erroneous belief that project success equals urban planning success.” He has subsequently developed a three tier evaluative methodology for urban revitalization.
Background Requirements for Successful Programs and Projects

Garvin believes that there are four necessary elements in any successful plan: effective input from all stakeholders; understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish; understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function; and examination of how the project or program in question has created positive change or prevented negative change.

TABLE 1.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary Element</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders</td>
<td>Too often in-depth participation by all stakeholders is left out of plan development by planners “who believe their job is to establish municipal goals and provide blueprints for a better city... the efforts of these planners end without much consideration of how they will obtain political support for their proposals, who will execute them, or where the money to finance them will come from.” Plans developed without adequate constituencies not only suffer from lack of support, they face greater potential opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish</td>
<td>“While it cannot change human nature and is therefore not a panacea for all urban ills, it surely can improve a city's physical plant and consequently affect the safety, utility, attractiveness, and the character of city life.” Thus planners must study the message they make to the public to ensure that they do not raise unrealistic expectations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function</td>
<td>Projects often have primary, secondary, and even tertiary impacts, all of which must be studied to ensure that the context in which the project operates is well understood, and to limit undesirable effects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 is continued on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary Element</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Examination of how the project or program in question has created positive change and prevented negative change | Create Positive Change  
The impacts that the project had, planned or otherwise, that improved the area.  
Prevent Negative Change  
The impacts the project had that prevented further area deterioration. |

Source: Garvin 1996.

**Garvin’s Framework of Government Programs to Encourage Private Investment**

Garvin believes that government officials must realize that their actions create a climate that encourages or discourages private revitalization efforts. Government must view revitalization as a public-private partnership.

**TABLE 1.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending, to encourage private investment</td>
<td>Private organizations seeking to invest in revitalization look to government to ascertain whether or not government assistance (or resistance) will accompany their projects. If government engages in strategic investment in new facilities that complements private investment, private organizations will proceed. If government is not willing to engage in new strategic investment, private organizations will have increased difficulty raising necessary capital, etc. for their projects in an area where the government obviously discourages development or simply neglects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk | Character of the Area  
Zoning laws and building codes determine land use and development character.  
Lessen Private Investment Risk  
Government policies facilitating the development process can increase the potential pool of investors by lowering costs and thus investor risk. Government “red tape” can do the opposite, raising costs and discouraging investment in new development. |
| Incentives for desired private development                                | Government incentive programs such as the 1978 Revenue Act, which provided investment tax credits for rehabilitation of older buildings, provide a “carrot” in favor of private organization developments. |

Source: Garvin 1996.
Garvin’s Ingredients of Project Success

Garvin has examined many less than successful developments and feels that developers, both public and private, often do not understand what needs to be addressed for a project to elicit a favorable private market response. Six major ingredients must be satisfactorily addressed for a project to succeed. These are market, location, design, financing, entrepreneurship, and time.

TABLE 1.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Public and private organizations must ask themselves if there are sufficient numbers of people desiring the program or project, and will those people be willing and able to pay the project’s capital and maintenance costs? Private efforts will entail sales or user fees; public activities must be subsidized by taxes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Location consists of two elements: <em>Inherent Site Characteristics</em> Properties specific to a particular place that aid or hinder a specific type of development. <em>Proximity</em> This is a site’s relationship to other locations. Proximity itself is dependent upon the dominant transportation technology, which introduces a temporal travel factor, alters the benefits of nearness, and changes the definition of proximity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Design is not limited to architectural style. It includes the arrangement of elements, their relative size in comparison to each other, and their individual characteristics. Individual elements directly impact the project cost, attractiveness and usefulness. Proper design organizes the elements into a mutually supportive, identifiable project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>Financing for public projects usually comes in the form of taxes, with occasional gifts from private benefactors. Financing for private projects generally involves several types of capital: start up (for planning, etc.), development loans (for interim expenses until the project has completed construction), and permanent mortgage financing (much like the traditional thirty year loan on a private home). The “cost” of money may vary over time due to differing interest rates and the amount of equity-stake financing required of the developer to get the project moving. Because projects require long lead times to fruition, large amounts of capital are involved, and any project must compete with other potential lender investments; therefore projects must have firm support before any work commences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 1.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Someone is needed to assemble, design, coordinate and inspire all the participants in a project to ensure that the plan becomes a reality. This is true for both private and public projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Time affects a project in three ways:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Immediate</em> How much time does it take to walk across a project? This is often important as to scale and character.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The 24 Hour Day</em> Will the project have enough diversity of use to be active throughout the twenty-four hour day?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Decades</em> Will the project be able to weather changes in political and economic fortunes, and adapt to new uses?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Garvin 1996.

1.2.3.2 The “Planning” and “Built” Legacies

Examination of the long term results of the project resulted in two distinct legacies.

TABLE 1.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Legacy</td>
<td>How plans from a program or project affected subsequent plans and processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Legacy</td>
<td>How the program or project affected the physical environment, and how the project exists today.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Atwater 1995.

1.3 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Lessons for the future refer to how successful elements identified within the preceding analysis could be replicated elsewhere.

TABLE 1.5. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What has been learned.</td>
<td>How this applied to the DIA’s efforts in this project.</td>
<td>Where the lesson could potentially be applied later.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is divided into the following sections:


Chapter 2 – The Contextual Framework of Urban Revitalization Study is detailed.

Chapter 3 – The Downtown Improvement Association, including its background, philosophy, objectives, intellectual sources, topics of concern, and vision is examined.

Chapter 4 – Hawai‘i State Capitol, constructed 1965-69, was developed to symbolize the new State of Hawai‘i, and was necessary to accommodate an expanding State government. The DIA sought to place the new Capitol near Downtown in order to increase access to government, and to increase demand for Downtown services.

Chapter 5 – Financial Plaza of the Pacific, constructed 1965-68, was the first new major Downtown office project, filling an entire block. The DIA supported this project as a “catalyst” for further Downtown office construction.

Chapter 6 – Fort Street Mall, constructed 1968-69, created a pedestrian mall on four blocks of the city’s historical retailing street. The DIA and City government sought to revive the area’s retail activities, or at least stop their further erosion.

Chapter 7 – Kukui Gardens, constructed 1968-70, provided modern low-rise housing for “gap group” citizens, and is located on former urban renewal land. The DIA backed this project because it brought housing back close to Downtown, provided businesses there with patrons, and extended the daily use of Downtown facilities.

Chapter 8 – Cultural Plaza, constructed 1970-74, houses four Chinese benevolent societies and two language schools. The DIA participated in this project,
hoping to maintain the area's cultural identity as a tourist attraction to revitalize Chinatown retailing.

Chapter 9 – Tamarind Park and Bishop Square, constructed 1970-72 and 1981-83, consists of two high-rise office towers, a large parking structure, and a one acre privately owned and maintained park in the heart of the Financial District. The DIA supported the demolition of the landmark Alexander Young Hotel, construction of additional office space, and creation of this “people place” because the DIA wanted a modern, active Downtown.

Chapter 10 – Fort Street Mall Renovation, constructed 1992-93, rebuilt the original 1969 Mall. The DIA supported renovation of the Mall, but had desired private maintenance as a means of improving the long term look of the area.

Chapter 11 – Aloha Tower Marketplace, constructed 1993-94, replaced aging passenger pier facilities at the Waterfront with a “festival marketplace.” The DIA supported most of this project, desiring another “people place” at the Waterfront, close to Downtown.

Chapter 12 – Conclusion, presents a summary of observations and conclusions about the activities of the DIA, and makes recommendations about how successful DIA organization or projects could be replicated elsewhere.
CHAPTER 2. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 NATIONAL TRENDS

Any examination of the DIA requires an understanding of the underlying forces changing urban America during the 20th century.

2.1.1 CRITICAL FACTORS THAT AFFECTED THE HEALTH OF AMERICAN DOWNTOWNS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

In his book *The Rough Road to Renaissance*, Jon Teaford examined the evolution of American cities from densely developed urban cores dependent upon the streetcar to metropolitan giants characterized by automobile driven development and resource disparity between suburbs and the central city. He made a number of observations of the problems facing inner cities as the 20th century progressed:

1. The inability of most inner cities to retain higher-income residents, and thus preserve the tax base, affected a city's ability to redevelop itself. Many cities, such as Boston, Philadelphia, and Cleveland, suffered greatly from eroding tax bases. Harland Bartholomew in 1940 warned that, “the whole financial structure of cities, as well as the investments of countless individuals and business firms, is in jeopardy because of what is called 'decentralization'.” Only a few cities, such as Cincinnati, Ohio, were able to maintain enclaves of middle or upper class residents within their borders.

2. Suburbs had the ability to offer “the best of both worlds” to area residents at the expense of the central cities. Metropolitan wide contract agreements guaranteed small urban peripheral cities such services as water delivery and sewage disposal, services that usually required massive investment and operated most efficiently on a large scale. Suburbs also enjoyed tailor made programs aimed at homogeneous
populations while central city residents had to deal with government agencies concerned with the needs of a multitude of special interests.

3. The changing organization of politics altered how and where money would be spent. Prior to World War II, party organizations had provided order and consensus by mediating conflicts between groups, doling out patronage and providing reliable blocks of support along party lines. After the War the decline of party loyalty led to a fragmented political structure and the rise of officeholders who loudly proclaimed their independence. Such conditions made it harder to develop the political consensus necessary to attack urban problems.

4. Federal policies favored new development over old. The Federal Housing Administration viewed inner city housing as potentially affected by "blight," and thus a higher risk for federal mortgage guarantees than suburban housing. The federal Department of Transportation, meanwhile, constructed "ring" freeways that allowed citizens to bypass the original centralizing "spoke" highway system and ignore the inner city altogether (Teaford 1990).

2.1.2 PLANNING APPROACHES TO URBAN REVITALIZATION PRACTICED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 1920+

Jon Teaford also categorized the response of inner city leaders to the metamorphosis that their communities were undergoing:

1. 1930s-early 1940s: Inner city businessmen, property owners, politicians, planners and journalists recognized something had to be done to restore the central urban areas to their traditional dominance.

2. Late 1940s-early 1950s: Cities tried to adapt to the changing transportation technology and lifestyles through major public works projects. Cities such as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Cincinnati sold bonds and borrowed billions of dollars to
finance the construction of highways and airports, build new housing, purchase more open space, and eliminate air and water pollution. These projects were designed to provide the inner cities with suburban-like amenities that would prevent the flight of middle and upper class populations.

When confronted with the prospect of possible decline, city leaders did not, then, choose to cut back municipal responsibilities or retrench in preparation for a bleak future. Instead they chose to defy the centrifugal drift toward suburbia and sought to perpetuate the central city's preeminent position in metropolitan America.

(Teaford 1990)

3. 1950s – early 1960s: Office building booms were shadowed by vacant urban renewal properties and the disruptive and dividing effects of interstate highway programs.

4. 1960s: Concerns for human renewal rather than physical renewal gave rise to the federal War on Poverty. Washington increasingly demanded control over programs it funded, and municipal policies increasingly based their decision making on the availability of federal money.

5. Late 1960s and early 1970s: Disillusionment set in over the inability of the War on Poverty programs to improve conditions for the poor. Inner cities began to focus on their traditional strengths, including mass transit, rehabilitation and the value of old fashioned neighborhoods.

6. 1980s: Downtown building booms, festival marketplaces and restoration of urban neighborhoods renewed hope for inner cities (Teaford 1990).
2.2 DOWNTOWN HONOLULU

Downtown Honolulu was indeed impacted by many of the changes affecting other American cities. Following is a discussion of Honolulu's inner city physical layout, how centralization and then decentralization progressed, and the distinct advantages Honolulu had in promoting revitalization.

2.2.1 GEOGRAPHY OF DOWNTOWN HONOLULU

(See Figure 1.)

Downtown Honolulu, for the purposes of this study, is defined as the area between Nu'uanu Stream, Honolulu Harbor, South Street, and the Lunalilo Freeway (also known as H-1).

Downtown Honolulu is also defined as having districts, each of which has its own distinctive character.

The Kukui Redevelopment District occupies the north eastern (mauka) part of the study area. The area was once occupied mostly by high density, low-rise, non-code structures. In 1961 the City and County of Honolulu's Honolulu Redevelopment Agency began land acquisition there, and eventually bulldozed most of the original structures. Over 1200 families and 400 businesses were relocated (Hawai'i Industry April 1962b). In 1998 the area is occupied by a mixture of government assisted housing, market apartments, the Cultural Center, and mixed use structures.

Chinatown historically represented an entertainment area for seamen, a center for small business activity conducted by ex-plantation workers, and a residential area for single men. Originally occupied by individuals of Chinese descent, more recently the area has held elderly Filipino residents and Vietnamese businesses. The area contains
Figure 2.1. Downtown Honolulu districts and major developments, 1996. (Honolulu is located at 21° 18' N, 157° 58' W.) Source: Downtown Improvement Association November 1995.
mostly low-rise fireproof structures built after the 1900 Chinatown fire, interspersed with City developed high-rise mixed income and mixed use buildings.

The Fort Street District today is a local commercial retail center and occupies only a small portion of the area where once Honolulu's finest shops operated. Declines in Fort Street's retail supremacy led to private and public efforts to redevelop the street (from Beretania Street to Nimitz Highway) into a pedestrian oriented mall. The new Fort Street Pedestrian Mall was opened in 1969 and rebuilt in 1993.

The Financial District's business activity was built upon providing operating capital to island sugar and pineapple plantations and shipping businesses. The Financial District originally developed along Merchant Street, migrated largely to Bishop Street in the early 20th century, and has expanded onto Fort Street since the 1960s.

The Waterfront at the base of Downtown was the original reason the town existed. Provisioning of ships, unloading of cargo, and the processing of passengers made the Waterfront the center of the city. Changes in technology have put cargoes into containers and most passengers into airplanes, both of which are now handled elsewhere. The result was, for many years, a nearly deserted Waterfront. Today the Waterfront accommodates cruise ship activity, and contains the tourist oriented Aloha Tower Marketplace and the Maritime Museum.

The Capitol District developed around the Iolani Palace and Judiciary Building, expanding over the years to include the Governor's Mansion (Washington Place), the new State Capitol, various State office complexes, and the Federal Building.
2.2.2 TRANSPORTATION MODAL CHANGES AND THEIR EFFECT ON DOWNTOWN HONOLULU

Downtown Honolulu after World War II was a city undergoing the same transportation modal changes and decentralization processes faced by mainland cities.

Downtown Honolulu had developed as a densely occupied district due to three factors:

1. The O‘ahu Railway and Land Company (OR&L), founded 1888, connected sugar and pineapple plantations from Kahana Bay, around Kaena Point, Wai‘anae and Ewa to downtown Honolulu and the docks. A separate line ran to Wahiawa. The OR&L was instrumental in locating the pineapple canneries near Downtown (Yardley 1981).

2. The Honolulu Rapid Transit and Land Company (HRT&L and later HRT), founded 1898, ran an extensive system of street cars focused on Fort Street in downtown Honolulu (Melvin 1960).

3. The Honolulu Harbor was the only natural harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, and thus the only location handling the large ships that carried passengers and cargo both inter-island and elsewhere. The main docks lay immediately makai of Downtown.

Technological challenges to the three traditional transportation modes instituted the beginning of the "decentralization" process:

1. *Paradise of the Pacific* magazine in March, 1905 estimated that there were twenty-five automobiles on the roads of Honolulu (*Paradise of the Pacific* March 1905). In 1915 the HRT&L tested its first trolley bus, and by 1934 the HRT&L had employed enough trolley buses that it began to dismantle its rail network (Melvin 1960). The retirement of street cars, the growing use of diesel buses and the increasing use of automobiles changed the character of Honolulu. Bus service, freed first from the rails and then the overhead electric grid, could travel anywhere across the city. Transfer
points developed outside of Downtown. As a result, Fort Street no longer had a monopoly on the sale of goods and services, as first order retail functions began to be met by the small neighborhood stores in Kaimuki, Kalihi, Mo'ili'ili and other locations.

2. At the same time, the OR&L was gradually losing traffic, especially during the Depression, when the government began development of a circle island highway system. The new highway pitted OR&L against a government subsidized transportation competitor, and meant that people no longer had to pass through Downtown to get to the "country".

3. The increasing use of air transportation slowly eroded the use of Downtown passenger piers. The development of containerization would also remove activity from the docks nearest Downtown in favor of facilities at Piers 1 & 2 and Sand Island.

There was official concern about the effects of these transportation induced changes. The Honolulu City Planning Commission, in Honolulu's Master Plan, A Progress Report, January 1941, stated that:

During past years traffic through the business area has increased annually until many of the streets have reached their saturation points...and only a small percentage of the patrons coming into the business district can find parking space. These patrons in looking for non-existent parking places, are, to a great extent, responsible for the acute traffic congestion throughout the area.

Perhaps the most serious situation in Honolulu at the present time from the standpoint of many taxpayers, is the decentralization or disintegration of our central business district. This has been going on for a number of years at a rate much greater than is generally realized. If continued as at present, in only a few more years this section of the city will have many vacant store buildings, now occupied by some of our best business enterprises. The result will be a great
reduction of rental values followed by an enforced reduction of taxation values of practically all the high valuation property in the business section. This decentralization has not yet progressed so far that the devaluation stage has been reached, but in only a few more years it will appear unless a concerted move is made by the Municipal Government and the property owners involved.

(City and County of Honolulu 1941)

*The City of Honolulu 1939-1944 Master Plan* made recommendations for a series of municipal parking lots throughout Downtown, and an elevated highway across the Waterfront designed to remove through traffic from Downtown streets.

During World War II, private use of automobiles was severely curtailed. Downtown again thrived because of restrictions on gasoline and the use of private automobiles. After the War, however, the automobile immediately returned to popularity. OR&L, for example, had carried 20 million passengers and earned $4.5 million in revenues in 1945, only to carry a disappointing 7.5 million passengers and earn $2.5 million in revenues in 1946 (Kneiss 1957). The last Kahuku-Honolulu O'ahu Railway run occurred on December 31, 1947 (CinePac 1970). Rail then ceased to be an economic factor in downtown Honolulu.

The impacts of automobiles steadily grew worse in downtown Honolulu. The February 14, 1949 edition of the *Honolulu Advertiser* noted that “Shoppers May Shun Traffic Congestion in Downtown Area” (Honolulu Advertiser 2/14/1949).

Small regional retail strips in Wahiawa and Kaimuki were not the only threat created by automobile mobility. A small article in the October 28, 1949 *Honolulu Star Bulletin* reported that a preliminary public hearing was to be scheduled before the City
Figure 2.2. Proposed Off-Street Parking Lot System, necessitated by increasingly difficult access and parking problems in Downtown. (Honolulu is located at 21° 18' N, 157° 58' W.) Source: Master Plan: City of Honolulu 1939-1944.
Figure 2.3. Corner of Bethel and Beretania Streets (1958). Note the cars parked along the curb and the “For Rent” sign in the Schnack Building window. Downtown Honolulu's economic lifeblood was retailing, but downtown access difficulties encouraged customers to frequent new shopping complexes in Wai' alae, Aina Haina, Kailua, Kane' ohe and other suburbs. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.

Figure 2.4. Union Street looking Ewa-makai (1958). This is an example of Downtown business evolution. The Kress store on the left, a typical early 20th Century “five and dime,” would be replaced by an office complex. The Fronk Clinic (on the right) relocated to Beretania Street. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.
Planning Commission to discuss a proposed shopping complex on Dillingham Corporation property along Ala Moana Boulevard. This would become the Ala Moana Shopping Center (Honolulu Star Bulletin 10/28/1949).

In 1953, the Downtown Merchants Association was formed. The organization spent $85,000 promoting Downtown activities over the next five years (Wheeler 1958).

In 1957, forty-one upper Fort Street merchants banded together, declaring themselves the “Upper Fort Street Shopping Center.” Spokesman Samuel Kramer stated that, “The idea is to encourage people to shop in this area... New shopping areas are springing up and we want people to continue their downtown shopping habits” (Honolulu Advertiser 11/28/1957).


2.2.3 ADVANTAGES FACILITATING REVITALIZATION OF DOWNTOWN HONOLULU

The DIA was fortunate that Downtown Honolulu enjoyed significant advantages in any revitalization program.

1. The City and County of Honolulu is a single political jurisdiction, consisting of the whole island of O‘ahu. This facilitates the planning process and nearly eliminates the possibility of “tax and job flight” experienced by many mainland jurisdictions.
2. Downtown Honolulu is within walking distance of State of Hawai‘i and federal government offices (and decision makers and funding sources). This is unusual within the United States.

3. The limited land area of the island encourages recycling of underutilized properties and districts.

4. The small size of downtown Honolulu meant that individual revitalization projects would have greater potential impact than projects of similar size in large urban districts.

5. State land use policies have until recently discouraged the development of agricultural land and instead promoted more density in the Honolulu primary urban core.

6. Until the early 1990s Hawai‘i enjoyed a healthy economy.

7. Until recently, most major corporations were locally owned, and were active participants in civic activities.

2.2.4 SPECIAL CHALLENGES IMPACTING THE REVITALIZATION OF DOWNTOWN HONOLULU

Political changes occurring in Hawai‘i during the early years of the DIA could have made cooperation between government and business difficult to accomplish.

Since the end of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893, Hawai‘i’s politics and economy had been controlled by a small group of mostly Caucasian and Republican individuals. Opportunities for other groups had been limited.

The Democratic Party after World War II became the vehicle for these non-represented groups to enter the political and economic arenas. In 1954 the Territorial Legislature became Democratic, and in 1962 the Democrats also captured the powerful Governor’s Office.
While the DIA and other pro-business groups had been expanding their membership to include a broader base of the population, major island businesses were still heavily representative of the old economic and political aristocracy.

It is thus to the credit of these political and business leaders that they were often able to put their differences aside and cooperate in long term programs for economic revitalization.
CHAPTER 3. THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION

3.1 BACKGROUND

A headline of the March 24, 1958 edition of the Honolulu Star Bulletin reported that “Downtown Stores Band to Save Area: Hope to Fight Shopping Trend to Suburb Rim” (Honolulu Star Bulletin 3/24/58). It erroneously reported that “merchants” were organizing an effort to keep shopping centers from digging too deeply into Downtown business pockets. The article said the group called itself the Downtown Improvement Association (DIA).

The article illustrates a popular misconception as to who was organizing and why. Mr. William Grant, Executive Director of the Downtown Improvement Association in 1996, described the situation:

When the Downtown Improvement Association began in 1958, the owners of the land on which the city stood knew that a boom was coming with statehood and they didn’t want to be left out. Understand, most of our members are landowners, with a few merchants mixed in.

At that time, downtown Honolulu was the headquarters for plantation agriculture and the high-class retail center of the Islands: Liberty House, McInerny, quality jewelry and shoe stores. Property owners were making their money from retail stores on the first floor. (Krauss 1996)

Unlike the retail shop owners who saw opportunity at the new Ala Moana Shopping Center and could “hedge” their bets by opening branches there, the owners had significant investments in non-portable assets Downtown. Retail operations had
been the historical means to gain high income from commercial real estate. The property owners founded the DIA because they wanted to protect their investments.

The original members of the DIA represented some of the most economically powerful corporations in the Hawai‘i business community. Membership in such circles represented access to resources not usually enjoyed by other community groups.

TABLE 3.1. ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION

| 1. | Alexander Young, Ltd. |
| 2. | Hawaiian Telephone Company, Ltd. |
| 3. | C. Q. Yee Hop & Company, Ltd. |
| 5. | Pantheon Building Company, Ltd. |
| 6. | Estate of James Campbell |
| 7. | N. Kamuri, Ltd. |
| 8. | L. McCandless Estate |
| 9. | Bernice P. Bishop Estate |
| 10. | American Factors, Ltd. |
| 11. | Bishop Trust Company, Ltd. |
| 12. | Bishop National Bank of Hawai‘i |
| 13. | Hawaiian Trust Company, Ltd. |
| 14. | Bank of Hawai‘i |
| 15. | Cooke Trust Company, Ltd. |

Source: Downtown Improvement Association April 1978.

During its thirty-eight year life span, the Downtown Improvement Association, would consistently reflect the interests of the business, and especially landowner, community within Hawai‘i.

Mr. William Grant, DIA Executive Director, in 1998 stated his belief that community organizations with the most longevity are those organizations whose members feel their interests are under long term “threat”. The threat creates cooperation and cohesion to provide long term direction and goals. In the case of the DIA, member landowners and tenants would benefit from vitality and economic viability downtown. Anything that threatened Downtown as a place to do business would be
actively addressed or opposed, and any new activity that promoted business would be actively supported (Grant 1998).

A list of DIA presidents illustrates who the DIA represented and the longevity the organization enjoyed.

**TABLE 3.2. PRESIDENTS OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. Alexander Anderson</td>
<td>Von Hamm Young Company</td>
<td>1958-1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert R. Midkiff</td>
<td>American Trust Company</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarence T. C. Ching</td>
<td>Loyalty Enterprises (land development)</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moses L. Randolph</td>
<td>Campbell Estate</td>
<td>1967-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard H. Wheeler</td>
<td>Andrade &amp; Company (retail operator)</td>
<td>1975-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack K. Palk</td>
<td>Security Title Company</td>
<td>1977-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald M. Kuyper</td>
<td>Hawaiian Telephone Company</td>
<td>1980-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron M. Chaney</td>
<td>Chaney Brooks &amp; Company (real estate)</td>
<td>1984-85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard W. Gushman II</td>
<td>DGM Group (real estate development and redevelopment)</td>
<td>1986-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew D. Friedlander</td>
<td>Monroe &amp; Friedlander (real estate)</td>
<td>1995-96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Downtown Improvement Association September 1996b.

### 3.2 INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE DIA

#### 3.2.1 ADMINISTRATION

The internal organization of the DIA was designed to provide continuity.

The general membership annually had the option to vote for or against a slate of candidates for the Board of Directors.
The Board of Directors set policy, recommended new members for the Board, hired the Executive Director, elected the President, and approved special projects and the creation of special purpose committees.

An Executive Committee, elected by the full Board of Directors, worked directly with the President and Executive Director. This Committee usually had between eight and ten members.

The President of the DIA often focused on special projects such as Robert Midkiff did with the State Capitol or Moses Randolph with the Fort Street Mall. The President usually helped coordinate support for projects or positions within the Downtown community, and often met with government officials.

The Executive Director handled collection of dues, ran the office, supported the President at public meetings, and met with government planners. The architectural background of Mr. Grant often made him a go-between when building density negotiations were underway between the City government and DIA members (Grant 1998).

3.2.2 BUDGET

DIA activities were financed through dues and special project contributions.

Landowner dues amounted to a percentage of their real property assessments. As the percentage was fixed and the assessment public knowledge, both the landowner member and the DIA itself could estimate the amount and plan accordingly. Lessees (retail establishments, architectural firms, etc.) negotiated their membership dues. The annual budget for the DIA, separate from special projects, was approximately $150,000 in 1996 (Grant 1998).
Special project contributions would be solicited by the President and/or Executive Director through mutually known intermediaries for projects approved by the Board of Directors (Grant 1998). Examples of such projects include the Union Mall in 1962 and the Chinatown Police Station in 1988 (Downtown Improvement Association September 1963 and November 1988).

### 3.2.3 COMMITTEES

Besides the Executive Committee, the DIA had standing committees such as those for Membership and Planning.

- The Membership Committee would actively recruit new members.
- The Planning Committee's responsibility was to pull together a broad range of ideas and proposals for Downtown, and organize them into a coordinated action plan. Areas included urban design, urban renewal, regulatory issues, open space and the malls system (Downtown Improvement Association July 1981).
- The Environmental Committee was formed to deal with issues affecting the quality of working and living Downtown, including safety, cleanliness, enjoyment and area appearance (Downtown Improvement Association June 1981).
- Special projects committees would also be formed when the need arose.
- One such committee was the Waterfront Committee which sought to promote redevelopment of the area immediately adjacent to Downtown into a people oriented complex (Downtown Improvement Association February 1981c).
- Another special project committee was the Chinatown Committee whose work evolved from the almost total clearance programs of the Kukui Redevelopment Project into restoration and redevelopment programs under the rules of the Chinatown Historic Cultural Scenic District (Downtown Improvement Association April 1981).
Figure 3.1. Shop owner placing the DIA logo on his front window display (late 1950s or early 1960s). The DIA’s standing Membership Committee was responsible for recruiting new participants in the DIA’s programs. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.

Figure 3.2. DIA Master Plan Committee viewing Downtown revitalization concepts contained in the Wou Plan of 1962. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.
3.3 PHILOSOPHY

The DIA felt that private redevelopment of Downtown offered the best opportunity to provide desired aesthetic features and spur economic growth.

R. Midkiff, DIA President in 1965, declared that:

We believe that the techniques of owner-redevelopment, under the umbrella of city and federal authority, will enable like-minded men to work together. It can lead to the renaissance and new growth in the cities of America on a far sounder economic basis than through purely government action. We must have close partnership with government, however, since the over-all plans for the city, the area, and each block must be economically and aesthetically related. If landowners have a will to achieve, together with a willingness to conciliate the interests of other property owners, plus the help and authority of enlightened government, great works can be accomplished in our cities.

(Midkiff 1965)

3.4 OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES OF THE DIA

The Charter of the DIA, issued in 1958, listed four objectives and purposes for the Downtown Improvement Association:

1. To cultivate, develop and maintain the Central Business District of Honolulu as the dominant core and focal point of trade and commerce on O'ahu.

2. To enlist the active interest and financial support of individuals, firms, and corporations concerned with the development and
improvement of the Downtown Honolulu area, particularly property owners and tenants located within the Central Honolulu Business District.

3. To promote and encourage rehabilitation and redevelopment of blighted areas in the Central Business District, promulgating and devising physical plans and standards for structural rehabilitation and improvement to prevent the spread of blight.

4. To collaborate and cooperate with public agencies, Federal, State, and Municipal, especially with the Mayor and the Council of the City and County of Honolulu, the Planning Commission and other improvement associations, including the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, whose functions may in any manner relate to any of the objectives hereunder.

(Downtown Improvement Association 1973)

3.5 INTELLECTUAL SOURCES

The DIA was constantly looking for new ways to improve business Downtown. Information came from national and international business groups; presentations and studies by out of state experts; and Aaron Levine of the O'ahu Development Conference.

3.5.1 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS GROUPS

The DIA was involved in several national and international business groups, including:

1. International Downtown Executive Association (I.D.E.A.). The DIA hosted the midwinter 1976 meeting. I.D.E.A. represented 30,000 business and industry
organizations from 120 cities in the United States and Canada (Downtown Improvement Association November 1976a).

2. The International Downtown Association, a business group that monitored trends in Downtown retailing, mall development and redevelopment (Downtown Improvement Association November 1986a).

3.5.2 PRESENTATIONS AND STUDIES BY OUT OF STATE EXPERTS

Private sector organizations such as Pittsburgh's Allegheny Conference on Urban Development, throughout the 1950s, received widespread publicity for urban environmental reform, slum clearance and revitalization (Teaford 1990). The DIA responded by hiring a number of mainland consultants to do a series of economic and transportation studies for Downtown and regularly inviting mainland experts to speak on planning issues at its annual meetings. Examples of imported speakers include:

1. In 1962, Dr. Chester Rapkin, Wharton School Economist, described city planning and economic growth.


3. In 1976, Knox Banner, Executive Director of the National Capital Downtown Committee, Inc.; Lucius Williams of the Downtown Development Authority of Miami; and Dan Sweat of Central Atlanta Progress, Inc., reported on transit projects in their cities (Downtown Improvement Association January 1983).

4. In 1990, Robert Barron, Jr., President of Enterprise Development Company, an affiliate of the Rouse Company, discussed the festival marketplace concept and how it would be applied to the Aloha Tower development (Downtown Improvement Association February 1990).
3.5.3 AARON LEVINE AND THE O’AHU DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE

Perhaps the greatest long term influence on the DIA came from Aaron Levine. Aaron Levine was President of the O’ahu Development Conference (ODC), “A volunteer organization devoted to the long-range planning and sound growth of O’ahu and the State of Hawai‘i” (O’ahu Development Conference 1986). Levine was a firm believer in citizen participation in the planning process and the need to develop consensus. He had been Director of the Philadelphia Citizens Council on City Planning, and former Senior Planner of the Philadelphia City Planning Commission. Levine was recruited in 1962 by Al Boeke of Oceanic Properties and LeRoy C. Bush (Grant 1998), who conducted a national search for an experienced community based planner they felt was needed to tackle planning concerns for the whole of O’ahu. The search was financed by contributions by the twenty-five largest private corporations in the State of Hawai‘i (Sutton 1998).

The purposes of the ODC were to:

1. encourage sound planning.
2. help preserve Hawai‘i’s natural beauty.
3. prepare and distribute research information.
4. assist public agencies and community groups.
5. conduct educational programs on planning issues.

ODC activities included:

1. community leadership seminars.
2. the University Community Plan.
3. the State Land Use Commission.
4. resolution of Diamond Head zoning issues.
DIA members served on both the ODC Board of Directors and committees. While the ODC worked on citizen participation on an O‘ahu-wide and later State-wide level, the ODC and the DIA cooperated on projects of interest to Downtown. Areas of mutual interest there included:

1. Hawai‘i Capitol District
2. Iolani Palace
3. Honolulu Waterfront Study
4. Harbor plans for O‘ahu
5. Aloha Tower Plaza
6. Honolulu zoning code
7. Mass transit
8. City Development Plans

3.6 MAJOR TOPICS OF CONCERN FOR THE DIA

Robert R. Midkiff, former President of the Downtown Improvement Association, listed three major areas of interest for the organization immediately after its inception: enhancing economic activity; access, parking and transportation; and the need for an overall master plan (Midkiff 1980). The continuing growth of Downtown would expand the breadth of each of these areas, requiring the DIA to develop a newsletter (originally entitled simply the Newsletter, later Data and finally the Downtowner), and to issue periodic position papers, in order to better explain its policy decisions. Included below are the major immediate areas of concern, and the DIA responses over time.
3.6.1 ENHANCED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

In 1959 the DIA hired mainland real estate consultant James Downs to evaluate Downtown's economic future. Downs felt that three steps were needed:

1. Anchor the major City, State and federal government decision making centers Downtown.

2. Anchor the business decision center of the state Downtown.

3. Revitalize downtown retailing by inducing tourists to visit the area.

3.6.1.1 Anchor the Major City, State and Federal Government Decision-Making Centers Downtown

This would require locating the new State Capitol near Iolani Palace, the projected municipal office addition near City Hall, and the proposed Federal Building as close to Downtown as possible.

Potential sites for the Hawai‘i State Capitol included Iolani Barracks, Fort Armstrong, the Ala Wai Golf Course, and Kane‘ohe. A DIA “Friends of the Civic Center” committee got 10,000 signatures in favor of the site bounded by Richards, Hotel, Punchbowl and Beretania Streets. The DIA used this support to push for release of State funds to buy the site. DIA member Midkiff, along with State Representative George “Scotty” Koga, became the two key members of the committee that selected both the architect and the design for the new Capitol.

City agencies also needed a new site, having long outgrown City Hall and the Mission Memorial Buildings Diamond Head of the original complex. A Citizen’s Advisory Committee was set up to advise John Carl Warnecke and Associates in the development of a Honolulu Civic Center Master Plan (1965). One feature of the Plan was a new City office tower to be located in the block bounded by Kapi‘olani Boulevard, and King, Alapa‘i and Beretania Streets. Members of the community who served on the
Committee included DIA representatives R. Alexander Anderson and Robert Midkiff, and Aaron Levine of the Oʻahu Development Conference.

The DIA lobbied hard for a new Federal Building site at Fort Armstrong close enough to Downtown to have government services easily available to Downtown business concerns.

3.6.1.2 Anchor the Business Decision Center of the State Downtown

A “Rockefeller Center” style first class office development was felt necessary to serve as a business catalyst. This development would become the Financial Plaza of the Pacific in 1968. Six owners of the block bordered by Fort, Merchant, Bishop and King Streets, namely Castle and Cooke, Bishop Trust Company, the Wilcox Development Company, Territorial Savings and Loan, American Savings and Loan, and the Austin Trust, agreed to develop the largest commercial real estate condominium in the United States. The project involved a series of property exchanges and relocation of Bishop Trust across King Street at the old Bank of Hawaiʻi site.

3.6.1.3 Revitalization of Downtown Retailing by Inducing Tourists to Visit the Area

Making Downtown an attractive place for tourists and local residents called for three sets of projects:

1. restoration of Iolani Palace, the Mission Houses Museum and other unique Downtown historical sites. DIA member Midkiff became a member of the policy committee overseeing the Palace restoration (Midkiff 1980).

2. development of the Fort Street Mall. The Mall was part of the Downtown Gruen master plan and a personal project of DIA President Moses Randolph. Adjacent property owners contributed $1,208,201.44 toward developing the Mall, which included
fountains, a children's sandbox, plazas at Beretania Street and at King Street, and a pedestrian underpass below King Street (Downtown Improvement Association February 1969).

3. the Chinese Cultural Plaza, now known simply as the Cultural Plaza.

Clarence T. C. Ching, DIA President, organized the non-profit Chinese Cultural Plaza, Inc, in 1965. Participants included the Sun Yat Sen and Mun Lun Schools; and the Chee Kung Tong, Kuo Min Tang, Leong Doo, and Lung Doo Societies. The project was designed to include language schools for the young, meeting halls for senior citizens, and shops, restaurants and cultural events to attract both residents and tourists (Hawai'i Business April 1979).

3.6.2 PARKING, THE BUS, AND MASS TRANSIT

3.6.2.1 Parking

The DIA viewed parking as its "first order of business."

The City had instituted a public off-street parking development program in 1952. Known as Improvement District 80, the program had exempted Downtown properties from parking requirements in return for an assessment system that covered the cost of constructing the lots. The DIA paid eighty per cent of the costs of a study that established the need for parking structures in the Downtown area in the early 1960s. Parking structures were subsequently erected by the City in 1960-61 at Alakea-Richards (288 stalls), Smith-Maunakea (395 stalls), and Nimitz-Bethel (395 stalls) (Downtown Improvement Association September 1960, November 1961 and 1970d).

After assuming office in 1969, new Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi began postponing purchase of land and construction of additional public parking structures in favor of using planning resources for rapid transit. The lack of an operating rapid transit system and no
additional public parking led the DIA to constantly inventory the number of parking
spaces available across the Downtown area, estimating the number of stalls the DIA felt
were necessary, and recommending measures to mitigate automobile dependencies,
including Downtown apartments, expansion of the bus system, and rapid transit. The
DIA specifically monitored the design and speed of housing construction on District 80
and Honolulu Redevelopment Agency lands that had been previously pressed into
parking use, as such construction removed valuable parking opportunities. The DIA also
suggested that repeal of the District 80 parking rules and imposition of Comprehensive
Zoning Code (CZC) parking requirements be considered to add even more additional
parking. Downtown landowners and developers did indeed respond to the parking
 crunch by doing as the DIA suggested, increasing the amount of privately built parking
even in excess of District 80 and CZC regulations. By September, 1996, eighty-five per
cent of Downtown parking was privately owned (Downtown Improvement Association
September 1996).

3.6.2.2 The Bus

The DIA supported the City and County of Honolulu’s acquisition of the Honolulu Rapid
Transit Company bus system, expansion of the bus fleet, and creation of a “fare free
zone” Downtown. The DIA was quick to recognize the impact bus patrons had on
Downtown: in 1970 DIA surveys showed that approximately twenty-five to thirty-three
per cent of all Downtown shopping was directly created by bus patrons (Downtown
Improvement Association 1975a).

3.6.2.3 Mass Transit

The DIA was perhaps the most vocal proponent in the city for a rapid transit corridor
along Hotel Street, rather than other suggested alignments along Beretania or King
3.6.3 MASTER AND LARGE SCALE PLANNING

As business organizations and individuals, the members of the DIA were very concerned about planning from a macro perspective. The DIA itself felt that, unfortunately, too often "we find largely independent planning going forward. The end result of this might or might not be a congenial or compatible whole" (Downtown Improvement Association 1975c). These concerns made the DIA a champion of large scale planning.

3.6.3.1 Early Downtown Studies and Master Planning

Over the years the DIA financed a series of studies and plans of downtown Honolulu in order to understand economic changes and planning possibilities. These plans will be discussed in detail later, but are listed here to provide an overview of DIA planning efforts:

1. Economic Analysis of Downtown Honolulu (1959) by the Western Real Estate Research Corporation.


3. A Master Plan for the Central Business District (1962) by Leo Wou, A.I.A., architect-planner and David Tom, planning consultant (i.e., the Wou Plan).

### 3.6.3.2 The Victor Gruen Master Plan

The DIA encouraged the City and County of Honolulu to hire Victor Gruen & Associates, developers of the first permanent pedestrian mall built in an American downtown, to prepare a master plan for downtown Honolulu.

The DIA strongly endorsed the planning recommendations made by Gruen in the *Report of the Studies and Recommendations for a Program of Revitalization of the Central Business District of Downtown Honolulu* (April 1968). The Gruen Plan included creation of downtown "superblocks" for pedestrians, a feature of master plans popular both on the mainland and included in the previous Wou Plan. This would be accomplished by:

1. widening of Alakea Street and Nu‘uanu Avenue to reroute traffic away from the Central Business District.
2. creation of a mall on Fort Street between Nimitz Highway and Kukui Street.
3. a mall along Hotel Street, from King to Punchbowl Streets.
4. the addition of large scale public parking structures (Gruen 1968; Downtown Improvement Association 1970c).

### 3.6.4 Attract Other Businesses and Amenities into Downtown

As its initial programs were completed, the DIA turned its attention to bringing other new businesses and amenities to Downtown. The longest term project was to reestablish a business hotel in Downtown. Honolulu was one of the few cities of its size
Figure 3.3. Wou Plan Planning Concept. While the Master Plan for the Central Business District did not contain a legend for this map, examination of the document leads to the following conclusions: parks are designated green, buildings blue, retained roadways solid gray, and pedestrian malls marked in gray with trees. (Honolulu is located at 21° 18’ N, 157° 58’ W.) Source: Wou 1962.
Figure 3.4. The Wou Plan Land Use Concept. (Honolulu is located at 21° 18' N, 157° 58' W.) Source: Wou 1962.
Figure 3.5. The Gruen Plan Urban Space and Amenities. (Honolulu is located at 21° 18' N, 157° 58' W.) Source: Gruen 1966.
Figure 3.6. Gruen Plan Circulation Plan. (Honolulu is located at 21° 18' N, 157° 58' W.)
Source: Gruen 1968.
in the United States without such an establishment. Hawai‘i Visitors Bureau statistics for 1973 listed 125,381 business travelers in that year (Downtown Improvement Association 1975b), and the DIA wanted them spending their time in Downtown. Benefits of such a Downtown hotel would include:

1. common rooms, convention and banquet facilities.
2. ease of access to business and government offices.
3. potential addition to late afternoon and evening social events Downtown, thus making Downtown more active and attractive “round the clock” (Downtown Improvement Association 1975b).

The DIA’s effort was proven successful when the Executive Center turned 120 of its offices into hotel suites. In 1996 all were booked solid (Krauss 1996).

3.7 DIA DISTRICT VISIONING

3.7.1 FINANCIAL DISTRICT

The DIA consistently wanted the Financial District to be densely developed and compact, growing to the maximum height allowed under zoning. This would allow an “efficient, lively, crowded and heterogeneous high value center” where business decisions could be made that required “frequent face-to-face contacts.” Thus there was no need for important commercial development immediately outside of Downtown. Downtown should “develop up, not out” (Downtown Improvement Association 1970b).

3.7.2 CHINATOWN REDEVELOPMENT AREA

Chinatown was always considered part of Downtown by the DIA. The DIA supported retention of the Oriental character of the area, commercial ground level uses and residential development above.
1958 Landmarks
1 Aloha Tower
2 American Factors
3 Alexander & Baldwin
4 Theo. H. Davies
5 First National Bank
6 Alexander Young Bldg
7 Iolani Palace
8 Armory

Figure 3.7. Representative drawing of downtown Honolulu at the founding of the Downtown Improvement Association in 1958. Downtown's infrastructure had not significantly changed since the 1930s. Source: Downtown Improvement Association February 1988.
Thirty Years Later

In commemoration of DIA's 30th Anniversary we are pleased to publish these sketches which depict those three decades of change.

In 1958 (above) Downtown was headquarters for plantation agriculture and the Territory's financial center. Fort Street was the Island's major retail concentration and would soon be eclipsed by the Ala Moana Shopping Center. The Legislature met in the Iolani Palace.

Downtown's street network was mostly two-way and parking meters accepted pennies. The HRT Bus lines were privately owned and ridership was declining. Public open space in Downtown was almost nonexistent. Oahu's population was approximately one-half million and Downtown's daytime business population was probably about 10,000 persons.

In 1988 (right) Oahu's population has doubled but Downtown's daytime population has increased four fold to over 50,000 persons. There are approximately 8 million square feet of floor area, 80% of which is contained in high rise office buildings, constructed since the mid-1960's.

Downtown has an extensive system of public plaza's and arcades in the Financial District. Retailing is still on Fort Street, a pedestrian Mall since 1968, and serves the Downtown office workers. Chinatown is redeveloping as a historic district with food markets, specialty retail and cabarets.

Figure 3.8. Representative drawing of downtown Honolulu in 1988. High-rise office buildings have replaced most of the early 20th century buildings along Bishop Street and near the State Capitol. Source: Downtown Improvement Association February 1988.
The DIA expected financial activities would expand in the Ewa direction along King Street. The 1970 edition of *Objectives, Purposes, and Policies of the Downtown Improvement Association* stated that "land assembly by condemnation is probably the only effective method of achieving the necessary land assembly to support economically large scale redevelopment of the area" (Downtown Improvement Association 1970a).

The inclusion of Chinatown on both the State of Hawai‘i and National Registers of Historic Places forced the DIA to rethink the proper role of Chinatown and its relationship to the Financial District. The historical designation diminished the potential for high-rise landuse within Chinatown, reinforcing the "up and not out" development pattern within the Financial District. The Chinatown historic designation also directly affected how landowners could use their property.

No notification or public hearing was required in 1974 in naming a site to either State or Federal Register. Owners or developers could find themselves having already incurred considerable preliminary project expenses before discovering that the project was potentially cancelled (Downtown Improvement Association May 1974).

The DIA noted that:

While the State and Federal governments have established ways of identifying many sites worth saving, they have not provided the economic means sufficient to preserve those sites. When government funds are available, they are usually channeled to highly visible public projects such as restoration of Iolani Palace. Private preservation funds are ordinarily geared to single buildings or residential areas. The economic burden of preserving urban commercial buildings thus falls almost entirely on their owners.

(Downtown Improvement Association May 1974)
Problems faced by landowners of older buildings included:

1. rising land values, which mandate intensive use of central sites.
2. inefficient design of interior spaces for modern use.
3. zoning and tax laws that encourage parcel assembly and “highest use.”

The DIA declared that “to survive, buildings must be both culturally worthwhile and economically viable.”

The DIA responded to these problems by forming a Historic Sites Committee, under the direction of architect Paul Jones, and sought government assistance to landowners in the form of “development rights transfers, tax abatements and adaptive new uses of old buildings” (Downtown Improvement Association May 1974).


3.7.3 KUKUI REDEVELOPMENT AREA

The DIA was particularly concerned about Honolulu Redevelopment Agency plans for the Kukui Street and Queen Emma areas. Since the land was being cleared, it presented an excellent opportunity to integrate redevelopment there with new development elsewhere using a master plan (Downtown Improvement Association September 1961a).

Honolulu Redevelopment Agency had designated much of the 75 acre Kukui Redevelopment Project for commercial use. There was little market demand for the land in the early 1960s, however, and the area remained mostly vacant. The DIA,
recognizing the scarcity of adequate housing in the city, recommended the development of high density housing within the Kukui area instead (Downtown Improvement Association September 1961a).

The continued vacancy of HRA lands mauka of Beretania brought another DIA initiative for housing in the Kukui area in 1971. DIA President M. L. Randolph noted that the vacant Block F (Maunakea-Beretania-Nu’uanu-Kukui) was still zoned commercial, while housing continued in short supply. The DIA President felt that extension of retail/commercial exclusive zoning “cannot help and is sure to hurt the established area of Downtown which would amount to ‘urban sprawl’.” Instead, he recommended mixed use developments such as the upcoming Kukui Plaza (Downtown Improvement Association June 1971).

3.7.4 ALOHA TOWER REDEVELOPMENT

DIA interest in the Waterfront increased over time:

In Position Paper No. 8-68 (adopted August 1968), entitled “Honolulu Harbor and Downtown”, the DIA recognized that it had not paid much attention to the harbor area in the past because it felt the area was walled off from the Central Business District by Nimitz Highway. The DIA was, however, concerned with “dangerous, ugly or noxious activities” and requested that such activities operate away from areas adjacent to Downtown (Downtown Improvement Association 1970e).

The 1968 Victor Gruen Downtown area plan encouraged the DIA to look at the Waterfront as a potential park and recreation site linked to Downtown by a pedestrian bridge across Nimitz Highway (Downtown Improvement Association 1970e).

By 1970 the DIA strongly recommended a joint venture between the State of Hawai‘i and private enterprise to redevelop the terminal area around Aloha Tower. The
object would be to restore the area as a “people place,” while preserving maritime uses, beautifying the area, and retaining low development densities. The project should mean replacement of existing buildings with new ones of significant architectural merit (Downtown Improvement Association 1975d).

In 1975 the DIA formed a Waterfront Committee, with Harold Eichelberger, Campbell Estate Trustee, as Chairman. In 1976 the Committee issued a “Waterfront Design Concept” for Honolulu Harbor that promoted the opportunities of harborside development, taking view planes, legal and physical constraints into consideration (Downtown Improvement Association 1976).

The DIA consistently met with State representatives, overseas developers and financiers to promote Waterfront revitalization. In 1980 the State created a semi-autonomous Aloha Tower Development Corporation (ATDC) to oversee redevelopment of the area, and the DIA gained representation on the ATDC Board. Initial State plans for the site had included an international trade center, evolving into an office and hotel complex. The key decision by ATDC Executive Director Randall Iwase to allow potential developers to determine how best to rebuild the area was a historical turning point in the project (Grant 1998). When the request for proposals was closed the DIA folded its Waterfront Committee. The ATDC signed an agreement with Aloha Tower Associates to develop a $700 million complex that included offices, a hotel, luxury condominiums, and a festival marketplace.

Unfortunately, subsequent financial difficulties and rising project costs brought proposals from the developers to drop two features from the plan, underground parking and a pedestrian bridge across Nimitz Highway to Fort Street, and to request the use of Irwin Park as the site for an above ground parking garage. The DIA fought the use of Irwin Park for the garage, noting that the Aloha Tower Associates’ original design had
called for restoration of Irwin Park as a green focus for marketplace activities. Aloha Tower Associates is currently looking at a site Diamond Head of the Hawaiian Electric power plant to augment their meager parking (Gushman 1998).

3.8 EXPIRATION OF THE DIA

The DIA Executive Director, William A. Grant, retired in September of 1996. The Board of Directors disbanded the organization in November 1996.

At its demise, the organization had 400 members, a 46 seat Board, and two full time staff members.

The closing Downtowner newsletter declared that many DIA objectives had been achieved:

Downtown is the premier office center for the State, the Capitol District has been developed, Downtown has become an attractive place of residence for many and the area is rapidly evolving as an entertainment and cultural center...

The public issues facing Downtown now are mostly social concerns. They are far different than the economic and physical ones which confronted us in the post-war period. Today, the major problems are crime, homelessness and street people, pervasive issues which require very different remedies than a business group can provide.

(Downtown Improvement Association September 1996)

3.9 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Examination of the thirty-eight year life span of the Downtown Improvement Association leads to a number of useful lessons about organizing a long term community organization engaged in economic revitalization.
### Lesson for the Future | Application with the DIA | Possible Future Use
--- | --- | ---
Communities organize when members of a neighborhood feel something of value to them is in danger of being lost ("a threat"). | Landowners feared potential declines in the value of their properties Downtown, and organized the DIA to revitalize the economy of the area. | Aiea, Hilo, Lihue and Waipahu all have historic commercial districts that have been negatively impacted by nearby shopping centers. Landowners, businessmen and civic leaders could organize groups similar to the DIA.

A distinct constituency provides group cohesion and a sense of direction. | The Downtown Improvement Association represented mostly landowners and included some area businessmen. The organization allowed members to feel that their problems were shared by others and gave them the confidence that something could be done. | Similar groups of merchants, property owners, financial institutions, chamber of commerce members, schools, neighborhood boards and civic clubs could organize to economically rehabilitate formerly vibrant local commercial areas. Allies of such groups could be consumers who want convenience, the local municipal or county government which desire tax revenue, and historical preservation groups that want restoration.

A mission, well defined goals and objectives are useful tools in providing a sense of belonging and direction. | The DIA membership's direct interest in the future of Downtown provided them with a sense of mission. This mission was subsequently organized into a set of goals and objectives promoting development of a vital, active Downtown that would be a positive place to do business. | Community organizations interested in economic revitalization also need this same sense of mission because of the amount of time and effort necessary for success.

Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 3.3. (CONTINUED): ORGANIZATION OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

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<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application with the DIA</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
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<td>Organized, consistent funding allows members to predict their expenses and creates a sense of belonging to the group; allows the organization to plan its annual expenses; and provides credibility to the association in the eyes of government and other bodies because it suggests permanency. The ability to request funding for special projects can be useful in meeting unexpected opportunities for social betterment.</td>
<td>The DIA's main funding source was dues from landowners, based on a percentage of their real property taxes. Retail organizations negotiated their own rates. Special projects were funded through networks of affected corporations and individuals. Special projects included parking studies and the Nu'uanu Avenue Police Substation.</td>
<td>Perhaps the role of the DIA has not been finished in Downtown Honolulu. Current area issues include a park for local residents on Smith Street at Beretania, the need for a new occupant for the F.W. Woolworth space on the Fort Street Mall, new ideas for a rapid transit system, etc. Only a long term oriented, well financed organization can make itself felt as well as the DIA once was on such issues of concern for the Downtown area.</td>
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<td>Two types of committees need to be organized in order to focus personnel resources: standing and special projects committees. Standing committees could include an Executive Committee, charged with identifying opportunities and threats, and engaging in long term planning; a Board of Directors to set policy; and a Membership Committee to encourage new membership. Special projects committees, in contrast, would concentrate on specific areas of opportunity or threat.</td>
<td>This was the organizational pattern of the DIA, allowing both long term focus and new opportunities to be addressed by talented, motivated individuals. The DIA, for example, set up a special Waterfront Committee in addition to its standing Executive Committee.</td>
<td>Standing committees in Hilo could develop plans to have the bulk of government services remain in downtown rather than move to outlying areas such as Kaiko'o Mall. A special project committee in Hilo could help develop a railway museum downtown to tell the story of the Hawai'i Consolidated Railway. Such a facility could be patterned after California's popular state railway museum in Sacramento. Another special project committee that might exist in downtown Honolulu would concentrate on the economic health of Fort Street. Included in its agenda would be finding a replacement for F.W. Woolworth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
### TABLE 3.3. (CONTINUED): ORGANIZATION OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lessons for the Future</th>
<th>Application with the DIA</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizations engaging in economic revitalization need a professional staff person who can &quot;talk shop&quot; with government officials and other experienced individuals in the private sector. Such a person furthers stability, gives a voice of authority to policy positions, implies credibility, creates a contact center, provides information, and organizes volunteers.</td>
<td>The DIA was fortunate in that it could afford an experienced, professional Executive Director. William Grant, for example, helped member organizations negotiate with government officials over such issues as building envelopes for new construction.</td>
<td>Many organizations may not have the financial resources available that the DIA had in order to get experienced staff. If this is true, organizations seeking a professional staff member(s) could hire a retired architect, planner or engineer. Newly licensed individuals could also be considered. Partial funding might even be considered from the local municipal government, but it should be noted that such funding may become political in nature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| An economics education program for members, especially decision makers, is important to minimize unplanned or undesired results of policy. Included should be: | Understanding the development process and the skills of a professional staff can allow revitalization organizations to become more and more proactive – to engage in larger, more complex projects. Thus revitalization efforts could move from simply assisting area maintenance to teaching members about the tax advantages of rehabilitation, or perhaps even acting as developer of low cost housing. In Honolulu, for example, community groups could follow the role of the DIA and the Hawai'i Council for Housing Action to develop more residences in underutilized areas such as Iwilei. |

1. understanding the relationship between economic activity, property values and tax revenues. |

2. the business cycle, including supply and demand. |

3. the development process, including creating project proposals, estimating costs, hiring of architects and contractors, complying with building codes, managing risk, determining necessary equity capital, application for construction loans and permanent financing. |

One major advantage that the DIA enjoyed in pursuing its agenda of economic revitalization was that its members were mostly landowners and other business people well versed in economics. They understood that encouraging economic activity was the key to growth in land values and the tax revenues necessary to support area services. This knowledge and their long term outlook allowed DIA members to wait out tough economic times until the business cycle returned to a more positive mode. Confidence in themselves furthered innovation in such projects as the Financial Plaza's condominium concept. |

Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizations based upon meeting serious broad based problems require a long term outlook. Such perception allows development of resources such as expertise and economic support that improves opportunities for program success.</td>
<td>The DIA was founded by landowners and businessmen wishing to address a complex problem - economic revitalization - that could not be solved by any single action. The DIA's long term outlook allowed it to identify and develop a program of enhanced economic activity, improved access and large scale planning.</td>
<td>Economic revitalization of downtown Hilo, Lihue, and Waipahu will require the same long term commitment by local community organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A long range, comprehensive revitalization plan results from such long term thinking. It should include the following: 1. assisting existing businesses to improve customer service. 2. finding tenants for existing unused or underutilized space. 3. promoting the downtown as a place to do business. 4. examination and inventory of local market conditions, identifying problems and opportunities. 5. formation of a plan to exploit identified opportunities. 6. work with government to provide necessary amenities and develop projects that the market alone cannot provide.</td>
<td>The DIA undertook a series of economic, land use and transportation studies immediately after its creation. These studies inventoried the area, and evaluated its strengths and weaknesses. Based upon the information gathered, the DIA created a three tier plan to reinvigorate the area. This led to locating or retaining state and private decision making Downtown; assisting the City in development of a master plan; and increasing economic activity with the construction of pedestrian retail malls.</td>
<td>An inventory of local market conditions that identifies problems and opportunities can identify industries that have successfully located in similar areas. The results of this &quot;opportunity&quot; inventory could be shared with the local entrepreneurial community to encourage startups.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition building, information dissemination and other efforts to garner community support are necessary to win success for the organization's program.</td>
<td>The DIA was always willing to form coalitions with other groups interested in maintaining the economic viability of Downtown. Alliances were thus formed periodically with the O'ahu Development Conference, the Chamber of Commerce, Historic Hawai'i Foundation, and the Outdoor Circle. The DIA also was an active lobbyist at both the State and City levels. During the State Capitol project the DIA also financed information gathering and petition methods to gain public support.</td>
<td>Economic revitalization organizations will need to work with other community groups, businesses, social agencies, etc., in helping determine where the community itself wants government amenities such as a rapid transit system. This improves their chances of government listening to their wishes. Economic revitalization groups can also develop themselves as accurate sources of information. This is useful to themselves, government and media, and can be the basis for improved relationships between all three.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-private relationships will increasingly include partnerships where both parties will contribute resources to a common project.</td>
<td>The DIA preferred that government provide strategic infrastructure improvements and then leave redevelopment to private business. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific demonstrated this. However, the DIA did engage in public-private partnerships where the DIA felt it had an effective voice and the project made economic sense. For example, the placement process for the Hawai‘i State Capitol involved a close working relationship between the DIA’s Robert Midkiff and the Legislature’s George Koga.</td>
<td>The City is again considering the possibility of a rapid transit system and will probably be seeking private assistance in paying for it. Community organizations intent on economic revitalization of their areas could act as facilitators with local businesses and civic groups to plan the route and station sites.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 3.3. (CONTINUED): ORGANIZATION OF THE DOWNTOWN IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community organizations intent on promoting their downtowns must prepare “new generations” of member/leaders to continue the effort after the present generation wishes to retire. Although the particular problems and economic opportunities may change, downtowns will always need promotion of their interests.</td>
<td>As had the ODC before it when Aaron Levine retired, the DIA expired with the retirement of William Grant. The organization’s leadership said that the challenges facing Downtown had changed from those upon which the organization was founded.</td>
<td>Downtown Honolulu today (1998) still faces problems of parking, park space, retail turnover, transportation, etc., which will become more difficult when economic health returns. An organization promoting Downtown’s economic health is still needed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 4. HAWAI'I STATE CAPITOL PLACEMENT (1969)

4.1 GOAL: PLACING THE NEW HAWAI'I STATE CAPITOL DOWNTOWN

Anchor the government decision making center by locating the new State Capitol in central Honolulu, thus ensuring that all State, City and federal headquarters buildings were part of downtown.

(Midkiff 1980)

4.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The Hawai'i State Capitol Building occupies the center of the Richards-Hotel-Punchbowl-Beretania block.

The Hawai'i State Capitol is organized as follows:

1. Underground: Legislative chambers, large meeting rooms and parking.
2. Ground Floor: Open rotunda.
3. Second Floor: Senate offices.
5. Fifth Floor: Governor and Lieutenant Governor offices.

The openness of the Hawai'i State Capitol is its most significant feature. "Bridge like" entrances crossing ponds lead into a large open central rotunda. The rotunda offers views on either side of the State Senate and House Of Representatives below. Above, expansive open walkways on each office level offer informal areas to conduct the people's business.

Architects: John Carl Warnecke and Associates and Belt, Lemmon and Lo.

(Honolulu Advertiser 10/16/1968; Bilby 1969).

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4.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

During most of the Territorial period, Iolani Palace had contained both legislative and executive functions. The Palace had been designed to meet the needs of the monarchy of an isolated, thinly inhabited kingdom, and not those of a much more populous democracy. Hawai‘i’s new State government needed large scale meeting facilities and greatly expanded office space. A new facility would accommodate the new needs of the State and allow restoration of Iolani Palace into a museum representing the monarchy period.

As a result, in 1959 the Legislature appropriated $100,000 for the design of a new Capitol. The location of the new Capitol was expected to become a major activity center and raise land values within the selected neighborhood. Potential sites included:

1. Fort Armstrong, where extensive landfills were projected to provide a large enough site for the project. Atherton Richards proposed a large fountain of water cascading from the roof of a new Capitol building located at this Waterfront site as a landmark attraction.

2. Kane‘ohe, at the present site of Hawai‘i Pacific University, with the lush Ko‘olau Mountains as a backdrop. This site would be donated by Harold Castle, whose family owned extensive lands in the area under the name Kane‘ohe Ranch.

3. the Ala Wai Golf Course, already government owned land, supported by Senator Oren E. Long.

4. various proposals made to locate the new structure on the neighbor islands, supported by representatives from those locations (Midkiff 1980).
4.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION

As mentioned previously, the DIA hired mainland real estate consultant James Downs, in 1959 to evaluate Honolulu's real estate future. Downs strongly recommended the location of government headquarters in downtown Honolulu. The largest possible site near the existing Palace was the block immediately mauka—the area bordered by Richards, Hotel, Punchbowl and Beretania Streets. This site offered Downtown businesses the best access to government officials and potential government customers. This site would also maintain central government authority in the historic government district. Its main drawback was the location of the historic Iolani Barracks within the proposed Capitol block.

After a citizens' committee chaired by Frank Midkiff narrowly approved the Fort Armstrong site, competition firmed around either Fort Armstrong or the civic center site. The DIA had established a Civic Center Committee, with Robert Midkiff as Chairman. The DIA Committee had a scale model of the proposed Civic Center built, showing how a new Capitol would fit within the site, and providing walking access times from the new Capitol to other key government offices.

When property values began skyrocketing around the potential new Downtown site, inappropriate development threatened to overshadow the area. A DIA "Friends of the Civic Center" group gathered 10,000 signatures supporting the DIA favored location. The Legislature barely passed the required funding bill, and a high-rise at Hotel and Punchbowl Streets was averted.

Meanwhile, the DIA model was presented to then Governor, William Quinn, with a request for release of the $100,000 Capitol design appropriation. Governor Quinn appointed an architect selection committee. DIA member Robert Midkiff and State Representative George "Scotty" Koga became co-chairmen. Included in the 12 person
Figure 4.1. Aerial photograph of the Richards and Hotel intersection prior to development of the State Capitol. The area consisted of a mixture of warehouses, office buildings, parking lots, a church, and the Armed Forces YMCA. Of the buildings shown in the photograph, less than a third would remain standing in 1998. Source: Camera Hawaii, Inc.

Figure 4.2. The DIA’s scale model of the proposed State Capitol District. Source: Camera Hawaii, Inc.
committee were neighbor islanders; legislative members from both parties; and representatives from the Governor's office, the City of Honolulu, and the federal General Services Administration.

It was decided that the committee would choose both the architect and design for the new Capitol directly, rather than through an AIA style design competition. Architects from around the world were welcomed to submit proposals, provided they worked in conjunction with a local design and engineering team, so that local building codes, zoning and climate would be followed.

Of the 39 architectural firms that originally showed interest, 28 actually made presentations. The winning design was patterned after a proposed U.S. Embassy planned for Bangkok, Thailand, and was the work of the national firm John Carl Wamecke and Associates and a local company, Belt, Lemmon and Lo (Midkiff 1980).

The committee headed by Midkiff and Koga accepted the 13th submittal by the Wamecke-Belt, Lemmon and Lo architectural group for a structure with an open center, rising from reflecting pools. According to John Carl Warnecke, the original design idea for the building was a heiau (native Hawaiian religious structure). This would be a long, low platform with offices below and one story above ground. Above this was a great plaza, over which floated a sculptural form...The plaza evolved into a spacious pavilion, the two floors of the heiau scheme were elevated into the air, and the openness of the sculptural canopy was retained in a wide open dome and the entire structure was floated in water to reflect and symbolize the island state...(The final design integrated) the never-changing relationship of man to scale through the ancient and classical use of columns which made it possible to retain the open, airy feeling of the original concept. They serve a very practical
Figure 4.3. Signature petitions gathered by the DIA in support for a new Downtown State Capitol building. The photograph was taken on the steps of Iolani Palace. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.

Figure 4.4. State Senator Daniel Inouye endorsing the Capitol design and plan. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.
Figure 4.5. Hawai‘i State Capitol 1998, looking Ewa-makai. Note the high-rise office redevelopment that has occurred on the right, as the DIA had hoped. The high-rises include both private and State construction. Source: Author.

Figure 4.6. Interior courtyard of the Hawai‘i State Capitol, with a view of legislative chambers on the left, and open lanais (patios) conducive to discussing government business fronting offices above. Source: Author.
purpose also: the legislative and department office levels are suspended from these fluted, tapered and towering columns.

(Warnecke 1969)

In 1962 new Governor John A. Burns accepted the proposed Capitol design (Midkiff 1980).

4.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT

4.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS

TABLE 4.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders</td>
<td>The project deliberately strove to include all members of the community, including the city, state, and federal governments, civic, religious, business and ethnic groups, and O’ahu and neighbor islanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish</td>
<td>In contrast to Iolani Palace, which was designed in part as a private residence, architects of the new Hawai‘i State Capitol sought to create an open, inviting and centralized activity center for political interaction. The democratic symbolism of easy access to all levels is deliberate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function</td>
<td>The DIA favored the site for providing Downtown businesses with access to government functions. Traffic, land valuation and other impacts were studied. Potential negative economics such as height restrictions in an extended Capitol District were addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating positive change and preventing negative change</td>
<td>Create Positive Change. The new Capitol created positive change through increased open space in the heart of the city. The site ultimately encouraged new private construction along the Ewa side of Richards Street, and makai of Queen Street. Prevent Negative Change. The project prevented negative change by discouraging blight between Downtown and the new Capitol District. An example of this is the successive development of the makai side of Hotel Street between Richards and Alakea Streets, where &quot;adult entertainment&quot; has been replaced by the Alii Place office complex (Author).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 4.2. GARVIN'S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Program</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending</td>
<td>Construction of the new Capitol in the location desired by the DIA entailed purchase of additional downtown property, demolition of the old Armory, and relocation of Iolani Barracks, in addition to erection of the new building. The project succeeded in raising property values (and tax collections) in nearby areas, and encouraged private development/redevelopment on its Ewa edge. Private projects include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Alii Place</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. renovation of the old Armed Forces YMCA into the One Capitol Plaza.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. the 1100 Alakea Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Central Pacific Plaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Pacific Trade Center (first phase of Bishop Square)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Pauahi Tower (second phase of Bishop Square)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk</td>
<td>Character of the Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A height limitation and the &quot;Great Park&quot; concept later developed for the Capitol District created an &quot;oasis of open space&quot; within the central city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lessen Private Investment Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Properties with potential views of the newly created open space became highly desirable development sites (i.e., Alii Place and No. 1 Capitol District). Financial institutions are generally more willing to lend to projects near centers of activity than peripheral ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives for desired private development</td>
<td>This being a public project, no formal incentives were offered. However, potentially large numbers of government workers utilizing space and services in adjacent properties (positive externality) encouraged landowners to further develop their holdings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4.3. GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient for Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>The market for the project was the State government, the general public, and tourists. The new State of Hawai'i had visibly outgrown Iolani Palace, and a larger facility was needed to facilitate public access to government. Thus there was popular consensus that a “statement” building accommodating larger numbers of people was needed to represent the entity created by Statehood. The booming “Statehood” economy created confidence in the government and public that the project was possible and affordable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td><em>Inherent Site Characteristics</em>&lt;br&gt;The chosen site had the disadvantage of limited space compared to alternatives at Fort Armstrong and Kane'ohe, and required the deliberate construction of vistas (i.e., the still incomplete mauka mall) and setbacks (redirection of Beretania Street) to make it appear more dignified. <em>Proximity</em>&lt;br&gt;The DIA succeeded in framing the discussion of a new Capitol placement, convincing both the public and government sector of the practicality of locating at the civic center site near both existing Downtown services and government offices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Design                 | The Capitol's architecture invokes interest for several reasons:<ol><li>The building is a radical departure from traditional state capitol designs.</li><li>The structure has developed a popular mystique highly symbolic of Hawai'i's origins: a volcanic island rising out of the sea, with a large "caldera" and surrounded by "palm trees."
</li><li>The project offers an open style, "inviting" the public to participate in decision making.</li><li>Also symbolic is the idea that the legislature can be viewed from the central open space — the legislature is below, meaning that the government works for the people. It should be noted that the building opens out directly onto Hotel Street, a major entry point to Downtown and a candidate for a rapid transit station that could further connect the Capitol to all parts of the island.</li></ol> |
<p>| Financing              | The new State of Hawai'i covered the costs of construction and maintenance through taxes.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Entrepreneurship       | DIA representative Midkiff, and Legislative member Koga, provided this function. They were instrumental in choosing the location, architect and design for the structure, monitoring even the construction work until the project was complete. DIA was thus influential in all phases of the project.                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient for Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td><strong>Immediate</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Hawai‘i State Capitol, located upon a slight rise on Beretania Street, was designed to impress upon approach. What is interesting is how it also is designed to invite the pedestrian to enter. Bridge-like structures cross reflecting pools, bringing pedestrians into a huge, open, central area. While the height of the building internally reflects the power of government, the open central area provides unity among the various levels. From the open central area one can monitor legislative activity. Continuous patios on all upper levels provide sheltered areas to communicate business, and to even communicate with individuals below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The 24 Hour Day</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Because of its special nature, activity can occur at any hour of day or night during sessions of the Legislature. When not in legislative session or under some other deadline, the facility adheres to a Monday through Friday 8:00AM-4:30PM schedule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Decades</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Although recently extensively renovated, the architectural distinctiveness of the Hawai‘i State Capitol has been maintained. Recently the building had a number of improvements done, including removal of asbestos. The structure, made mostly of concrete, provides concerns about leaks into the lowest level from the reflecting pools above. Considering the nature of the building as the State Capitol, and its central location among many government offices and the Governor's Residence (Washington Place), it is highly likely that proper maintenance funding will be provided.</td>
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</table>
### 4.5.2 THE "PLANNING" AND "BUILT" LEGACIES

**TABLE 4.4. THE "PLANNING" AND "BUILT" LEGACIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Planning Legacy| **The Hawai'i State Capitol project placement process**  
"popularized" planning more than any project had done so before.                                                                                                   |
|                | 1. The use of scale models in the Capitol project would be soon copied by other developments. For example, the Financial Plaza of the Pacific used a scale model fitted into aerial photographs (Hawai'i Business and Industry March 1966a). |
|                | 2. Distance-time studies, drawings, and other vehicles to entice public participation were also copied. A good example was the O'ahu Urban Design Project (UDP), written by the O'ahu Development Conference in 1968, and encompassing the leeward O'ahu shoreline from Honolulu Airport to Diamond Head. UDP incorporated three-dimensional "drawings which incorporate the various schemes, (so that) people can see what these ideas will do to an area and how they will affect the adjoining areas" (Hawai'i Business and Industry March 1968b). |
|                | 3. The DIA's successful effort in obtaining a downtown Capitol site became a role model of community group organizing, visioning, and use of a large scale plan. The DIA and ODC would use this method again (i.e., the UDP study, etc.) to further participation in the planning process. The decision making process utilized in the development of the Hawai'i State Capitol provided the catalyst necessary to develop the Capitol District Master Plan developed by John Carl Warnecke and Associates. |
| Built Legacy   | The DIA has ensured that for the foreseeable future, state government will have a significant economic impact on downtown Honolulu. It can be argued that within Downtown, the location of the State Capitol has had the effect of directing newer development from the Financial District toward it, at the expense of the Fort Street and Chinatown areas. Furthermore, by locating State government so close to Downtown, State agencies directly compete with the private sector for parking, office space, etc. This would increase the value and density of nearby Downtown properties. |
### 4.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

#### TABLE 4.5. HAWAI'I STATE CAPITOL PLACEMENT: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ability of community organizations to aid in consensus building</td>
<td>It was the DIA’s vision that organized public support for the downtown Capitol site and opposition to development of a high-rise there.</td>
<td>When projects such as the recently completed Kahekili Highway widening provoked community displeasure over its design, it is apparent that government-community communication needs work. By “networking” within neighborhoods, community organizations can aid government planners by explaining design choices and developing consensus before plans are finalized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The importance of sufficient resources to the development and effectiveness of community organizations</td>
<td>Business groups such as the DIA often have access to more resources than most other community groups. Business and other community groups accomplished the goal of a downtown Capitol by combining their resources.</td>
<td>Broader use of methods used by organizations such as the Nature Conservancy, which actively seeks broad sources of financial and manpower support for creation and maintenance of nature preserves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-private financial and operational cooperation</td>
<td>The DIA financed the Capitol model and helped organize public support for the Civic Center site. The State provided funding for land purchase. George “Scotty” Koga of the State Legislature and Robert Midkiff of the DIA cooperated throughout the Capitol design phase, resulting in a unique and dynamic structure.</td>
<td>In this time of heavy fiscal demands and limited resources, public-private support of public services should be encouraged. A current example of this concept is the Makiki Library, where private funding sources help keep that facility in operation. Along the same line, expansion of the State’s Adopt-a-Highway and the City’s Adapt-a-Park program should be undertaken.</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive economic impact of government location close to the business center</td>
<td>Honolulu is unique among American cities in locating the business and political communities within walking distance of one another. The DIA was correct in determining that a downtown Capitol location would have a positive effect on Downtown, as State offices there have contributed to retail sales, rents and land values.</td>
<td>Outer island communities such as Hilo and Lihue should explore returning government into depressed downtowns as a revitalization method, rather than moving such activities into peripheral shopping centers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5. THE FINANCIAL PLAZA OF THE PACIFIC (1968)

5.1 GOAL: ANCHOR THE BUSINESS DECISION-MAKING CENTER DOWNTOWN

Anchor the business decision-making center of the 50th state downtown by building a sort of ‘Rockefeller Center’ to serve as a business magnet and catalyst.

(Midkiff 1980)

5.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The project was the world’s largest commercial condominium when built. It occupies the total block bounded by Fort-Merchant-Bishop and King Streets, and contains three buildings: the twenty-one story Pacific Century Tower (originally the Castle and Cooke Building and later known as the Bancorp Tower), the twelve story American Savings and Loan Building, and the six story Bank of Hawai’i Building.


5.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

In the early 1960s, Al Boeke, Vice President of Castle and Cooke subsidiary Oceanic Properties, was assigned to study replacing the parent firm’s aging C. W. Dickey edifice on the corner of Merchant and Bishop Streets. Boeke contacted a personal friend of his, architect Victor Gruen, for design help (Haight 1998).
As potential plans were considered, other property owners in the block expressed interest in redevelopment proposals. In 1963, Scott Pratt, President of Hawaiian Trust Company, arranged an initial meeting. The landowners were:

1. Castle and Cooke
2. Bishop National Bank
3. American Savings and Loan Association
4. Territorial Savings and Loan Association
5. Wilcox Development Company

Encouraged by the expression of interest, Gruen envisioned a block wide project patterned after Manhattan's Rockefeller Center -- a high quality project combining the economic advantages of high-rise construction with open space for people-related activities at ground level.

Local architect Leo Wou was called in to help develop designs for the proposed complex due to his expertise with pre-stressed, post tension concrete. The project would feature new construction techniques because all forms were molded elsewhere and assembled on-site (Haight 1998).

As the scale of the project broadened, the corresponding workload expanded. Oceanic Properties President Warren Haight and Planner Al Boeke conducted the real estate paperwork, and local attorney Martin Anderson handled legal matters (Haight 1998).

The major hurdles facing the project were:

1. assembling the land.
2. getting necessary zoning.
3. setting up an organization for ownership of the new complex (Haight 1998).
5.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION

The Downtown Improvement Association saw the proposed project as a potential catalyst in rebuilding Downtown and maintaining it as the home of Hawai‘i’s major corporations. DIA members Robert Midkiff and Moses L. Randolph were intimately involved with the development of what became the Financial Plaza of the Pacific.

Robert Midkiff facilitated consensus between the landowners and between the landowners and government.

Midkiff, who personally knew representatives of all six property owners, suggested using a commercial condominium ownership arrangement for the new project. The Hawaiian Trust Company had successfully pooled private property in a Kalihi redevelopment project, and he felt confident the same could be done Downtown. Nothing, however, had ever been done with commercial condominiums on this scale.

The 1963 State of Hawai‘i Act 170-A Horizontal Property Law, and several modifications approved in 1964, allowed real property to be divided into “condominium units” and common elements. The law allowed such property to be bought, sold, exchanged, mortgaged or willed to others. Original land owners exchanged their land and buildings for the land under the new condominium project on a tax-free basis using Sections 1031(a) and (b) of the Internal Revenue Code. Each of the six owners received his proportionate share in the new condominium project based on an independent fair market appraisal of his previous land and buildings (Midkiff 1965, 1980, 1998; Haight 1998).

Units not occupied by owners were held in common and managed by an independent rental agent, thus providing a uniform set of rentals based on value of the space. Each owner was then taxed on their share of the rentals collected by the common agent.
One of the six entities involved was a family trust legally restricted from the long term borrowing necessary for redevelopment. Midkiff, in 1965, explained that:

In exchange for increased rental income for the next 33 years, with step-ups for inflation, the trust leased its units to the condominium. The long-term loan which will 100 per cent finance the construction will be paid off in 28 years, and some years thereafter the trust will receive back its condominium units, free and clear of loan.

(Midkiff 1965)

Midkiff also brokered a complex property swap between the six principals and the Bank of Hawai‘i. Bishop Trust Company, an occupant of the original block, had determined that it wanted to maintain a clearly defined business address in fee simple. At the same time, the Bank of Hawai‘i, located across King Street from the Financial Plaza site, needed additional office space that its existing facility could not accommodate. An agreement was reached wherein Bank of Hawai‘i became a participant in the Financial Plaza, with its own building. Bishop Trust Company temporarily remained on the Financial Plaza site during construction of the Plaza’s buildings. Once the Bank of Hawai‘i’s new Financial Plaza building was complete, the Bank would move into the Financial Plaza and Bishop Trust Company would move into the Bank’s annex building on King Street. The original Bank of Hawai‘i building would then be demolished to make way for a new Bishop Trust Company building (Midkiff 1965, 1988; Ames 1996).

Governance of the project took two forms. Initially all proposals had to be unanimous. Once the project was underway, however, time became critical. Under terms of a master agreement, each property owner agreed to turn title of his project over to a trust to be operated by a management committee representing all property owners.
Figure 5.1. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific looking Ewa-makai in 1998. The high-rise on the left originally contained Castle and Cooke, Ltd., and Territorial Savings and Loan Association, and in 1998 is occupied by the Bank of Hawai'i. The main Bank of Hawai'i Building is on the right. American Savings is barely visible behind in the center. Source: Author.

Figure 5.2. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific looking Diamond Head-makai in 1998. The prominent building in the center is occupied by the Bank of Hawai'i, and the Fort Street Mall is in the right foreground. Source: Author.
The management committee had authority to make decisions with the approval of committee members representing eighty per cent of the condominium.

Midkiff also acted as facilitator between government officials and the landowners' architects. The City was in the midst of redoing its zoning program, exploring the idea of developer incentives that allowed more structural height if more open space was provided at ground level. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific became a model of such incentive zoning later formalized under the new Comprehensive Zoning Code (Haight 1998; Grant 1998).

DIA representative and Campbell Estate Trustee M. L. Randolph was instrumental in gaining the cooperation of the Estate for development of a new building in the makai-Ewa corner of Merchant and Fort Streets. The new Campbell Building, although just off the main block, was an instrumental component of the Financial Plaza. Water table concerns and the need for underground vaults at the Bank of Hawai'i precluded large parking facilities within the main block. Instead, arrangements were made so that the necessary parking for the Financial Plaza was built into the Campbell Building (Haight 1998).

The development of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific meant the loss of two Honolulu landmarks: the Lewers and Cooke and Bank of Hawai'i buildings. The Bank of Hawai'i Building was especially memorable because of its pioneering role providing greenery and open space in a downtown setting (Ames 1996).

The Financial Plaza of the Pacific was the first new “Class A” building complex in downtown Honolulu, meaning that it was of recent construction, in a prime location, enjoyed high occupancy, and had highly competitive rental rates (Hawai'i Business, 1986). This implies a prestigious address. Most Downtown structures at the time had been developed during the 1920s and were dated, inefficient, and insufficient in size to
meet current business demands. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific set the stage for numerous other full block “Class A” projects by T.H. Davies, Amfac, First Hawaiian Bank, etc. (Clark 1998; Haight 1998).

5.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT

5.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS

TABLE 5.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

| Requirement                                                                 | Evaluation                                                                                                                                 |
|                                                                            | The condominium arrangement, although new for the time in a commercial development, provided that each landowner would have a stake in the new project. The key decisions, facilitated by DIA representative R. Midkiff, were acceptance of the condominium concept and that the underlying appraisal was fair. |
| Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish                      | The developers and DIA were trying to create a quality focal point for business in the city. They realized that there was risk inherent in doing so large a project in an area that had been mostly characterized by smaller or less architecturally unique developments. |
| Understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function | Development of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific was meant as a physical statement, both to the public and to government, that business intended to remain Downtown. The project was meant as a catalyst for further private and public development (Midkiff 1980). |
| Creating positive change and preventing negative change                     | Create Positive Change  
The Financial Plaza of the Pacific was meant to incite rebuilding in Downtown. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific built on the landscaping traditions of the original Bank of Hawai‘i and Alexander and Baldwin Buildings, adding to that tradition by including large amounts of open space. It was a successful catalyst because T.H. Davies, Amfac, and the Hawaiian Telephone Company subsequently redeveloped their large lots with large office buildings complimented by generous open space. Prevent Negative Change  
The Financial Plaza of the Pacific and Campbell buildings were erected to maintain Downtown as the center of business decision-making in Hawai‘i, encourage rebuilding to prevent further deterioration of the area, and to increase the population of office workers available as customers for suffering retail businesses along Fort Street. |
### TABLE 5.2. GARVIN'S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Programs</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending</td>
<td>As the physical and economic conditions of downtown Honolulu declined in the early and mid-1960s, concerns mounted in both City government and business circles as to what could be done. The result was increasing cooperation between the Blaisdell Administration and the business community. Most significant was the agreement by the City to hire Victor Gruen Associates for a master plan for the CBD, which was scheduled for completion in 1968. The plan contained such features as $100 million in new public parking garages, the Fort Street Mall, beautification of Bishop Street, a rapid transit line, etc. The DIA worked with Gruen and City Planning Director Frank Skrivanek on the plan while the DIA also worked with the Financial Plaza principals on that project. Thus the DIA knew that the City and County of Honolulu would back the Financial Plaza of the Pacific project with an integrated program of strategic government investment in the area. It is significant that Mayor Blaisdell in March of 1968 announced government initiatives based on the Gruen recommendations at a DIA annual meeting before the Gruen Plan had been formally presented to or adopted by the City (Downtown Improvement Association March 1968).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk</td>
<td><strong>Character of the Area</strong>  The State had committed to the DIA’s Civic Center site for the new Capitol, and the City was serious about providing additional parking, the Mall, and rapid transit. All these programs helped define Downtown as a central, active, decision and commerce center.  <strong>Lessen Private Investment Risk</strong>  The City’s Improvement District 80 limited the amount of parking legally necessary within the Downtown area, lowering development costs and investment risk. The developers of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific, hampered by a high water table and the desire to create as much ground level open space as possible, thus limited the amount of parking to be built within the block. In fact, only one level of parking exists underground. To provide for perceived additional parking needs for themselves and their tenants, the developers contracted with the Campbell Estate to develop parking nearby in the makai-Ewa corner of Merchant and Fort Street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives for desired private development</td>
<td>The Financial Plaza of the Pacific served as a “test case” for the City’s proposed new Comprehensive Zoning Code (CZC). The CZC offered developers additional height in return for ground level open space. The result was creation of the largest privately developed open area in downtown Honolulu at that time, at the Bishop-King Street intersection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 5.3. GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Real estate surveys done by the DIA through 1962 had predicted an annual need for only 100,000 additional square feet of office space per annum for Honolulu (Hawai‘i Business and Industry 1966). Yet “Neither the banks, the State, nor private planners have ever agreed on a formula or come up with standardized statistics...About the only thing certain is that the estimate will be well under what will actually be needed, planners being conservative” (Hawai‘i Business and Industry March 1968a). The backers of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific, however, had two distinct advantages in their project: 1. The project would enjoy high immediate occupancy rates because the developers themselves would take most of the space. The six owners were: Castle and Cooke, Bank of Hawai‘i, Territorial Savings and Loan, American Savings and Loan, Austin Trust, and Wilcox Development Company. 2. The Financial Plaza enjoyed a number of features making it a desirable business address. Located in the heart of the Financial District and occupied by major Hawai‘i corporations, it was the first “Class A” building built in Downtown in years and boasted the only open space in the area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Location              | Inherent Site Characteristics  
                         The project block was originally determined by the operation of Castle and Cooke. The block was also the original site for the Bank of Hawai‘i, a fact that that firm promoted extensively.  
                         The site offered the potential for complete block redevelopment because it contained no relatively new buildings and had a limited number of owners.  
                         Proximity  
                         The site was attractive for office redevelopment because it was: 1. located halfway down Bishop Street. The block was near the center of the premiere finance business street for the city. Nearby were major corporations such as Alexander and Baldwin, T.H Davies, First National Bank, and the Alexander Young Building. 2. faced heavily traveled King Street, and due to the curvature of King, was prominently displayed throughout Chinatown from the Ewa direction. 3. placed the Financial Plaza between the Bishop Street financial institutions and Fort Street retail activities. 4. bordered Fort Street, which offered retail amenities to Financial Plaza customers and employees, and was to be redeveloped by the City. The new Mall would unite the Financial Plaza with the Campbell Building parking facility, and could encourage development from the Plaza in the Ewa direction. 5. situated on Merchant Street, the original mercantile location in the city, and still the locus of many professional offices. |

Table 5.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 5.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Design                | Architect Leo Wou had to define a complex that offered a unity of design while providing its occupants with separate identities. He organized the three major occupants into three structures:  
1. The Bank of Hawai'i Building's height was set as the same as that of the end pavilions of the Alexander Young Building. The structure's frame consists of four cast-in-place girders that form the outside wall of the building between the fourth and sixth floors, supported by central columns, creating an open effect at ground level both in and out of the building.  
2. The Castle and Cooke Building (later Bancorp Tower and 1998's Pacific Century Tower) has the distinctions of a tapered base and the top three floors hanging eight feet out over the rest of the building.  
3. The third building, American Savings and Loan, reaches a height between the other two complexes. Its small footprint, however, limits its flexibility to use by only a few tenants.  
Architect Leo Wou's original design had included arches to complement the old Davies Building across Bishop Street, but the developers wanted something more distinctive for the new complex. The style that was chosen was referred to as "Brutalism" in the 1960s. This architectural form used overscaled features and rough concrete surfaces (Ames 1996). The rough surfaces give the buildings a more timeless, natural look.  
The Financial Plaza followed the lead of the old Bank of Hawai'i main office across Bishop Street in the use of artwork and plantings. Four major pieces of sculpture and the landscape work of architect Lawrence Halprin were used to soften and humanize an otherwise overassertive architectural environment.  
The project was unique because most of the components were built elsewhere and assembled on site, an innovation for that time (Haight 1998).  
The project was a "test case" of guidelines that became the Comprehensive Zoning Code (Grant 1998). The idea was to encourage ground level pedestrian open space by offering additional building height as an incentive:  
1. The open space on the Bishop Street side of the complex, coupled with a "walk up" fountain, is Downtown's original plaza. It provides welcome relief for bus riders and individuals savoring the outdoors.  
2. The Financial Plaza also has a large covered open space between the three structures, which has been criticized as dark, but which provides a useful refuge from wind and rain. |

Table 5.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 5.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td>Individual private mortgages were originally to be financed with an issue done through the Solomon Brothers brokerage, but that fell through. Kidder, Peabody then agreed to do the permanent financing (Haight 1998). The long term loan was negotiated with an effective overall interest rate of 4.78 per cent. Different owners of the condominium each negotiated their own individual rates with the lender, ranging from 4.6 to 5.25 per cent. The total loan was for $13,000,000 (Midkiff 1965).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entrepreneurship</strong></td>
<td>There were two key individuals: 1. Oceanic President Warren Haight, who did much of the background real estate work and project development. 2. DIA representative Robert Midkiff, who suggested the condominium concept and who acted as facilitator with the owners to get agreement on the kind of project to develop, and with government zoning officials over open space and height proposals (Clark 1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time</strong></td>
<td><strong>Immediate</strong> Approaching the Financial Plaza of the Pacific from either the Bishop or Fort Street sides is a pleasurable experience because of the open space, flowers and works of art. The plumeria plants remind one of Hawaiian gardens, and the weathered look of the concrete is reminiscent of natural lava rock. <strong>The 24 hour Day</strong> The complex was designed for office use, and although operations do occur there after regular business hours, those operations are hidden away. The area is vacant at night, except for people awaiting buses or using the automatic teller machines outside. Fortunately, the automatic teller machines are in a well lit area facing the street. <strong>Decades</strong> The natural look of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific has prevented it from aging architecturally. Castle and Cooke, Ltd. has sold its space to the Bank of Hawai‘i. The complex continues as a prestigious business address. The addition of the Fort Street Mall in 1969 and the development of Pioneer Plaza and its extensive plantings in 1977 have created the impression of one continuous courtyard between the Merchant-Fort area and Bishop Street. The greatest change in the operation of the Financial Plaza has been the addition of parking using the Watkins (old King Theater) property Ewa on King Street. The continuing limited amount of available public parking has made this necessary. The feeling of openness on the Bishop Street side has been expanded by new open space at Tamarind Park and the First Hawaiian Bank Building.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES

TABLE 5.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Legacy</td>
<td>1. The Financial Plaza is a good example of Garvin’s idea of successful planning as a “public action that will produce a sustained and widespread private market reaction.” The Blaisdell Administration, increasingly concerned about Downtown’s future, worked with the DIA to develop a Downtown master plan while the DIA simultaneously worked with the Financial Plaza’s developers. This allowed creative synergy: the projected Mall made it possible for the Financial Plaza plan to work (Haight 1998), and the city was willing to invest in the Mall in order to get that private investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Although it was a private project, the Financial Plaza is a fine example of strategic investment. The project developers wanted to make a statement that business would remain centered in Downtown. Project developers and the DIA made every effort to give this initiative maximum publicity, even referring to it as a “Mini-Rockefeller Center” (R. Midkiff 1980). This deliberately high quality and costly project, backed by prominent members of the business community, had the desired results of increasing the value and potential of properties around it. It sparked other successful real estate investment activities in the immediate vicinity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Downtown as the premiere office center of the state was confirmed, so that Downtown could expect to become a high density, high-rise area. The March, 1969 issue of Hawai‘i Business noted that, “Surprisingly, the high price tags attached to such attractive packages as the Financial Plaza and other Class A office space has proved no deterrent to renters. Apparently the commercial value of prosperous surroundings and a prestigious address offsets the steep fare” (Hawai‘i Business March 1969). City planners could expect that pressure would be strong on Downtown property owners to redevelop because:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The incentives to develop are there. Downtown landowners are aware that if they do not build, someone else outside of the downtown core area will provide office space” (Hawai‘i Business and Industry March 1968a). It was in the interests of Downtown property owners to maintain the development momentum. Owners of less high quality space (Class B and C) would not have as vigorous a market and felt increasing pressure to upgrade their properties. The Alexander Young Hotel property was one such prospect mentioned (Hawai‘i Business March 1969). The Hotel was razed in 1981.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 5.4. (CONTINUED): THE "PLANNING" AND "BUILT" LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Legacy (continued)</td>
<td>4. The project served as a “test case” for the City's new Comprehensive Zoning Code. Open space requirements provided height incentives under the CZC. The Financial Plaza, and subsequent construction under the CZC, such as the Davies Pacific Center (1972), 1164 Bishop (1975) and the Grosvenor Center (1979/81), would transform Downtown from an area limiting pedestrians to narrow sidewalks to an area featuring open space, plantings and fountains. Although not required under Improvement District 80, the developers of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific would provide additional parking beyond the legal minimum. This would set a standard that other projects (i.e., Amfac Center with 930 stalls) would follow (Downtown Improvement Association July 1993). Additional parking proved a wise decision when the City's rapid transit system was twice cancelled. Projects such as the Bishop Trust Building, which did not provide such additional parking, would be at a disadvantage when seeking tenants (Haight 1998).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Built Legacy               | 1. The developers and the DIA were correct in their prediction that there existed great latent demand for Class A space within downtown Honolulu. The project remains a Class A business address, and has incited a list of other projects seeking to use the same formula. Projects erected after the Financial Plaza/Campbell Buildings along Bishop Street included the Amfac Center (1969,72), the Bishop Trust Company (1970), the Davies Pacific Center (1972), the Bishop Square/Pauahi Tower (1983), and First Hawaiian Center (1996) (Dougherty 1988; Ames 1996).  
2. The Bishop Street open space of the Financial Plaza served as a catalyst in creating a “people place” at the corner of Bishop and King Streets. Nearby developers centered their open space there, including Tamarind Park, located in the mauka/Diamond Head corner of the intersection, which added one acre of open space in 1983.  
3. The project also transformed the character of Fort Street makai of King Street, but not in the manner expected. The area redeveloped almost totally into an office complex, with minimal retail operations catering to lunchtime or office supply needs. The open character of both the Financial Plaza and Pioneer Plaza no longer provides demarcation for the Mall, so that the Mall almost "disappears" into the adjacent complexes. |
### TABLE 5.5. FINANCIAL PLAZA OF THE PACIFIC: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of a comprehensive plan to improve investment effectiveness</td>
<td>The DIA's comprehensive plan for Downtown revitalization required access to government decision makers, a first class office facility, and a lively and interesting retail sector. DIA consultant Downs felt that a series of coordinated projects offered greater potential success than any single project could.</td>
<td>Neighborhoods such as Waipahu, suffering from the decline of their core environments, should study the DIA's development of a comprehensive plan to reinvigorate area businesses. Similar ideas could include placing government offices, social service agencies, rapid transit stops, etc., in these locations to develop &quot;critical mass.&quot; Specialized small business could subsequently rebuild by servicing government and transit patrons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business ventures entail taking risks and rely on communication and personal trust between principals. Thus close proximity among firms is an advantage that downtowns can offer businesses.</td>
<td>One of the main reasons for businesses remaining Downtown, according to the DIA, was the need for personal contact. &quot;The specialized functions of Downtown Honolulu require an intensively developed area arranged to enable easy, convenient and direct contact between interrelated economic, business, cultural, professional, and governmental activities&quot; (Downtown Improvement Association 1967). It was through personal relationships that DIA representative R. Midkiff was able to facilitate acceptance of the condominium concept and aid in zoning negotiations with the City (Haight 1998).</td>
<td>Downtown Honolulu again needs the kind of mutual commitment that personal contacts provide. The Fort Street area is again in decline, with F.W. Woolworth's departure leaving a whole block of empty storefronts that undoubtedly is affecting nearby merchants such as Liberty House and Leeds Shoes. A group of business oriented people needs to organize and find a tenant large enough to use that space before the vacancy further negatively impacts nearby businesses.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
CHAPTER 6. THE FORT STREET MALL (PHASE I, 1969)

6.1 GOAL: REVITALIZE DOWNTOWN RETAILING

The purpose of the Fort Street Mall was to revitalize the retail business of downtown Honolulu.

(Midkiff 1998)

Fort Street was the historic premiere shopping location for the city.

6.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The Fort Street Mall is a pedestrian right of way in downtown Honolulu, extending from Nimitz Highway to Beretania Street. The Mall follows the original Fort Street, which extended from the gate of Honolulu Fort inland, and marked the trade route for imported goods into the hinterland and island produced goods to the harbor ships. The Fort Street Mall as first constructed actually extended from Queen to Beretania Streets. It included such features as an underpass at King Street, plazas at King and at Beretania, fountains, overhanging trellises, and a children’s sandbox.


6.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

By the early 1940s, the ability of automobiles to transport anyone anywhere had seriously eroded the popularity of Honolulu’s electric street car system. The street car system’s demise meant that Fort Street was no longer a necessary center of the
transportation network, and as a result, Downtown retail sales and property values began to stagnate while new retail centers developed in Kalihi, Wahiawa, and Kaimuki.

The 1939-44 City of Honolulu Master Plan stated that, “Lack of adequate off-street parking is probably the greatest single problem confronting city officials.” People simply could not find parking easily in the Downtown area and were going elsewhere to shop. The City Planning Commission issued Honolulu’s Master Plan, A Progress Report in January 1941 and expressed concern about the potential loss of Downtown taxation revenues to the City government caused by decentralization of popular retailing habits.

Merchants and property owners tried to find ways to entice people to enter Downtown to shop. The Honolulu Advertiser, on February 14, 1949, noted discussions between the Chamber of Commerce and the City Planning Commission to experiment with a “pedestrian plaza” on Fort Street between Merchant and Pauahi Streets, for a 90 day trial period (Honolulu Advertiser 2/14/1949).

On October 28, 1949 the Honolulu Star Bulletin reported that a preliminary public hearing was to be scheduled before the City Planning Commission for a shopping complex on Dillingham Corporation property along Ala Moana Boulevard (Honolulu Star Bulletin 10/28/1949).

Forty one mauka end retailers banded together as an “Upper Fort Street Shopping Center” in 1957. The retailers placed advertisements in the local papers together declaring “Upper Fort Street Shopping Center: Open Every Night.” Samuel Kramer, owner of Kramer’s Men’s Store on Fort declared, “The idea is to encourage people to show in this area. New shopping areas are springing up and we want people to continue their downtown shopping habits. But you can’t do that by just sitting back. So we formed this Center” (Honolulu Advertiser, 11/28/1957).
Alarmed property owners and retail operators formed the DIA in 1958, "in an effort to keep shopping centers from digging too deeply into downtown business pockets" (Honolulu Star Bulletin, 3/24/1958).


Retail sales declined Downtown from $64 million in 1958 to $55 million in 1963 (Gruen 1968).

6.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION

The leadership of the DIA believed that healthy retail operations would only be possible in the traditional premiere Fort Street location if a series of supporting activities were happening off of Fort Street. Inclusion of a mall Downtown would not be enough to stem the decline in retail activities. Thus issues of parking, access, etc. had to be addressed as part of a large scale plan. Shortly after receiving its charter in 1958, the DIA undertook a series of studies of the Downtown area, centering on economics, land values and overall planning concerns.

Economic Analysis of Downtown Honolulu (1959) by the Western Real Estate Research Corporation. This study made several observations and recommendations.

1. Downtown Honolulu was unable to compete with Waikiki for hotel rooms, and was weak in cultural and entertainment activities.

2. Parking, access and planning needs had direct impacts on potential futures for the CBD.

3. "Oriental" activities in Chinatown could be organized and rebuilt to create "a foreign and exotic atmosphere...similar to the Vieux Carre (the old French Quarter) just off Canal Street in New Orleans" that could become a tourist mecca.
4. The Honolulu CBD could profit from its "virtually unique" proximity to both federal, State and City government decision makers.

5. The Honolulu CBD could provide offices for administrative, technical and engineering firms seeking a base for Pacific operations.

6. There would be a growing need for office space in Honolulu for the foreseeable future, and most of that office space should be located in the CBD.

Central Business District of Honolulu (1959) by Central Business District Consultants. The City Planning Commission, in conjunction with the Honolulu Redevelopment Agency and the DIA, hired four planners in 1961 to develop a master plan for Honolulu. They were Walter Collins from Belt, Collins, and Associates; Donald Wolbrink of Harland Bartholomew and Associates; George Houghtailing for Community Planning Incorporated; and Charles Bennett for Charles Bennett and Associates. Their report graphically displayed the disparity of locations with the highest tax assessment (retail along Fort Street) and those areas receiving recent private investment. This strongly indicated retail decline. The study then called for development of a "retail core" along Fort Street and the areas immediately Ewa near King and Hotel Streets.

Unfortunately, no consensus about area access was reached among the planning group. Two planners (Walter Collins and Donald Wolbrink) suggested creation of a "Circumferential Circulation Plan". Makai and mauka freeways would keep through traffic out of the CBD. Large peripheral streets would carry traffic to parking garages located around expanded city blocks created by closure of smaller interior streets. Fort Street would become a mall from Hotel to Merchant, with connecting malls on Hotel and King. Included were recommendations to institute floor area ratio legislation that would allow developers to trade ground level open space for building height, and creation of a

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Downtown Development Corporation to begin urban renewal Ewa of Nuuanu Avenue in Chinatown.

The two other planners, George Houghtailing and Charles Bennett, wanted to develop a "Linear Circulation Plan" that would speed traffic flow through, rather than around, Downtown. Parking would remain along the perimeter. Hotel Street and Richards Street near Iolani Palace would be widened into divided roadways, while Fort Street would not become a mall. Pedestrian space would be created along Pauahi and Smith Streets.

This lack of consensus by planning experts further confused Downtown merchants, property owners, and the DIA as to what action they should take (Alf Pratte 2/21/1969).

_Honolulu: A Master Plan for the Central Business District_ (1962), by architect Leo S. Wou and planning consultant David Y. C. Tom. The DIA, in another attempt to develop consensus on a master plan, hired Wou and Tom and published the results. The Wou Plan made even more extensive use of malls than did either of the _Central Business District of Honolulu_ plans. Features included:

1. development of extensive pedestrian malls by closure or partial closure of River, Kekaulike, Smith, Bethel, Fort, Alakea, Hotel, Merchant Streets, and Nuuanu Avenue. Only King and Maunakea Streets would remain as through roadways within the CBD.

2. removal of most structures and parts of existing streets, similar to prevailing urban renewal practice, thus providing space for development of extensive new buildings.

3. parking along the periphery.

4. an international center to be constructed next to Nuuanu Stream.
5. a retail shopping complex extending Ewa from Fort Street along the existing Hotel Street right of way.

Economic Trends and Planning for the Central Business District of Honolulu, Hawaii (1963), by UCLA Graduate School of Business Assistant Dean Dr. James Gillies, and Research Analyst C.E. Elias. The Gillies report called the 1962 Wou Plan, “a starting point for such master planning; the plan is imaginative and provides for effective development.” Gillies went on to recommend:

1. a more detailed determination of desired land use and occupation densities be made as part of a comprehensive zoning plan.

2. support for an “Oriental Center” to serve as a cultural focus, provide shopping for local residents interested in Asian products, encourage tourism into the area, and by proximity, help existing businesses.

3. development of a major office complex of approximately 250,000-350,000 square feet. “What is needed to unequivocally dramatize the significance of the Central Business District as the business and financial center of the State is the construction of a major office complex -- a miniature Rockefeller Center for Honolulu” (Gillies 1962).

At about this time other entities besides the DIA were also conducting planning Downtown, concerned about the declining vitality of the CBD:

The Planning Department of the City and County of Honolulu (1962), engaged in planning studies of Downtown, also recommended a pedestrian mall on Fort Street (Gruen 1968).

Landowner Oceanic Properties hired Victor Gruen Associates (1962) to study a four block area centered at King and Fort Streets. The study recommended a pedestrian mall along Fort Street.
The continuing decline in the retail health of the Fort Street area was illustrated by 1966, when Liberty House moved its “Flagship Store” designation to the second phase of the Ala Moana Shopping Center.

DIA President Clarence Ching and Wade McVay of Downtown landowner Campbell Estate (the largest single property owner in the Fort Street area) decided that something had to be done about revitalizing retail activity along Fort Street. Both men contacted Ben Kaito, Chairman of the Honolulu City Council’s Public Works Committee for assistance. The three men then convinced the City Planning Commission to pay for a Fort Street study by Victor Gruen Associates, the firm which had already begun a limited Downtown study for Oceanic Properties, and which had designed the first permanent pedestrian downtown mall at Kalamazoo, Michigan. Victor Gruen Associates recommended that the whole of the CBD undergo study for a comprehensive long-range master plan and revitalization program, of which the proposed Fort Street Mall would be one element.


1. creation of pedestrian “superblocks,” including Nuuanu Avenue-King-Alakea and Beretania Streets.
2. redevelopment of Chinatown also using superblocks, and including apartments.
3. widening of Alakea and Nuuanu Streets to place traffic on the periphery.
4. a rapid transit corridor under Hotel Street.

Specifically for Fort Street, the Gruen Plan recommended:
1. three new parking garages. The first would include the block bounded by Nuuanu Avenue-Beretania-Queen Emma and Kukui Streets; a second on both sides of Maunakea Street between King Street and Nimitz Highway; and the third on the Diamond Head side of Nuuanu Avenue from Pauahi Street to King Street. Existing facilities were to be expanded at Alakea-Richards-Hotel Streets and Kaahumanu Street. The Kaahumanu Street garage expansion would entail removal of portions of Bethel Street, the original Bishop Bank building, and Melcher and Honolulu Police Station structures on Merchant Street.

2. a harborside complex, including a hotel, “ship museum” and restaurants to be created makai of Fort Street, centered on Aloha Tower.

3. pedestrian malls be built along Hotel and Fort Streets. A pedestrian bridge would cross Nimitz Highway from Fort Street to Aloha Tower to facilitate access to the harbor.

4. a major rapid transit station be constructed on Hotel Street between Union Street and Nuuanu Avenue.

5. space for an additional department store be provided on the Ewa side of Fort Street at Beretania Street. (The distance between this new department store site and the existing Liberty House store is appropriately enough, roughly the distance within the Ala Moana Shopping Center, between Sears and Liberty House (Grant 1998).

6. a major office-hotel complex with ground level retail activities on the blocks bounded by Bethel-King-Bishop and Hotel Streets (Gruen 1968).

The DIA formed two committees to deal with immediate issues relating to the proposed mall:

1. A Fort Street Mall Committee consisted of representatives from Castle and Cooke, Oceanic Properties, Hawaiian Trust Company, Sato Clothiers, the O‘ahu
Development Conference, Our Lady of Peace Cathedral, the City and County of Honolulu Department of Public Works, the Honolulu Academy of Arts, and the Council of Downtown Honolulu Merchants. Its Chairman was Richard Wheeler from the Andrade Store mauka of King Street.

2. A Parking Committee had representatives from Bank of Hawai‘i, Campbell Estate, City Bank, and Manoa Finance. The Chairman, David Black, was from the F.W. Woolworth store on the corner of Hotel and Fort Streets.

The DIA committees worked directly with Councilman Ben Kaito of the City Council Public Works Committee; Traffic Engineer William Hong; Planning Director Frank Shriver; and members of the Gruen design team (Downtown Improvement Association February 1969).

The developing close working relationship between DIA President Moses L. Randolph and Honolulu Mayor Neal Blaisdell over issues of Downtown revitalization is well illustrated by a speech given by the Mayor at a DIA luncheon on March 4, 1968. Although the City had not formally adopted the Gruen Plan, the Mayor used the DIA meeting to outline City Administration proposals that followed much of the Gruen Plan. Included were the Fort Street Mall, four multi-deck parking garages, a rapid transit terminal along Hotel Street near Fort, creation of a superblock bounded by Alakea, Nuuanu, Beretania, and King and downtown apartments (Downtown Improvement Association March 1968).

Hawaiian Dredging and Construction Company broke ground for the Fort Street Mall on June 1, 1968, and completed work February 17, 1969. The Mall was dedicated on February 22, 1969 months behind its hoped for Thanksgiving opening date due to unforeseen problems with poorly mapped underground utility lines. The City of Honolulu paid $1,532,841.06 toward the cost of construction, the Board of Water Supply
$25,442.00, and Fort Street property owners $1,208,201.44 (Downtown Improvement Association February 1969).

On April 3, 1969 newly elected Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi, who previously had "voted reluctantly" as a City Councilman in favor of the Fort Street Mall, declared that the City would not be able to finance the Gruen Plan's ambitious parking program. Fasi said he had decided not to award a contract for design work on the next planned City owned parking structure. He explained instead that he wanted to do studies on the proposed rapid transit system before resuming construction of any more parking Downtown (Downtown Improvement Association May 1969c).

DIA President Randolph tried to salvage the plan by suggesting a $27 million bond issue for the parking program. Randolph noted that this would cost only $1 million a year from an area projected to increase its tax valuation by the same amount annually (Downtown Improvement Association May 1969a).

Fasi countered by suggesting that any further parking be developed through public-private participation in mixed use projects in the Kukui area (Downtown Improvement Association May 1969a). Ultimately, both Kukui Plaza and the Chinatown Gateway Plaza would provide public parking within their complexes, but not within the five year time frame hoped for by the DIA.

Meanwhile, operation of the Mall itself became an issue.

The first problem was the use of public property in the same manner as a private shopping mall. As the Mall is public property, regulations governing permissible public behavior are much more loosely defined than those acceptable at private shopping complexes. Examples of this were "street people," whose presence some members of the public found objectionable, and who could legally be removed from private, but not public, property.
Figure 6.1. Opening of the Fort Street Mall in 1969. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.

Figure 6.2. Local high school band plays at the opening of the Fort Street Mall in 1969. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.
Figure 6.3. The Fort Street Mall in 1969, looking Ewa-makai from Beretania Street. Our Lady of Peace Cathedral is on the left. Source: Camera Hawai’i, Inc.

Figure 6.4. The Fort Street Mall in 1969, looking makai near Chaplain Lane. The Ritz Department Store is on the left and the Blaisdell Hotel on the right. Source: Camera Hawai’i, Inc.
Figure 6.5. The Fort Street Mall in 1969, looking mauka toward Hotel Street. Hartfield's is on the left, and F.W. Woolworth's on the right. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.

Figure 6.6. The Fort Street Mall in 1969, looking Ewa-mauka toward its intersection with King Street from a courtyard of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific. Liberty House is the only retail activity that would remain in this area. Source: Camera Hawai'i, Inc.
How, then, could security be improved, so that patrons felt safe? The practice of the Honolulu Police Department to patrol the city in automobiles meant that most of the Mall was difficult to access for the police. Driving police automobiles down the Mall was a hazard for pedestrians. Input from the DIA and businessmen in the area led to the use of foot patrols (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a). Private organizations such as Hawai'i Pacific University, for example, eventually hired their own private security force to walk the Mall fronting school buildings at night, in effect providing backup for the Honolulu Police Department.

The second problem was the use of municipal government in the same manner as a private landlord.

The City and County of Honolulu was simply not organized to perform the specialized functions of private shopping complex owner/managers.

Although the Union Mali predated the Fort Street Mall, the City did not have a well-organized set of rules for mall operations when the Fort Street Mall opened. Declaring that, "Downtown Malls must be managed like shopping centers, or we're going to lose out," DIA representative Richard Wheeler in 1969 suggested that merchants could assist the City in operating the Mall. Wheeler suggested an ordinance to set up a Downtown Malls Commission to consist of two City and County members, two landowners, two land users, and one at-large representative. The proposed commission would have had the power to issue permits for mall use, review and make recommendations for structural changes to frontage buildings, review and make recommendations about signs, establish timetables for repair of public utilities, assist with art acquisition, recommend Mall maintenance policies, and suggest improvements to the appearance of both public and private properties facing the Mall (Downtown Improvement Association May 1969b). The Mayor eventually did appoint a malls
advisory committee, but disbanded it after disagreeing with its recommendations (Loftus 1997).

Unlike Ala Moana Shopping Center, there was no landlord coordinating promotion along the Mall. Mr. Rudy Loftus, last manager of the F.W. Woolworth store, remarked that the decline of Fort Street's retail operations led to the demise of the local merchant association, a volunteer organization of approximately 40 members which had once tried to perform this function (Loftus 1997). The DIA did eventually reach agreement with the City to limit sidewalk sales to four a year, to be held only by businesses fronting the Mall after applying for a permit (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a).

The condition of landscaping, frequency of trash pick up, etc. were a continuing headache, as level of maintenance was unfavorable to that of private shopping centers. Maintenance functions were split between City departments, with Parks and Recreation responsible for trash pickup, the Transportation Services for lights and electrical work, and Public Works for surface replacement (Reid 1998). Merchants often complained that the frequency of work was insufficient, and cleaned the areas in front of their stores themselves (Medeiros 1997).

The Mall ultimately failed to retain the majority of the retailers operating there when it opened. It was the end of any hope for Downtown to retain any sizable portion of O'ahu's regional retailing activity. Most of the merchants who had already opened branches within the Ala Moana Shopping Center, such as Kramer's Mens Wear, the Ritz, Hartfield's, and Sato Clothiers, proceeded to close their Fort Street stores. Others, such as Ming's Jewelry, moved into ground level shops within the new office high-rises. Of the merchants operating along Fort Street in 1969, only four (Miyamoto Jewelers, Medeiros Optician, Kim Chow Shoes, and Liberty House) would still function on the
mauka end of the Mall between Hotel and Beretania Streets by 1998. Only office specialty stores would operate makai of King Street.

6.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT

6.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS

TABLE 6.1. GARVIN'S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders</td>
<td>Despite DIA President Randolph's happiness that &quot;we were able to lay before the City Council letters of consent for this great project signed by three out of four of the Fort Street property owners&quot; (Downtown Improvement Association March 1968), the DIA had not reached consensus with all stakeholders.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Not all landowners and retail establishments welcomed the proposed mall.</td>
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<td>The Roman Catholic Church objected to a $132,334.30 assessment, forced sale of land immediately mauka of the Our Lady of Peace Cathedral for creation of a pedestrian plaza, and loss of vehicle rights for social functions at the Cathedral front (Hawai'i Business and Industry May 1968).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The owner of the Blaisdell Hotel, Attorney Arthur Spitzer, complained that the Mall blocked access to his property, sued the City over his $47,415.95 assessment, and won (Honolulu Advertiser 11/27/1969).</td>
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<td>Several small business owners such as the Medeiros Optician owners fought the project, feeling that Mall development would make them less visible to potential customers, make access even more difficult due to removal of parking, and represented additional expense, i.e., the assessments passed through to them by the landowners (Medeiros 1997).</td>
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<td>2. The DIA had not reached accommodation with Fasi, a likely strong candidate for the position of Mayor. Before and during the election, the DIA was heavily promoting its agenda. When Fasi became Mayor, his first speech to the DIA contained the theme &quot;Don't ever try to pressure the Office of Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu&quot; (Downtown Improvement Association May 1969c).</td>
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Table 6.1 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 6.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot</td>
<td>The major exit of established shops from Fort Street did not occur until after the Mall was completed. Many retailers had remained after Ala Moana’s retail competition with Downtown began, hedging their bets by opening branches at Ala Moana, and hoping that business would pick up Downtown once the Mall was in operation. The constant comparison in the press between the design of the Mall and that of the Ala Moana Shopping Center created unreasonable expectations of what was becoming a much more localized (and specialized) retail operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accomplish</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Understanding how physical changes to the urban</td>
<td>The creation of the Fort Street Mall did not create a sustainable, revitalized retail sector as hoped by the DIA. The Mall instead provided: 1. a pedestrian entrance and corridor into Downtown, utilized daily by thousands of workers on their way to and from surface parking facilities in the Kukui area and Downtown. 2. a Downtown pedestrian oasis. The length of the Mall allowed different sections to develop their own individual character, complementing surrounding activities and architecture. The open spaces between office buildings on the makai side of the Mall were successful enough to be copied by other developments, including extension of the Mall itself to Nimitz Highway.</td>
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<tr>
<td>environment can improve the economy, quality of</td>
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<tr>
<td>life, and city function</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creating positive change and preventing negative</td>
<td>Create Positive Change The Mall succeeded in creating positive change in ways not imagined by its original proponents. Along Beretania Street, subsequent federal rehabilitation tax policies have restored buildings that, combined with the open space of the Mall, have created a pleasant urban campus for a new kind of business -- Hawai’i Pacific University. Makai of King Street, the new Campbell and Pioneer Plaza complexes held little retail space. Only between Hotel and King Street did general retailing spark sizable new construction (Liberty House and F.W. Woolworth). Prevent Negative Change The Mall prevented negative change by creating a focal point for HPU development in the area hardest hit by declining retail activity (near Beretania). While this was not the high end retail hoped for, the growth of HPU prevented empty storefronts and assured structure maintenance.</td>
</tr>
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<td>change</td>
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### TABLE 6.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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| Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending | **Positive effects of Investment**  
Strategic investment by the City and County of Honolulu had positive effects.  
1. In 1952 the City had created Improvement District 80 which assessed property owners for funds to create off street parking lots (Reid 1998). These public lots, although never enough, contributed to accessibility for Fort Street retail customers at a time when parking was increasingly difficult.  
2. In 1961 a study, eighty per cent financed by the DIA, confirmed the need for additional public off street parking Downtown. The City responded with development of three parking structures at Richards-Alakea, Kaahumanu-Nimitz, and Smith-Maunakea. The November, 1961 *Data* happily remarked that the three lots represented “a 125% increase in City garage facilities in an 18 month period” (Downtown Improvement Association November 1961).  
3. Honolulu’s Mayor Blaisdell’s pledge in March 1968 for a $60 million series of public parking structures Downtown, projected with the development of the Fort Street Mall, was enthusiastically welcomed by Downtown landowners and merchants. Randolph remarked that month in the DIA newsletter that such government support was important:  
   The real test of the efficacy of our partnership with our city government is the tremendous confidence physically expressed by private enterprise on the construction of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific, the start of construction of the new Hawaiian Telephone Company Building, the announcement of a huge building project by Amfac, Inc. (Amfac Center) at the foot of the Fort Street Mall, and the completion of the Campbell building.”  
   (Downtown Improvement Association March 1968)  
4. Projected development of the Fort Street Mall “made the Financial Plaza work” (Haight 1998). Parking necessary to the successful development of the Financial Plaza was located in the Campbell Building across the Mall. The Mall helped unify the projects both architecturally and functionally. |

Table 6.2 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 6.2. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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| Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending (continued) | **Negative Effects Caused by a Lack of Strategic Investment:** Just as strategic investment brought about positive change within the Fort Street area, conversely a lack of strategic investment had a number of negative impacts:  
  1. The slowdown in the City parking program by Mayor Fasi and the cancellation of the Honolulu Area Rapid Transit (HART) by the following Mayor, Eileen Anderson, meant that two of the three elements designed by the Gruen Plan to support Downtown retailing would not exist. The number of potential retail customers patronizing Downtown merchants would be dependent upon the bus and the limited number of existing parking stalls. This had major effects on Fort Street retail activities.  
    First, the movement from general into specialty retailing was accelerated.  
    Office workers shopping on their lunch hour represented the largest single source of customers. Mr. Rudy Loftus, last Manager of the downtown F.W. Woolworth store in 1987 estimated that sixty-seven per cent of his store’s business occurred between 11:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. (Loftus 1997).  
    Bus patrons, shopping on their way home, would NOT be looking for large or bulky items.  
    HPU students, who catered mostly to ethnic restaurants on the mauka side of the Mall.  
    Local area residents doing convenience shopping.  
  Second, the movement of the remaining high end retail operators off Fort Street and into ground level space in the new office towers rapidly increased. The 1960 Central Business District of Honolulu report had shown the growing physical separation of the original retail core from new office development within Downtown. Stores such as Ming’s Jewelry simply followed their customers. The single major exception, Liberty House, was sufficiently close to the financial institutions and between the two major bus stops in the Downtown area to warrant reconstruction (Gray 1997).  
  Third, the lack of additional public parking led to an increasing dependence upon private development for parking Downtown. By September, 1996, eighty-five per cent of all parking would be privately owned (Downtown Improvement Association September 1996). Many developers, such as that of the Amfac Center, would deliberately build more parking than the Comprehensive Zoning Code and Improvement District 80 required. Additional parking helped make properties prestige addresses, and allowed developers to charge lessees |

Table 6.2 is continued on the next page.
### TABLE 6.2. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

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<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending (continued)</strong></td>
<td>higher rents. Unfortunately, such parking stock was usually in the office areas and not near the Mall, further disadvantaging Mall retail activities. No restrooms were built on the Mall, as plans were to include them within nearby City parking garages. However, no such facilities were actually ever built. This put the Mall at a supreme disadvantage compared to privately owned retail complexes. The children's sandbox became an impromptu toilet by night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Character of the Area</strong>&lt;br&gt;The Mall transformed Fort Street into a safe haven for pedestrians. The pace of movement slowed down as pedestrians no longer had to dodge cars while crossing the street. <strong>Lessen Private Investment Risk</strong>&lt;br&gt;The Mall was constructed to help the Downtown merchants compete favorably with those located at private shopping complexes. Unfortunately, two challenges were uncovered with the completion of the Mall:&lt;br&gt;1. The attempted use of public property (Fort Street) in the same manner as a private shopping mall was not successful. Unlike projects such as the Aloha Tower Marketplace, which lease the entire project property from the government, the Fort Street Mall proprietors did not control their project frontage. Thus they did not control the shopping environment.&lt;br&gt;2. The attempted use of municipal government in the same manner as a private landlord. As mentioned earlier, the City and County of Honolulu was not organized to perform the specialized functions of private shopping complex owner/managers, and thus could not respond in like time to perform those functions.&lt;br&gt;These two disadvantages, along with access problems, discouraged commuters from utilizing Fort Street as a regional shopping complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives for desired private development</strong></td>
<td>Several incentives were offered to commercial establishments operating along the Fort Street Mall:&lt;br&gt;1. As mentioned earlier, the City Improvement District 80, adopted in 1952, exempted the Fort Street area (and much of Downtown) from regular parking requirements.&lt;br&gt;2. The City's financial contributions toward development and maintenance of the Fort Street Mall was meant to attract shoppers to retail operations in the area.</td>
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### TABLE 6.3. GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Market</strong></td>
<td>Two markets were the target of the 1969 Mall development:</td>
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<td>1. Office workers from the new high-rises proliferating Downtown.</td>
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<td>2. As many of the old island wide customer groups as could be accommodated by access constraints.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th><strong>Inherent Site Characteristics</strong></th>
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<td>Upon the opening of the Mall in 1969, Fort Street could boast an excellent collection of retail stores such as Long’s Drugs, F.W. Woolworth, Liberty House, etc. within walking distance of each other.</td>
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<td><strong>Proximity</strong></td>
<td>Fort Street merchants operating in 1969 faced a number of distinct disadvantages:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1. While Fort Street still could boast excellent bus connections throughout the island, the lack of parking and the limiting nature of nearby roadways made access a major problem.</td>
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<td>2. The center of activity Downtown was also shifting away from Fort Street toward the State Capitol and major high-rise corporations along Bishop Street. The high-rise buildings also offered retail activities on their ground floors, with parking usually provided.</td>
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<td>3. Fort Street, located within Downtown, increasingly suffered from a popular conception as an area of decaying buildings, street people, etc.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design</th>
<th>The 1969 Mall design:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. made extensive use of light tan concrete. Thirty seven overhead light posts and four trellises were also made of the same material.</td>
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<td>2. contained a series of features that proved hard to maintain, including a children’s sandbox and a low rise fountain near Pauahi Street.</td>
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<td>3. used false olive trees to provide shade, but such plants also gave off material that was tracked into stores, forcing constant cleaning of floors.</td>
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<td>4. contained two mini “plazas,” one at Beretania and one at King Street. (It is ironic that the King Street plaza was the site of the major McInerny’s Department Store, torn down for a mall designed to aid retailing).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. had an underpass, complete with another fountain, which carried pedestrians under King Street traffic. Because pedestrians were eventually allowed to cross King Street at ground level, the underpass gradually became abandoned. A petroglyph mural by artist Ed Stasack was located in the underpass (Downtown Improvement Association February 1969; Reid 1997).</td>
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Table 6.3 is continued on the next page.
### TABLE 6.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
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<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>The 1969 Mall was financed by $1,208,201.44 in direct assessments to adjoining property owners, and $1,532,841.06 in taxes from the City (Downtown Improvement Association February 1969). Maintenance was to be provided through the regular City operating budget. Maintenance levels soon, however, came into question by merchants and landowners along the Mall.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Although earlier DIA President Clarence Ching, Wade McVay of the Campbell Estate and Ben Kaito of the City Council had major input into the project, it was DIA President M. L. Randolph (also of the Campbell Estate) who was most closely associated with the 1969 project (Downtown Improvement Association February 1969).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td><strong>Immediate</strong>&lt;br&gt;The Mall served two main purposes:&lt;br&gt;1. a pedestrian corridor between Downtown offices and Hotel Street bus stops or parking in the Kukui area.&lt;br&gt;2. a specialized retail area for Downtown office workers, bus patrons, HPU students and a small but growing Downtown residential population.&lt;br&gt;In 1969, each Mall block created a different sense of place.&lt;br&gt;Between Beretania and Pauahi Streets, the Mall was graced by Our Lady of Peace Cathedral and small shops within the aging Model Progress Block.&lt;br&gt;Between Pauahi and Hotel Streets, the Ritz sold wedding dresses and other formal wear, Kress operated a “five and dime” store complete with soda fountain, and the Kramer and Hub stores carried men’s clothing. Children would play in a long low fountain and a sandbox while their parents and retirees watched nearby.&lt;br&gt;Between Hotel and King Streets, F.W. Woolworth was another “five and dime” store that also sold a variety of local foods, Andrade retailed clothing, Hartfield’s had its usual large displays of women’s attire, and Liberty House carried the highest fashion goods.&lt;br&gt;From King to Merchant Streets, the Bank of Hawai‘i and American Savings occupied their high-rise buildings within the Financial Plaza, while travel agencies and other financial institutions operated out of a series of small structures on the Ewa side.&lt;br&gt;Along Fort from Merchant to Queen Street, the dignified old Judd and Brewer complexes contrasted with the new Campbell Building across the Mall. The Mall itself had become a quiet pedestrian path rarely used for anything but access to elsewhere.&lt;br&gt;<strong>The 24 Hour Day</strong>&lt;br&gt;Although the Mall opened with great fanfare, potential patrons increasingly shopped elsewhere. Store operating hours shortened and during weekends, evenings and nights the Mall was increasingly deserted.</td>
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### TABLE 6.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

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<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<td>Time (continued)</td>
<td>Decades</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Mall failed in its purpose of retaining a regional retail presence. Meanwhile, over the years the Mall suffered from inadequate maintenance. Surface paving began to disintegrate under heavy pedestrian traffic, trees and shrubs were unkempt or died, the irrigation system failed, and lights became inoperable. The King Street underpass became abandoned. By the 1980s Downtown merchants, landowners and the DIA were actively pressing the City to renovate the Mall and hire a private maintenance contractor to improve the Mall’s appearance. The DIA and City negotiated about potential new assessments to provide the necessary funding, but the maintenance issue could not be resolved. The City Department of Housing and Community Development rebuilt the Mall in 1993 using solely City funds (Reid 1998).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.5.2 THE "PLANNING" AND "BUILT" LEGACIES

### TABLE 6.4. THE "PLANNING" AND THE "BUILT" LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Legacy</td>
<td>The 1950s saw work begun on the first General Plan for the City and County of Honolulu (Atwater 1995). The DIA was a strong advocate of such master planning, and the Fort Street Mall was meant to be a major beneficiary of that planning. The studies undertaken by the DIA were never officially adopted by the City, but would contribute to the Downtown that citizens of Honolulu know in 1998. Economic Analysis of Downtown Honolulu (1959) by the Western Real Estate Corporation noted Downtown’s potential as an office center and Pacific area business headquarters. Downtown’s unique location near government decision makers and Chinatown also offered potential benefits. Central Business District of Honolulu (1959) by Central Business Consultants did confuse its patrons with its conflicting “Circumferential Circulation” and “Linear Circulation” Plans. Elements of the Circumferential Circulation Plan suggested a mauka freeway to keep through traffic out of Downtown, and malls and floor area ratio legislation that traded height for ground level open space to create a more pedestrian environment. The Linear Circulation Plan also included pedestrian malls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4 is continued on the next page.
### TABLE 6.4: (CONTINUED): THE “PLANNING” AND THE “BUILT” LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Planning Legacy** (continued) | *Honolulu: A Master Plan for the Central Business District* (1962), by Leo Wou and David Tom suggested an international center along Nuuanu Stream, a Fort Street retail complex, and office development adjacent to the Civic Center.  
*Economic Trends and Planning for the Central Business District* (1963) by Dr. James Gillies and C.E. Elias, recognized that Downtown’s retail supremacy was over, and recommended an Oriental Center in the Kukui area.  
*Report of the Studies and Recommendations for a Program of Revitalization of the Central Business District of Downtown Honolulu* (1968) by Victor Gruen Associates was the plan most utilized by the City and DIA. The Gruen organization developed the plan utilizing ideas from previous DIA studies and experience gathered on the mainland while pioneering the conversion of other downtown streets into shopping malls (Grant 1998). The Gruen Plan features that impacted the Fort Street area included:  
1. a commercial core superblock, bounded by Nuuanu Avenue, Nimitz Highway, Beretania and Richards Streets.  
2. mixed use projects.  
3. a rapid transit alignment through Downtown.  
4. housing in both Chinatown and the Kukui area.  
5. incentive zoning.  
6. use of horizontal property acts (condominium law) for commercial and residential development.  
7. extension of the Fort Street Mall to Nimitz Highway.  
8. development of a tourist-oriented, water transportation oriented, information center at the Aloha Tower.  
9. retention of vistas (Gruen 1968).  
As of 1998 the prospect of a central rapid transit system station along Hotel between Union Street and Nuuanu Avenue continues to offer the most potential for future area growth. |
| **Built Legacy**               | The Fort Street Mall after 1969 was a pedestrian refuge in the city, made interesting and diverse by its length. The 1969 design invoked an outdoor suburban shopping center with its squared concrete designs, fountains and children’s sandbox. The area became increasingly bleak as access difficulties caused the number of shoppers to decline. Stores such as the Ritz, Sato Clothiers, Kress, Watamull’s, and Hartfield’s moved out, and discount and hamburger purveyors moved in. Litter problems increased. Physical maintenance declined as the Mall’s surface deteriorated; water fountains, music speakers and lighting units became inoperable and were not replaced; and unforeseen problems created in increasing numbers of “street people” created unsanitary conditions. |

Table 6.4 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 6.4. (CONTINUED): THE "PLANNING" AND THE "BUILT" LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Built Legacy (continued)</td>
<td>The Mall also developed separate characters, depending upon structures immediately adjacent to it. Between Beretania and Pauahi Streets during the first years of its existence the Mall increasingly served only as a transit corridor between parking lots in the Kukui and the Financial Districts. The small square at Beretania Street was mostly unutilized and the nearby Model Progress Block continued to deteriorate. Changes in federal tax rules encouraging building renovation and the growth of Hawaii Pacific University slowly changed the area into an urban college campus where students socialized on the Mall's benches. Within the Pauahi to Hotel Street area, the small fountain near Thom McAn Shoes and the sandbox near Kress increasingly belonged to the homeless. The area became a public toilet, avoided by the patrons it was supposed to serve. Small service businesses remained along the Ewa side, while the bigger retailers such as Ritz, Kress, Kramers and the Hub moved out. The Ritz and Kress buildings were demolished for the Pan Pacific Plaza. The Hub location became a McDonald's. Along Fort from Hotel to King Street, the location of bus stops on both Hotel and King and the popularity of the Liberty House and F.W. Woolworth stores kept the area much more active and clean. Groups of retirees continued to relate their stories to each other while sitting on benches near the F.W. Woolworth entrance. The King Street underpass was eventually closed to the public. The underpass had never been handicap accessible, and thus the ground level crossing had been restored. The public simply ignored the underpass, preferring the speed and personal safety of a visible ground level crossing. From King to Merchant Street, the open entrance of Pioneer Plaza, coupled with the similar space in the Financial Plaza of the Pacific, removed any effective visual demarcation lines between the Mall and adjacent private property. The Mall became an indistinguishable area between two private developments. Fort from Merchant to Queen Street featured more trees than any other portion of the Mall and was farthest from the center of Mall activity. It became a quiet refuge for office workers seeking to get outside for a lunch spent sitting on any of the numerous benches available. This area would remain virtually unchanged, except for the renovation of the Judd Building, for the next twenty years.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 6.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

**TABLE 6.5. THE FORT STREET MALL (PHASE I): LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Often only the intensification of a problem forces involved parties to organize, develop consensus and create an action plan.</td>
<td>Downtown's retail activities had slowly worsened since the 1930s. The impending opening of the Ala Moana Shopping Center was the catalyst that sparked first the formation of the Upper Fort Street Shopping Center by merchants in 1957 and then the Downtown Improvement Association by mostly landowners in 1958.</td>
<td>Honolulu's worsening traffic situation may push the costs to all parties for lost time, gasoline, vehicle maintenance and air pollution so high that an alternative to automobile dependency could be demanded by the majority of the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in political administrations can readily affect timetables and commitments. Citizen organizations must be prepared to invest considerable amounts of time in explaining the reasons for their positions in order to “win over” present and potential government officials.</td>
<td>Just as Mayor Fasi was unwilling to commit himself to the Blaisdell parking program, so too was Mayor Anderson unwilling to continue the Fasi HART project.</td>
<td>Critical local government projects such as rapid transit need to become more “bipartisan” and less identified with individual politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive planning, when not combined with adequate financing and administrative follow through, will fail to produce the results desired. Project developers must be “up front” in acknowledging this. Master planning thus is not simply “larger scale area planning,” but must include “long term commitment” to the plan itself.</td>
<td>The 1969 Mall, a Downtown retail center dependent upon outside customers, was bucking the popular trend toward suburban merchandising. Without additional parking and the rapid transit system the Mall as a regional shopping complex was simply doomed.</td>
<td>Honolulu’s on-again, off-again rapid transit system is an example of difficulties encountered in initial development and long term commitment. It has been suggested that the program be split into phases in order to lower initial costs. It must be understood that construction of succeeding phases will be necessary for the project to provide the maximum potential ridership benefits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 6.5. (CONTINUED): THE FORT STREET MALL (Phase I): LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
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<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Today when government resources are limited and financing projects often requires joint government-private participation, questions of project operation and maintenance must be better addressed prior to project development. This should involve contractual obligations between all parties.</td>
<td>Many operational problems between the City and the owner/merchants were not resolved before the Mall was constructed. This included security, waste removal, maintenance of equipment, etc.</td>
<td>Any privatization of State small boat harbors should explicitly spell out the operational roles and obligations of the private entity contracted by the State, the State itself, and the future of government workers currently working at those locations. It should be recognized that the private entity may wish greater operational latitude than possible in the past.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 7. KUKUI GARDENS (1970)

7.1 GOAL: BRING HOUSING BACK DOWNTOWN

Some 10,000 people will be relocated from currently planned renewal areas. Present plans call for the entire area Waikiki of the River and makai of Vineyard to be zoned "commercial". DIA contends that renewal areas should be substantially in multi-family housing for people.

(Downtown Improvement Association September 1961b)

7.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The Kukui Gardens is an 822 unit low-rise rental project developed by the Clarence Ching Foundation, located on former Honolulu Redevelopment Agency lands bounded by Liliha, King, Beretania, A'ala, Kukui, and River Streets, and Vineyard Boulevard. The project was developed as "gap group" housing – meant to benefit renters who earned too much income to qualify for traditional public housing, but who were unable to afford market price residences. The project utilized funding from the Ford Foundation and loan guarantees from the federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD’s Section 8185 D3 guaranteed the mortgage, allowing a lower interest rate that, in turn, lowered necessary rental levels for residents of Kukui Gardens.

7.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

After World War II Honolulu mauka of Beretania Street could best be described as a high density, low-rise area of dilapidated buildings – a prime site for the “bulldozer” urban renewal projects that were increasingly popular among city governments across the United States.

The Honolulu Redevelopment Agency (HRA), organized in 1949 under the Territorial Urban Renewal Act, undertook this role of community redevelopment. The HRA would identify areas it felt were blighted beyond redemption, purchase (or condemn) the property, relocate occupants, and clear the land. The HRA then acted as a packager and coordinator for developers, typically selling the land at its own cost or at a loss, while retaining review and approval rights to the subsequent project for a stated number of years. The HRA ultimately cleared 73.8 acres in the Queen Emma Project, 75 acres in Kukui, 30 acres in Kauluwela, and 4 acres in A'ala (Hawai'i Industry April 1962b), uprooting thousands of people from their neighborhoods and leveling hundreds of structures.

The Honolulu Redevelopment Agency was described by Hawai'i Business Magazine as:

a product of the first generation of thinking about urban renewal – concerned more with the problems of clearing slums than with building new housing. HRA itself has lacked the necessary legal powers to develop housing, and has had to enlist private enterprise to build the approximately 5,000 housing units completed or in progress on redevelopment lands.

(Hawai'i Business June 1973)
HRA manager Ray Fisher in 1973 described the problems faced by the HRA in disposing of the consolidated properties:

...families were moving out to the suburbs, where new housing and shopping centers were being built. When you started talking about urban renewal in those days, you really had problems. People were reluctant to build in the City core because they had little faith in renewal of the surrounding area.

(Hawai'i Business June 1973)

Melvin Shinn, former manager of the HRA, noted that had the HRA been successful in redeveloping its Kukui property in the early 1960s, there is little likelihood that the area would have gone into housing for displaced residents. Following prevailing practice, the HRA planned commercial zoning for most of the redevelopment areas, because commercial activity "was thought to be the key to rejuvenation of failing urban centers" (Hawai'i Business June 1973). The lack of market interest in the land was exemplified by large vacant lots and the erection of the low-rise development of funeral homes known as "mortuary row" along Kukui Street.

Honolulu's chronic housing shortage encouraged redevelopment of the area as a series of high density residential complexes. Yet the public was "wary of high-rise, low income projects because of the difficulties with the Hawai'i Housing Authority's high-rise public housing project, Kuhio Park Terrace" (Hostetler 1970).

The HRA's first effort at high-rise residential development near Downtown began as a request for proposals in 1960. Meant as a demonstration project of what urban renewal could do, the effort became the showpiece 581 unit Queen Emma Apartments. Completed in 1964, the Queen Emma Apartments was a joint project of Oceanic Properties and E.E. Black, and designed by well-known architect Minoru Yamasaki (who
also did New York City’s World Trade Center. The $12.5 million dollar project was possible because of HRA land acquisition, consolidation, infrastructure and land sales policies, and offered studio, one and two bedroom units. It did not aim to rehouse the original area inhabitants, but was successful in attracting 1,500 people to live immediately adjacent to Downtown (Hawai‘i Business and Industry June 1964).

The introduction of new Federal Housing Administration programs in 1961 provided the HRA with additional housing options for its lands near Downtown. The National Housing Act Section 221 (d) (3) provided federal mortgage loan guarantees that allowed the borrower access to Below Market Interest Rates (BMIR) on the mortgage because the lender’s risk of a loan default was lower. This in turn lowered overall costs and allowed the borrower to charge lower rents. During the life of the mortgage, the FHA would then monitor project maintenance costs and rental income. The 221 (d) (3) program would be used by two organizations in Honolulu to develop extensive housing near Downtown – the Hawai‘i Council for Housing Action (HCHA) in the Kauluwela Project, and the Clarence Ching Foundation in the Kukui District (Hawai‘i Business June 1970).

7.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION

The DIA’s desire for integrated land use planning had called for the return of housing to Downtown. As early as 1961 the Newsletter had recommended the use of the Kukui area for high density residences.

Clarence Ching, DIA President in 1966, was an island born developer, known for residential and industrial projects in the Honolulu Airport, Salt Lake and Moanalua Gardens areas. Tight financial conditions in 1966 had encouraged him to look at Section 221 (d) (3) as a source of funds for apartment construction. Over a period of 22
months, Ching worked with the FHA on his 700 unit Moanalua Hillside development, the first large project in Hawai‘i to use the program. Federal regulations limited his profit there to six per cent (Hawai‘i Business and Industry 1968d and Hawai‘i Business June 1970).

Ching felt confident enough in his relationship with the FHA that he made an application in 1966 for a HRA project to be built mauka of Downtown which became Kukui Gardens. The Kukui Gardens project was organized to accommodate “gap group” renters earning ninety-five per cent of the median area family income (Gota 1998), using Section 221 (d) (3).

As part of his application for the Kukui Gardens project, Ching notified the HRA of his intention to create the Clarence T. C. Ching Foundation. This Foundation, as a tax exempt charitable trust, would act as developer. Ching would guarantee the Bank of Hawai‘i $400,000 of his own funds to secure the Foundation a loan for a similar amount. Those funds would be used as start up capital for the project.

Another new entity, Kukui Gardens Corporation, would actually own the project. Kukui Gardens Corporation would be governed by a fifteen member board made up of five members from Chaminade College, five from St. Louis High School, and five from the Clarence T. C. Ching Foundation (Hong 1998). During the life of the project mortgage, rental income and expenses would be monitored by the FHA to ensure low rents to residents, maintain proper reserves, and provide cost containment. The forty year mortgage note allowed prepayment/payoff after twenty years. Once the mortgage ended, the three organizations would no longer be bound by FHA guidelines, and any income from the project would be utilized by the three governing entities (Gota 1998). It was estimated that Ching would lose $500,000 in potential profit because of the non-profit arrangement (Cook 1967).
Figure 7.1. A central pedestrian pathway within Kukui Gardens in 1998, looking makai. The stairs on either side provide private entrances to upper units. Source: Author.

Figure 7.2. Kukui Gardens from the distance, looking mauka, in 1998. In the immediate foreground are amenities of the adjacent Beretania Park. Source: Author.
Both the Hawai‘i Council for Housing Action and Ching submitted proposals to the HRA for the Kukui site. The project required a minimum of 800 units on the 21 acre site (40 units per acre) (Honolulu Advertiser 1/14/1970).

Ching’s architects devised a design for 822 housing units. The majority of the apartments would be in three story low-rise buildings. The remaining four structures would be six stories in height. Ching’s architects felt that low-rise buildings were desirable because of popular disillusionment with high-rise public housing projects in Kalihi. Low-rise buildings could also be built for less cost (Honolulu Advertiser 1/14/1970). There were to be one, two, three and four bedroom units, with over fifty percent of the units to consist of three and four bedrooms to accommodate families (Ching 1966).

The Hawai‘i Council for Housing Action’s proposal called for one ten story building and three eleven story buildings, with the remainder of the complex consisting of two and three story structures. The HCHA proposal offered a total of 779 units at a cost per unit $500 higher than Ching’s $17,800. Estimated rentals would have averaged $9 a month higher than Ching’s $77-$155 range (Honolulu Advertiser 1/14/1970).

Although the HRA favored the Hawai‘i Council for Housing Action design, Ching’s proposal won because it had more units, could be built for less cost per unit, and was low-rise (Hostetler 1970).
7.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT

7.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS

TABLE 7.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders</td>
<td>The Honolulu Redevelopment Agency was under great public pressure to utilize the vacant site left from HRA clearance activities, to provide housing for individuals and families displaced by redevelopment, and to provide “gap group” housing for those unable to qualify for previous government housing programs. Thus from inception the project underwent intense scrutiny from federal, State and City agencies. Only former area residents displaced within the previous two years were promised a project unit, while earlier displacees were not. The project also became a political issue between then State Governor John Burns who supported the project, and his rivals within the Democratic Party, Honolulu Mayor Frank Fasi and State Lieutenant Governor Thomas Gill. The latter two individuals described the project when under construction as having the potential to be “another noisy and unpleasant slum” (Honolulu Advertiser 1/14/1970). Criticisms of the project decreased when it was disclosed that 3,000 names had been placed on waiting lists for the 822 units (Honolulu Advertiser 1970d). Criticism of the project’s design also lessened later in 1970 when the project won an American Institute of Architects award for its design (Honolulu Star Bulletin and Advertiser 11/15/1970).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish</td>
<td>The project proponents knew that they could not solve Honolulu’s chronic affordable housing shortage, but they did address the needs of families and the “gap group.” The project was designed to avoid what its promoters felt were many of the mistakes of the past. Although massive in scope (822 units), Kukui Gardens contains no buildings over six stories. Large units, individual addresses, distinctive architectural touches, community facilities and a broader mixture of income groups were all used to attract families, create community and avoid stereotyping residents. If demand is any indication, the project remains successful.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 7.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish (continued)</td>
<td>The developers also wanted to create housing near Downtown to provide economic support for area businesses. Kukui Gardens offered retailers 3,000 potential new customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function</td>
<td>Kukui Gardens replaced what was widely regarded as the city's worse slum, and the wasteland left by HRA land clearance. While the HRA did attempt to house former area residents in the new facility, unfortunately records apparently were poor and only a small percentage of such individuals returned to the area. The new facility offered residents fire proof structures, community facilities, a park, and large units to accommodate families. Provision of housing near major bus routes and Downtown provided residents with employment opportunities. Housing 3,000 individuals in the central city area potentially lessened their commute and removed a large number of vehicles from the city streets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination of how the project or program in question has created positive change and prevented negative change</td>
<td><strong>Positive Change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The project created positive change by removing a windswept wasteland and supplying badly needed housing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kukui Gardens, by only providing an upper limit on residential income, created a non-stigmatized public housing project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kukui Gardens, along with the higher income Queen Emma Gardens project, furnished Downtown retail merchants with a broader customer base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Prevent Negative Change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kukui Gardens, by filling a vacant wasteland, prevented the use of the area as a dump and isolated site for crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation of the area helped to keep businesses along Liliha Street from further decline when the original area inhabitants were relocated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 7.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending</td>
<td>The HRA condemned and consolidated the 19.5 acre site, and then sold it to the developer. Provided were construction of the A’ala Street extension into the project area, and construction or upgrading of Vineyard Boulevard, Liliha, King and Beretania Streets along the project’s perimeter. Also included was development of Beretania Park along A’ala Street.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk | **Character of an Area**  
Originally a collection of high density, low-rise, antiquated wooden structures, the initial HRA urban renewal action had turned the area into a windswept wasteland.  
The new project emphasized internal neighborhoods by placing parking on the perimeter, and use of distinctive plantings and architectural features. The low-rise housing character of Kukui Gardens complements the same low-rise housing development immediately mauka of Vineyard Boulevard. Much of the district continues as a collection of low-rise concrete structures.  
**Lessen Private Investment Risk**  
The HRA’s Queen Emma Project had demonstrated the demand for larger apartment units near Downtown (Hawai'i Business and Industry June 1964). This demand determined the greater number of large units to be built in the Kukui Gardens project.  
The use of Section 221 (d) (3) lowered investment costs to the developer.  
The public support of the Governor of Hawai'i, John Burns, also expedited the project. |
| Incentives for desired private development      | Section 221 (d) (3) offered developers two major incentives.  
1. Government financing to build housing in times of restricted capital availability, as Ching had used in 1966 for his Moanalua Hillside project, helped developers avoid the "peaks and valleys" problem common to development.  
2. Developers could utilize federal housing assistance to lower costs during the life of the mortgage, and eventually own the development "free and clear" once the mortgage had been paid off. |
### TABLE 7.3. GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Market</strong></td>
<td>Honolulu's chronic housing shortage had hit the &quot;gap group&quot; especially hard. This group earned too much to be eligible for traditional housing assistance, but could not afford market housing. Especially hard hit were families. The demand was well represented within the 3,000 families on the waiting list for the 822 units available when the project opened (Honolulu Advertiser 5/29/1970b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td><strong>Inherent Site Characteristics</strong>&lt;br&gt;Kukui Gardens is located on a gently sloping 19.5 acre site.<strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Proximity&lt;br&gt;The project is within walking distance of Downtown, and on major bus routes.</strong>&lt;br&gt;A State developed high-rise apartment building for senior citizens is located nearby at Beretania and A'ala Streets, offering a mixture of lifestyles to the neighborhood.</strong>&lt;br&gt;Unfortunately, the development is also adjacent to Kukui Street, which has become a &quot;drive by&quot; route for crimes such as prostitution and drugs. The project has erected high fencing along College Walk and other nearby streets.**&lt;br&gt;The U shape of the development, surrounding Beretania Park on three sides, combined with the fencing along Vineyard, Liliha, King and Beretania Streets, provides additional security to the Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
<td>The project consists of mostly three story structures, with four buildings built to six floors. Parking is on the periphery, so that unit access is by foot. Each unit has its own address, and cross ventilation. Nine neighborhood courts exist with distinctive architectural finishes, plantings and play equipment. A community meeting and day care center are adjacent to the public park (Honolulu Star Bulletin and Advertiser 11/15/1970).&lt;br&gt;The project consists of the following types of units:&lt;br&gt;1. 105 one bedroom/one bath&lt;br&gt;2. 302 two bedroom/one bath&lt;br&gt;3. 53 three bedroom/one bath&lt;br&gt;4. 226 three bedroom/one and a half bath&lt;br&gt;5. 136 four bedroom/two bath (Gota 1998). Demand for units in the project has remained strong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td>Clarence Ching guaranteed a loan to the Bank of Hawai'i for $400,000 to get the project started (Honolulu Advertiser 1967).&lt;br&gt;On February 11, 1969 the project received its Section 221 (d) (3) letter of mortgage guarantee from the federal government (Gota 1998). The Ford Foundation issued a $16 million, 40 year mortgage for the project using the federal guarantee (Hawaii Business June 1970).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3 is continued on the next page.
### TABLE 7.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Clarence Ching was responsible for the development of Kukui Gardens. He applied for the project, organized the ownership, personally put up the money, requested and received the necessary federal financial support, and oversaw construction and completion of the project.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Time            | **Immediate**  
|                | Kukui Gardens is a pedestrian friendly environment that creates a sense of internal community and security by its design. The emphasis is on families.  
|                | The two most visually interesting components are the pathways between buildings and the stairs to the second floor units. This creates a sense of personal space for the children playing and their parents sitting nearby.  
|                | **The 24 Hour Day**  
|                | Residents of the project are active throughout the daylight and evening hours. The large number of children make the afternoons and early evenings within the complex especially busy. Security fences create demarcation lines at night, especially along the small project area along Kukui Street. |
|                | **Decades**  
|                | The project has weathered time quite well. The complex is properly maintained. New sloping roofs installed to prevent leaks in upper levels have had the added bonus of lessening the “box” look of the buildings. Fences were installed to deal with security concerns along the perimeter.  
|                | Judging from foot traffic, patronage from Kukui Gardens has helped area businesses such as Liliha Square and restaurants along Liliha Street and the Dillingham Boulevard-King-Liliha Street intersection. Downtown-Kukui Gardens interaction is harder to ascertain, as the distance usually entails a short bus ride.  
|                | The project is still in great demand (Luke 1998). |
7.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES

TABLE 7.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Planning Legacy | Kukui Gardens succeeded in returning residents (especially families) back to the Downtown area. This fit in well with the DIA’s desire to provide a mix of land uses in the area, and provide Downtown businesses with a potential base of customers.  
Kukui Gardens is a fine example of several successful trends in public housing projects:  
1. development of “gap group” housing, offering assistance to a group that had not been able to afford market housing.  
2. housing a broader spectrum of people within the same project. By limiting occupancy to those who earned up to ninety-five per cent of the mean local family income, a broader group of renters was accommodated, and the project was not stigmatized as had earlier public housing developments such as Kuhio Park Terrace.  
3. more attention to families. The Queen Emma Project had overestimated the demand for studios, a fact that Ching kept in mind when determining the unit mix for Kukui Gardens.  
4. increased emphasis on creating neighborhoods. The Queen Emma Project had been developed as a high-rise apartment complex with extensive open space. Kukui Gardens was designed to create a sense of community.  
5. use of architectural detail to create a unique sense of identity (“ownership”) of specific areas within the complex. |
| Built Legacy    | Kukui Gardens has a number of features that won it an architectural award. These include:  
1. low-rise design  
2. personal touches such as individual mail address and private stairs to upper floor apartments.  
3. landscape architecture as an integral part of the plan. The plantings do much to lessen the feeling of density and to identify areas within the complex.  
4. use of distinctive materials to provide character to areas of the development.  
5. a high percentage of larger apartments for families.  
6. other family and children oriented facilities. |
### 7.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

#### TABLE 7.5. KUKUI GARDENS: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public-private partnerships such as the Section 221 (d) (3) program have been</td>
<td>This federal mortgage guarantee program lowered the interest rate on the project loan,</td>
<td>Reinstitute the BMIR. Section 221 (d) (3) is historically most used during times of restricted capital. Hawai'i in 1998 is in a local recession coupled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>successful in providing positive housing environments that neither the government</td>
<td>allowing the owners to lower project unit rents.</td>
<td>with the State's historic housing crunch. Development of housing would both help those needing shelter and the local construction industry. Underutilized properties makai of Kukui Gardens and A'ala Park are possible sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nor market could provide individually. Below Market Interest Rates (BMIR) as used</td>
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<tr>
<td>by Kukui Gardens, were an additonal useful tool.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of housing for all income levels provides a broad customer base for</td>
<td>Kukui Gardens has a mixture of income levels among its residents. Nearby projects such</td>
<td>Government should encourage diverse housing opportunities Downtown. Block “J”, for example, the last undeveloped HRA site, and “Mortuary Row” along</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nearby businesses.</td>
<td>as Honolulu Tower offer market level housing. Downtown benefits from having this</td>
<td>Kukui Street, offer opportunities because of their proximity to Downtown and their large lot size.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mixture, because: 1. Downtown is not represented as inhabited by only one income group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. A broad income population can support diverse shopping opportunities, making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Downtown a more interesting destination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The demand for family housing has not been well addressed. Many couples with</td>
<td>Queen Emma Gardens overestimated the demand for studio units. Kukui Gardens contained</td>
<td>Government should provide incentives for production of units with larger numbers of bedrooms to accommodate families. Public housing developments should</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children cannot afford single family homes, but need additional bedrooms in their</td>
<td>over fifty per cent larger, family oriented units.</td>
<td>include high ratios of such units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dwellings. Unfortunately, such units require larger initial investments.</td>
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</table>

Table 7.5 is continued on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mixed income developments</td>
<td>Kukui Gardens’ income limit for residents was ninety-five per cent of the local median family income. This allowed housing for a mixture of income levels, where residents did not know the income level of their neighbors.</td>
<td>This policy should be continued in all subsequent public housing projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 8. THE CULTURAL PLAZA (1974)

8.1 GOALS: ENERGIZE REDEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZE RETAILING

Energize redevelopment of Chinatown.

Revitalize the retail business of downtown Honolulu by enticing tourists away from Waikiki.

(Midkiff 1980)

8.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The popular conception of the Cultural Plaza is that it contains four Chinese benevolent societies, the Chee Kung Tong, Kuo Ming Tang, Leong Doo, and Lung Doo, and two schools, the Sun Yat Sen School and Mun Lun School. All six were relocated to the block bounded by River, Beretania, Maunakea and Kukui Streets, from the Kukui Redevelopment Project, in hopes of developing an “Oriental Center” that would spark retail interest within the greater Chinatown area. Subsequent disputes between the six led to the spin off of the Mun Lun School.

1. The Mun Lun School is located at the corner of Maunakea and Kukui Streets.


2. The Cultural Center (including the Sun Yat Sen School) occupies the remainder of the block.

Architects: Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall designed the central common area and the Kuo Min Tang building; Peter Hsi and Associates the Chee Kung Tong and Leong Doo buildings; Park Associates the Lung Doo building, and Wong and Wong the Sun Yat Sen School building (Pang 1998). Contractor: Hawaiian Dredging


8.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

Chinese cultural societies for generations had performed the functions of providing economic assistance to new arrivals, offering a familiar social environment, and handling tasks such as writing letters or sending money home. In order to do this, the societies historically purchased property for rental income, or engaged in commercial ventures.

Urban renewal in the Kukui district greatly impacted most of the 70 to 80 Chinese societies resident in Honolulu during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Displaced groups found themselves in possession of cash settlements from the Honolulu Redevelopment Agency and a promise for first choice of redevelopment lands once the properties were consolidated.

It was determined that special zoning would be required to allow Chinese cultural and benevolent organizations to revive their old lifestyle – a mix of institutional and commercial uses (Hawai‘i Business and Industry March 1966b).

8.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION

The DIA, as part of its three tier plan to revitalize Downtown, wanted to reinvigorate Downtown retailing. The Western Real Estate Corporation, Wou and Gillies studies had suggested a center of cultural activity as being a potentially strong draw for tourism into Downtown, aiding Downtown retailing and Chinatown retailing in particular. It was hoped that such a center could transplant cultural activities from the decaying structures of the past into an attractive, modern facility.

Clarence T. C. Ching, President of the Joint Committee on Chinatown Renewal, the Sun Yat Sen School, past President of the United Chinese Society, and DIA
President, organized the Chinese Cultural Plaza, Inc., in 1965 (Hawai‘i Business April 1979).

As the Honolulu Redevelopment Agency did not lease land, a unified development corporation organized to purchase the land and immediately lease most of it back out seemed the best method to economically relocate displaced cultural groups back into the Kukui area. Federal regulations, unfortunately, did not allow "discriminatory" projects to qualify for federal funds. Yet it was the ethnic factor that was most likely to draw curious tourists from Waikiki into Downtown. Thus the “Chinese Cultural Plaza” became the “Cultural Plaza.” The project would contain apartments, offices, a library, and parking for 2,000 cars.

This new program was strongly endorsed by younger ethnic Chinese businessmen, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the United Chinese Society, and the Downtown Improvement Association. The governing body of the “Cultural Plaza” was to consist of representatives of six large displaced Chinese cultural groups: the Chee Kung Tong, Kuo Ming Tang, Leong Doo, Lung Doo, the Sun Yat Sen School, and Mun Lun School. Each of the six groups would hold two seats, one occupied by the group’s elected president, and the second by a permanent group representative.

John Carl Wamecke and Associates, which had done the State Capitol and Capitol District plans, was brought in to design the complex. The Wamecke Plan covered two city blocks, constituting the area between River, Beretania, Nu‘uanu and Kukui Streets. The Plan included multi-family housing to be financed by the Federal Housing Administration. The Small Business Administration also offered to assist individual merchants as tenants in the new center (Hawai‘i Business and Industry March 1966b).
The Wamecke Plan exposed serious structural problems within the organization of the project:

1. The Board of Directors and the Chairman were all volunteers. As the personal time of Chairman Ching was limited, he was forced to have one or more of his employees represent him in the project.

2. As Chairman, Ching wielded little formal authority. Furthermore, culture apparently played a role in decision making, as many members of the Board were Ching's seniors and the usually tough developer seemed reluctant to impose his will on them.

3. The six different groups had no tradition of working together. While some Board members were interested in a "new" Chinatown, others who represented the individual schools and societies were simply interested in rebuilding their individual school or society headquarters.

4. While the Board of Directors was indeed responsible for project decisions, each of the Directors was answerable to the society or school board that he or she represented, and many were unwilling to make decisions without prior approval by their own boards. As some group boards contained as many as 50 directors, or required debate by their full memberships, consensus and decision making became extremely difficult and time consuming.

5. Even the vision of how best to financially support the project was not shared by all members of the six groups. Although most members agreed that retail activity would be necessary to sustain the complex, few had any experience with actually operating a business. "Nevertheless, all insisted on participating in even the minutest decisions" (Hawai'i Business April 1979).
The Wamecke Plan called for a high-rise hotel, apartments and an office tower. Inclusion of such facilities was meant to create a broad base of financial support for the project and provide it with potential customers. The Plan was scuttled because the groups could not agree on condominium ownership.

The project as built was far different from the Wamecke Plan. It was scaled down to the single River-Beretania-Maunakea-Kukui block. Four of the organizations immediately hired their own architects to design “their” own buildings. The Mun Lung school acquired separate financing and built its own freestanding complex eighteen months before the others. Construction of the main section of the Cultural Plaza began in 1972, with the opening occurring in December 1974 (Hawai‘i Business April 1979).

The project has never lived up to its projections.

1. Money intended for promotion purposes instead went to cover construction costs. Chairman Ching personally covered part of the construction costs.

2. Upon opening in 1974, only one third of the shops were occupied.

3. The lack of rental income left no money for promotion, which created a vicious cycle of no customers and no additional tenants.

4. The project lost its leasing agent, and such duties fell on the Project Coordinator.

5. Disagreements within the Board of Directors led to the hiring of a duplicate center manager.

6. A need for tenants to bring income into the Center led to lease agreements with inexperienced, first time retailers. Members of the societies, themselves unskilled in business methods, engaged in lease negotiations with potential tenants. The results were lapses of basic retailing principles.
Figure 8.1. Exterior of the Cultural Plaza, 1998. View looking Diamond Head-Ewa. Note the lack of a main entrance or unified architecture. Source: Author.

Figure 8.2. Moongate Stage, located within the central courtyard of the Cultural Plaza, in 1998. One of the project’s major assets, the parking garage, lies to the left (Diamond Head direction). Source: Author.
7. Language and cultural barriers created conflicts within the complex (Hawai‘i Business March 1975 and April 1979).

8. The lack of an overall plan, plus the use of six different architectural firms, resulted in no bus handling facility being built on site for tourist vehicles (Midkiff 1998).

8.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT

8.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS

TABLE 8.1. GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders</td>
<td>Effective input from a group of stakeholders must be based upon a realistic evaluation of the situation. This was not done. Relocation was deemed difficult because of the mix of institutional and commercial land uses that such groups engaged in. Yet other such society structures exist in the Kukui area today on Fort Street and on River Street. This option was not pursued for the six groups in favor of uniting the relocation project with a cultural center. Those familiar with such cultural societies and schools should have understood the organizational difficulties of placing them in a developer context. Although the organizers had good motives, they did not address the problems of stakeholders as developers. 1. The societies and schools did not empower their representatives to make decisions for them, thus slowing down the decision making process. 2. Elders were unwilling to allow younger individuals, even if educated in a particular area, to make decisions. This was also reflected in the reluctance of Clarence Ching and others to be more assertive with the elder run societies and schools. 3. The competitive nature of the societies made cooperation among them difficult. 4. It was deemed necessary to have a highly respected individual within the Chinese community, such as Clarence Ching, working with the societies and schools on the project. However, Ching was often forced by time constraints to have others (frequently non-Chinese) represent him.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 8.1 is continued on the next page.
### TABLE 8.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders (Continued)</td>
<td>A lack of input from potential tenants was also made apparent when the project opened in 1974. The Project Manager “soon discovered that Chinatown’s remaining established merchants, many of whom were approaching retirement age, had no intention of reopening their shops in the Cultural Plaza or anywhere else, even if urban renewal were to move makai of Beretania Street and displace them” (Hawai‘i Business April 1979.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish</td>
<td>The DIA and other backers of the Cultural Plaza were mistaken in thinking that they could change the <em>modus operandi</em> of the six groups. Much of the decision making processes were cultural, and had taken thousands of years to develop. Furthermore, the societies and schools had not been entrepreneurial in nature, but instead had relied on their tenants to produce their income. The lack of business experience could not be quickly overcome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function</td>
<td>The DIA and others hoped that the Cultural Plaza would be another successful catalyst of economic activity much as the Financial Plaza of the Pacific had been. Unfortunately, the decision making process vetoed the Wamecke proposal, which contained features that could have reinforced the project, including a hotel, office complex and apartments. The final plan left a retail complex without any built-in customer base (Hawai‘i Business and Industry March 1966b; Hawai‘i Business March 1975 and April 1979). It is ironic that today (1998) an element of the Wamecke proposal, housing, has been built in the Diamond Head half of the original plan area. Many of the residents of those units do frequent area businesses, but most of the foot traffic seems to travel in the makai direction toward Chinatown itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examination of how the project or program in question has created positive change and prevented negative change</td>
<td><strong>Positive Change</strong> The Cultural Plaza replaced the substandard structures that had previously characterized the area, housed the six groups, and provided a large parking structure on the Ewa side of Downtown. It offered additional space for small Asian businesses, particularly restaurants and travel agencies, immediately adjacent to Chinatown. <strong>Prevent Negative Change</strong> The project prevented further physical deterioration within the area, but has not been an effective engine for commercial success.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 8.2. GARVIN'S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Program</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending</td>
<td>The property on which the Cultural Plaza sits was condemned and assembled by the Honolulu Redevelopment Agency. That agency also developed the present road network around the complex. The land was then sold to the six groups for $1.5 million (Hawai Business 1979). The City government also endorsed the Cultural Plaza plan, much like the DIA, to consolidate the six groups and use the result as a cultural/retail catalyst Downtown.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk | **Character of the Area**  
The complex seems out of place within Chinatown because, unlike the traditional low-rise structures that face the street across Beretania, the Cultural Plaza looks inward, and has no readily defined entrances.  
**Lessen Private Investment Risk**  
The City encouraged consolidation of the six groups' relocation efforts, offering them funds for their properties, and offered them land at a discount. |  |
| Incentives for desired private development | The societies and schools were given “first priority” at acquisition of urban renewal lands, especially if they consolidated their efforts. The Warnecke Plan would have enabled their tenants to apply for Small Business Loans, and provided Federal Housing Administration financing of the multi-family housing above the complex. City support continued for the second plan, encouraging New Jersey’s Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, which had also been doing business with Clarence Ching’s Loyalty Enterprises for over ten years, to make the loan (Hawai’i Business April 1979). |  |

### TABLE 8.3. GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient for Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Planners viewed the potential market for the project as city-wide, especially the population of Asian descent, and tourists. The Western Real Estate Research Corporation 1959 <em>Economic Analysis of Downtown Honolulu, the Central Business District of Honolulu</em> 1960 study and the 1962 <em>Master Plan for the Central Business District</em> (Wou Plan) had all considered an &quot;Oriental&quot; or &quot;International Center&quot; within Chinatown. &quot;If this general area could be organized and some of the noncompatible uses replaced, shops and restaurants here could become a tourist Mecca second only to the island atmosphere shops of Waikiki&quot; (Western Real Estate Research Corporation 1959).</td>
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Table 8.3 is continued on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient for Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td><strong>Inherent Site Characteristics</strong>&lt;br&gt;The project was moved from Chinatown near Nu'uanu Stream into the Kukui Redevelopment Area because that land was already available and cleared while Chinatown itself had not undergone urban renewal. The six Chinese societies and schools had, as displaced entities from the Kukui area, first rights to property there once consolidation by the HRA was complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design</strong></td>
<td>Two remarkable features of the existing complex are that there is no focal entrance to the project to provide presence and invite customers in from the street, and no bus bays/off loading areas designed for large tour buses. Such activities must be done directly on the street, a feature that greatly compromises a complex originally hoping to draw large numbers of tourists (Midkiff 1998).&lt;br&gt; The existing complex differed from the Wamecke Plan because it lies only within one block, bounded by River, Beretania, Maunakea and Kukui Streets; and does not include any hotel, office or apartment towers above it designed to provide mortgage or retail support for ground level shops.&lt;br&gt;The physical organization of the complex is governed by several factors.&lt;br&gt;1. Four of the organizations hired their own architects.&lt;br&gt;2. The Mun Lun School separated itself from the rest of the five by acquiring its own financing and commenced construction ahead of the rest of the facility.&lt;br&gt;3. Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall were hired to do the central common area and the Kuo Min Tang Building. Although DMJM stated that there was “no problem” in integrating six different sets of architectural plans, the underlying disharmony of design is quite apparent simply in the lack of well defined entrances on both the Maunakea and Beretania sides of the complex (Hawai'i Business April 1979 and author 1998).&lt;br&gt;Within the Cultural Plaza block, each of the six societies and schools have their own buildings. The four located along Beretania are, moving in the Ewa direction the Chee Kung Tong, the Lung Doo, Leong Doo and the Kuo Ming Tang. The Mun Lun School is situated at the Maunakea-Kukui Street intersection and the Sun Yat Sen School on Kukui Street.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient for Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Design (continued)</strong></td>
<td>The block is divided into four functional areas:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. The largest, occupying two thirds of the block, is centered on an inner courtyard and stage, and is bounded by the four society buildings along Beretania, the parking garage on the Maunakea side, and shops along both the north and River Street faces. Structures are two or more stories. Restaurants predominate on the second floor and along Beretania, small retail concerns occupy the remaining space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. The Mun Lun School facing Maunakea and Kukui Streets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The Sun Yat Sen School facing Kukui Street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. A series of small take out food shops along River Street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td>Financial planning for the Cultural Plaza was inadequate, particularly predictions of required capital and potential profitability:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Interim financing was handled largely by New York based Irving Trust Company, with Clarence Ching’s Liberty Bank providing a small part of the construction loan.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. New Jersey’s Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company provided the project with a $7.25 million loan for permanent financing based on its long association with successful developer Clarence Ching. No commitment fee was required, but Mutual Benefit Life required immediate and reliable cash-flow for the project upon completion (Hamai Business April 1979).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Inflation, skyrocketing interest rates and construction strikes delayed opening of the project. Loyalty Enterprises personnel, monitoring progress, found the project fifteen to thirty per cent over budget, and had to ask the six groups for additional funds several times during construction. One group mortgaged its remaining property, $500,000 in promotion funds were used, and reportedly Clarence Ching made up $435,000 himself.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Lease (commercial occupancy) projections did not prove true upon opening, sending the cash-starved project into a tailspin. Lack of tenants meant less income, limited income starved promotion, promotion deficiencies negatively impacted sales, and few sales meant fewer tenants. By early 1975 most of the original tenants had left.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. The discovery that most of Chinatown’s merchants were not interested in opening in the Cultural Plaza led to a scramble for tenants. The Project Manager had, “relied heavily on members of the societies, friends, friends of friends, and word-of-mouth to attract tenants...Many of the renters who signed up proved to be less than ideal” (Hamai Business April 1979). Furthermore, language and intercultural misunderstandings became a common problem.</td>
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Table 8.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient for Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financing (continued)</td>
<td>6. Further management difficulties ensued when two individuals held the position of general manager simultaneously. 7. Efforts to entice tourists failed. Tour operators complained that the mix of tenants was not varied enough to spark visitor interest. Bus arrival schedules were poorly arranged to complement hours of operation. Time spent in the Center by visitors proved too short. 8. Mutual Benefit Life cooperated with the six groups by raising its mortgage commitment several times to cover rising costs, finally reaching $9 million. The Plaza's interim lenders, however, pulled the plug after arrearage passed the $2 million dollar mark (Hawai'i Business April 1979). 9. In 1978 the project, minus the separately financed Mun Lun School, was offered for sale at a price of $13.5 million (Hawai'i Business 1979). The project was sold in 1979 to Longevity International Enterprises Corporation (Pang 1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Clarence Ching, President of the Cultural Center and President of the DIA, must be viewed as the person who kept the project going through to completion. Although his many commitments often meant that he delegated work to subordinates, he remained with the project, on occasion personally helping cover its debts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is no intriguing architectural entrance anywhere to capture the shopper's imagination. The physical separation of the two schools and the domination of Beretania Street in the area focuses potential customers on the makai two thirds of the complex. The only unifying theme in the area is a series of red painted columns that eventually lead patrons into the central square. The design disorientation easily confuses patrons as to how to retrace their steps. The 24 Hour Day During the day, the most interesting part of the Cultural Plaza actually occurs on its perimeter. Along the mauka end of River Street, old local men play games and eat the ethnic foods available from Plaza shops nearby. The Cultural Center is developing a reputation as a place to have an inexpensive lunch or to get a reasonably priced air fare to the Far East. Both of these activities occur within the central courtyard area. In the evenings, parking attendants for the restaurants located along Beretania Street do a lively act double and triple parking cars on the sidewalk as their patrons make their way indoors.</td>
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Table 8.3 is continued on the next page.
### TABLE 8.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient for Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time (continued)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Decades</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cultural Plaza continues to languish economically. As mentioned earlier, the project had to be put up for sale. The present owners have not had much success adding life to the complex. In fact, the project seems forgotten – the DIA drawing &quot;Downtown Honolulu 1958-1988: Key to Landmarks&quot; does not show or list the Cultural Plaza (Downtown Improvement Association February 1988).</td>
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### 8.5.2 THE "PLANNING" AND "BUILT" LEGACIES

#### TABLE 8.4. THE "PLANNING" AND "BUILT" LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Legacy</td>
<td>The inability of the Cultural Plaza to bring large numbers of tourists into Downtown and thus revitalize Chinatown helped refute the &quot;federal bulldozer&quot; approach to urban renewal in Honolulu. The &quot;federal bulldozer&quot; had completely removed whole neighborhoods and left the area vacant for long periods of time. Finally, when redevelopment did occur, the assistance promised conflicted with cultural norms, and the completed project became one of the &quot;lackluster&quot; commercial centers decried by Jane Jacobs in her book <em>The Death and Life of American Cities</em>. The result was that the project became an embarrassment, and was quietly forgotten. The &quot;federal bulldozer&quot; approach was discredited. Honolulu then followed the national trend (see Teaford) away from such wholesale district demolition and the problems it created. The pre-Cultural Plaza 1962 Wou Plan for Chinatown, for example, included large scale demolition of existing structures, while the later Gruen and Chinatown Plans continually increased the number of retained and rehabilitated buildings. By 1973, Chinatown itself would be placed on the National Register of Historic Places.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Legacy</td>
<td>Functionally, the Cultural Plaza operates much like other low-rise structures in the area, occupied by mostly Asian-American or immigrant small retail stores or restaurants. Unfortunately, unlike the street-facing older facilities of Chinatown, the complex looks inward, discouraging the very retail activities that were meant to support it. Its most differentiating features are the modern (rather than traditional Chinese) architecture along Beretania Street and the parking garage along Maunakea. The complex, as constructed, is unlikely to have any great impact on the area around it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 8.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

### TABLE 8.5. THE CULTURAL PLAZA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Detailed Explanation</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A realistic understanding of clients and evaluation of their needs is essential.</td>
<td>Relocation of the six groups was consolidated rather than providing them with individual sites. A lack of understanding of their independence, decision making structures, limited commercial skills and unwillingness to defer to experience over seniority was illustrated by the rejection of the condominium concept within the Warnecke Plan.</td>
<td>Proponents should not be afraid to “back up” and reevaluate proposals if the project becomes less and less workable. An example is the City’s Ewa Villages project, where costs seem to be escalating far beyond original estimates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional market studies must be undertaken before construction begins.</td>
<td>Project proponents were surprised at the lack of enthusiasm displayed by area merchants to locate in the Cultural Plaza after it was completed.</td>
<td>Project proponents should ensure that detailed market studies are done by licensed professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced project management must be committed in advance of construction. This management team must have the authority to approve spending and determine lessees.</td>
<td>The internal organizations of the six groups which made up the Cultural Plaza were not conducive to large scale or fast decision making. The final organizational structure of the project was unwieldy, and the individuals who would be expected to set direction actually had little authority. In the Cultural Plaza situation, poor initial rentals resulted in the loss of experienced help. Management conflicts resulted in a poor tenant mix.</td>
<td>Community development groups undertaking projects should be able to demonstrate both a workable decision making apparatus and access to experienced project management talent. A list of organizations offering project management assistance, or a list of organizations interested in similar projects and containing such management experience, would be invaluable to community groups interested in development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.5 is continued on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Detailed Explanation</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proper capitalization is necessary in order to prepare for delays and the long initial periods in which investment is greater than returns.</td>
<td>Construction problems and other delays are common in large projects, and a financial cushion must be prepared for this possibility. This undercapitalized project had to utilize other funds, including promotion monies and personal assets, to cover costs of delays. Proper capitalization must also be available for promotion, otherwise a vicious cycle erupts of declining sales, tenants, rents, etc.</td>
<td>Officials examining future development of City property such as the Pali Highway-Beretania-Queen Emma-Kukui Street block must critically examine the ability of promoters to bring their proposals to fruition. This includes market demand, obligations of lenders, and interest rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed use projects spread risk and provide multiple sources of income.</td>
<td>The Cultural Plaza had no office, hotel or apartment component to spread risk, help it meet its mortgage obligations and provide a customer base.</td>
<td>Federal restrictions on the use of Kukui District lots in the area bounded by River Street, Kukui Street, Pali Highway and Vineyard Boulevard will soon expire. These lots are currently underutilized, and developers could benefit from mixed use that would, for example, include ground level shops, parking behind or above, and housing above that. This would provide multiple income sources, spread risk, and improve the customer base for the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial activities facing the street invite customers into retail establishments, increase street activity, improve security, and create a pedestrian environment.</td>
<td>The Cultural Center design looks inward, turning its back on potential customers and the character of the area.</td>
<td>New Downtown development should include the requirement for street level shopping. This includes parking structures, which otherwise tend to create gaps in an otherwise &quot;linked&quot; pedestrian environment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 9. BISHOP SQUARE AND TAMARIND PARK (1972/83)

9.1 GOAL: DEVELOPMENT OF A DOWNTOWN PEDESTRIAN CENTER

This park at the corner of King and Bishop Streets will be almost an acre in size and will undoubtedly become Downtown’s pedestrian center, comparable in many respects to the skating rink at Rockefeller Center or the plaza at Embarcadero Center. While many of us will miss the old Alexander Young Hotel Building, a great many more will be able to enjoy this splendid new open space.

(Downtown Improvement Association January 1981)

9.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

Tamarind Park is the pedestrian focus of Bishop Square, a complex in the block bounded by Bishop, King, Alakea and Hotel Streets. Bishop Square’s buildings contain retail and office functions that define Tamarind Park on two sides.

Bishop Square was developed in two phases:

1. The 30 story Pacific Trade Center (1998’s Pacific Tower) and the 1250 stall parking garage immediately mauka of it occupy the Diamond Head side of the block. The project developer was the Hawai‘i Corporation (Daines 1983).


2. The 28 story Pauahi Tower and Tamarind Park immediately makai of it occupy the Ewa end of the block. The Park contains a series of fountains and pools, large trees, and a prominent artwork by British artist Henry Moore. Underground are
128 parking stalls. The project developer was the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company.


9.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

Downtown Honolulu's Bishop Street originated between Hotel and King Streets, when in 1900 Alexander Young announced plans to line the Diamond Head side of the new road with a series of fireproof first-class buildings provided with all the latest improvements. His Alexander Young Hotel (completed 1903 and later known as the Alexander Young Building or the Alexander Young) had a height of five stories, over 450 feet of frontage along Bishop Street, and extended for over a hundred feet along both Hotel and King Streets. The hotel contained 192 rooms, including suites, single and double rooms. The Hotel became the premiere business hotel of the City for many years, hosting many social events at its rooftop garden (Ames 1996).

The City and County of Honolulu proposed that the Diamond Head side of the block be developed as a public parking lot in Honolulu's Master Plan: January 1941, but nothing came of the proposal. In 1962 the Hawai'i Corporation considered erection of a new hotel on that site (Hawai'i Business and Industry August 1962).

Demand for hotel rooms, however, had long been shifting to Waikiki. Downtown Honolulu's increasing demands for office space offered the owners of the Alexander Young a profitable alternative to hotel rooms. The Alexander Young evolved into a professional office center, catering to businessmen, dentists, and doctors. By 1964 the
owner of the Alexander Young, the Hawai‘i Corporation, decided to completely phase out hotel operations by converting the remaining 120 hotel rooms into offices (Hawai‘i Business and Industry December 1964). The success of the Alexander Young as a prestigious office center led to extensive interior renovations within the building (Hawai‘i Business March 1969).

9.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION

The success of the DIA supported Financial Plaza of the Pacific, just Ewa and makai of the Alexander Young Building, encouraged the Hawai‘i Corporation to scrap the hotel plan and announce development of the Pacific Trade Center in 1970. The DIA supported the development of the Pacific Trade Center (Grant 1998). The additional Class A office space and large parking garage facing the designated arterial of Alakea Street fit well into the Gruen Plan.

Unfortunately for the Hawai‘i Corporation, other developers (Amfac in 1968 and 1971, and Theo. H. Davies in 1971) were able to develop similar Class A projects ahead of the Pacific Trade Center (completed 1972), creating a “buyer’s market” for Downtown office space. This forced the company to provide inducements for lessees such as generous improvement allowances, fully finished space, and turnkey leasing services to handle old location leases (Hawai‘i Business March 1972).

By 1974 the office rental market had recovered. A quarter of a billion dollars in government, commercial and residential construction was then either underway or nearing the construction stage (Hawai‘i Business March 1974).

In 1974 the Hawai‘i Corporation sold the Pacific Trade Center to the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Northwestern Mutual purchased the Alexander Young property two years later (Coppedge 1998).
The condition of the 77 year old Alexander Young Building in 1980 was such that Northwestern Mutual Life had to weigh the options of extensive additional renovation of the structure or demolition and construction of a replacement. The Alexander Young had been placed on the State Register of Historic Places. Such designation meant that the Building could not be torn down without notifying the State three months in advance of demolition, within which time the State could use its condemnation powers to purchase the building if it wished to preserve it.

A legal inquiry by Northwestern Mutual into the possibility of tearing down the building led to the formation of public opposition groups, the Friends of the Alexander Young Building, and the Voice of the Pacific (Honolulu Advertiser 7/30/1980; Engle 1980).

The potential razing of the Alexander Young was difficult for the DIA because the building had many personal ties to the DIA's membership. For example, the first President of the Downtown Improvement Association, R. Alexander Anderson, was the grandson of Alexander Young. The Downtown business community had held many luncheons at the rooftop garden of the Alexander Young, and many of its members had either stayed there over the years, or had offices in the building.

Usual supporters of Downtown renovations such as the artist Ramsey opposed the demolition. The proposed replacement for the Alexander Young, a Class A high-rise and pedestrian focused park, interested others. The split within the general public reached into the DIA, requiring its leadership, which viewed the replacement project as preferable, to support the high-rise/park proposal behind the scenes (Grant 1998).

Efforts by Northwestern Mutual to proceed with the demolition resulted in an effort by the Voice of the Pacific to require an environmental impact statement (EIS). The State Board of Land and Natural Resources decided not to require such a study.
and efforts by the Voice of the Pacific to delay the project in the courts were ultimately unsuccessful. Demolition of the Alexander Young Building began on July 7, 1981 (Gomes 1981).

Once the decision had been made by Northwestern Mutual to go ahead with the demolition, the DIA's *Downtowner*:

stressed the need to look ahead to the project's benefits. The long period of argument tended to obscure the project's remarkable gift to the public:
a magnificent new open space right in the heart of Downtown's financial center.

(Downtown Improvement Association January 1981)

The replacement for the Alexander Young Building, the Pauahi Tower, commenced construction as Downtown Honolulu entered an office rental market glut. Over one million square feet of new Class A office space was being prepared, including such projects as Central Pacific Plaza and Executive Center. The project's leasing manager, T. Clifford Melim, tried to put a positive light on the situation, noting that Executive Center's office space was actually fee simple and not rental, and that, "We're going through the same cycle we've been going through the last 20 years" (Daines 1983). Melim was convinced that when the then existing office space surplus was eaten up a few years in the future, a new wave of building would be ignited.

The Pauahi Tower was aggressively marketed, beginning during the construction phase. Northwestern followed the common practice of providing lessees with incentive packages such as several months of free rent, free parking, after-hour air conditioning, longer lease terms, etc. Such tactics were preferred by landlords because they did not affect long term rental income from the project. Northwestern Mutual went further than convention, however, by refusing to hire an exclusive leasing agent, which created
Figure 9.1. Tamarind Park undergoing renovations in 1998. The parking garage is on the left, and the Pacific Tower (formerly Pacific Trade Center) on the right. Restaurants fill the ground level of the parking garage, allowing pedestrians to then take their lunches into the Park. Source: Author.

Figure 9.2. Tamarind Park in 1998, looking mauka toward the Pauahi Tower. The change in elevation that allows a miniature "river" can be appreciated from this angle. Source: Author.
competition between reality firms. The company also discounted quoted rental rates for the less desirable first ten floors of the project that faced the parking garage. The last two tactics were unprecedented in Honolulu’s office rental markets (Hawai‘i Business April 1984).

The Pauahi Tower continued to suffer lengthy vacancy problems. In 1985 the building was only thirty per cent leased (Hawai‘i Business April 1985). In 1986 full floors were still available (Schmicker 1986). Only by 1987 was the building leased to the ninety per cent range (Wentzel 1987).

Tamarind Park, however, had “begun to take on a ‘big city’ sophistication and ambiance that (real estate) brokers are pleased with” (Hawai‘i Business April 1984). Clever use of walkways, pools and benches, diverse eating opportunities, lunchtime entertainment such as the Honolulu Symphony and the Royal Hawaiian Band, evening activities such as Ho‘olaule’a and First Night, and active participation in the Honolulu City Lights Christmas display have made Tamarind Park the pedestrian activity center of Downtown.

Tamarind Park/Bishop Square won the City and County of Honolulu’s “Project of the Year” award for 1986 (Downtown Improvement Association August 1986).
9.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT

9.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS

TABLE 9.1. GARVIN'S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders</td>
<td>Development within the block was private. Demolition of the Alexander Young Building was a public issue, however. Citizen's groups, the State Department of Land and Natural Resources, and the courts all were involved in debate. The issue even split the ranks of the Downtown Improvement Association, many of whose members had personal ties to the building. The fate of the structure was sealed by the State's conclusion that it could not afford to condemn the building, and left the decision to the owner to replace it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish</td>
<td>Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, the owner and developer of both the Pauahi Tower and Tamarind Park, wanted both a prestigious business address and an attractive people oriented environment. To create a vision of quality the building and Park both contain large amounts of imported Italian marble (Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company 7/21/1983). A large statue by noted British artist Henry Moore was also installed in the Park. The Park used design suggestions from William H. Whyte's <em>The Social Life of Small Urban Places</em> to create what he called &quot;people places&quot;. Such areas contain good access and views to the street, ample seating, trees, water, sunlight, and nearby shops. All of these items were provided within or on the perimeter of the Park, creating synergy between the Park and its two defining high-rises (Honolulu Advertiser 8/20/1983). The park is private space, and is posted as such, even if it is used for a public purpose. Thus the owners have the right to monitor an individual's behavior and revoke permission to enter at anytime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function</td>
<td>Development of Bishop Square provided the Financial District with two Class A office facilities, a 1,250 stall parking garage, and Tamarind Park. The Bishop-King Street intersection became the center of pedestrian activity in Downtown -- where open space from the Financial Plaza, Bishop Square, and later First Hawaiian Center would meet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.1 is continued on the next page.

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TABLE 9.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Create positive change and prevent negative change | *Create Positive Change*  
Portions of Bishop Square replaced aging structures (such as the original power plant for the Alexander Young Building on the Diamond Head side of the block) with modern office facilities. The parking structure provided over 1200 highly desirable stalls close to Bishop Street. Tamarind Park furnished badly needed open space and a pedestrian focus in an increasingly high density, high-rise environment.  
*Prevent Negative Change*  
Making the decision to renovate or demolish the existing Alexander Young Building was preferable to postponement, because the building was deteriorating due to age and change of use. The condition was such that Northwestern decided to remove and replace.  
Construction of new ground level retail space in the Pauahi Tower allowed many of the former Alexander Young Building tenants (i.e., airline ticket offices, bookstore, etc.) to return, thus maintaining the character of central Bishop Street as a service center for the business community.  
The owners did consider the Tamarind Park site for development of a multistory shopping arcade which would have competed with Fort Street for customers. Successful development of the Park made the area more valuable to the owners as a central open space, rather than commercial use (Daines 1983). |
TABLE 9.2. GARVIN’S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending</td>
<td>The development of the Hawai‘i State Capitol at the Civic Center site nearby to Bishop Square made the Hawai‘i Corporation/Northwestern property a prime potential office site. The Bishop Square site enjoys good access from other parts of the island via Pali Highway-Bishop, King, and Alakea-Queen Emma Streets. Hotel Street, frequent site of rapid transit line and station proposals and a potential access bonanza, lies immediately mauka of Bishop Square.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk | **Character of the Area**  
The State of Hawai‘i courts did not require the owner/developer, Northwestern, to develop an environmental impact statement study about demolition of the old Alexander Young Building. The State also did not purchase the property to preserve it. This allowed Northwestern to replace the Alexander Young with the high-rise Pauahi Tower and Tamarind Park.  
**Lessen Private Investment Risk**  
The arrival of Statehood in 1959 had allowed life insurance companies such as Northwestern to invest in Hawai‘i. This greatly increased the potential pool of investment capital for such projects as Bishop Square (Grant 1998). |
| Incentives for desired private development | Bishop Square was subject to the open space requirements and height bonuses that were pioneered by the Financial Plaza of the Pacific.  
The project site was within the area designated for developments of up to 350 feet. The City Council later raised the limit for Bishop Square and other nearby properties to 450 feet, encouraging further office development immediately adjacent to Bishop Square (Downtown Improvement Association January 1993). |
### TABLE 9.3. GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>The market for the high-rise structures within Bishop Square is businesses seeking Class A space Downtown, especially those wanting to be close to both the Capitol and Financial Districts. The market for Tamarind Park is the Downtown office worker. The Park offers sunshine, active and passive areas, and includes a variety of restaurants along its perimeter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Location   | Inherent Site Characteristics  
A nine foot drop in elevation between Hotel and King Streets provided the opportunity to create a mini-river within Tamarind Park (Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company 9/8/1983).  
Proximity  
The site occupies the longest block of Bishop Street, and is at the main intersection (Bishop and King) in the heart of the Financial District. It is within walking distance of all three branches of government. |
| Design     | Bishop Square has four sections: the Pauahi Tower, the parking structure, Tamarind Park and the Pacific Tower. The large parking structure is mostly hidden away from the Park by the bulk of the two Towers and ground level shops built into its base.  
Landscape architect James Hubbard designed the Park using the ideas of William Whyte to attract people to the Park. It was a deliberate attempt to keep the area open to make: everyone feel comfortable and safe, even at night.  
And we have lots of space for seating, where people can meet and talk, eat lunch, enjoy the sun or shade, and stretch out on the grass.  
(Northwestern Mutual 9/8/1983)  
Making use of a change in elevation on the site, Hubbard designed: What’s really a man-made river that cascades down through the entire park – a corridor of water with weirs or small waterfalls. They’re made of Italian granite; you can see it by looking through the falling water, which acts like a magnifying glass.  
(Northwestern Mutual 1983b)  
Tamarind Park/Bishop Square won the City and County of Honolulu’s “Project of the Year” award for 1986 (Downtown Improvement Association August 1986). |
| Financing  | The first half of Bishop Square (the Pacific Trade Center and parking garage) began with a $3 million line of credit from the Bank of Hawai‘i, Bank of America and First Hawaiian Bank. Once the project received commitments for sixty five per cent of its space, a $16 million dollar loan was arranged with the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company (Chapman 1998).  
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company financed the second half of Bishop Square using its own funds (Melim 1998). |

Table 9.3 is continued on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>It was Bishop Square's misfortune that both phases of the project entered the office rental market during periods of excess capacity. Bishop Square did not have tenants the size of those moving into the Financial Plaza of the Pacific, Amfac Center, and the Davies Pacific Center, to immediately occupy much of the space in its buildings. The first phase of Bishop Square, the Pacific Trade Center and the parking structure, were developed under the leadership of Randolph Crossley, Chairman of the Hawai’i Corporation, and Rex Kuwasaki, President of American Pacific Group. (The American Pacific Group owned a majority of the stock of the Hawai’i Corporation, and subsequently merged with it.) The key individual in the second part of the project was Cliff Melim, President of Bishop Square Management Corp., acting as agent for Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee. Melim oversaw that portion through planning, demolition of the Alexander Young, and construction of the Pauahi Tower and Tamarind Park.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td><strong>Immediate</strong> The completed project's main attraction is the man-made river that runs through the Park. After exploring the river, pedestrians are offered options to eat at take out or sit down restaurants on the perimeter of the complex, to stretch out on the lawn, or sit on benches provided both under cover of trees or out in the sun. <strong>The 24 Hour Day</strong> The complex is most active during the daylight hours during weekdays, especially at lunchtime. After-hour activities include special events such as the Ho’olaule’a and First Night block parties and the Christmastime Honolulu City Lights program. At night and on weekends the area is much less attended, but still provides a sense of security due to its openness and private guard service. <strong>Decades</strong> The project is still quite new, only sixteen years old as of 1998, and the only appreciable change is that the Park’s trees have increased their canopy size. The complex is extremely well maintained.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 9.5.2 THE "PLANNING" AND "BUILT" LEGACIES

#### TABLE 9.4. THE "PLANNING" AND "BUILT" LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Legacy</td>
<td>Bishop Square is another beneficiary of the City and County of Honolulu's zoning changes that began with the Financial Plaza of the Pacific – provision for ground level open space allowed increased building height. Northwestern Mutual went further than developing simple open plazas by deliberately creating a focused &quot;people place&quot; at Tamarind Park. Tamarind Park was designed to create a safe change of pace from the office by providing entertainment, privacy, sunlight, food, a bookstore, etc. Tamarind Park also is an example of private space used for a public purpose – a place where, unlike the Fort Street Mall, permission to enter is revocable. This creates a somewhat &quot;sanitized&quot; environment. The completed Bishop Square used one of a limited supply of remaining large lots left in Downtown. Future development will likely require consolidation of smaller lots, a prospect likely to require maximum density brought on by consolidation costs. In Hawai'i's difficult economic climate of the 1990s, this makes other downtown high-rises less likely for the foreseeable future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built Legacy</td>
<td>The two high-rises of Bishop Square define the open space of Tamarind Park. The Park's use of flowing water, bridges, benches, lawns, and artwork provide a succession of microenvironments for different pedestrian tastes. The development of the Park, across from Downtown's original open space in the Financial Plaza of the Pacific, encouraged the development of further open space at the First Hawaiian Center (Ames 1996).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 9.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

**TABLE 9.5. BISHOP SQUARE/TAMARIND PARK: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The impact of architectural features and details has a major impact on the actual use of a facility. People want to feel safe in their parks, and visibility is their first line of defense.</td>
<td>Tamarind Park was deliberately designed to be open, to allow users to feel comfortable and safe, even at night. While there are numerous seats, nothing blocks the view from other areas. This is in contrast to the City's original design for Kamalii Park at Beretania Street and Pali Highway, where concrete structures blocked views of the seating area from the street. The City subsequently demolished the concrete planters and walls that blocked views.</td>
<td>Design park facilities in as open a manner as possible. Light parks from the same poles that light adjacent streets for easy maintenance and increased safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The draw of such private &quot;people places&quot; may negatively impact the efforts of cities to revitalize downtown pedestrian malls.</td>
<td>The Fort Street Mall is too narrow to provide the sunshine that Tamarind Park enjoys. Maintenance is also superior at the Tamarind facility.</td>
<td>Cities should encourage the development of &quot;people places&quot; along existing or planned city redeveloped pedestrian malls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;People places&quot; such as Tamarind Park have positive effects on downtown office complexes, bringing occupants out of their structures to intermingle, and lessening the image of the typical office building as a self contained unit.</td>
<td>Tamarind Park draws workers from across Downtown to its activities and provides an important place to socialize.</td>
<td>Creation of similar activity sites in areas seeking revitalization would be a useful patron draw. Lihue and Hilo both need a central sense of place within their downtowns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 10. THE FORT STREET MALL RENOVATION  
(PHASE II, 1993)

10.1 GOAL: IMPROVE AND REDEVELOP THE FORT STREET MALL

Upgrade the Mall to a private shopping center standard.

(Gushman 1998)

10.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The Fort Street Mall occupies the original vehicular Fort Street between Nimitz Highway and Beretania Street in downtown Honolulu. Plazas occur at Beretania and at King Streets. Immediately adjacent to the King Street plaza is a large lava rock fountain and a popular Satellite City Hall in the underpass. The 1993 Mall was designed using a "Victorian" style of architecture, including black light posts, drinking fountains, and traffic barriers, extensive use of palm trees, and earth tone pavers over a sand subsurface.


10.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

A DIA-City agreement had been instrumental in the development of the original Gruen designed Fort Street Mall in 1969. Unfortunately, the parking garages and rapid transit components called for in the Gruen Plan were not constructed, creating access problems for potential customers from outside of Downtown. Further problems were
encountered in attempts to operate a regional shopping complex from a public street without benefit of coordinated marketing. As a consequence, what regional retailing that had remained disappeared from Fort Street.

Fort Street retailing instead evolved to accommodate four growing groups of patrons:

1. office workers
2. bus patrons
3. Hawai‘i Pacific College/University students
4. area residents.

Fort Street retailing also became very time-dependent. The F.W. Woolworth store, for example, in 1987 noted that sixty-seven per cent of its sales occurred between the hours of 11:00 a.m.-1:30 p.m. (Loftus 1997).

Pedestrian travel statistics also bore this out. By 1987 the DIA estimated 3,600 persons per hour passed the Liberty House during the peak lunch period (Downtown Improvement Association September 1987).

The environment of the Mall, however, had been deteriorating for some time. This involved both private and public property.

Within the private sector, some store owners had done little to renovate their own buildings since the Mall was built. Reported one store manager, "The trouble is we can’t pass regulations on a public mall and control the condition of the buildings the way they can in a private shopping center. And the owners are very independent — they aren’t getting together" (Gautier 1971).

Within the public sector, while security continued to be a concern, maintenance became the dominant issue. The heavy pedestrian use of the Mall and maintenance problems were giving the Mall a worn out look.
1. Irrigation system: The irrigation system was not functioning (Downtown Improvement Association September 1987).

2. Landscaping: Many of the original trees planted in 1969 were often overgrown, upkempt, or had died (Gautier 1971; Downtown Improvement Association September 1987). The original “false olive” trees created a litter and stain problem on local retail floors when tracked in on customer’s shoes (Medeiros 1997).

3. Facilities problems included drinking fountains that did not provide cool water or any water at all, dirty benches, inoperable overhead audio and light systems, lack of restrooms, and deteriorating walking surfaces (especially the brick) (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a; Author).

10.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION

While the DIA no longer viewed Fort Street as a major island wide retailing center, the DIA wished to promote its specialty functions. As much as possible the DIA wanted to upgrade the Fort Street Mall to the facility standards enjoyed by patrons of private complexes such as the Ala Moana Shopping Center. This required that the DIA address maintenance and security problems in both the public and private sectors along the Mall (Gushman 1998).

The DIA publicly pushed private enterprise to improve the image of downtown Honolulu. During a DIA Annual Meeting held on March 5, 1970, Castle and Cooke President Malcolm MacNaughton stated that Downtown merchants should, “Clean up, paint up, modernize and upgrade your merchandise” (Honolulu Advertiser 3/6/1970).

In 1979 Mayor Fasi did indeed appoint a committee of Mall property owners and tenants (the Mayor’s Committee on the Fort Street Mall) to meet with City agencies on
problems of maintenance, operations and security (Downtown Improvement Association 1990d).

During 1981 Mayor Eileen Anderson named Wade McVay, DIA representative and Campbell Estate Trustee, Chairman of the Mayor's Committee on the Fort Street Mall (Downtown Improvement Association November 1981). The City subsequently disclosed the maintenance costs for the Fort and Union Street Malls, leading the Mayor's Committee to conclude that private contractors could perform better maintenance at a lower cost.

In 1983 Mayor Anderson agreed to the creation of a new improvement district, with fifty per cent of the cost to be covered by the City, and fifty per cent by abutting landowners, provided the costs were acceptable and the majority of property owners approved. The Mayor also agreed to contract maintenance to a private contractor (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990c).

The Committee decided in 1984 that a thorough renovation of the Mall was necessary, raised $15,000 from private sources and hired four design firms to provide ideas. Costs for renovation were estimated at $2.95 million. Seventy five percent of the property owners on the Mall agreed to a 50/50 plan using 20 year City bonds provided that private maintenance was implemented. The City Council then approved $100,000 for design (Downtown Improvement Association July 1984b, March 1990a, March 1990c).

In 1985 re-elected Mayor Fasi selected DIA representative Richard Gushman II as Chairman of the Committee.

During 1987 Spencer Mason Architects presented a Preliminary Plan for the Renovation of the Fort Street Mall that included the complete repaving of the Mall. A separate contract was to be issued to create a large water feature in new Wilcox Park.
Diamond Head of the King Street plaza. Restrooms were proposed as part of a development agreement with Pan Pacific Plaza developer FSA Corporation.

No bids were received by the City for use of the King Street underpass as an outdoor restaurant, prompting a proposal to fill in the facility.

The year 1988 saw Mayor Fasi prevailing upon the City Council to open a Satellite City Hall within the King Street Underpass (Downtown Improvement Association December 1988). The City Council also appropriated $2 million as the City's share of renovation costs for the Fort Street Mall (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a).

By 1989 the plan had reached final stage and approval by the Committee, pending missing details. The DIA and landowners were still willing to contribute fifty percent toward an improvement district provided that the City hire a private contractor, creating a Maintenance District. The City felt a maintenance district was impractical, and declined. Late in the year the City changed plans, and as the funds were not committed, they lapsed.

Mayor Fasi terminated the Committee in 1990.

The City decided to redevelop the Mall on its own in 1991. A new renovation plan was prepared by landscape architecture firm PBR Hawai'i under the direction of the City Department of Housing and Community Development (Downtown Improvement Association September 1991).

Construction began in 1992 with all construction costs of $3.7 million completely covered by the City (Downtown Improvement Association February 1993).

During this time the DIA joined Downtown merchants and residential groups in opposition to the conversion of the former Blaisdell Hotel building into a State shelter for
Figure 10.1. Fort Street Mall, looking mauka from near Chaplain Lane, 1998. Hawai‘i Pacific University is on the left, and Our Lady of Peace Cathedral on the right. The area immediately in front has become the “campus” of HPU, providing space for activities such as International Day. Source: Author.

Figure 10.2. Fort Street Mall, looking mauka from Hotel Street, 1998. Gone are the New York Dress Shop, Kramers, the Ritz, Sato Clothiers and Kress. Fast food outlets and small service businesses now occupy the area. Source: Author.
Figure 10.3. Fort Street Mall, makai view from Hotel Street, 1998. This was the most active retail segment of the Mall. Notice the narrowness of the right-of-way, and the resulting shadows. F.W. Woolworth was on the left, and Liberty House continues farther down (out of sight) on the right. Source: Author.

Figure 10.4. Fort Street Mall, mauka view from above Merchant Street, 1998. The parking garage of the Executive Center dominates the far right. This area once had a clearly defined street edge, lined by service businesses and small offices. The open spaces of the Pioneer Plaza on the left and Financial Plaza of the Pacific on the right have changed the character of the area. Source: Author.
Figure 10.5: Layout of the Fort Street Mall, 1998 (not to scale). Source: Author.
homeless persons, fearing negative impacts of the shelter on nearby businesses (Downtown Improvement Association December 1992).

In 1993 renovation of the Mall was completed (Downtown Improvement Association February 1993). The completed project was a City, and not a DIA, project (Gushman 1998).

10.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT

10.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS

TABLE 10.1. GARVIN'S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders</td>
<td>The DIA and the City communicated through the Mayor's Committee on the Fort Street Mall for eleven years. The DIA represented landowners and merchants who had become dissatisfied with the maintenance performed by the City, but were willing to contribute to the renovation of the Mall in return for a private maintenance contractor. They hoped a private contractor could be hired to service the area more often and do more detailed work than the City was willing to undertake. The City felt such a maintenance district was impractical, because many different branches of City government were involved in maintenance of the Mall, and so true costs would be difficult to ascertain (Reid 1998). The DIA also wanted less extensive Mall renovations than those the City proposed. Although the DIA and the Mayor's Committee felt that, &quot;renovation of the Mall was needed before any real significant improvement in maintenance could be attempted&quot; (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a), the Committee and DIA preferred a &quot;simple contemporary design, (including) uncluttered walkways, shade trees and easily maintained street furniture&quot; to the Victorian replica streetscape favored by the City (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990a).</td>
</tr>
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Table 10.1 is continued on the next page.

170
TABLE 10.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders (continued)</td>
<td>The DIA did not want a waterfall (developed under a separate contract by the City) in adjacent Wilcox Park. The DIA opposed the water feature because of maintenance problems, cost, and concerns about homeless people using it as a toilet. The City administration wanted the waterfall to soften street noise, and viewed the Park as a shaded sitting area and overflow dining area for the nearby Executive Center. The City decided to renovate the Mall on its own. &quot;The Committee had to learn that the plans had gone out to bid through a legal advertisement and only saw the 'final' plans when a set was requested just days before the bid opening&quot; (Downtown Improvement Association March 1990b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish</td>
<td>One major problem for downtown Honolulu is the homeless. Unfortunately the facilities available for the mentally ill, the working poor, and the unemployed simply are inadequate in Honolulu for the task. The focal point for homeless persons in the City had become A'ala Park, just Ewa of Chinatown and the Financial District. Fort Street offered the homeless proximity to the Edwin Thomas Home, and access to both charitable passersby and inexpensive eateries, much to the unhappiness of retailers and other pedestrians who wished such individuals would &quot;simply go away.&quot; In response to this conflict and general security concerns, the DIA and the City agreed to close the Mall at night. Merchants and the DIA also hoped to prevent installation of features that might prove attractive to the homeless. This included the aforementioned Wilcox fountain, and led to the removal of the 1969 era low rise fountains, the children's sandbox, and flat benches (Gushman 1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function</td>
<td>The City rebuilt the Fort Street Mall to upgrade the area, help invoke a sense of place and reinforce its historical character (Reid 1997). The architecture enhances the historical buildings on both ends of the Mall, and provides an attractive pedestrian portal for individuals entering or exiting Downtown from the parking structures located in the Kukui district. The fact that this important entrance to Downtown is so close to Chinatown offers economic potential to both the renovated Hawai'i Theater and Chinatown itself.</td>
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Table 10.1 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 10.1. (CONTINUED): GARVIN’S REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Create Positive Change and Prevent Negative Change</td>
<td><em>Positive Change</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The new Mall architecture complements the historic architecture makai of Beretania and near Queen Street.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The renovated Mall acts as a central activity area for Hawai‘i Pacific University (HPU) functions. Each week different HPU student organizations conduct publicity or membership campaigns from tables set up along the Mall. HPU also uses the Mall for pep rallies and its International Student Day presentations of cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create Positive Change and Prevent Negative Change (continued)</td>
<td><em>Prevent negative change</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Retention of the worn or broken Mall surfaces and equipment would have had a long term negative effect upon renovation of existing buildings or new construction in the area.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The project has aided in the successful expansion of HPU at the mauka end of the Fort Street Mall, providing landlords with stable tenancy for their structures, ensuring renovation and maintenance. HPU has been successful enough to invoke imitation – the University of Phoenix also located on the Mall, providing the same function as HPU on properties makai of Merchant Street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The “Victorian” nature of the street furniture and the Wilcox statue at King Street could contribute to increased public interest in the untapped historic resources of the area. The original DIA plan stressed finding ways to encourage tourists into the area. A historic marker project as developed in Atlanta, Savannah and other cities could bring more people Downtown and increase Downtown commerce in Honolulu as it has in those cities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The quiet nature of the makai end of the renovated Mall reinforces maintenance of the “residential” nature of the historic C. Brewer compound, a complex that unfortunately sits on prime real estate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 10.2. GARVIN'S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending</strong></td>
<td>The City made several efforts to improve the Mall and its environs, including:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1. $4,000,000 renovating the Mall to enhance it as a Downtown retail and office center (Reid 1998).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. the opening of a Downtown Police Substation (with $155,000 in private contributions toward construction) on nearby Nu'uanu Avenue to provide improved security for the area (Downtown Improvement Association November 1988).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. development of a Satellite City Hall in the King Street underpass (Downtown Improvement Association December 1988).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. development of Wilcox Park and fountain (Downtown Improvement Association February 1993; Reid 1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk</strong></td>
<td><strong>Character of the Area</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The City's &quot;Victorian period&quot; renovation of the Mall reinforces the historic nature of downtown Honolulu, especially near Beretania and Merchant Streets. This ties in well with renovations of turn of the century buildings and placement of similar street furniture along Hotel Street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Lessen Private Investment Risk</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Changes in federal tax laws have recently lessened interest in renovation of historical buildings. The continuance of the City's Improvement District guidelines relaxing parking requirements, and placement of historical theme street furniture, encourages landowners to continue renovating older buildings or maintain the historical theme in new construction.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives for desired private development</strong></td>
<td>The City uses two tactics for maintaining Fort Street as a desirable location.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The first is continuance of the Improvement District 80, which waives standard requirements for parking. This is especially useful for small lots or older structures.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Since 1993 larger lots could benefit from the raised height limit allowed for new structures within the Downtown core. Potential Fort Street heights went to 450 feet between Merchant and Hotel Streets, and 400 feet between Hotel and Beretania Streets. This followed the DIA policy for high densities within Downtown, and directed growth back into the Fort Street direction, away from the Capitol District (Downtown Improvement Association January 1993).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 10.3. GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Market                | The market had been redefined since 1969 to center on four groups:  
1. office workers, needing food and engaging in some shopping at the noon hour, and purchasing small items to take home after work.  
2. university students from HPU and the University of Phoenix, whose mostly foreign student bodies patronize smaller ethnic food establishments.  
3. City Bus riders, who frequent retailers near bus stops.  
4. a small but growing number of nearby residents who live in City projects in Chinatown or mauka of Beretania Street. |
| Location              | *Inherent Site Characteristics*  
The Mall begins with a small plaza at Beretania Street, and contains another on the makai side of King Street. The remainder of the Mall is a narrow thoroughfare, with a minimum width of only eighty-eight feet. This creates a shadowy, canyon-like effect along most of its length.  
*Proximity*  
Fort Street is no longer as peripheral as it once was. Five large high rise residential structures now are located along Beretania, and four more are located nearby in Chinatown. These and the construction of public parking garages in Kukui Plaza and Chinatown Gateway Plaza place Fort Street more in the center of Downtown “gravity” than it once was. The DIA vision of a rapid transit corridor along Hotel Street would have a dramatic effect upon Fort Street’s potential. |
| Design                | The City’s design for the Fort Street Mall included:  
1. reconstruction of the Mall using multi-tone brown pavers. This was done to ease maintenance of the many underground utilities in the area. The pavers are simply pulled up, the work done, and the pavers replaced. One problem, however, is unevenness of the paver surface, which can trip pedestrians.  
2. replacing the false olive trees with palm trees. This lessened the mess tracked into stores, but required constant vigilance on the part of the City to ensure that palm fronds did not fall on passersby.  
3. elimination of the sandbox and other hard to maintain features.  
4. installation of “Victorian” lamp posts and traffic barriers intended to reinforce the historical character of the Mall. The “cobblestone” pavers and increased use of trees make the Mall a more attractive place to sit in the afternoons, unlike the lighter concrete of the previous Mall, which reflected light and heat. |
| Financing             | General obligation bond funding was used to finance the project (Reid 1998). |

Table 10.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 10.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>City Managing Director Jeremy Harris was responsible for the Fort Street Mall project. The project as built was NOT a DIA project (Gushman 1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td><strong>Immediate</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>As was the case with the original 1969 construction, walking through different areas of the Fort Street Mall today (1998) invokes different personas.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mauka of Hotel Street, Hawai'i Pacific University is increasingly making its presence felt. The University has been extending its conversion of office and retail space into classrooms, and now occupies part of the First Hawaiian Tower at ground level. Ethnic carry out and sidewalk cafes serving Russian, Vietnamese, Chinese and other foods cater to the students. General retail, however, has never been weaker. The homeless also congregate there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Between Hotel and King, retailing has had a major blow with the closure of F.W. Woolworth. The entire Diamond Head side of the block is now shuttered, creating a sense of abandonment. Perhaps the congested Long's Drugs outlet next door will take some of the space before Liberty House, Leeds and Payless Shoes become too negatively impacted.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Makai of King Street the Mall dissolves into the Financial and Pioneer Plazas, and the Brewer complex. The area serves as a nicely landscaped corridor to other activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The 24 Hour Day</em></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Except for school hours Monday through Friday, the Mall is busiest before 8:30 a.m., during lunch hours, and at about 4:30 p.m., reflecting the effects of office workers. Weekend activity lies mostly near HPU.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evening activity at HPU occurs until about 8:30 p.m. when classes quit, and at the nearby Merchant Square &quot;saloons&quot; until diners retire. The whole of the Mall is deserted later at night.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Decades</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The renovated Fort Street Mall is too new to make much of a long term prediction, although the removal of features such as the sandbox and low fountains should ease long term maintenance costs. Provision of adequate maintenance funds will be key, however, to providing the character and in turn the private investment, of the area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 10.4. THE "PLANNING" AND THE "BUILT" LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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</table>
| Planning Legacy   | The design of the Fort Street Mall developed in 1993 reflects several trends:  
1. recognition of the changing nature of Downtown retailing. Gone are the aspirations for continued supremacy in commercial activities. Parking was no longer central to the program, as it was in the 1969 plan.  
2. willingness of the government to take the initiative, even if consensus was not reached with all participants. In 1969 the DIA had to convince the City of the necessity of building the first Fort Street Mall. In 1991 the City decided to "go it alone," without private financial assistance, because the City was unwilling to enter into a maintenance contract for public property with a private concern (Gushman 1998).  
3. use of "theme" architecture in a public project. Similar "period" architecture was or would be used on other public projects in Chinatown, Kakaako and West Loch Estates. |
| Built Legacy      | The Fort Street Mall of 1993 arrested the physical decline of the Mall itself. The narrow, often shadowy right of way remains a pedestrian refuge in the city, made interesting and diverse by its length.  
The 1993 materials of palms, earth tone pavers and "Victorian" lamp posts are more in the character of a tropical downtown aspiring to interest tourists than the older brick and cement squares of the 1969 design. The Mall today has separate characters, depending upon location.  
1. At the "top" of the Mall the remodeled Beretania plaza has become the activity center for Hawaii Pacific University. The area has the ambiance of an urban college campus, with students often crowding the area during daylight hours. The school uses the Mall for pep rallies and its "International Day" festivities. The Roman Catholic Our Lady Of Peace Cathedral and early 20th century buildings dominate the immediate plaza. Street furniture consists of metal and wooden benches, Victorian period water fountains and lamps, and concrete planters mauka of the church.  
Small businesses located in the Blaisdell Hotel and buildings immediately nearby cater to HPU foreign students' meal requests. Tables and chairs spreading out from the shops onto the Mall create a sidewalk café atmosphere. |

Table 10.4 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 10.4. (CONTINUED): THE "PLANNING" AND THE "BUILT" LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Built Legacy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(continued)</td>
<td>2. Further makai, a transition area accommodates long established small businesses, fast food outlets and ethnic take out establishments. The First Hawaiian Bank area is mostly vacant, and its separation from street level precludes most retail activity from its space. Groups of the homeless often occupy the benches here, their first beachhead on the Mall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. The character of the Hotel-King Street area is changing. This was originally the most traveled area of the Mall because of its strategic location between two major bus stops. The closure of the F.W. Woolworth store, which occupied the entire Diamond Head end of the block, has given the area a depressed look and encouraged pedestrians to use Hotel and Bishop as access to points makai. Campbell Estate has apparently postponed its project for the Ewa end. Liberty House and the Robins Shoe Store have been joined by a Payless Discount Shoe Store on the Campbell properties. Large numbers of retirees who had for decades used benches outside the F.W. Woolworth store have been giving way to the homeless.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The City’s rebuilding of the King Street underpass as a popular Satellite City Hall has helped to maintain the presence of office workers in the area. The City closed the escalators that once operated there but provided elevator access for the handicapped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. The Mall takes on an entirely middle class look between King and Merchant Streets. As mentioned earlier, the Mall is virtually unrecognizable as a separate right of way. The mini stage on the Financial Plaza of the Pacific side remains unused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Across Merchant, the “office park” atmosphere becomes more leisurely due to the introduction of considerably more benches than available above Merchant Street. The benches, however, are increasingly occupied by the homeless on weekends.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 10.6 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

**TABLE 10.5. THE FORT STREET MALL (1993): LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heavily traveled pedestrian corridors need periodic extensive renovations or wholesale replacement as do any other city street, but are considerably more expensive.</td>
<td>Renovation of the Fort Street Mall involved replacement of plantings, light fixtures, fountains, water fountains, drains, etc. Considerable delays were taken before consensus was reached to renovate the whole Mall extensively.</td>
<td>The &quot;life&quot; of the original 1969 Mall was 23 years (1969-1992). The existing Mall will probably need replacement in a shorter period of time, considering the even greater pedestrian traffic it carries today.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large stand alone shopping complexes have distinct retail advantages compared to older shopping areas composed of downtown streets converted into pedestrian malls. These advantages stem from a single ownership/management entity that provides vision, organization and enforcement. Included are the ability to design mutual promotions, regulate tenant décor, determine product mix, remove &quot;undesirables,&quot; and negotiate fees from their tenants for renovations. Downtown malls do not have such a single organizing entity, must rely on cooperation, and have, in effect, a common landlord (government) unversed in the needs of retail activities.</td>
<td>Private shopping center management such as that at the Ala Moana Shopping Center control all property and make promotion, maintenance and security decisions. Downtown landowners and merchants facing public property do not have the same control over the shopping environment.</td>
<td>Downtown merchants must recognize that unless some accommodation is made with their adjoining landlord (the City or State), they will not be able to compete on the same level as a private shopping center. If that is the case, merchants should play to their strengths created by their location. For example, this could include convenience in a mixed use building containing residences, or a niche market if located in a Class A business complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A historical marker program can encourage &quot;cultural tourism&quot; and local interest in downtowns. The additional pedestrian traffic generated can contribute to the local economy.</td>
<td>The DIA's original plans included enticing more tourists Downtown, but a historical marker program was not begun.</td>
<td>Fort Street could offer a &quot;trial&quot; program, having such sites as Our Lady of Peace Cathedral, the Sacred Hearts Convent, the first shots of the Revolution of 1891, and Honolulu Fort.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 10.5 is continued on the next page.
**TABLE 10.5. (CONTINUED): THE FORT STREET MALL (1993): LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| As the entity controlling the unifying factor of a downtown mall district, the mall itself, government determines the character of the shopping complex. Government has a range of choices in handling the potential operation of retail malls such as Fort Street.  
1. Maintain the present level of services, thus affirming the existing Mall environment.  
2. Encourage nearby merchants and/or landlords to “adopt” the areas in front of their businesses. (This is unofficially done now on the Mall.)  
3. Increase management, security and maintenance, including staffing, to approach the support enjoyed by facilities such as Honolulu International Airport.  
4. “Privatize” (outsourcing) some services, such as trash collection.  
5. Lease individual street blocks out to nearby landlords, tenants, or combinations of both. This would allow the lessee to determine its own security, maintenance and other policies. Although this has not been done on a City owned street, State property such as the Aloha Tower Marketplace does this. | The City decided not to hire a private contractor and instead continued with the existing maintenance system. The City renovated the Mall on its own initiative. | Periodic evaluations of important retail areas fronting City owned streets in Waikiki, Downtown and other locations are important to maintaining those areas as attractive centers of mercantile activity. Such evaluations may determine what renovations and/or a changed level and/or type of maintenance may be necessary. |

Table 10.5 is continued on the next page.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proper documentation of underground utility lines should be required to prevent accidental severance, costly plan rewrites or construction delays.</td>
<td>It is interesting to note that Hawaiian Dredging and Construction Company complained that lack of adequate documentation of utility placement resulted in extensive delays in the 1969 project. The same problem occurred in 1992 (Reid 1998).</td>
<td>Extensive use of detailed Geographic Information Systems to map utility lines as they are placed underground can prevent these problems in the future.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 11. THE ALOHA TOWER MARKETPLACE (1994)

11.1 GOAL: REDEVELOP THE WATERFRONT AS A “PEOPLE PLACE”

The Downtown Improvement Association strongly urges that the State of Hawai‘i take action, in a joint venture with private enterprise, to redevelop the underutilized maritime terminal area along the Waterfront adjacent to the Aloha Tower. The object of redevelopment should be to restore the Waterfront as a “people place”, while preserving its maritime uses, beautifying its general appearance, and retaining low development density...Publicly acceptable redevelopment must be of lasting first class architectural quality.

(Downtown Improvement Association 1975d)

11.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

The Aloha Tower Marketplace is a 185,000 square foot tourist oriented retail project centered on the Aloha Tower complex (Piers 8-11) and adjacent Waterfront areas.


11.3 BACKGROUND OF THE PROJECT

Two factors within the mid 20th century changed the character of Honolulu Harbor.
The first was the arrival of the “jet age,” which drastically cut travel time between Honolulu and the rest of the world. Honolulu Airport became the dominant passenger travel center, removing that function from its historical ship pier location at the foot of Downtown.

The second major change was containerization, which allowed faster loading and unloading of ships, but which required acres of open space for container handling and storage. Such large open areas were simply not available immediately adjacent to Downtown, and those activities moved to Piers 1 and 2 near Fort Armstrong, or onto Sand Island. The result was that the area immediately adjacent to Downtown, long bustling with activity and congestion, became underutilized.

The decline of activity at the wharves of Aloha Tower and the economic stagnation facing Downtown brought two reactions from the State government.

The State began renovation of the antiquated pier complex itself. Constructed in 1963-65, the $3 million dollar project created a ground floor freight area and a second floor passenger deck in the center of the original pier area. The top passenger level was connected to Irwin Park via escalators, and via a vehicle ramp to Piers 5, 6, 7 and 8 (Hawaii Business News 6/25/1963; Honolulu Star Bulletin and Advertiser 11/15/1964).

The State also considered a freeway along the Nimitz Highway right of way to route through traffic around Downtown.

11.4 DIA INVOLVEMENT AND PROJECT EVOLUTION

The Downtown Improvement Association originally did not pay much attention to the harbor area. Instead the DIA initially concentrated on developing and executing its three point plan for the core Downtown area. It was the O'ahu Development Conference, with its island wide perspective, that involved the DIA with harbor development.
The O'ahu Development Conference (of which the Downtown Improvement Association was a member) opposed the State's Waterfront freeway project. Aaron Levine, Executive Vice President of the ODC, feared that the Nimitz corridor freeway would "wall off" Downtown from the Waterfront, as the Embarcadero Freeway separated much of San Francisco from that city's wharves and bay. The Waterfront freeway opposition succeeded in locating an alternative freeway route mauka of the original alignment. That freeway route became the Lunalilo Freeway (O'ahu Development Conference 1967; Levine 1998).

In January 1968 the O'ahu Development Conference unveiled its Urban Design Project (UDP), a "three dimensional approach" using drawings to dramatize how different development schemes might interact and affect the area between Honolulu Airport and Waikiki. The Urban Design Project was meant to encourage public discussion of development proposals. Included in the Honolulu Harbor segment was a high-rise luxury apartment complex, a pedestrian bridge from Aloha Tower to the Fort Street Mall, a public promenade, small boat marina, an inter-island ferry terminal, and even landscaping on Sand Island. The UDP was a joint project of the O'ahu Development Conference and the State Foundation on Culture and the Arts, and featured Aaron Levine (President of the ODC) and Planner William Grant (later Executive Director of the DIA) as author and graphics artist on the report (Cook 1968; Hawai'i Business and Industry March 1968b).

The April 1968 DIA-inspired Gruen Plan included several harbor activities with direct ties to Downtown:

1. a hotel/convention complex along Nu'uanu Stream near the Waterfront between King Street and Nimitz Highway.
2. a hydrofoil transportation island to provide direct water-oriented transportation to Downtown from Waikiki. A ramp would carry pedestrians over Nimitz Highway into Downtown.

3. a ship museum /restaurant/commercial complex to create interest in the Waterfront.

4. views such as that of the Aloha Tower from Fort Street should be preserved.

5. another ramp to carry pedestrians between the Fort Street Mall and the Aloha Tower piers. Most importantly, “The existing functionally obsolete pier buildings of massive scale for the waterfront should be progressively removed for a new, small scale, water-oriented development of greater public use” (Gruen 1968).

In August 1968 the DIA’s Position Paper No. 8-68, entitled “Honolulu Harbor and Downtown,” supported the use of Honolulu Harbor for “clean” (non-toxic) industries and promptly endorsed the Gruen Plan’s harbor features (Downtown Improvement Association 1970e). The DIA newsletter, the Downtowner, would subsequently make periodic reports on maritime activities (and the Aloha Tower area in particular) to keep the DIA membership informed.

The Hawai‘i State Legislature, at the urging of Governor John Burns, in 1970 appropriated $100,000 for concept studies on a world trade center by the Department of Planning and Economic Development (DPED) (Legislative Auditor of the State of Hawai‘i 1979). A world trade center was viewed as a means to attract international business to Honolulu, create new industry, provide employment, and increase the tax base (Sutton 1998). Similar projects had been developed by governments in Baltimore, Maryland; Houston, Texas; Seattle, Washington; and New York City, New York. Private concerns had developed world trade centers in Dallas, Texas and New Orleans, Louisiana (State of Hawai‘i, Legislative Auditor 1979).
The DPED in 1972 conducted a site study for an international or “Pan-Pacific” trade center, placing the underutilized Aloha Tower complex as its first choice. The international trade center was conceived as an office building, a conference and information center, and an exhibition hall. Further development would lead to training, research, and scientific/technical exchange programs associated with international trade (State of Hawai‘i, Legislative Auditor 1979).

In 1973 Harold Spector, Vice-President of ex-DIA President Clarence Ching’s Loyalty Mortgage Company, announced preliminary discussions with the State Department of Transportation and DPED officials for development of a foreign trade center at Aloha Tower. The architectural firm of Boone and Brooks had been retained to design the project in conjunction with the existing foreign trade zone at Pier 39. Apartments could be constructed to help offset the initial costs of the project. Refurbishment of the Aloha Tower would be followed by construction of new commercial buildings to provide space needed by the trade center. The nearby existing Oceania floating restaurant and the Falls of Clyde museum ship would also be attractions for the project. Whether or not this “exploratory proposal” actually had the support of the DIA leadership, State Department of Transportation officials contacted by the Honolulu Star Bulletin at the time intimated that space was already difficult to obtain at Aloha Tower (Honolulu Star Bulletin 5/22/1973). Nothing came of the proposal.

The Hawai‘i International Services Agency (HISA), a part of the State Department of Planning and Economic Development, in 1973 hired the architectural and engineering consulting firm of Charles R. Sutton and Associates to conduct a physical requirements/cost analysis of a proposed Hawai‘i International Trade Center (HITC) to be located at Aloha Tower. The resulting report entitled Feasibility Study, Hawai‘i International Trade Center Located in Aloha Tower Complex (1974) determined that the
pier buildings at Aloha Tower were structurally sound and renovation was feasible. Two alternatives were offered for redevelopment:

1. renovation of the pier buildings, to include exhibit space; a conference center; offices, meeting rooms, commercial space; and a pedestrian bridge across Nimitz Highway. Costs were estimated at $10,231,340.

2. demolition of Piers 8 and 9, construction of a five story building and a 250 room hotel. Cost estimates were $28,811,900 (Charles R. Sutton and Associates 1974).

In 1975 DIA Position Paper 1-75 put the Downtown Improvement Association on record promoting redevelopment of the Aloha Tower area as a low rise “people place” (Downtown Improvement Association 1975d). The DIA also formed a Waterfront Redevelopment Committee, chaired by Harold Eichelberger (Downtown Improvement Association February 1981c).

In 1976 the DIA issued a generalized plan for Waterfront redevelopment entitled Waterfront Design Concept for Honolulu Harbor. The plan sought to:

1. reduce the effect of Nimitz Highway and Ala Moana Boulevard as a physical and psychological barrier.

2. establish an urban character in the Waterfront area by intensifying and mixing compatible “people activities,” while preserving maritime uses.

3. provide maximum opportunity for pedestrian access at water’s edge along its entirety.

4. establish an orderly sequence of open spaces for both pedestrian and motorist, and to integrate buildings and spaces through the inter-relationship of scale, materials and vistas.

5. establish the Aloha Tower as the focal point of converging pedestrian ways and harbor views (Downtown Improvement Association 1976).
The general design called for twin elevated access bridges across Nimitz Highway, and a "horseshoe" design of "people activity generators" around a "Marine Activity Zone." Renovation of the Aloha Tower itself was part of the plan.

A second DPED-financed study by Charles R. Sutton and Associates, initiated in 1975 and released in 1979, was charged with examination of the demand for a world trade center, analyzing other potential sites, completion of another structural review (to include Piers 10 and 11), examination of parking and access needs, preparation of a project development schedule, estimation of revenues and costs, and exploration of financing alternatives. The second Sutton report also endorsed the expanded (Piers 8 through 11) Aloha Tower site, and called for demolition of all existing pier structures. Increment I would include an eight story office building; commercial areas, shopping arcades, and a pedestrian overpass to Fort Street; and renovation of Pier 11. Increment II would double the base eight-story world trade center building and potentially contain an additional 20 story structure. Increment III would contain a 400-720 room hotel and a completely redeveloped maritime terminal at Pier 11. The Increment I cost was estimated at $49,697,000 (State of Hawai'i, Legislative Auditor 1979).

DPED Director Hideto Kono on August 10, 1976 appointed an Advisory Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza (ACATP) to provide HISA with citizen input. Included in this group were Clare Beck, Executive Director of the DIA, Aaron Levine of the ODC, and representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, U. S. Department of Commerce, and the Hawai'i State DOT.

The DPED Advisory Committee in September 1978 issued Aloha Tower Plaza and the Hawaii World Trade Center for HISA, based upon information developed for the soon to be released second Sutton report. The Advisory Committee endorsed the Sutton conceptual plan recommending that the trade center be located at Aloha Tower
and be the focal point of a single progressive renewal project that should ultimately include Piers 2-18. The Committee envisioned an Aloha Tower Development Authority organized to manage a joint public-private development program to integrate the area “functionally, organizationally, and architecturally” with Downtown. Other specific recommendations included making the Aloha Tower a freestanding structure by removing the buildings at its base; creating a plaza, fountain and makai park of over three acres focused on the Tower; development of commercial and public exhibit space between Piers 8 and 9; renovation of the passenger terminal at Pier 11; removal of automobile storage from Irwin Park; construction of new bus, taxi and automobile access at the foot of Fort Street; and provision for additional maritime use of Pier 8 (Advisory Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza 1978).

The State Department of Transportation published a harbor report of its own in September 1978 to complement the work done at Aloha Tower by DPED, HISA and ACATP. Entitled Conceptual Planning Study: Piers 2 to 18, Honolulu Harbor, the study was done by EDAW Inc., and involved creation of a Downtown Waterfront Redevelopment Team that included the DIA, ODC, Chamber of Commerce and Outdoor Circle. The study recognized the effects that technology had had on the harbor area immediately adjacent to Downtown.

Matching the future maritime requirements with the facilities available or planned, it became apparent that the harbor interface with the City of Honolulu might better serve the community, oriented toward the needs of the city rather than the Harbor.

(State of Hawai‘i, Department of Transportation 1978)

The report recommended:
1. pedestrian overpasses be built over Nimitz Highway at Bishop, Fort and Smith Streets to create better access between Downtown and the Waterfront.

2. a continuous pedestrian promenade be constructed along the water’s edge.

3. Pier 2 be developed as a foreign trade zone.

4. Pier 4 continue with Coast Guard use.

5. Piers 5 and 6 be extended for additional parking and improved atmosphere for the Falls of Clyde and Oceania Floating Restaurant.

6. Pier 7 become a promenade with space for parking and moorages for cruise boats and a ferry system.

7. Piers 8-11 would be under the administration of DPED, with the ground level remaining in maritime use.

8. Pier 12-14 buildings would be replaced by promenades, landscaping and parking with the piers themselves available for maritime use when needed.

9. Pier 15 remain as the harbor firehouse; and Piers 16-18 contain the commercial fishing fleet (State of Hawai‘i, Department of Transportation 1978).

Questions about the financial feasibility of the proposed world trade center, including potential costs to the State of Hawai‘i and the willingness of private enterprise to invest in the project, surfaced in the Hawai‘i State Legislature in 1979. The State Administration asked for an $8.5 million dollar appropriation toward establishment of the trade center and redevelopment of the area piers. The Legislature instead instructed the Legislative Auditor to evaluate the Administration’s proposals and present a report back to the Legislature. Only then would a reduced appropriation of $500,000 for design be released (Altonn 1979).

The resulting Legislative Auditor report found that the project would not be self supporting. After construction of Increment I the project was estimated to have a
negative cash flow of $1 million a year, and later project increment liabilities had not been determined (State of Hawai‘i, Legislative Auditor 1979).

The Legislative Auditor also had several serious questions about the international center’s suppositions.

1. It found no firm correlation that international business corporations would locate in a city because of a particular office complex.

2. The amount of commercial space planned for the project was greater than the adjoining office complex could support. Potential local customers to make up the difference would have to cross the Nimitz Highway barrier from Downtown. Tourists would require bussing or ferries to the Aloha Tower, but there were few attractions in the complex that would entice tourists away from similar shops in Waikiki.

3. The second Sutton report had established that in 1976 a harbor side first class hotel was not economically feasible. Should the condition change, it was possible that private developers might erect such a complex closer to the central Downtown area.

4. The isolation of the Aloha Tower across Nimitz Highway required development of enough “critical mass” to draw people from Downtown across the barrier. This required consideration of increment size, timing and staging that, in the Legislative Auditor’s view, had not been adequately addressed.

5. No information as to projected future increment costs was present in the second Sutton report. Development of Increment I, however, would commit the State to engage in subsequent increments, for which no costs were known.

The Legislative Auditor concluded that any authorization for demolition or construction was premature, that establishment of an independent authority was likewise best postponed, and more definitive studies would need to be undertaken (State of Hawai‘i, Legislative Auditor 1979).
In July of 1979 it was disclosed that the DPED had hired American Cities Corporation, a subsidiary of the Rouse Companies, for $83,333.00 to do a more detailed marketing and feasibility study of the proposed Hawai‘i International Trade Center (Woo 7/24/1979). The Legislative Auditor questioned the legality of the study when it was disclosed that the new study had itself not been authorized by the Legislature (Woo 7/27/1979).

Meanwhile, the success of the Baltimore, Maryland’s Inner Harbor project, and its potential parallels to Honolulu Harbor’s Aloha Tower were being publicized in Honolulu’s newspapers. Both cities, for example, had historical ships and were considering or had placed floating restaurants. “Baltimore Has Inner Harbor Triumph: A Lesson for Honolulu” in the Star Bulletin on August 6, 1979 detailed how Maryland State funds were used to build a new World Trade Center and the role of the Rouse Company in developing a maritime marketplace (Altonn 1979).

Public interest in the harbor and ocean formed the basis for the Aloha Tower Marine Information Education Center and Maritime Museum Group. This organization, the forerunner of the Hawai‘i Maritime Center, was founded with the realization that many local residents were mostly unaware of the sea around them and the tremendous effects that the Pacific Ocean exerts upon Hawai‘i. The group began by sponsoring a highly successful lecture series in cooperation with the University of Hawai‘i Marine Advisory Program and the Chamber of Commerce of Hawai‘i held on the 9th floor of Aloha Tower (Downtown Improvement Association October 1979).

The 1980 Hawai‘i State Legislature authorized $225,000 towards site engineering, site planning, financial planning and preparation of alternative management plans for the Aloha Tower Plaza/World Trade Center project. The DIA spent
considerable amounts of time lobbying at the Capitol for the project (Downtown Improvement Association July 1980).

On November 21, 1980 James Rouse, Board Chairman of the Rouse Companies, addressed the Downtown Improvement Association about downtown revitalization and the role of public-private partnerships. Rouse was the developer of the new city of Columbia, Maryland; the Boston, Massachusetts' Quincy Market; Baltimore, Maryland’s Harbor Place and other festival marketplaces across the United States.

On February 25, 1981 the DIA hosted Leo Molinaro, President of the American City Corporation, which had the previously mentioned State contract to investigate the feasibility of the Aloha Tower project. The DIA was one of the members of the Advisory Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza, now called the Aloha Tower Advisory Committee, which had input on the project (Downtown Improvement Association January 1983).

The American City Corporation report, entitled *The Aloha Tower Plaza*, was issued in March 1981. The design plan continued the ideas of restoration of Irwin Park, and a large central open space at the base of the Aloha Tower through to the harbor. New maritime facilities, office and restaurants were to be developed along Piers 10 and 11, and maritime, shops and hotel use along Pier 8. Also included were to be a Nimitz Highway pedestrian overpass, continued use of the three story Harbors Division Office Building along Nimitz Highway, and one thousand parking spaces.

The American City Corporation report set out to detail its proposals in order to address Legislative concerns about timetables, revenues, and liabilities.

Project development was divided into three phases: ten months for planning, demolition and clearance; eighteen months for construction of the public areas; and eighteen months for construction of private space.
Revenue calculations did not include income from existing DOT operations because such funds were not considered available to repay new project debts. Project repayment revenues were estimated from hotel land lease, office land leases, and parking operations. Such funds were expected to be collected by a new State authorized development corporation for repayment of bonds issued by the said corporation. Over a thirty year period, revenues were estimated at $197,696,000 and expenditures at $45,320,000 netting cash of $152,376,000. Financing bonds would total $33,260,000, with repayment at $87,256,000. The total net after financing estimate was $98,380,000.

The development entity was recommended as a not for profit State created development corporation governed by a board of directors to include the DPED, DOT, Hawai'i State Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR), and appointed business community leaders. The development corporation would have the following responsibilities:

1. overall direction of the project
2. coordination of services
3. direction of staff consultants
4. daily project review
5. legal coordination
6. selection of developer and subsequent negotiations
7. architectural review
8. public relations
9. issuance of revenue bonds
10. any other necessary activities (American City Corporation 1981).
The Hawaii State Legislature in 1981 passed Act 236 that created the Aloha Tower Development Corporation (ATDC). The Act authorized the Corporation to issue up to $33,260,000 in revenue bonds for the public portions of the complex. One stipulation, however, was that no demolition or site development could proceed until contractual commitments had been made with a developer.

Governance of the Corporation is through a Board of Directors. The Board consists of the four government officials, the Directors of DPED, DOT, DLNR, and the Mayor of Honolulu; and three members appointed by the State Governor from the public at large. The first three appointees by then Governor George Ariyoshi were Aaron Levine of the ODC, Thomas Trask of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, and Donald Kuyper, President of the Hawaiian Telephone Company and the DIA (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1981; Downtown Improvement Association September 1981).

The first year of operation for the ATDC was slowed by financing. The legislation that allowed the Aloha Tower Development Corporation to raise funds for planning and construction did not contain any money for operations. The ATDC was forced to return to the State Legislature in 1982 to seek $500,000 for pre-development costs (Oshiro 1982).

American City Corporation; Architects Hawai‘i Ltd.; Arthur Young and Company; Graham Wong-Hastings-Martin-Chew Group 70; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell; and ROMA Architects submitted written and oral presentations for the position of pre-development consultant. This consultant was slated to work on the design manual, prospectus and draft lease agreement (Hawai‘i Business August 1982). The ATDC Board unanimously voted to award the contract to ROMA Architects on October 12, 1982 (Pacific Business News 10/18/1982). The basis of the decision was “broad experience in mixed use
development, public and private joint development, waterfront renewal projects, and their experience in Hawai‘i” (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1982).

ROMA included in its design team Donald Wolbrink for planning and landscape design; Williams Kubelbeck and Associates for real estate economics and public finance; Sam Hirota, Inc., for civil engineering; Moffatt and Nichol, as maritime engineers; and Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade and Douglas for traffic and parking (ROMA Architects 1982).

On January 11, 1983 the ROMA proposals were presented to the ATDC. Major elements included a five hundred room hotel along Pier 8; an office building adjacent to Pier 10; and retail, restaurant and new maritime facilities. Heights for new structures would be limited to 65 feet, compared to that of the Aloha Tower at 180 feet. All existing buildings would be demolished except for the Pier 9 passenger gallery and the former Matson Building (then occupied by the DOT). The Aloha Tower itself would thus be uncluttered by other structures, and would be the beginning of a pedestrian walk to Fort Street. Irwin Park would continue as parking, and lose additional space to an access road.

The “ROMA Plan” contained a number of changes from the preceding American Cities proposal.

1. The office complex would be reduced by two-thirds.
2. Retail and restaurant areas would be reduced by twenty per cent.
3. Maritime and sheltered pier areas would be diminished.
4. Parking would be halved.
5. No pedestrian bridge would be constructed across Nimitz Highway to Fort Street. Only an at-grade crossing would be provided.
6. Irwin Park would not be returned to green space, but instead would continue as a parking lot.

The DIA expressed concern that the low rise nature of the ROMA Plan, designed to make the Aloha Tower the dominant feature of the area, would cost the project productive floor area, parking and maritime space. The DIA also noted that the proposal mixed pedestrians and vehicles at grade on Nimitz Highway (Downtown Improvement Association February 1983b, May 1983).

The DIA and others' voiced concerns about the safety of pedestrians crossing Nimitz Highway resulted in reinstatement of the pedestrian overpass by the ROMA team. Criticism of the ROMA Plan came from the Outdoor Circle over the permanent use of Irwin Park for automobile storage, from the Chamber of Commerce Maritime Committee over the maritime facilities, and the DIA about the "critical mass" necessary to draw patrons and finance the improvements (Downtown Improvement Association May 1983).

The ATDC made a request for proposals in May, 1983 to 450 different development groups based on the ROMA recommendations (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1983). Potential bidders had to make note that, unfortunately, 1983 was a period of economic downturn in Hawai’i (Hawai’i Business April 1983). Also complicating the financial picture was the announcement by the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) that part of the proposed Aloha Tower development occupied ceded lands and that OHA would thus be eligible for part of the project revenue. The result was that only five organizations submitted expressions of intent to bid in the first round of negotiations with ATDC (Holman 1998). These were:

2. Hawai‘i Waterfront Partners of Honolulu, with principals Graham Wong Hastings and Sanford Murata, Inc. Three firms would collaborate on design: Gale, Kober; Wudke, Watson, Davis; and Engstrom, Garduque.


4. International Land, Inc./Calishun of San Francisco. Ramada Inns would be the hotel operator, and Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall the architects.

5. Southern Pacific Land Company (SPLC) of San Francisco. No hotel operator was listed. John Carl Warnecke and Charles R. Sutton were listed as architects (Downtown Improvement Association August 1983).

Based on the information submitted by the potential developers to the ATDC, the ATDC determined that only the Aloha Tower Associates and Southern Pacific Land Company had the financial resources necessary to complete the project. Both developers were then asked to submit more detailed proposals.

The ATDC Board of Directors felt that the ROMA guidelines, based on consultation with DOT, DPED, harbor users, Legislative leaders, the Governor’s office and private business, offered the best chance of satisfying all parties and ensuring project success. Thus the final choice of developer was structured upon compliance with the ROMA guidelines, submitted financial statements and proposed implementation plans (Holman 1998). On November 22, 1983 ATDC announced that Southern Pacific Land Company of San Francisco had won the competition (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1983).

SPLC’s $91 million proposal included a 411 room hotel and 170,000 square feet of commercial and office space (Pacific Business News 11/28/1983). The SPLC Plan
followed most of ROMA’s guidelines, with the hotel at Pier 8, the Fort Street Mall extended to Aloha Tower, and the office structure at Pier 10-11. The exceptions to the ROMA Plan was removal of a hotel west wing facing the plaza, which was done to improve views and open the hotel pool area, and placement of all parking underground. Other design concepts included replicating the Aloha Tower’s classical archway entry along the entire façade of each building. Exterior finishes were to be the same light-colored concrete/plaster look of the Tower. Two financing schemes were offered, one a conventional plan with a seventy-five/twenty-five per cent debt/equity ratio. A second plan would have a eighty/twenty per cent debt/equity ratio. Debt for this second option would be split into two segments: forty per cent reserved for qualified development elements for which tax-exempt bonded financing would be pursued, and the remaining fifty-five per cent using conventional financing (Southern Pacific Development Company 1983).

The ATDC, meanwhile, had been busy on other fronts.

1. An Environmental Impact Assessment, based on the ROMA Plan, was conducted, public comment solicited, and then completed. The Governor accepted the EIS on September 15, 1983.

2. The ATDC applied for and received a Certificate of Appropriateness from the Hawai’i Capitol Historic, Cultural and Scenic District.

3. A zoning change from B-2 to B-4 was also requested and approved by the Honolulu City Planning Commission and presented to the City Council.

4. The ATDC arranged an Exclusive Right to Negotiate with the SPDC, listing issues to be resolved.

Unfortunately for the Aloha Tower Development Corporation, in 1984 the Southern Pacific Railroad, parent corporation of the Southern Pacific Development Company...
Corporation, merged with the Santa Fe Railroad. The new corporation determined that the Aloha Tower project did not meet its "risk and reward" criteria and announced its intention to leave the project. Southern Pacific did, however, offer to help ATDC find a new developer, and strongly recommended that John Carl Wamecke and Associates be allowed to continue with the project (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1984).

Working in conjunction with Carl Wamecke and Associates, the ATDC in 1984 examined the possibility of increasing the "critical mass" of the amount of rentable floor space from 160,000 to 350,000 square feet, reached agreement with the Peninsular Hotel Group to manage a 415 unit hotel, and obtained all additional necessary governmental approvals for the project (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1984).

Carl Wamecke and Associates’ Warnecke Development Corporation also began negotiations with several companies for a new development partner. Included was the Carley Capital Group from the original set of developers, and American Hawai’i Cruises/Island Navigation Corporation (Realty) Ltd. of Honolulu; Cordish, Embry and Associates of Baltimore, Maryland; and Watson-Casey/Halcyon Ltd. of Hartford, Connecticut and Austin, Texas (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1984).

In early 1985 Kenneth Brown, architect, local businessman, first Chairman of the State’s Kakaako Development Authority, and President of the Hawai’i Maritime Center, asked the ATDC to reconsider the idea of a festival marketplace. Brown questioned the economics of the ROMA Plan.

ATDC in 1983 had maintained its ROMA guidelines by voting for the Southern Pacific Development Corporation proposal, rather than Aloha Tower Associates’ festival marketplace concept. The Aloha Tower Associates (ATA) plan de-emphasized the office and hotel portions of the ROMA Plan, and placed the Maritime Center Museum near Aloha Tower. The ATA group had included James Rouse’s Enterprise Corporation,
a subsidiary of the Rouse Corporation, which had an impressive track record as
developer of Boston’s Faneuil Hall, Baltimore’s Harborplace and Philadelphia’s Galleria
(Downtown Improvement Association February 1985).

Instead of following Brown’s suggestion and initiating discussions with Aloha
Tower Associates, the ATDC declared in April 1985 that it was negotiating exclusively
with Cordish Embry and Associates, American Hawai’i Cruises, and Island Navigation
Cruises and Island Navigation Corporation (Realty) of Honolulu subsequently withdrew
when it was determined that the initial $33 million in tax-exempt revenue bonds would
not be enough to sustain the project.) Negotiations between Cordish Embry and
Associates and the ATDC would become increasingly strained due to competing DPED
and DOT space needs at the Tower, and the resulting effects on project size and
financing.

In 1986 the State DOT issued a new *Year 2010 Master Plan for Honolulu Harbor.*
Items relating to Downtown and the Aloha Tower area would include:

1. the Aloha Tower Piers 8-11 continue as Honolulu’s passenger ship facilities.
   Interisland ferry berths probably would be located there also.

2. Piers 5-6 be utilized by charter and cruise boats.

3. Pier 7 be occupied by the Maritime Museum.

4. Piers 6-7 and 12-13 be developed into uses deemed compatible with
   activities at Aloha Tower and the Downtown area.

5. Piers 13-14 be available for expansion of commercial, fishing, cruise, charter
   or ferry operations.

6. Piers 15-18 be designated for commercial fishing operations.
7. pedestrian overpasses across Nimitz Highway be constructed at Fort and at Smith Streets.

8. no petroleum or other flammable storage facilities be constructed within the Harbor, and existing facilities relocated to Barber’s Point.

DIA representatives participated in drawing up the harbor Master Plan (Downtown Improvement Association November 1986b).

Unfortunately for the ATDC planners, the DOT’s space requests for ship berthing, baggage handling and customs needs at the Aloha Tower were increasing rapidly. Such requests grew from 44,000 square feet in 1983 to 248,000 square feet in 1986 – larger than the five acre area under negotiation between Cordish Embry and Associates and the ATDC. The ATDC was required by law to reimburse the DOT for any lost revenues caused by redevelopment, and replacement of any maritime facilities. These costs would be passed on to any Aloha Tower developer. The only means to pay such additional costs would be a corresponding increase in commercial space. Cordish Embry indeed did ask to increase the amount of commercial space to 750,000 – a vast increase in density compared to the earlier ROMA Plan (Kresnak 1987).

The lack of concrete progress at Aloha Tower prompted Legislative Auditor Clinton Tanimura in February 1987 to declare the project unworkable. Noting that nothing had been built since the ATDC was authorized in 1981, the Auditor listed several major problem areas in the ATDC organizational setup. These included:

1. conflicts between maritime and commercial uses over limited spatial resources.

2. unrealistic commercial space requests by the developer that dwarfed previous plans and which would result in a project comparable to only the largest Downtown projects.
3. Jurisdictional conflicts between the DOT and ATDC, with the DOT retaining control of the site.

4. Requirements that the State not contribute any financial assistance to the project had led to inappropriate and unworkable financial strategies.

The Auditor recommended that any planning of the Aloha Tower be part of a Waterfront design for the area between Ala Moana Park and Sand Island, and that the ATDC be disbanded (Kresnak 1987; Honolulu Advertiser 2/20/1987).

Governor John Waihee subsequently suggested that the project not be abandoned but be transferred to the Hawai'i Housing Development Authority, the State agency responsible for redevelopment of Kakaako (Downtown Improvement Association March 1987).

The DIA strongly suggested in its March 1987 issue of the Downtowner that the project continue as planned with private financing, but that design guidelines be more “realistic” and that ATDC Board members be more experienced in real estate development (Downtown Improvement Association March 1987).

The Aloha Tower Development Corporation, meanwhile, had broken off relations with Cordish Embry and Associates and declared that no agreements existed between them. The ATDC announced that it would concentrate its efforts in dealing with maritime needs, financing and ceded lands issues (Downtown Improvement Association March 1987).

ATDC felt compelled to go to the courts in September of 1987 to declare any previous agreements between itself and Cordish Embry and Associates as no longer binding. Cordish Embry countersued. The object of contention was a one year “interim development agreement” signed between the ATDC and Cordish Embry in April 1975, and subsequently extended to July 7, 1986 (Andrade 1987).
Governor Waihee called on renewed citizen participation in Waterfront renewal, a call taken up by the Hawai‘i Community Development Authority (HCDA) and the American Institute of Architects in studying the area between Kewalo Basin and Honolulu Harbor. The result, entitled A Reawakening: The Honolulu Waterfront, was released on December 28, 1987. The document centered most of its design proposals in the Kakaako-Kewalo area, but offered three scenarios for the Aloha Tower area.

1. Entitled Pacific Gateway, scenario number one contained the office and hotel ideas of earlier Aloha Tower proposals. Additional features included depressing Nimitz Highway through Downtown to Kakaako to remove it as a physical barrier to the Waterfront. Financial burdens would be lessened by the sale of air rights over the roadway. Removal of the Hawaiian Electric power plant Downtown, development of mixed use apartment buildings over the present Nimitz corridor, and creation of a large new urban park makai of the Federal Building would substantially change the character of the area immediately adjacent to Aloha Tower, provide it with potential new customers, and integrate it with Downtown.

2. Noho Kai (To Live by the Sea) called for development of an elevated pedestrian overpass at Fort Street to the Aloha Tower Complex, use of Piers 1 and 2 for cruise ships as demand warrants, and generous landscape treatment of Nimitz Highway/Ala Moana Boulevard.

3. The Gathering Place would also utilize Piers 1 and 2 as overflow cruise ship locations should the Aloha Tower complex be unavailable. A hotel was recommended at Pier 5, a ferry terminal and maritime museum at Piers 6 and 7, and inter- and intra-island ferry terminals and a hotel at Pier 8. Parking would be underground. Piers 10 and 11 would continue as cruise ship locations. Nimitz Highway would be depressed, the
Hawaiian Electric Company power plant removed, and a shoreline walkway built from
River Street to Kakaako (American Institute of Architects 1987).

The Office of State Planning commissioned Helber, Hastert and Kimura and R.
M. Towill Corporation to study much the same area (Kewalo to Nu‘uanu Stream). The
resulting proposal called for:

1. cruise ship berthing a Piers 1 and 2. A tunnel between the two piers would
   connect Ward Avenue to Sand Island.
2. dinner cruise boat berths between Piers 4 and 5.
3. a commercial marketplace at Piers 5 and 6.
4. removal of the Hawaiian Electric Company power plant and its replacement
   with a festival market and parking.
5. an interisland ferry complex centered around Piers 6 and 7.
6. a maritime museum on Pier 7.
7. a hotel and cruise ship terminal at Aloha Tower's Piers 8 and 9.
8. offices and a cruise ship terminal at Piers 10 and 11.
10. a floating restaurant at pier 15.

The plan also called for five pedestrian bridges across Nimitz Highway between
River Street and the Federal Building. Parking requirements were dependent upon the
development of a rapid transit system by the City along Nimitz Highway (Downtown
Improvement Association February 1989).

The plan raised a number of concerns from the maritime community, due to its
relocation of container activities from Piers 1 and 2. The DIA voiced concerns due to its
ambitiousness: the plan depended upon the cooperation of all State departments, the
City, and private sector when smaller projects (such as the Aloha Tower renewal)
requiring similar participation had been unsuccessful (Downtown Improvement Association February 1989). It should also be noted that the DIA had actively opposed a rapid transit Nimitz Highway alignment upon which the Office of State Planning proposal depended.

The Aloha Tower Development Corporation itself raised controversy in September 1989 by proposing the expansion of its development area 473 feet makai into the harbor turning basin. Maritime interests immediately complained of potential safety infringement (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989).

The ATDC, under new Executive Director Randall Iwase, had determined that the best means to renew developer interest in potential Aloha Tower development was to lessen restrictions on what could be built, and make a new request for proposals (Grant 1998).

Having learned from the past, we felt it was better to have the private sector come up with a design proposal and let the state set up a development proposal that was flexible...and workable for the team that was chosen.

Randall Iwase, Executive Director, ATDC (Kaplanek 1990)

Evaluation of proposals would be made with the help of a professional Evaluation Committee recommended to the Board by Iwase and hired by ATDC (Kaplanek 1990). Included were a planner, harbor planner/engineer, architect, traffic engineer, financial analyst and an attorney (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1989). The recommendation to the Board of the ATDC was to be based upon “the developer’s qualifications, overall merit of the proposal and its benefits to the state” (Kaplanek 1990).

The final decision, however, was to be made by the Board of Directors. As prescribed in the Corporation’s rules, the public was not allowed to see the proposals
prior to the final selection. Losing proposals would only be disclosed by their sponsors (Downtown Improvement Association September 1989; Kaplanek 1990).

Iwase justified the secrecy on several grounds.

1. Previous development attempts had led to litigation between the developer and the State. The concern was that many developers and architects would not want to be involved with the project publicly.

2. Release of a developer's confidential internal information could preclude bidding. Thus only the winning developer would be required under the rules to divulge such material.

3. A public hearing on the development rules, conducted December 1, 1988, had received no public comment against the confidentiality provisions.

4. Designs of proponents not selected could be used elsewhere (Kaplanek 1990).

This lack of public input clouded all the ATDC's actions. The Hawai‘i Chamber of Commerce charged that it had been “shut out” of the planning process. The Chamber's Maritime Affairs Committee wrote Iwase asking for information and the “opportunity to offer constructive comments” on the impact of various development plans.

We, the harbor users, would like to share our insights regarding the design concepts proposed for the development of the Aloha Tower area. We are not asking for a say in who develops; we are asking for a say in what happens to Honolulu’s working Waterfront.

Ace Clark, Chairman, Maritime Affairs Committee, Chamber of Commerce (Smith, Rod 10/2/1989)
Iwase replied asking for details about issues affecting the maritime industry, to which the Committee responded that it could not give details because the State had given it "nothing specific to comment on" (Smith, Rod 10/2/1989).

Aaron Levine of the ODC called this secretive decision making a "flawed process" that would create a lack of public confidence in the developer selection procedure. "This decision and the way it was made sets the tone for the way the Waterfront development will proceed. Who knows what the secrets are?" (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a).

Although as many as nine bids were expected, only four corporations actually produced proposals. These included:

1. Christopher Hemmeter/Tokyu Corporation's $1.35 billion bid, which included a $125 million sports complex, an $80 million cultural park, a 430 unit hotel, 375 housing units, realignment of Nimitz Highway, and a Chinatown revitalization project.

2. The Myers Corporation's $1.1 billion proposal, which included a world class hotel, two residential projects, two office developments, a theme retail center and maritime facilities.

3. The Hawaiian Waterfront Connection Consortium's $1.1 billion plan, which contained a Hawaiian cultural center; a 600 suite hotel; 2,000 units of affordable housing; 759 condominium apartments; Waterfront promenade; mass transit station; and 5,000 parking stalls (Hawaiian Waterfront Connection Consortium 1989; Rognstad 1998).

4. Aloha Tower Associates' $600 million bid, which included a 380,000 square foot "festival marketplace," two 350 foot condominium towers of 270 units makai of Chinatown; a round 340 foot office tower; a 500,000 square foot maritime building with berths for two large cruise ships; a 109 unit seven story business type hotel; 3,700
underground parking stalls; and annual payments of five per cent of the developer’s income into an Enterprise Foundation trust fund for affordable housing (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a, 12/25/1989b; Downtown Improvement Association January 1990a, December 1990; Kaplanek 1990c).

The Evaluation Committee recommended the Aloha Tower Associates. Aloha Tower Associates (ATA) was a partnership of Enterprise-Hawaii, Inc., chaired by James Rouse; and Aloha Tower Hawaiian Partners, consisting of Robert Gerell, George Hutton, Glenn Okada, U. J. Rainalter, Jr., and Peter Smith (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a). The ATA proposal was recommended by the Evaluation Team because of developer experience, the plan’s respect for the character of the site, realistic financial strategy, construction timetable and attractive passenger ship facilities, and pedestrian and vehicle access (Aloha Tower Development Corporation 1989).

The ATDC Board of Directors subsequently awarded the exclusive right to negotiate a long term lease and development agreement to ATA in December of 1989 (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a).

The *Downtowner* happily noted that “the State’s Aloha Tower Development Authority selected a top team of developers to proceed with the large, long-delayed project” (Downtown Improvement Association December 1990).

Negative effects caused by the secrecy of the developer selection process was immediately apparent after the announcement. Hemmeter declared that he had not been informed of the direction that the Board wanted to take the project.

If I’d known that the process was to create a project with the least impact, I would have started out with three palm trees and a dollar bill.

Christopher Hemmeter, 1989 bidder (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a)
Galen Fox, the City's representative on the Board, said he had favored the Hemmeter/Tokyu proposal for its sports complex and sound financial backing. Even Board Chairman Roger Ulveling acknowledged potential negative public response from two high rises proposed makai of Chinatown.

Local planner Mark Hastert, who headed the evaluation team, noted that final negotiations had to be worked out with ATA. He pointed out that the ATA proposal had far fewer residential units than any other; the hotel lacked many facilities that Downtown groups had sought; and no grade separation (overpass) was provided across Nimitz Highway (Smith, Rod 12/25/1989a).

Former City Councilman Kekoa Kaapu, a member of one of the development teams, contested in court the closed developer selection process. The State's Office of Information Services had upheld ATDC (Pacific Business News 1/29/1990). The lawsuit was later dismissed (Pacific Business News 3/5/1990).

The DIA, which at different times had had some of its membership sit on the ATDC Board of Directors (Downtown Improvement Association November 1985), found itself in the uncomfortable position of defending a selection process that had also chosen the project of Robert Gerell, a DIA member (Downtown Improvement Association May 1986). In a January 1990 editorial in the Downtowner, the DIA noted that

Charges that the ALOHA TOWER DEVELOPMENT CORP was illegally secretive in its selection of a Waterfront developer seem odd. The City uses virtually the same process in order to attract good developers and has never been challenged...

(Downtown Improvement Association January 1990)

In an effort to blunt criticism, ATA issued a number of press releases in January 1990.
1. The ATA announced detailed plans for a new “world-class” passenger terminal at Piers 5 and 6 to be developed as part of the Aloha Tower Project. Included would be offices for the DOT and other maritime office space. The plan would not infringe on the harbor’s turning area, an important concern in the maritime community. Passenger use of Piers 5 and 6 would allow other changes at Aloha Tower itself. Pier 8 would be reserved for a high speed ferry service and dinner catamarans. Pier 9 could accommodate small power craft and major transient vessels. Piers 10 and 11 (including a new terminal) would still be available for large cruise vessels (Smith, Rod 1/1/1990).

2. The ATA released details about its two million square foot retail, office, hotel and parking proposal for the area between Piers 9 and 14. Included would be 120 restaurants and shops, eight movie theaters and an entertainment center. The hotel would be part of a low rise structure at Piers 10 and 11. A high rise office tower was designed to be as close to Downtown as possible to integrate it with nearby buildings, and to maintain the separate character of the Aloha Tower itself. Residential condominiums, including 270 luxury units, would be located at Piers 13 and 14 (Smith, Rod 1/8/1990; Downtown Improvement Association January 1990).

3. The developers also tried to portray themselves as community minded citizens, promising an additional $2 million grant to the previous five per cent pledge of profits for the Enterprise Foundation. Development of a historical park focusing on the nearby site of Honolulu Fort planned for Pier 12 was announced. Developer team member U. J. Rainalter’s personal ties to the Waterfront (his grandfather, John Walker, had developed the original Pier 11 passenger facility and the Aloha Tower itself) were publicized (Smith, Rod 1/15/1990, 1/22/1990).

Conflicts between the DOT and the new developer began almost immediately. In March 1990 it was reported that the ATA wanted cruise ships to temporarily berth at Piers
Figure 11.1. Aloha Tower World Trade Center proposal made by Charles Sutton and Associates. Source: Advisory Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza 1978.

Figure 11.2. Aloha Tower winning proposal 1989. The low rise structures on the right are the "festival marketplace" to be built by the Rouse Company. The overall complex would later be scaled back due to economic difficulties. Source: Downtown Improvement Association January 1990a.
39 and 40 while reconstruction of the Aloha Tower complex was underway. DOT officials, stressing the remoteness of the site and the condition of its facilities, recommended completion of new facilities at Piers 5 and 6 before work began at Aloha Tower (Smith, Rod 3/12/1990).

The ATDC Board of Directors voted 5-0 to accept the development agreement between ATDC and ATA on June 13, 1990. Galen Fox, representative of the City and County of Honolulu, abstained due to concerns about the two proposed residential high rises on Nimitz blocking views from Chinatown (Kresnak 1990). The actual development agreement between the ATDC and ATA was signed June 20, 1990 (Pacific Business News 6/25/1990).

The agreement required a "holding period rent" of $25,000 a month from signing of the master lease, $212,000 a month during development, and double that during the first year of operation (Andrade 6/24/1990).

Throughout 1991 the Aloha Tower project suffered delays. ATA was unable to receive permits from the Army Corps of Engineers and the State Land Use Commission required for demolition and construction on the site (Pacific Business News 12/2/1991). Postponement due to market conditions of up to two years for the festival marketplace itself was announced in late 1991 (Smith, Rod 09/09/1991).

This turn of events led the Aloha Tower Development Corporation to actively renegotiate the contract with Aloha Tower Associates. The original secrecy rules were still in force, prompting Aaron Levine, retired President of the ODC, to comment that such policies created "an unnecessary aura of suspicion" on the entire project (Smith, Rod 10/14/1991). Rumors of changes to the development agreement, meanwhile, filtered out as State agencies contacted maritime and other principals for input.
In an effort to cut costs, ATA offered in early 1992 to contribute $7 million dollars for a new cargo-handling facility. ATA was hoping to convert the Pier 2 cargo area into a cruise ship terminal as an alternative to constructing a new cruise ship terminal at Piers 5 and 6 (Pacific Business News 1/27/1992).

The difficulties faced by the developer were well understood by June of 1992. Pacific Business News noted that ATA had received a $100 million financial commitment from C. Itoh & Company of Japan just two days before a $60 million lease payment deadline. The State also granted a 50 day extension for ATA to execute its master lease agreement. Construction was now to commence in mid-1994 for a 200,000 square foot festival marketplace; renovation of Aloha Tower; general improvements to the area between Piers 8 and 11; and added facilities for cruise ships, an interisland ferry, and dinner boats. All other facilities were to be postponed (Pacific Business News 6/1/1992).

A new publicity brochure produced by ATA listed parking at Piers 5 and 6, the existing Maritime Museum at Pier 7, dinner boat berths at Pier 8, and cruise ship use of Pier 10. A festival marketplace would be located between Piers 8 and 9, and Pier 10 would be renovated. Irwin Park would continue as a parking lot. Aloha Tower would be surrounded by a small plaza and connected to Fort Street (Aloha Tower Associates 1992).

As late as October 1992 ATA was asking for further extensions before beginning work. The State then announced in December that it would terminate the development agreement if construction did not begin by the following 30th of September (Thompson 12/21/1992).

Meanwhile, the State was trying to address the critical issue of parking. The 1989 plan had called for underground parking at Irwin Park, but the developer had subsequently found that plan to be economically and structurally unfeasible. The State,
Figure 11.3. The Aloha Tower Marketplace at the makai end of Fort Street, 1998. At the left is the festival marketplace; immediately ahead, kiosks and the Aloha Tower, and to the right, remaining terminal buildings. Source: Author.

Figure 11.4. Aloha Tower Marketplace, looking Ewa-makai, 1998. Restaurants occupy the area immediately adjacent to the pier. Source: Author.
in early 1993, proposed to borrow $40 million to build its own 800 to 1,000 stall, three story parking building in Irwin Park (Thompson 2/22/1993).

The DIA opposed the State parking structure idea, noting that “the proposal was characterized by one Legislator as a ‘bailout’ for the developers” (Downtown Improvement Association April 1993). The DIA April 1993 Downtowner went on to note that the park had been a gift from philanthropist William G. Irwin given to the State in 1930. The gift had had stipulations that if the land was not used for public park purposes, the heirs of Irwin could reclaim the land. The State was already using the property for an at-grade parking lot, despite censure from the Outdoor Circle and others. The DIA went on to criticize the developer’s proposal for use of Amfac Center, Grosvenor Center and Harbor Court parking for the Marketplace. The DIA referred to the mostly offsite parking plan as “poorly located and insufficient” (Downtown Improvement Association April 1993).

The DIA also criticized a suggestion by the State to finance and build a pedestrian overpass over Nimitz Highway at Bishop Street rather than the original proposal for a developer financed overpass at Fort Street.

The Downtowner article ended with the following:

Because building a parking garage in Irwin Park is not possible and obtaining the use of the existing parking in office buildings mauka is unrealistic, the developers of the Aloha Tower project will need to find some way to provide adequate parking on-site, as originally promised.

(Downtown Improvement Association April 1993)

The DIA’s opinion of Aloha Tower was important enough for U. J. Rainalter to attend the April 1993 DIA Board of Directors meeting, seeking support. The DIA voted to support the revised plans but continued to oppose the use of Irwin Park for parking
The Pacific Business News announced that the State was subdividing the Aloha Tower property to reflect the phasing of the project, and to allow for other developers to take over future work if the existing team could not fulfill its contractual obligations (Thompson 4/19/1993).

July 9, 1993 marked the ground breaking for the Aloha Tower project (Downtown Improvement Association August 1993). Demolition work was well underway by October (Thompson 10/18/1993). The rebuilt Pier 11 passenger terminal was dedicated in January 1994, when the Queen Elizabeth I, SS Constitution and SS Independence all berthed alongside Aloha Tower (Downtown Improvement Association February 1994). The project officially opened November 19, 1994 (Pacific Business News 10/20/1994).

Figure 11.5. Aloha Tower Marketplace, 1998. The Festival Marketplace and Aloha Tower are on the left, a passenger liner’s funnel can be seen over the active piers at the far center, and Irwin Park is marked by trees to the right. Source: Author.
11.5 ANALYSIS OF THE PROJECT

11.5.1 ALEXANDER GARVIN ANALYSIS

TABLE 11.1. GARVIN'S BACKGROUND REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Effective input from all stakeholders</td>
<td>Originally both the DPED and DOT organized citizen advisory panels to discuss potential use of the Aloha Tower area. DPED Director Hideto Kono on August 10, 1976 appointed an Advisory Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza (Advisory Committee for the Aloha Tower Plaza 1978). The State Department of Transportation in 1978 created a Downtown Waterfront Redevelopment Team that included the DIA, ODC, Chamber of Commerce and Outdoor Circle (State of Hawai'i, Department of Transportation 1978). The secrecy provisions of the ATDC were bitterly criticized by organizations such as the O'ahu Development Conference and the Hawai'i Chamber of Commerce Maritime Affairs Committee (Smith, Rod 10/2/1989, 1/25/1989a). Developer Christopher Hemmerton obviously misunderstood the criteria that projects such as his would be evaluated on (Smith, Rod 1/25/1989a). ATDC Executive Director Randall Iwase justified the rules as necessary to protect the developers’ proprietary information, shield developers from negative publicity, and a lack of public interest displayed in the past. Iwase, however, noted that “in retrospect, we probably should look at other avenues to secure public input” (Kaplanek 1990). Thus the ODC’s Aaron Levine was correct in criticizing the ATDC for rules that barred the release of project proposals and failed to conduct public input hearings prior to the ATDC decision. Such rules did damage public confidence in the selection process. It should be noted that the developer selection process for a subsequent State project, the Hawai'i Convention Center, was deliberately left open to public scrutiny to avoid such concerns (Sutton 1998).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understanding what planning can and cannot accomplish</td>
<td>Both the Legislative Auditor and the DIA questioned whether the project had enough “critical mass” and attractions to entice tourists away from similar shopping complexes closer to tourist hotels in Waikiki. Thus no matter how well designed the facilities of the Aloha Tower complex might be, there had to be a reason for people to come there.</td>
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Table 11.1 is continued on the next page.
Table 11.1. (continued): Garvin’s background requirements for successful programs and projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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</table>
| Understanding how physical changes to the urban environment can improve the economy, quality of life, and city function | The project was a deliberate attempt to better use unique assets along the Waterfront. Passenger ship traffic had been in decline since the 1960s, and the area had been virtually abandoned. It was hoped that the festival marketplace would return pedestrian access to the Waterfront and reinforce Downtown as a place to live and work. Aloha Tower itself was to become a more effective landmark within the city.  

The Aloha Tower Marketplace has made the Waterfront more attractive within the complex, brought more downtowners across Nimitz Highway, and increased popular awareness of the Tower itself as a landmark. The complex does offer residents and tourists another entertainment option.  

The project will, however, need to improve its parking situation to make it easier to visit. A parking garage has been suggested on the Diamond Head end of the Hawaiian Electric generating plant. This project should not block any mauka-makai views on Richards Street.  

The project also badly needs to improve the initial view it gives of itself. This refers to Irwin “Park”, which is really a nondescript “parking” lot complete with non-functioning fountain. The land is State administered, and until World War II was an attractive backdrop to the Aloha Tower. The Aloha Tower Associates once planned to restore the Park and make it a green entrance to the complex, attracting potential customers with cultural activities on the grass. The intertwined parking and Park problems should be remedied as soon as conditions allow, to create the attractive entrance that the complex deserves. |
| Examination of how the project or program in question has created positive change and prevented negative change | Create Positive Change  

The project replaced poorly maintained storage sheds and pier structures, and an unpopular automobile ramp that blocked the view makai from Bishop Street.  

Prevent Negative Change  

The project as built represented a more human scale development than some of the previous proposals, which could have created densities rivaling those of the largest Downtown developments (Kresnak 1987). |
### TABLE 11.2. GARVIN'S FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE INVESTMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ingredient of Success</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic investment in infrastructure, rather than routine capital spending</td>
<td>The State of Hawai'i had made investments in capital improvements between 1963-65 to remake a declining Waterfront. Three million dollars was spent to a ground floor freight area and a second floor passenger deck in the center of the original pier area. The top passenger level was connected to Irwin Park via escalators, and via a vehicle ramp to Piers 5, 6, 7 and 8 (Pacific Business News 6/25/1963; Honolulu Star Bulletin and Advertiser 11/15/1964). The State then changed tactics. Studies by or for the State on the practicality of harborside urban renewal were conducted in 1970, 72, 73, 78, 79, 81, 83, 87, and 89. The State chose to offer private developers exclusive rights to the harborside if the developers would finance the project. The State’s unwillingness to directly contribute money to the project put the whole development into question (State of Hawai'i Legislative Auditor 1979; Kresnak 1987; Honolulu Advertiser 2/20/1987). The City's proposed rapid transit line would have operated on Nimitz Highway, directly in front of the Aloha Tower complex.</td>
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| Regulatory policies that set the character of an area or lessen private investment risk | Character of the Area  
One of the major sources of delay in development of the Aloha Tower project was the poor coordination (if not outright competition) between the DOT and DPED. Conflicts over control of space and compensation helped derail the Cordish Embry and Associates' proposals and ended in court (Kresnak 1987; Honolulu Advertiser 2/20/1987).  
The Aloha Tower as developed completely changed the area's character from one of crowded and nearly abandoned warehouses to a tourist retail destination. The architecture of the original Tower is replicated throughout the complex. Removing the buildings at the base of the Aloha Tower and the 1960's era vehicle ramp restored vistas from both Fort and Bishop Streets toward the Waterfront.  
Lessen Private Investment Risk  
Executive Director Iwase's decision to allow experienced entrepreneurs to make their own development proposals encouraged those entrepreneurs to do what they did best. Granting exclusive development rights, government assistance in necessary zoning changes, and use of tax exempt bonds were intended to lower the developer's risk and costs. |
| Incentives for desired private development   | The State offered a long term exclusive lease on a well known site that possessed cachet with the public. Access to tax credits for historical renovation purposes was possible on at least part of the project. |
TABLE 11.3. GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

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<tr>
<th>Ingredient</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>The market evolved from a focused group of international business corporations; to a mixed group of tourists and businesses needing hotels, attractions and office space; into tourists (and some local residents) seeking entertainment in the form of a festive marketplace. The project still hopes to gain office, hotel and residential patrons at a later date.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Inherent Site Characteristics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The ultimate development area includes a series of piers and small peninsulas jutting into Honolulu Harbor. The most important are: Piers 5 and 6, a roughly triangular area, currently used for parking. Pier 7, used for the Maritime Museum. Piers 8-11, best known for the Aloha Tower, contains the majority of the land under development consideration. Pier 12, a very small protrusion partially built with coral blocks from the original Honolulu Fort. Piers 13-14 share a common peninsula. Pier 15 is roughly parallel to Nimitz Highway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity</td>
<td>Piers 5-6 lie near downtown Honolulu and the Hawaiian Electric power station. Pier 7 is also close to the power station, just on the Diamond Head side of the foot of Bishop Street. Pier 8-11 dominate the harbor at the foot of Downtown, with the Aloha Tower directly makai of Fort Street. Piers 12-15 immediately abut Nimitz Highway.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>The reorganized and downsized Aloha Tower complex occupies only Piers 5 through 12. Piers 5 and 6 are used for surface parking. Pier 7 is occupied by the separate, but complementary, Maritime Museum. Pier 8 was built to accommodate larger vessels than the plan calls for. Along Pier 8 is the festival marketplace, four two story structures architecturally patterned after the Aloha Tower. Pier 9 on its Ewa end is now open space adjacent to the restored Aloha Tower. Pier 10 has been renovated as a cruise ship terminal and parking. Piers 11-12 are used for parking. Piers 13-14 are occupied by a maritime activity warehouse. Pier 15 houses the harbor fire department. Aotani and Associates/D'Agostino Izzo Quirk Associates won the American Institute of Architects' Honolulu Award of Excellence in Office, Commercial and Institutional Design for the Aloha Tower project (Hawai'i Pacific Architecture November 1995).</td>
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Table 11.3 is continued on the next page.
TABLE 11.3. (CONTINUED): GARVIN'S INGREDIENTS OF PROJECT SUCCESS

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<tr>
<th>Ingredient</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>The project was initially hobbled by the refusal of the State to commit funds to the project, provisions in ATDC’s organization that required the developer to reimburse DOT for lost revenue or facilities, and restrictions on what kind of project would be developed. It was unfortunate that the ATA project was approved just as Hawai’i and Japan were entering a prolonged period of economic stagnation and depression. This forced a major scaling back of the first part of the project, slowed the leasing of retail space, postponed subsequent expansion, and created difficulties in releasing promised funds. The primary lender, C. Itoh and Company of Japan, granted ATA a $100 million commitment just two days before a deadline for lease payments to the State (Pacific Business News 6/1/1992). The State subsequently postponed collection of $60 million in advanced lease payments until “substantial” construction of the project was complete, or September 30, 1996 (Thompson 10/26/1993). Mechanics liens were the subject of litigation in July 1995 (Kamhis 1995).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>The project had no single entrepreneur during its 20+ year gestation period, as the DOT, ATDC, DPED and numerous developers each pushed their own agendas. The catalyst of the present facility, however, would be Randall Iwase, Executive Director of the ATDC (Grant 1998). Iwase and the ATDC Board of Directors made the critical decisions to allow potential developers to make their own design proposals for the property and to include professional planners in the team that evaluated those proposals. This meant that the project was more realistically geared to the existing market.</td>
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| Time           | **Immediate**  
|                | The festival marketplace as built can be walked in approximately twenty minutes. Major activities such as shopping, eating, harbor watching and the Maritime Museum next door can add considerably to the amount of time spent, depending upon personal taste.  
|                | **The 24 Hour Day**  
|                | The festival marketplace stores are geared to mostly daylight and early evening shopping by tourists. Theme restaurants and bars cater to a lunch and dinner crowd consisting of tourists and Downtown high rise office workers. Students from the local universities also join in the evenings.  
|                | **Decades**  
|                | The complex is too new and incomplete to give a fair appraisal. Harborside maintenance will be expensive, and additional activities will be essential for the project to reach full potential. This, however, will require an improved local economy and additional financing. |
### 11.5.2 THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES

#### TABLE 11.4. THE “PLANNING” AND “BUILT” LEGACIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Legacy</td>
<td>The Aloha Tower development represents three planning themes:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. The project is a prime example of evolution in thinking what Honolulu Harbor should be. The original concept of a strictly maritime district was supplanted by joint maritime/urban uses.</td>
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<td>During the early 1960’s the State DOT still hoped to retain passenger ship use of the Aloha Tower complex, and built the 1965 two story complex similar in design to airports of that period.</td>
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<td>The 1968 Gruen Study rekindled interest in the Waterfront as a site for pedestrian and commuter activity. A museum would be located at seaside, and a hotel on the Nu'uanu Stream.</td>
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<td>The DIA’s 1976 Waterfront Design Concept for Honolulu Harbor detailed the need for reducing Nimitz Highway as a pedestrian barrier to the Waterfront.</td>
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<td>The DOT’s 1978 Conceptual Planning Study: Piers 2 to 18, Honolulu Harbor officially recognized the Aloha Tower complex as multiuse – both commercial and maritime.</td>
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<td>The DPED 1981 Aloha Tower Plaza envisioned an integrated commercial, hotel and maritime facility operated by a special development corporation separate from the DOT.</td>
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<td>The 1983 ROMA Plan still represented an effort by the State to narrowly define what would be built by the private sector.</td>
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<td>The 1989 bidding process that allowed developers latitude in their proposals resulted in a diverse selection of possible futures: sports complexes, hotels, cultural centers, subsidized housing, etc.</td>
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<td>2. The Aloha Tower project also personified increasing public demands to be included in the planning process.</td>
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<td>When it was announced in 1963 that the DOT planned to build a vehicle ramp at Aloha Tower which would block the makai view of Bishop Street, public protests were in vain (Pacific Business News 7/3/1965).</td>
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<td>In 1979 the State Legislature put conditions on funding to be used by the Administration for a world trade center at Aloha Tower (Altonn 1979).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Planning Legacy (continued)</strong></td>
<td>In 1989 Aaron Levine criticized the “flawed process” that precluded the public from viewing project proposals before a winner was chosen (Smith, Rod 1/25/1989a). The resulting public controversy encouraged a more open developer selection process for the Hawai‘i Convention Center (Sutton 1998). 3. The Aloha Tower project represents evolution of public-private partnerships. The earliest proposals detailed what developers would be allowed to do and included no public financing. The 1983 ROMA study even dictated where individual components would go. The 1989 bidding allowed developers greater latitude in what they could propose. This allowed developers to use their individual talents to produce a wider range of choice for the community. In 1993 the State proposed to finance a parking garage in Irwin Park and a pedestrian overpass over Nimitz Highway. These were meant to address the “Achilles heel” of the scaled back project – parking – which threatened its viability (Grant 1998).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Built Legacy</strong></td>
<td>1. The festival marketplace has reinforced and restored the architecture of the Aloha Tower. Many proposals offered throughout the years were incompatible with the Tower architecturally. 2. The project as developed retained the integrity of the harbor itself. Several project proposals, such as that of the Myers Corporation, had proposed filling in large segments of the harbor. Such work would have reduced the harbor turning basin, vastly decreasing the facility’s ability to be a true working harbor (Smith 1989b). 3. Along with the smaller Merchant Square redevelopment, it has created a small night life component to Downtown where none existed before. The area could otherwise have gone high rise or remained neglected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 11.6 Lessons for the Future

### Table 11.5. Aloha Tower Marketplace: Lessons for the Future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public hearings have an important role in legitimizing the planning process. Even if there are members of the general public in the decision making body, public hearings are necessary to include all relevant data and to make the public feel it had its say. The public must feel that decision makers are approachable and open.</td>
<td>The ATDC Board of Directors had seven appointed members, of which four were government officials, and three from the general public. This was not enough broad based input to quell dissatisfaction over the process chosen for such a politically sensitive project. Although the system was common to local government, even the Executive Director admitted other mechanisms of public input needed to be employed.</td>
<td>Extensive publicity and public hearings should be conducted on all upcoming major public projects, including new rapid transit proposals, residential developments, road widenings, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The value to community organizations of having regular staff monitor development proposals and publicize their potential impacts. Having a systematic examination and evaluation of proposals, and subsequent notification of the results, is the “first line of defense” to encourage desired change and prevent unwanted change.</td>
<td>The DIA staff monitored and publicized the activities of both the State and private developers during the long gestation period of the Aloha Tower complex. As this happened over a twenty year period, such monitoring would be very difficult for individuals, community organizations or companies to do.</td>
<td>Provide a staff member to the Neighborhood Board Commission whose job is to gather and organize information by neighborhoods for dissemination to individual neighborhood boards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community and public officials must understand the importance of “market timing” and capitalization. Too often “red tape” can slow development projects, making the market analysis upon which a project depends no longer relevant.</td>
<td>The Aloha Tower Project was delayed by required permits for demolition, rezoning, and other issues while the local economy continued to deteriorate.</td>
<td>Government planners could examine preliminary project proposals and begin submission of general applications before final developer selection. Thus projects would have a “head start” towards completion, while market relevancy and official oversight were maintained.</td>
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Table 11.5 is continued on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislation creating an area of responsibility must also provide the authority to meet that mandate.</td>
<td>The organization of the Aloha Tower Development Corporation was such that for most of its existence the DOT rather than the ATDC controlled the Aloha Tower complex. This slowed the development process.</td>
<td>The Department of Parks and Recreation of the City and County of Honolulu could be allowed to set its own fees, much like the Board of Water Supply, allowing better budgeting, facilities and service. Minneapolis, Minnesota does this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation must be written to avoid creating conflicts between agencies. Agreements must be detailed to avoid “open ended” situations.</td>
<td>The ATDC legislation stipulated that the DOT be compensated for loss of income or facilities. As no agreed upon amount of wharf space was stipulated, this encouraged the DOT to ask for as much space as possible, thus providing additional revenue and new facilities to the DOT at no investment cost to the DOT.</td>
<td>Reuse and redevelopment of the Barber’s Point Naval Air Station will require coordination between various State agencies, particularly DBED and the DOT. Responsibilities and lines of authority should be detailed in advance to avoid similar situations to Aloha Tower.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowing developers to make their own proposals for a generalized project provides creativity and increased developer interest.</td>
<td>The original 1983 ROMA guidelines had limited the density and type of development that would have been built. Developers such as ATA submitted their own ideas anyway, and others such as Southern Pacific were later cancelled because the principals felt that opportunities were better elsewhere. The development proposals in 1989 became more “concrete” because the developers were able to literally “build” upon their expertise.</td>
<td>Hawai’i’s housing crisis needs imaginative solutions. Both public and private lands might be developed with low cost housing if developers could compete using their own project proposals and government provided financial assistance.</td>
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Table 11.5 is continued on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lesson for the Future</th>
<th>Application in the Project</th>
<th>Possible Future Use</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint public-private projects need more than just asset</td>
<td>While the ATDC could offer exclusive development rights to a site with cachet,</td>
<td>Government could protect its own exposure by more infrastructure investment. For example, as Barber’s Point Naval Air Station is returned to State control, and as the State sells off parts of the area to private redevelopers, the State could provide upgraded roads, utilities, etc., whose value will be returned in the final purchase price of the property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contributions from government as incentives. Actual</td>
<td>the lack of actual monetary support by the State meant that the developer was still</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financial contributions by the State or City lessen</td>
<td>personally heavily exposed. This led to financial schemes openly questioned</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>developer “equity,” making such projects more attractive.</td>
<td>on two occasions by the State auditor.</td>
<td></td>
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CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

12.1 INTRODUCTION

For a student of urbanism interested in fostering community input into the planning process, a walk through downtown Honolulu must be a positive experience. If he should happen to have an old copy of the DIA’s prescription for revitalizing Downtown, the student would be heartened to see how much of the plans had been implemented and the success rate of those recommendations.

12.2 CONCLUSIONS

The Downtown Improvement Association, as any organization, had its successes and disappointments when seeking to accomplish its vision of Downtown.

Within Chapters 3 through 11 were detailed evaluations of both the DIA and eight projects representative of its Downtown economic revitalization efforts. Evaluations were done on a project by project basis in order to better illustrate how the conclusions were reached. Such conclusions could then be used as a helpful guide to citizens organizing themselves for their own economic revitalization programs, and to give them a better understanding of what constitutes individual project success.

Based upon the chapter evaluations, the DIA was successful in four of the projects examined.

1. Hawai‘i State Capitol: The placement of the Hawai‘i State Capitol literally brought politicians and the business community closer together than anywhere else in the United States. This placement helped to make government decision makers such as Mayor Neal Blaisdell more aware of the Downtown business community and provided
Downtown with a market for services and office space. (Evaluation details may be accessed in Chapter 4.)

2. The Financial Plaza of the Pacific removed any concerns that Downtown might no longer be the center of business activity in the State, and provided the model for numerous similar projects. (Details are located in Chapter 5.)

3. Kukui Gardens provided badly needed additional "gap group" housing near Downtown. This low rise development of clustered apartments included a large number of family sized units, community facilities and even boasted individual addresses. The project provided an expanded customer base for Downtown retailers, helped dispel popular misconceptions of what "public housing" was all about, and ensured (along with the Queen Emma Gardens project) that Downtown residents would be a mixed income group. (Details are in Chapter 7.)

4. Bishop Square and Tamarind Park are outstanding examples of urban congregation points, providing activities, socialization opportunities, and even a bit of sunshine in an increasingly high-rise environment. (Details are located in Chapter 9.)

Two other projects have been moderately successful or are as yet too limited in length of operation and scope to warrant a final grade.

1. The Fort Street Mall (Phase II, the 1993 renovation) has been much more successful catering to its niche markets (office workers, university students, nearby residents) than were the original Mall's efforts in maintaining a regional retail presence. The government's rebuilding of the original deteriorating Mall prevented blight from spreading as quickly as would otherwise have occurred (Gushman 1998) and helped encourage expanded use by Hawai'i Pacific University. Problems, however, had occurred in the government's handling of stakeholders (property owners represented by
the DIA). Problems remained in retailing within the center Mall area and with security during evening hours. (Details are in Chapter 10.)

2. The Aloha Tower Marketplace is an attractive addition to the Waterfront and creation of a “people place,” but continues to struggle due to market timing, financing and weak “critical mass.” (Details are in Chapter 11.)

Two projects emerged as disappointments in the DIA’s effort to promote revitalization.

1. The original Fort Street Mall project (Phase I, 1969), did provide an escape for pedestrians from automobile congestion. Unfortunately, the project was unrealistically optimistic about the ability of the area to maintain its perceived regional retail market. Failure to include all political stakeholders led to the effective cancellation of the parking garages upon which the overall plan depended. Subsequent maintenance was also inadequate. (Details are in Chapter 6.)

2. The Cultural Plaza, organized to provide a new location for the six Chinese cultural groups, did not adequately address stakeholder, market, financial and administrative concerns, and has not been a financial success capable of renewing area retailing. (Details are in Chapter 8.)

12.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a list of major recommendations surmised from this study of the Downtown Improvement Association.

1. The promotion of economic revitalization must be viewed as a perpetual effort, the details of which are constantly undergoing evolution.

Internal organization is the key to success. Citizens wishing to organize themselves into effective associations must plan their organization and program to
survive for an extended period of time. This includes providing stable funding, hiring a professional staff person, creating extensive networks and building coalitions, dissemination of information, creation and adherence to a long term plan, and training of the next generation of association leaders.

The Downtown Improvement Association did most, but not all, of these things. The organization was formed by mostly landowners who had invested in Downtown for the long haul, could not easily leave, and were well aware that there were no “quick fixes” available. Its long term planning has left its mark upon types of economic activity, transportation systems, building density, and housing. Unfortunately Robert Midkiff and others were not able to convince the existing management of the DIA to continue after 1996. A walk down Fort Street today near the old F.W. Woolworth location should convince area proponents that Downtown needs another advocacy organization.

2. Organizations engaging in economic revitalization need a professional staff person who can “talk shop” with government officials and other planning and development experts. Such a person furthers stability, gives a voice of authority to policy positions, implies credibility, creates a contact center, provides information, and organizes volunteers.

William Grant performed these functions at the DIA, advising members of development rules and procedures, for example. Aaron Levine provided similar services at the ODC in an island-wide planning context.

3. Any community organization program for area revitalization must contain ongoing membership education about planning, economics, finance, and the development process.
Planning issues encountered by the DIA included stakeholder participation, consensus building, conflicting land uses, budget priorities, difficulties in obtaining plan adoption, and "just plain old politics."

Project developments uncovered problems in decision making processes, lease agreements, underfunded obligations, market studies, regulations and unanticipated costs. This occurred in projects at least partially assisted by professional developers.

Thus it must be recognized by a community association that after initial organization, it must engage in a comprehensive education program for both its leadership and general membership.

4. Such educational programs should include the pivotal role of government in shaping the development process, the resources that government can provide, and the value of public-private partnerships.

Government support was critical to much of the DIA's program. Examples of this included the City of Honolulu's commitment to the Fort Street Mall which made the Financial Plaza of the Pacific possible, federal government financial support for Kukui Gardens, and use of State of Hawai'i properties for the Aloha Tower Marketplace.

Community organizations should thus prepare themselves to become partners with government in the redevelopment process.

5. Based upon the skills and resources available, the organization must determine whether it intends to become a project facilitator or a developer in its own right.

The DIA chose the facilitator route, helping the principals of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific organize using the new condominium law, assisting businesses dislocated by construction of new municipal parking structures to find new locations, promoting increased development height limits at government hearings for its members, etc.
In contrast, the Hawai‘i Council for Housing Action became a developer of low cost housing in the Kauluwela area.

It should be noted that the facilitator route allows the organization to develop a broader spectrum of experience, requires less resources, and does not tie the organization to any single project.

6. Development of a long term, multifaceted plan, and adherence to its outline, must be viewed as essential.

A long term, multifaceted plan begins with an inventory of an area’s strengths, weaknesses and opportunities. It then seeks to exploit those opportunities, recognizing that economic revitalization will be a cumulative, synergistic process, created one complementary project at a time. The plan’s framework will guide the organization to grasp previously identified large scale opportunities while providing flexibility to exploit unanticipated situations as they arise. These activities can be organized by the association’s standing and special projects committees, respectively, as was the case with the DIA.

As part of the plan, the organization should examine promising themes in downtown economic revitalization that were identified by DIA activities.

Locating government services as a means of directing economic growth is a useful tool that could be used in downtowns such as those of Hilo and Lihue. Government services attract patrons who can also engage in commerce at nearby stores. The DIA illustrated this when it pushed for the Civic Center location for the new State Capitol. The Capitol created a market for Downtown services and office space. A similar effect occurred with the Nu‘uanu Avenue-Hotel Street Police substation, which improved safety in that area and thus encouraged patronage of the renovated Hawai‘i Theater.
Development of a historical marker program and organized or self-guided walking tours of such sites can increase civic pride and cultural tourism. Many mainland cities such as Philadelphia, Savannah and Boston benefit economically from considerable numbers of pedestrian visitors exploring their historic districts. Downtown Honolulu is compact enough to allow similar programs. Hawaii's geographical, ethnic and royal history is a unique asset that could similarly contribute to the area.

Promotion of a downtown residential population of mixed incomes can provide diversity of use, extended activity hours, and broadens the area economy. Many American downtowns have been stereotyped as devoid of residents or as enclaves of the poor, resulting in a self-fulfilled prophecy that damages tax revenues, erodes government services, and stigmatizes residents. In contrast, downtown Honolulu has residential condominiums and rentals spread across the area, and even more significantly, many of the individual apartment towers themselves contain a mixture of income groups. This eliminates much of the potential for social discrimination, and provides local retail merchants with a potential diverse market of customers.

Mixed use projects can allow the community association or its member organizations as developer to spread risk among several markets. For example, a project may contain residential condominiums, rental apartments, commercial, office or hotel space. The more profitable elements can then subsidize that part of the development for which there is weaker demand. This is particularly effective if government subsidized housing is built as part of a project, and market priced units are needed to help increase project income to replenish a development fund.
The City of Honolulu developed within a narrow coastal band of land that lies roughly northwest by southeast. Due to this layout, directions within the city are usually given in terms of directions toward prominent topographical features, utilizing mostly Hawaiian terms.

**TABLE 13.1. DIRECTIONAL TERMS USED THROUGHOUT THE THESIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hawaiian Terminology</th>
<th>Prominent Topographic Feature</th>
<th>General Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ewa</td>
<td>Village near Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>Northwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>makai</td>
<td>Pacific Ocean</td>
<td>Southwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond Head</td>
<td>Promontory near Waikiki</td>
<td>Southeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mauka</td>
<td>Koolau Mountains behind Honolulu</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


Camera Hawai‘i, Inc. Photographic Archive Collection (unpublished).


Chang, Wah Jip. May 20, 1998. Telephone interview. Mr. Chang was the contractor for the Mun Lun School project.

Chapman, Robert. June 3, 1998. Telephone interview. Mr. Chapman was responsible for the financial affairs of the Hawai‘i Corporation.


Clark, Henry. February 24, 1998. Telephone interview. Mr. Clark was Chief Executive Officer for Castle and Cook, Ltd.


Coppedge, John. April 6, 1998. Telephone interview. Mr. Coppedge is manager of Bishop Square Management.

Crosby, Kay. October 1997. Telephone and personal interviews. Ms. Crosby was the Office Manager for the Downtown Improvement Association when it closed in 1996.


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Downtowner. 29(12):2.


Downtowner. 30(9):1.


Downtowner. 31(2):1.

Downtowner. 31(3):1-2.

Downtowner. 31(3):3.


Downtowner. 31(12):1.

Downtowner. 32(9):3.

Downtowner. 33(12):3.


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Gushman, Richard II. March 5, 1998 and March 10, 1998. Telephone interview. Mr. Gushman was President of the Downtown Improvement Association from 1986-1991.

Haight, Warren. February 26, 1998. Telephone interview. Mr. Haight was President of Oceanic Properties, the real estate subsidiary of Castle and Cooke, and handled real estate transactions between the principals involved in development of the Financial Plaza of the Pacific.


Holman, Robert. Telephone interview April 29, 1998. Mr. Holman was Executive Director of the Aloha Tower Development Corporation during the 1983 developer selection process.
Hong, C. April 10, 1998. Telephone interview. Ms. Carol Hong is the Secretary/Treasurer of the Clarence T. C. Ching Foundation.


Honolulu Advertiser, October 28, 1969. “Mall Drunks a Headache to DIA, City.” 113(23357):B3


Honolulu, City and County. 1941. Honolulu’s Master Plan: January 1941. Honolulu, HI: Authors.

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Loftus, Rudy. October 17, 1997. Personal interview. Mr. Loftus was the Manager of the downtown F.W. Woolworth store, 1973-81 and 1983-97. He was Manager when the store was closed.


Melim, T. Clifford. Telephone interview May 6, 1998. Melim managed the development of the second half of Bishop Square, including Tamarind Park and the Pauahi Tower.


Medeiros, T. October 14, 1997. Telephone interview. Mr. Medeiros’ family has been involved with retail operations on Fort Street for three generations. He currently (1998) operates the Medeiros Optician store on the Mall mauka of Hotel Street.


Midkiff, Robert R. March 2, 1998. Telephone interview. Mr. Midkiff was the second President of the DIA.

Morikumi, N. October 23, 1997. Telephone interview. Mr. Morikumi is District Manager, Department of Parks and Recreation, City and County of Honolulu. He has been responsible for maintenance of the Fort Street Mall from 1988-present (1998).


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Reid, John. October 22, 1997, February 24, 1998, April 3, 1998 Telephone interviews. Mr. Reid is a Project Manager, Department of Housing and Community Development, City and County of Honolulu. He oversaw the redevelopment of the Fort Street Mall in 1993.

Rognstad, Jo Paul. April 22, 1998. Telephone interview. Mr. Rognstad was a member of the architect team for the Hawaiian Waterfront Connection Consortium which bid on the Aloha Tower project in 1989.


Warnecke, John Carl and Associates and the Civic Center Policy Committee. 1965. A Special Report on the Honolulu Civic Center Master Plan: Submitted to John A. Burns, Governor of Hawai'i, and Neal S. Blaisdell, Mayor, City and County of Honolulu. Honolulu, HI: Authors.


